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Abstract 
 
 Of the many powers granted to federal, state, and local governments through the 
Constitution of the United States, eminent domain is possibly the strongest and most imposing, at 
least as it relates to citizens’ property rights.  This dissertation explores several large-scale public 
undertakings in New Orleans during the period from 1929 to 2011 in which the application of 
eminent domain was necessary to accomplish the government’s goals. This research window will 
allow the analysis of eminent domain applications from the construction of the Municipal 
Auditorium through the new medical center projects spurred by the flooding associated with 
Hurricane Katrina.  This timeframe also allows for evaluation of the interaction between 
planning in New Orleans and the City’s exercises of eminent domain.  By better understanding 
the past uses of eminent domain and the goals and policies that drove the exercise of this power, 
researchers and planning practitioners will be better informed in making decisions that will 
impact the rebuilding and the future of New Orleans.   
 
 The specific cases studied as part of this dissertation are: the Municipal Auditorium 
(Chapter 2); the development of Public Housing (Chapter 3); the Civic Center (Chapter 4), 
Bridges and Highways (Chapter 5), the Cultural Center (Chapter 6); and the Medical Center of 
Louisiana at New Orleans and Veterans Administration Medical Center (Chapter 7).  The reason 
for evaluating all types of projects resulting in the use of eminent domain use in New Orleans is 
because all have profound impacts on the communities in which this governmental power is 
exercised. 
 
 The primary finding of this dissertation is that the exercise of eminent domain has never 
been used a principal tool in the implementation of redevelopment proposals in the city of New 
Orleans. All projects throughout the established research period required the use of governmental 
expropriation authority to complete land acquisition, but in all cases the government’s authority 
was used conservatively and only when privately negotiated purchases failed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban Planning; Urban History; New Orleans; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Redevelopment 
 
 1 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: 
A Background of Literature and Methodology in Eminent Domain Research 
 
In the summer of 2005, two separate and distinct events occurred which unpredictably 
intersected in New Orleans in the subsequent years.  On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court of the 
United States handed down a ruling in the case Kelo et al. v. City of New London (Connecticut), 
et al. (hereinafter, Kelo) holding that the exercise of eminent domain for economic development 
does fall within the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, if there is a properly and 
legally adopted comprehensive plan in place for such actions.
1
  Two months later, on August 29, 
2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a high category 3 storm on the Saffir-Simpson 
intensity scale, initially near Buras, Louisiana then finally near the mouth of the Pearl River.
2
  It 
should be noted that it was not Hurricane Katrina, but the failure of New Orleans’s protective 
levee system that caused the submersion of approximately eighty percent of the City of New 
Orleans.  
Of the many powers granted to federal, state, and local governments through the 
Constitution of the United States, eminent domain is possibly the strongest and most imposing, at 
least as it relates to citizens’ property rights.  While the threat of losing one’s home to an 
economic development project is fairly slim, the public outcry surrounding the Kelo decision 
caused the elected leadership of the people to spring into action and place restrictions on how 
and when takings may be exercised. In the wake of Kelo, forty-three of the fifty States, including 
Louisiana, have passed laws limiting the application of eminent domain within their states.
3
  
Ownership of property is sacred in America, and property rights are generally viewed as a 
                                                 
1
 Supreme Court of the United States, Kelo et al. v. City of New London (Connecticut), et al,  545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
2
 National Hurricane Center (NHC), Tropical Cyclone Report – Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005. 
3
 The Castle Coalition, as accessed via www.castlecoalition.org; on July 25, 2012, “Legislative Center.” 
 2 
relationship between individuals and commodities, but property rights also dictate relationships 
between individuals, as well as between individuals and their government.  While ownership of 
property is generally viewed as a private relationship, one must interact with others to gain 
ownership, and the government controls how and at times if, property rights are protected and 
enforced.
4
 
 This dissertation will explore several large-scale public undertakings in New Orleans 
during the period from 1929 to 2011 in which the application of eminent domain was necessary 
to accomplish the government’s goals. This research window will allow the analysis of eminent 
domain applications from the construction of the Municipal Auditorium through the new medical 
center projects spurred by the flooding associated with Hurricane Katrina.  This timeframe also 
allows for evaluation of the interaction between planning in New Orleans and the City’s 
exercises of eminent domain.  The New Orleans City Planning Commission, originally the City 
Planning and Zoning Commission, was created in 1923 and the City’s first zoning ordinance was 
adopted in 1929.  Because the research period begins at roughly the same time as professional 
planning in New Orleans, it will provide the opportunity to not only follow the evolution of 
eminent domain but also to follow the evolution of planning in New Orleans, as it related to 
public projects. 
 With the rise of modern, professional planning in New Orleans, it became possible for the 
City to realize large redevelopment projects rather than focusing on construction of an individual 
structure. At this stage in municipal governance, large public projects encompassing multiple 
acres of land were not common. Not only would projects become larger in scope, they would 
also transform from strictly projects of necessity to include projects of amenity, projects of 
                                                 
4
 Campbell, J.L., & Lindberg, L.N. (1990).  Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity by the State.  
American Sociological Review, Vol. 55 (Oct. 1990), pp. 634-647 
 3 
convenience, and projects of economic development. As planning grew to encompass more 
aspects of the urban experience it became inevitable that the enhancement of that experience 
would require property acquisition at some point. This is not to say that planning should be 
viewed as a direct cause of projects resulting in the exercise of eminent domain, or its mid-
century incarnation, Urban Renewal, but rather than the growth of planning as a profession made 
projects of such scope possible. 
This dissertation encompasses exercises of eminent domain by all levels of government: 
federal, state and city. It is necessary to evaluate all levels of government for this type of 
research because generally there is an overlapping goal or policy in the exercise of eminent 
domain.  This research is being conducted not only as a historical exercise in detailing the city’s 
history with takings, but to study the policies and goals which were being pursued through the 
exercise of eminent domain.  This study includes relatively small projects such as the Municipal 
Auditorium, larger projects like the Civic and Cultural Centers, and city-wide undertakings like 
the creation of public housing and the development of the Interstate Highway System.  The 
reason for evaluating all types of projects resulting in the use of eminent domain use in New 
Orleans is because all have substantial impacts on the communities in which this governmental 
power is exercised.  The following are the specific areas of focus within this dissertation: 
 Municipal Auditorium (Chapter 2) 
 Public Housing Developments (Chapter 3) 
 The New Orleans Civic Center (Chapter 4) 
 Greater New Orleans Bridge/Interstate Highway Construction (Chapter 5) 
 The New Orleans Cultural Center (present site of Armstrong Park) (Chapter 6) 
 Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans / Veterans Affairs Medical Center 
(Chapter 7) 
 
These six cases have been selected due to their profound impacts on both the built and 
social environment of their surrounding areas and New Orleans as a whole.  This impact is not 
 4 
necessarily limited to the physical impact of redevelopment on an adjacent community.  For 
example, the Municipal Auditorium was a small project, affecting only two municipal squares of 
land, but this project represents a fundamental shift in governmental priorities for development 
and the exercise of eminent domain.  This project was the first in New Orleans which did not 
meet the traditional standards of public use; the building would be municipally owned and would 
house government and public events, but the motivating factor was to house private cultural 
activities and promote tourism. 
The establishment of public housing in New Orleans and the construction of the Greater 
New Orleans Bridge and the Interstate Highways are projects which had substantial impacts both 
on their immediate locations and for the entire community.  Public housing not only cleared 
slums and provided clean, modern housing to low-income individuals, but also placed local 
government into the urban redevelopment business which would be extend further in subsequent 
projects.  Bridges and highways were, perhaps, the most significant project of the twentieth 
century, from a planning and eminent domain perspective. These projects required the 
acquisition of large quantities of land in nearly every neighborhood of New Orleans. Even those 
areas escaping the physical impact of these projects would feel the social shift that they enabled.  
No longer would the population of New Orleans be constrained by natural barriers or distance; 
once high-speed expressways were made available, New Orleans’s surrounding parishes would 
grow exponentially while the historic urban core declined. 
The Civic Center, the Cultural Center, and the Medical Center of Louisiana at New 
Orleans / Veterans Affairs Medical Center (MCLNO/VAMC) projects were selected due to their 
scale and the wholesale changes to the urban landscape that is associated with them.  The Civic 
Center, the present location of New Orleans’s City Hall, removed the last residential 
 5 
neighborhood in the Central Business District and allowed civic leadership to guide growth 
towards the northern end of Poydras Street as they desired. The Cultural Center, or Louis 
Armstrong Park, was envisioned as hub of intellectual pursuits. Museums, an opera house, and a 
theatre would populate the site while simultaneously providing a growth boundary to the 
burgeoning Central Business District. Lastly, the MCLNO/VAMC project, as with the other two, 
effectuated substantial change both within the selected footprint and in its surrounding areas. The 
projects required clear-cutting a portion of a National Register Historic District, altering traffic 
patterns, and will result in the establishment of large, regional medical centers which will serve 
as economic engines both within the city and without.  
Significance and Purpose of Research 
The reason for undertaking this research is that eminent domain has become a high-
profile topic of American planning practice and research since the United States Supreme 
Court’s Kelo decision.  This decision affirmed that the exercise of eminent domain for economic 
development does fall within the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, if there is a 
properly and legally adopted comprehensive plan in place for such actions.  Since that ruling in 
the summer or 2005, many states – including Louisiana – have passed laws limiting the exercise 
of eminent domain to uses that are truly “public.”   
In the 2006 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, two resolutions were passed 
and placed before the voters as constitutional amendments in September, 2006.  Acts 851 and 
859 served to limit the use of eminent domain within the state of Louisiana.  Act 851, very 
basically, provided a legislative definition to the term ‘public use,’ the definition was allowed to 
remain very broad as to encompass potentially unrealized needs of governments, but specific 
enough to provide that “[n]either economic development, enhancement of tax revenue, or any 
 6 
incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in determining whether the taking or 
damaging of property is for a public purpose”5  With the restriction of the Takings Clause 
effectively accomplished in Act 851, Act 859 served to further protect private property rights 
within the state of Louisiana.  Act 859 provided, with certain exceptions, that any land 
expropriated for a public purpose must be offered back to the former property owner before it is 
sent to auction for purchase by a third-party.  This restriction is limited to a resale within thirty 
years of the initial taking, but effectively prevents the possibility of the government taking 
property under false pretenses and offering it for resale to a developer.
6
 
As of this writing, New Orleans is rebuilding from a disaster which inundated 80% of the 
city.  As the government undertakes the construction of a new billion-dollar Veterans 
Administration and Louisiana State University hospital complex, eminent domain has resurfaced 
as a method for obtaining the necessary land for the project to move forward.  In addition to this 
project, the New Orleans City Council has passed ordinances, collectively referred to as the 
Good Neighbor Ordinance, allowing non-remediated properties to be cleaned and secured with a 
lien placed on the property.
7
  Following the passage of the previous ordinances, the Council took 
further action to remove properties deemed to be imminent health threats from the city; 
Ordinance 22,499 MCS allowed the City to demolish abandoned structures without the consent 
of the property owners following an administrative hearing.
8
 
In addition to the timeliness of the research, another motivating factor in pursuing this 
topic is that eminent domain exercises in New Orleans have never been chronicled.  This 
research will not only create a record of eminent domain in New Orleans but will also explore 
                                                 
5
 Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 851 of the 2006 Regular Session, Page 2. 
6
 Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 859 of the 2006 Regular Session. 
7
 Ordinance 22,356 MCS, City of New Orleans 
8
 Ordinance 22,499 MCS, City of New Orleans 
 7 
the policies and goals of the City in exercising this power.  There has been previous research into 
Urban Renewal in New Orleans but that research focused more on the policies and strategies of 
the Urban Renewal program than on the exercise and implementation of eminent domain as a 
tool within those programs.  While the topic of eminent domain is nationally timely, the subject 
is particularly important to the rebuilding of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
The purpose of performing a case study of eminent domain in New Orleans is, therefore, 
two-fold.  The first goal of this research is to create a chronicle of eminent domain utilization in 
New Orleans from 1929 through 2011.  This time period has been established in order to 
incorporate the development of public housing, urban renewal, and the City’s recovery from 
Hurricane Katrina.   The second and primary purpose of this research is to better understand the 
history of eminent domain in New Orleans.  By better understanding the past uses of eminent 
domain and the policies that drove the exercise of this power, researchers and planning 
practitioners will be better informed in making decisions that will impact the rebuilding and 
future of New Orleans.   
Literature Review 
  
 Eminent domain as a governmental power has been written about from many various 
fields, including economics, history, law, sociology, and urban studies.  As a privilege held by 
the government, the power to take private property for a public use is long established and the 
legality of such action guaranteed by the document upon which that government is based.  This 
dissertation does not explore the government’s authority to exercise eminent domain, but rather 
will be exploring how the three levels of government have utilized the power granted to it and 
what the basis for those exercises were, in the context of New Orleans.  This literature review 
briefly discusses the origins of property rights and eminent domain, the development of eminent 
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domain in the United States and, finally, how eminent domain as a governmental power has been 
modified and somewhat limited over time.  This review will serve as a basis for the case study of 
eminent domain in New Orleans moving forward. 
Understanding Property Rights 
   The foundation of modern property rights is found in the writings of John Locke, 
particularly in his Two Treatises of Government originally published in 1690.  Since that time 
property rights have been in debate, but the basic principles have not substantially changed.  
Krueckeberg illustrated Locke’s perspective on how one comes to own property in stating “the 
product of your labor becomes your property by natural right as an extension of your liberty, 
social status, and personality.”9  The product of one’s own work was viewed as the most basic 
form of property. Over time, the basis of property shifted from functional possession to being 
based in market-driven supply and demand.  It was at this juncture that people began to possess 
more than they could utilize, making it possible to accumulate wealth and control the availability 
of goods.  
 In the American application of Locke’s ideas, the next major ideas in the realm of 
property rights came from Thomas Jefferson.  The Jeffersonian interpretation of property was 
that property was a social, rather than a natural right.  Jefferson differentiated natural rights from 
social rights in that natural rights are those rights “necessary for moral and intellectual 
achievement.”10  Of these natural rights, the most important were “individual liberty and social 
freedom;”11 specifically, “freedom of thought, freedom from tyrannical political authority, and 
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freedom in choosing and plying one’s own livelihood.”12  These liberties were “never to be 
abridged or denied in any man-made institution.” 13  Post states that this is made clear through 
Jefferson’s writing of the Declaration of Independence, in that he substituted the phrase “pursuit 
of happiness” over “property” as an inalienable right;14 however, in eighteenth century thought, 
the implication of ‘happiness’ was not necessarily distinct from ‘property.’ Use of the term 
‘happiness’ in the context of the Declaration of Independence would have connoted that the 
ability to acquire property was just as important as protecting the rights of individuals in the 
property that they currently held, and “the right to obtain and possess property was at the heart of 
the pursuit of happiness.”15 
The policies enacted by Jefferson also demonstrated his thoughts on the issue of property 
rights.  Two specific actions are cited as demonstrable of his thinking: the enactment of laws 
governing inheritance and the granting to all white males over the age of twenty-one the 
necessary property to qualify as a voter. These laws were enacted because Jefferson believed that 
property owners were the “most responsible guardians of social welfare” because “they had a 
physical stake in the preservation of society and were ‘tied to their country by … the most lasting 
bonds.”16   In Jeffersonian thinking, property rights as a social right differentiated from natural 
rights because property “was incidental and adventitious, a right produced only after formation 
of a social contract.”17  Post cites The Correspondence of Jefferson and Du Pont de Nemours to 
explain how natural and social rights differ, in that social rights “are those of personal protection, 
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of acquiring and possessing property, in which the individual power is less than the natural…. 
These are civil rights or rights of compact, and are distinguishable from natural rights.”18 
 From an economic standpoint, property rights are viewed by scholars as social rights 
rather than natural ones, and the only true value of those rights are associated with those 
elements of property which can be bought and sold.  Demsetz states that “property rights specify 
how persons may be benefited and harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the 
actions taken by persons.”19  In this analysis of property rights, there is no natural right 
associated with either the creation or possession of property other than that which society 
provides it. 
 Sociological perspectives on property rights date back to the formation of sociology as a 
field.  According to Carruthers and Ariovich (2004), property rights have been discussed in 
sociological writings since the time of Marx. Marx theorized that property ownership is a 
fundamental indicator of inequality.  Since the legal system, and thus the state, has defended the 
sanctity of property rights, those systems are also involved in the perpetuation of inequality.  
Additionally, through the field of sociology, one is able to trace the development of property 
rights and the shifts in fundamental principles as they correspond with larger social movements.  
During times of revolution and other political change, there is commonly a change in the way 
property ownership is viewed and controlled.
20
   
 Engels, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and The State, offered that the 
concept of property ownership and especially the concept of land ownership was a creation of 
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the bourgeoisie.  Engels, in the tradition of Locke, believed an inherent right of ownership of that 
which one produces. As stated above, the value associated with property and the need to possess 
land stems from economics; goods derive their value when the market becomes involved, and the 
same is true of land.  The commoditization of goods, and therefore potential for profit from 
goods, directly led to the private ownership of land which dictated who would benefit from the 
production of that land.
21
 
 Carruthers and Ariovich also break property rights up into five elements of ownership.  
The primary questions in this elemental discussion are: What can be owned? Who may own? 
What rights exist in ownership? How are rights enforced? and How are rights transferred?  To 
the question of “What can be owned?” Carruthers and Ariovich state that the answer to this 
question is fluid.  Ideas of ownership change, as do societal norms that govern how rights are 
protected and asserted.  As an example in the United States, ownership once extended to holding 
fellow human beings as property, and as American society came to find this practice 
unacceptable the rules governing ownership changed, and virtually overnight fortunes were lost 
without any form of compensation to the property owners.  In modern times, property ownership 
has been extended to ideas and thoughts.  Never before in history has such a liberal view of what 
constitutes property been given the protections of the legal and social systems that they exist 
within.
22
   
 The answer to the question of “Who may own?” is not as simple as stating that anyone 
may own property.  The right to own property may be legally limited in some instances, and the 
right to own extended in others.  Under United States law, there exist two types of person: 
natural and fictive.  Natural persons, under the law, are actual persons, while fictive persons are 
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the creation of government or industry, such as a corporation, non-profit, or governmental 
agency.  The legal rights of fictive persons were established in 1886 through the United States 
Supreme Court’s ruling in County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company.23  In 
this case, the Southern Pacific Railroad was making the argument, among others, that the Santa 
Clara County violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in that they were not being treated equally under the law.  The Court did not rule 
directly on this argument but rather its recognition of the validity of this reasoning led to the 
acceptance of corporations as “persons” under the protection of the law.  Carruthers and 
Ariovich state: “[n]o society grants full ownership rights to all natural persons, and the rights of 
fictive persons often differ across public/private or [for-]profit/non-profit lines.”24  These 
distinctions often come through regulations related to use rather than pure ownership.  For 
example, non-profit agencies are not permitted to use their resources to participate in partisan 
politics, but they may engage in politics associated with issues.  This leads directly into the 
discussion of “what rights exist in ownership?” 
 Ownership of real property does not necessarily constitute the right to do what one 
pleases with a tract of land.  There are numerous ways in which the use of property can be and is 
actively limited, generally by government.  Governments possess the ability to limit the use of 
private property because it is that same government that is responsible for protecting private 
interest in property.  The restrictions of use can be seen as a trade-off of losing some rights in 
land while gaining protection of the rights that are permitted.  Restrictions on rights in real 
property are most commonly seen in the form of municipal zoning laws.  The uses of other types 
of property can be seen in the example of licensure requirements for operating a motor vehicle.  
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Restrictions on how property may be used can also be enacted in the private sector through the 
use of restrictive covenants and contractual agreements.
25
  The main focus of this discussion, 
however, is on the questions of how rights are enforced and how rights are transferred, which are 
posed by Carruthers and Ariovich in their sociological investigation of property rights.   
 The process by which rights are enforced by government is a sign of not only the 
importance placed on private property by a government but also the strength of the government 
itself.  Many measures enacted to protect the rights of private property owners are generally 
based in policy rather than action.  The ability of these policies to protect rights comes from the 
perceived legitimacy of the source of those policies, which is the ruling government.  When 
these public policies weaken, or the perceived governing organization is no longer viewed as a 
legitimate authority, property rights are generally one of the first societal creations to be both 
questioned and strengthened.  The public will commonly see the turmoil of government as an 
opportunity to violate the private property rights of the owning classes and the government will 
convert crimes that were formerly seen as property crimes into capital crimes, thus increasing the 
power of the enforcement mechanism and the subsequent penalty for violating the laws.
26
 
The process of buying or selling a particular piece of ground generally accomplishes the 
transfer of rights.  Even the transfer of property can be guided through the societal norms of the 
area where the transfer is taking place.  The example provided by Carruthers and Ariovich is that 
of Mexico, and the prohibitions that exist against selling land to people from outside of the 
community.
27
 Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution directly prohibited manufacturing, 
mining, and petroleum companies from “acquiring, holding or administering rural properties” in 
favor of traditional community-based land ownership.  This prohibition was removed from the 
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Mexican Constitution in 1992.
28
 So, while property gains its value from its very marketability, 
there are nonetheless restrictions and social factors that can dictate how that marketing can occur 
and to whom the property may be sold.
29
  
 From an economic perspective, the state takes on the role of allocating resources to 
influence the activities of economic actors.
30
  Part of this allocation of resources is the legal 
manipulation of property rights, illustrated less by the manipulation of legal safeguards than by 
the exercise of governmental powers that allow property to be taken from its owner to benefit the 
public good.  Property rights are generally viewed as a relationship between individuals and 
commodities, but property rights also dictate relationships between individuals.  As is stated by 
Campbell and Lindberg, the ownership of property by one person is usually equivalent to the 
lack of ownership or control by another.
31
  
 According to Weimer and Hoyt, property rights are subject to three main restrictions by 
government: taxation, eminent domain, and the police power.
32
  Of these three restrictions, this 
research will focus on eminent domain and its ability to compel the sale of private property to 
further the “public good.” 
Development of Eminent Domain 
 The question of how property rights can be transferred is also primary to the question of 
eminent domain and any discussion of property rights generally.  The concept of eminent domain 
as it is presently understood is first mentioned in the American Bill of Rights; however, the basis 
for this concept derives from Clause 28 of the Magna Carta which ensure that no movable 
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properties are to be taken without immediate payment.
33
  ‘Movable’ property under this meaning 
included personal property (i.e. livestock, tools, hats), this did not include real estate. Real 
property in England was possessed by the Crown. Those English elites able to attain the status of 
‘land owner’ were never truly in possession of this property, but rather they were bound by 
continual obligations and annual tributes to the Crown in order to retain their dominion over their 
individual estate.  Failure to comply with this requirement would have resulted in the loss of the 
property that they theoretically ‘owned.’  While the English legal system did not require the 
payment for real property under the Magna Carta, by the seventeenth century Parliament would 
routinely provide for compensation when land was taken by the government for any purpose.
 34
 
 The conception of land ownership changed with the colonization and exploration of the 
New World, due to the limitless amount of land found in North America, colonial governments 
and settlement companies offered land grant titles in fee simple, which was the most absolute 
form of ownership found under the English Common Law.  However, while the government was 
willing to be more generous insofar is allowing the possession of title to land, the concept of 
eminent domain as understood by the English Common Law remained applicable and was 
exercised.  At this juncture, the power of the governing authority to expropriate privately held 
land was not limited to truly ‘public’ purposes, but closely resembled what would today be 
referred to as eminent domain for economic development.  In addition to the use of this authority 
for the development of roads and public buildings, eminent domain was extended in the Colonies 
to include takings for the advancement of economic growth; this growth fostered the 
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development of private industry but such industries were seen to benefit the community and were 
considered a public service.
35
  
 While compensation for taken property was considered fundamental at this time, there 
was no law to govern these transactions.  For example, while the government would provide 
compensation if productive land was taken, they would generally not compensate the owner if 
the land taken was undeveloped.  Ely states that this practice “was not a denial of the 
compensation principle” but rather that “[b]ecause land was so plentiful, the colonists felt that 
unimproved land was of slight monetary value.  Moreover, they reasoned that the advantages of 
a highway would more than offset the loss of a small amount of land.”36  As land became more 
valuable, this practice ceased and compensation would become the practice regardless of the 
actual value of the property taken. 
Origins and Application of Eminent Domain in the United States 
 The validity of eminent domain in the United States is found in the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution, stating in part: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”37 This was further modified by the fourteenth amendment, which states: “nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”38  
These two statements serve as the foundation upon which all modern eminent domain takings are 
based.  In the United States, it is generally accepted that the government can take property from 
an individual to serve a greater public good, but there has never been a definition provided for 
what constitutes a ‘public use.’  ‘Public use’ has come to be viewed as protection of the health, 
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safety, and welfare of the represented community.
39
  How those particular standards are assessed 
is, for better or for worse, left to the same bodies that decide when and where to exercise the 
power of eminent domain.  This leaves the action and the justification of the action in the hands 
of one or more governmental entities.   
Traditionally, the “‘public use’ requirement” of eminent domain is “satisfied whenever 
the power of eminent domain ‘is being exercised for a public purpose.’”40  However, there are 
two opposing bodies of thought regarding the actual meaning of ‘public use.’  The competing 
theories guiding the application of eminent domain are the actual use and public-benefit theories.  
The actual use theory requires that all members of the public have access to the taken property in 
its final form.  For instance, land that is taken to construct a school or other government facility 
will be open to the general public when it is completed, in comparison land that is taken for 
redevelopment may be used to construct a new apartment complex or convention center, that 
would restrict access to only tenants or conventioneers.  There are two elements that are usually 
weighed to determine if a taking can be described as actual use, the first element of this test is 
universal access, and the second is equal access; both elements must be present, in some degree, 
to constitute ‘actual use.’  This would mean that all members of the public would have access to 
the result of the taking, and no member or group would have more access rights than any other 
person or group. It has also been determined by the courts that all members of the public 
realizing a non-tangible, but equal benefit from the taking can meet the actual use test.
41
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 The public-benefit theory of eminent domain requires only that the end result of the 
taking benefit “some portion of the pubic.”42  This is a far less stringent standard than the actual 
use requirements discussed above, and because “every action of a democratic government is 
presumably designed to produce some public good”43 even exercising eminent domain to turn 
the property over to another private party would meet the requirement if the goal of the program 
would produce some quantifiable public-benefit.  In deciding the Kelo case, the United States 
Supreme Court reasoned that economic development is a traditional role of government and that 
in many cases, “the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private 
parties.”44  It has been long accepted that the public-benefit theory was a legitimate test of the 
validity of an eminent domain taking, but Kelo served to make this rule abundantly clear.   
 Meidinger states in his article The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy 
that the ‘public use’ requirement of eminent domain has been somewhat lost, since through the 
years the courts have devised a system of standards that is loose enough to allow any 
governmental taking to be justified, while at the same time strict enough for the courts to 
occasionally invalidate takings.
45
  Through the judiciary’s liberal approach to what constitutes a 
valid ‘public use’ it would virtually take the direct transfer of property from one private party to 
another without any sort of government purpose to have a taking invalidated.
46
  The view 
adopted by the judicial system comes down to the unwillingness of the courts to interfere with 
the actions of local governments, since the courts assume that those governmental actors would 
have the best knowledge of local affairs. Also, there is the belief that since legislative bodies 
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speak for the people in a representative democracy, there is the presupposition that the actions 
taken by these bodies will be in the best interest of the community. 
 Over time, takings have been extended to include not only the physical taking of 
property, but also to the loss of economic gains caused by governmental regulation.  Regulatory 
takings are difficult to define, it is generally accepted that a regulatory taking occurs when the 
government “severely restrict[s] the property’s use, they leave the owner in much the same 
position”47 as if the government would have seized the actual property.   
 The government has been fully within its authority to exercise takings for economic 
development for many years and it took the United States Supreme Court’s split-opinion in the 
case of Kelo to truly bring to light the breadth of eminent domain powers, and the harsh reality 
that the only thing standing between the homes of the populace and a shiny new convention 
center was the restraint of local governments.  For many, the thought of using the power of 
eminent domain to spur economic development is reminiscent of the urban renewal schemes of 
the 1960s.  At that time, entire neighborhoods were declared “blighted” by local governments, 
and federal funds were provided to provide just compensation to property owners and the 
construction of new housing developments or civic complexes.  Urban renewal should not be 
seen to equate to the exercise of eminent domain, however, the utilization of eminent domain 
was generally found to be an element of attaining the goals of the urban renewal program.   
Though the most familiar and generally most documented use of eminent domain is in 
urban redevelopment, this practice has a history long before the urban renewal projects of the 
1960s.  One of the earliest records of using eminent domain to combat urban ills is found in the 
case Dingley v. City of Boston (100 Mass. 544), in which the court ruled that the exercise of 
eminent domain to remove a public nuisance and preserve public health is within the rights of a 
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municipality, as long as just compensation is paid for the land taken.
48
  Another ruling that 
empowered the right of government to take land for urban redevelopment is found in New York 
City Housing Authority v. Muller (270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153(1936)), in which the court found 
that “decreasing the juvenile delinquency, crime, and disease it believed was caused by the slums 
to be a broad public benefit satisfying the public use requirement”49  Over the years the public 
use test has morphed into the public benefit test, which comes equipped with a more far-reaching 
scope of what can be proposed as a public benefit.  This practice is what has led up to the ruling 
of Kelo and the fallout that is currently being experienced.
50
 
 The role of the government in redevelopment was explored more fully by Nancey Green 
Leigh.  While specifically focusing on the remediation of blight and decline in urban areas, there 
are basically two elements that must be met for a government to expropriate ‘blighted’ properties 
from its owner in order to initialize redevelopment: (1) state enabling legislation and (2) a 
declaration of ‘blight’ status before land is targeted for seizure or redevelopment. 51  Taylor 
Ruilova, explores the proposed urban redevelopment plan that has been enacted for the city of 
Camden, New Jersey.  In that plan, approximately 90% of the city of Camden will be declared to 
be a redevelopment zone, and with $175 million in funding, the city is to be transformed, phase-
by-phase, into a thriving urban center.
52
  
Eminent Domain in New Orleans 
 This history of eminent domain exercise is visibly present in the New Orleans area.  
During the urban renewal and highway building schemes of the 1950s and 1960s, a portion of 
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interstate highway was placed through a previously thriving minority neighborhood and a grand 
civic center constructed atop what was deemed to be a ‘slum.’  As was common of that era, the 
government associated blight with the presence of low-income minorities, and the areas selected 
for ‘renewal’ in New Orleans met just that description (See Appendix 1.1).  For example, in 
1951, the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) prepared A Preliminary Report Upon 
Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment Project U.R. 1-A which detailed the slum conditions 
of an urban neighborhood along with the reasons and strategies for clearing the area and 
replacing the slum with new public amenities and property for commercial redevelopment.
53
  
Today, the center of this urban renewal scheme contains the New Orleans City Hall, the Orleans 
Parish Civil District Court building, a park, and vacant land where a state office building and the 
Louisiana Supreme Court stood until demolished in 2009. 
 There is little academic work on the use of eminent domain in the city of New Orleans.  
The majority of the research for this dissertation is from the City Archives and newspaper 
accounts of redevelopment projects in New Orleans.  It is evident from the existing research that 
even those with the ability to exercise it viewed eminent domain as a four-letter word which was 
avoided as much as possible during the planning process, as evidenced in the Report Upon Slum 
Clearance.  In that report, the exercise of eminent domain or any variation of takings was not 
mentioned in the document; however, as an appendix to this report there is a table entitled 
“Itemized Statement of Values”54 which was used to determine the fair-market value of 
properties within the redevelopment zone to allow budgeting of property acquisition costs.  
While the government actively tried to avoid the use of this unpopular tool, they have proven 
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willing to exercise their eminent domain authority when negotiations failed or were becoming 
too time consuming. 
Limitations on Eminent Domain in Defense of Property Rights 
  Louisiana is not the only state to have taken the initiative to limit the effects of the Kelo 
decision, but it is the one being focused on as this research explores how eminent domain and 
property rights have evolved in New Orleans. Christopher Swope, in his 2006 article for 
Governing Magazine, Domain Poisoning, argues the downside of such limitations to the use of 
eminent domain.  In a specific example that could parallel Post-Katrina New Orleans, 
Sacramento, California seized hundreds of housing units in a crime plagued neighborhood, 
turned them over to a non-profit agency and brought in a private management company.  This 
effectively revitalized the neighborhood, but such projects may be banned under Kelo-responsive 
legislation adopted in Louisiana.  Would this be a legitimate exercise of the ‘public use’ doctrine, 
or would this be overstepping the boundaries into economic development?
55
 
 The first request for judicial interpretation of the effects of the 2006 Louisiana 
constitutional amendments is found in a 2007 expropriation suit filed by the New Orleans 
Redevelopment Authority (NORA) against Kittoria Johnson and Joseph Burgess, Jr. The 
specifics of this particular case are similar to the many other cases that NORA has brought over 
the years.  There is no question as to NORA’s ability to seize blighted properties; however, the 
ability for NORA to transfer these properties out of their agency for redevelopment is the crux of 
the case. Particularly, NORA states that they are unable to find any title insurers willing to insure 
the title of NORA-expropriated property because of the unresolved issue of the constitutionality 
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of NORA’s transfer – specifically if the resale of the expropriated properties remains 
constitutional under the amendments to the Louisiana Constitution.
56
 
The desire to place limitations on the exercise of eminent domain in defense of property 
rights is not new.  For decades, state legislatures have been drafting laws and state constitutional 
amendments that place limitations on how and when eminent domain can be exercised, and for 
what purposes.  As illustrated by Meidinger, Connecticut, Montana, and North Dakota enacted 
limitations to specifically standardize what constitutes a ‘public use’ for the purpose of eminent 
domain takings within their states.  This was, however, not a prohibition on the exercise of 
eminent domain for any specific purpose.
57
 These pre-existing limitations on the use of eminent 
domain specifically address how situations that result in takings should be avoided if at all 
possible.  Connecticut’s language for the limitation of eminent domain was found in the 
proposed Constitution of 1965, which stated in part: “No property shall be taken for public use 
unless the taking be necessary for such use.”58  Meidinger states that this type of restrictive 
language would require the governmental actors to prove that the proposed project “could not 
reasonably be carried out without the condemnation.”59  While this is debatably a good standard 
to which to hold governments, the more common, and non-specifically stated, approach to the 
exercise of eminent domain is that of convenience, both to the taxpayers and the project.  As 
stewards of taxpayer dollars, governments commonly search for the most cost-effective means to 
an end. 
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Methodology and Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a record of eminent domain in the city of 
New Orleans and the evolution of eminent domain as a tool as it relates to planning and 
development in New Orleans.  This is not only to provide a historical record of eminent domain 
in the City, but to observe the exercise of this Constitutional power from urban planning and 
public policy perspectives.   
This dissertation utilizes mixed methods to develop a case study of eminent domain in 
New Orleans between 1929 and 2011, from an urban planning and policy perspective while 
analyzing the historical use of takings throughout the city.  The qualitative methods of case study 
research, historiography, and textual analysis are utilized to chronicle the story of eminent 
domain, both from official historical records and through the accounts of these projects found in 
the popular press.  Quantitative methods will be utilized to evaluate population data for the areas 
where eminent domain has occurred in the City, where available.  These statistics are intended to 
evaluate the locations of exercising eminent domain versus the population that occupied those 
areas.  Further, the acquisition of individual properties and the method of such acquisition will be 
chronicled and evaluated to determine what, if any patterns emerge in the decision to exercise the 
government’s expropriation authority. 
Research Questions 
 There are three primary research questions which are explored through mixed research 
methods.  This methodological approach will allow the research to overlap and thus reinforce the 
findings to answer the following research questions.   
1)  To the extent that the City of New Orleans over the last century has pursued 
specific land use policies through the use of its eminent domain power, what 
have those policies been? 
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2)  What particular factors have played a role in the City’s determination as to 
which areas were suitable for municipal projects, and specifically, to what 
extent was the impact of such projects on the surrounding community a factor 
in policy-making? 
 
3)  What land use strategies, if any, might have been employed by the City that 
would have been effective in accomplishing the same policy goals without the 
need for exercising the eminent domain power, and do these strategies present 
realistic and viable alternatives today? 
 
Data Sources 
 
The data sources explored in this research are primarily government documents which 
were produced in the planning stage of large governmental undertakings.  These documents 
allow the research to follow the progression of conceptual municipal improvements through the 
study and planning stage and to implementation, including land acquisition and the exercise of 
eminent domain, when necessary, to fully realize civic priorities.  The following sources of data 
are sources of key information in this dissertation: 
 Archived information from the New Orleans City Planning Commission; 
 Municipal real estate records from the Division of Real Estate & Records; 
 City Archives from the New Orleans Public Library; 
 Condemnation Ordinances from the New Orleans City Council; 
 Legislative records of the State of Louisiana as it relates to eminent domain 
powers of local governments; 
 
 Newspaper archives (The Times-Picayune, The Gambit Weekly, and older 
newspaper records under former titles); and 
 
 City-recognized plans prepared by City agencies and outside planners for and in 
conjunction with the rebuilding of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. 
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Operational Definitions 
 Several terms are used throughout this dissertation which have perceived meanings 
beyond what is to be addressed in this document.  It is therefore necessary to operationalize key 
terms which will be used throughout this chronicle of eminent domain exercises. 
Eminent Domain: As used in this context, eminent domain should be understood as any 
governmental taking of private property exercised under the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, which states in part: “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”60 
Taking: ‘Taking’ shall be defined as a governmental exercise of eminent domain which results 
in the transfer of privately held property to the government or another entity.  A taking is 
exercised when a governmental entity condemns private property through expropriation.  This is 
a more common term for eminent domain.  
Public Use:  No concise, concrete definition of the term ‘public use’ has ever been generated as 
it relates to eminent domain.  ‘Public use’ is generally viewed as protection of the health, safety, 
and welfare of the represented community.
61
  There are competing interpretations of the term, 
which are broken down into actual use and public benefit,
62
 both of which will be addressed in 
this research.  For the purposes of this research, ‘public use’ shall be defined as the purpose for 
which any taking occurs.   
Actual Use: ‘Actual Use’ requires that all members of the public have access to the taken 
property in its final form.  There are two elements that are usually weighed to determine if a 
taking can be described as actual use, the first element of this test is universal access, and the 
second is equal access.  This would mean that all members of the public would have access to 
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the result of the taking, and no member or group would have more access rights than any other 
person or group. It has also been determined by the courts that all members of the public 
realizing a non-tangible, but equal benefit from the taking can meet the actual use test.
63
 
Public Benefit: ‘Public Benefit’ requires only that the end result of the taking benefit “some 
portion of the pubic.”64  This is a far less stringent standard than the actual use requirement 
because “every action of a democratic government is presumably designed to produce some 
public good.”65  Even exercising eminent domain to turn the property over to another private 
party would meet the requirement if the goal of the program would produce some quantifiable 
public-benefit. 
Research Methods 
While this research utilizes mixed research methods, the research is best categorized 
under the case study methodology.  A case study is defined as a study where the “researcher 
explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals.  The 
case(s) are bounded by time and activity and researchers collect detailed information using a 
variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time.”66  While this dissertation 
does recognize the application of eminent domain in the recovery of New Orleans from 
Hurricane Katrina, the primary focus is on the way eminent domain has been used within the city 
of New Orleans in the past.  Yin’s description of a case study adds to the reasoning for this 
methodology in the subject case.  Yin describes a case study as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
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boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”67  Eminent domain is 
understood as the act of taking private property for a public purpose, but generally the context is 
not made clear.  One of the primary goals of this particular research is to bring together the 
takings which have occurred in New Orleans with the policies and governmental goals which 
were being furthered by exercise of eminent domain and how eminent domain, as a planning 
tool, has evolved over the research period within the context of the city of New Orleans. 
This proposed research asks ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions relating to the exercise of 
eminent domain in New Orleans.  According to Yin, these types of questions are explanatory and 
“deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies of 
incidence.”68  I have conducted this case study to research eminent domain as the land 
acquisition tool of last resort, and as such how the decisions were made to exercise this power.  
A substantial portion of this dissertation places an eye to the past in evaluating the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions relating to eminent domain.  While case study research is generally utilized in 
real-time observations, the same methods may be utilized when looking to historical events.  To 
do so, the case study begins to co-mingle with historical research.  When a case study is being 
used to evaluate past events, the researcher generally has more options for information gathering 
than using purely a historical methodology. Case studies also entail direct observation and 
interviews of the persons involved in the events.  A “case study’s unique strength is its ability to 
deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations – beyond 
what might be available in a conventional historical study.” 69  In particular, the case-study 
methodology being proposed for this research falls with in the category of ‘embedded case-study 
design,’ in that while eminent domain within the context of development in New Orleans is the 
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primary purpose of the research, the results of the study will be attained through individualized 
study of those cases comprising the evolution and execution of eminent domain within a 
specified area.  In this particular research, and in reference to Yin’s presentation of case-study 
design, the ‘case’ in question is eminent domain in New Orleans, and the means of investigation 
is through the analysis of individual cases detailing how, when, why, and for what ultimate 
purpose eminent domain has been exercised within New Orleans over the course of the research 
period.  This embedded methodology contrasts with the alternative, holistic, design in that a 
holistic research design would present a global analysis of eminent domain in the city, rather 
than allowing a presentation of particular cases.
70
  By approaching the topic through analysis of 
individual exercises of eminent domain, the goal is allowing an comparative analysis to track the 
evolution of eminent domain as a tool in both planning and urban development as well as 
observing its use and effectiveness as a tool in achieving the goals for which it was exercised. 
A key question in case studies and one extraordinarily relevant in this proposed research 
is the generalizability of the research findings.  Yin proposes that challenges to generalizability 
may be countered by studying multiple cases or through generalizing only to theoretical 
positions rather than similar situations.
71
  Conversely, Stake discusses the need for what he terms 
‘intrinsic case study’ which specifically addresses case studies which are not conducted with the 
end goal of generalizing the results to a greater population.  Stake states that intrinsic case 
studies are undertaken “not because by studying it we learn about other cases or about some 
general problem, but because we need to learn about that particular case.”72  Further, through an 
intrinsic case study, the focus is placed on understanding the case being studied and the 
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uniqueness of that particular case.
73
  In the intrinsic case study, there is not a strong argument for 
generalizing to a greater population, nor is that position taken in the present research.  Stake 
allows for what is termed ‘naturalistic generalizations’ where “people can learn much that is 
general from a single case.”74  According to Stake, this is “partly because [people] are familiar 
with other cases and they add this one in, thus making a slightly new group from which to 
generalize, a new opportunity to modify old generalizations.”75  This approach allows the reader 
to interpret potential generalizations to their own experiential knowledge and does not require 
that the researcher connect all possible points; the value of this approach is that “translation from 
experiential language to formal language diminishes and distorts some of the meaning.”76 
The professional analysis and interpretation of events or information by the researcher is 
crucial to the validity of findings in one’s research. This holds true whether the research is being 
done historically or as a case study. According to Stake, case studies rely not only on the analysis 
of data but on the professional judgment of the researcher in interpreting the meaning of a 
document, situation or singular event.
77
  Similarly, Howell and Prevenier state that while 
historical research is primarily concerned with facts and evidence, there is a level of 
interpretation that must be applied to create a historical argument about a document or 
documented event.
78
  History is not a field in which a participant in the event is normally 
available for clarification of sources or additional information which may not be included in the 
written record.   
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From a historical research perspective interpretive, interdisciplinary approaches are a 
modern development, in that history is no longer constrained to the facts of an event, but rather 
take into account the social and cultural background which led to that which is being 
investigated.  These approaches have a tendency to blur the lines between pure historical 
research and the methods engaged in by the social sciences.  The general perception is that the 
two distinct fields of research have much to learn from one another, and that by taking elements 
of each better research will be produced.  From the historical perspective, the reliability of 
sources is a key concern, where generalizability is the key concern in more general qualitative 
research.  The particular research being proposed will benefit by combining historical research 
qualities with the more standard repertoire of methods found on the qualitative side of the social 
sciences.
79
 
In reference to Creswell’s definition of a case study, which states that a case study is 
bounded by time and activity, with detailed information being collected through a variety of data 
sources,
80
 historical research also studies change over time.  Howell and Prevenier state that 
while not all histories explicitly focus on change over time, even those which focus on a specific 
event or moment in history must recognize a change through time because they are “exposing the 
distinctiveness of the practices being described and the ways they came into being.”81 
While my particular research will focus on the exercise of eminent domain within the 
City of New Orleans, multiple embedded cases will be studied and analyzed.  Particularly, this 
research will focus on the exercise of eminent domain by the governmental actors, including the 
City, State and Federal governments, and the policies and goals which were being pursued by 
this exercise.  Multiple cases within the city will be evaluated, not to reinforce findings of 
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previous cases but to evaluate differences in governmental priorities, projects, and goals over the 
past eighty years.  The common element will be the utilization of eminent domain as the land use 
tool utilized to acquire the needed property to achieve these goals, and the evolution of the tool 
itself within the context of planning in New Orleans.  This dissertation also evaluates through 
what other mechanisms the government may gain control of property and how ultimately the 
eminent domain had to be relied upon to ensure the successful implementation of policies and 
achievement of goals. 
Institutional Review Board Compliance 
In compliance with the policies of the University of New Orleans, as it relates to 
institutional review of research, the proposal for this dissertation was submitted to the University 
of New Orleans Office of Human Subjects Research for review.  This dissertation was been 
determined to be exempt from review based on Category 4 of exempt research published by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), the letter from the IRB granting exemption to this research is 
included as Appendix 1.2.   
 Category 4 serves to exempt research involving the collection or study of existing data, 
documents, and records, if these sources are publicly available.  In examining uses of eminent 
domain in New Orleans over the past century the primary sources of data are newspaper accounts 
of the takings and city-generated documents and plans regarding the redevelopment of the 
properties and strategies for obtaining the land needed for public improvements.  Newspaper 
records and historic city documents are generally available through the New Orleans Public 
Library.  For those documents not available through the library, all necessary planning and policy 
documents are considered to be public record which must be made available upon request.
82
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Rationale and Significance of Research 
The significance of this dissertation is found not in the generalizability of this research to 
other cities, but in better understanding the history and evolution of eminent domain within the 
context of New Orleans.  By better understanding the past uses of eminent domain and the 
policies that drove the exercise of this power, researchers and planning practitioners will be 
better informed in making decisions that will impact the rebuilding and future development of 
New Orleans.  This research will not only be able to guide recovery and capital planning in New 
Orleans, but should also prove valuable in understanding public sentiment regarding the threat of 
eminent domain.  The current political climate in New Orleans, Louisiana and the United States 
as a whole as it relates to eminent domain begs further investigation into the history and 
evolution of the tool and the policies and objectives that have driven the exercise of eminent 
domain.  
Threats to Validity 
The primary threat to validity within the proposed research is researcher bias.  This 
potential threat comes from two directions: my present employment with the City of New 
Orleans and, more generally, my job as a planning practitioner.  To compound this threat, I was 
employed by the City Planning Commission of New Orleans for approximately one year; and a 
portion of this dissertation studies the actions of this agency as it relates to past and potential 
uses of eminent domain in New Orleans.  While I am no longer employed with the City Planning 
Commission, I remain employed by the City of New Orleans in the Department of Safety & 
Permits.  This position removes the potential of direct conflicts of interest which would arise in 
researching the same city agency in which one is employed.  However, through employment 
with the City of New Orleans, there remains a potential threat to research validity that will be 
 34 
alleviated through triangulation of the relevant data in order to examine evidence from multiple 
sources to build and reinforce research findings.
83
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Chapter 2 
 
The Municipal Auditorium: 
Culture meets Tourism 
 
 The Municipal Auditorium undertaking was the result of a confluence of circumstances 
in the early Twentieth Century.  In 1919 the French Opera House, located in the Vieux Carré, 
burned and with that fire the cultural heart of New Orleans was lost.  Immediately following the 
fire, the community rallied behind the reestablishment of the French Opera House, but there was 
disagreement as to whether it should be rebuilt as it was or if the City should invest in a new, 
modern auditorium.
1
  At this same time, chambers of commerce were beginning to develop both 
in New Orleans and nationally with an eye towards promotion of cities as destinations which 
would serve to increase business opportunities for local merchants and hoteliers.  It was 
presumably with the aim of civic improvement that the City opted to construct a new auditorium 
rather than repairing the French Opera House or constructing a new building in that location.
2
   
 The location selected for the new Municipal Auditorium was across North Rampart Street 
from the Vieux Carré adjacent to what is presently known as Congo Square,
3
 within what has 
become Armstrong Park.
4
 The exact site, chosen following analysis of alternate locations and 
several public meetings, was a compromise between neighborhood activists and business 
interests.   
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Figure 2.1 – Times-Picayune Illustration of proposed Municipal Auditorium site.5 
 
The business community and civic boosters encouraged this location as a boon to North Rampart 
Street businesses and as a convenient location for downtown tourists.
6
  Neighbors and other 
activists encouraged the City to find an alternate location to preserve the playground and 
swimming pool within the square as public open space.   
The Vision 
 Lyle Saxon, in his book Fabulous New Orleans, summarizes the spirit of New Orleans as 
it related to the French Opera House in one simple sentence: “New Orleans went in to mourning 
for the French Opera.”7  Saxon reproduces what amounts to the obituary for the French Opera 
House which was printed in the Times-Picayune, and reflected the almost familial relationship 
that the general public had with the structure, and as a result of this relationship, one can 
understand the prolonged debate over if and how the building should be replaced: 
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Gone, all gone.  The curtain has fallen for the last time upon “Les Huguenots,” 
long a favorite with the New Orleans public.  The opera house has gone in a blaze 
of horror and of glory.  There is a pall over the city; eyes are filled with tears and 
hearts are heavy.  Old memories, tucked away in the dusty cobwebs of forgotten 
years, have come out like ghosts to dance in the last ghastly Walpurgis ballet of 
flame.  The heart of the old French Quarter has stopped beating.
8
 
 
The French Opera House had remained damaged and derelict following the fire of 1919 
and “despite pleas by preservationists, business leaders, and opera lovers, dissention had plagued 
all efforts to rebuild the opera house.”9   Ultimately the French Opera House was demolished in 
1928 with the blessing of the Vieux Carré Commission and the City of New Orleans to make 
way for a new apartment building.
10
 
Discussion of replacing the French Opera House with a modern auditorium began shortly 
after the fire and gained momentum through the 1920s, leading to the creation of the Municipal 
Auditorium Commission in July, 1927.
11
 Contrary to the wishes of many in the French and 
Creole communities, the City of New Orleans decided to abandon the French Opera House and 
the Vieux Carré with the decision to construct a new auditorium.  The vision outlined by the City 
included opera as just one function of the new space, with the capacity to serve a growing 
community.
 12
 
 In what appears to have been a letter to the full Commission-Council of New Orleans in 
1928, Commissioner of Public Property John Klorer outlined the goals of a new auditorium in a 
letter seeking approval to place a bond issue before the voters.  The total bond issue was to 
amount to $7,500,000, with $2,000,000 of that amount being designated for construction of a 
new municipal auditorium.  Commissioner Klorer outlined the goals for the new auditorium as 
                                                 
8
 Ibid, at 281. 
9
 Raffray, at 293 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid, at 293, Note 37. 
12
 Ibid. 
 38 
benefitting business interests while also fulfilling the cultural needs of the community which had 
been wanting since the French Opera House burned in 1919.
13
 
 As outlined in the bond proposal, the Municipal Auditorium would not only provide a 
cultural home for opera and live theatre, but would also create a venue for indoor sporting 
events, Mardi Gras balls, community functions, and “political, patriotic, and religious 
gatherings.”14  In addition to these civic functions, the new auditorium would be designed and 
constructed to accommodate large conventions and trade shows which could not be 
accommodated in any existing halls in New Orleans.  Commissioner Klorer notes that the 
“Tourist and Conventions Bureau of the Association of Commerce will tell you how many 
possible large conventions have to be passed up on account of the lack of a sufficiently large 
convention hall.”15 
 In order to offset any community concerns relative to maintenance costs of the 
auditorium, the City initially proposed designing the building in a manner that would generate 
revenue for the upkeep of the building.  The initial proposal would build pedestrian uses into the 
first floor of the building, including restaurants, stores and offices, while the basement would be 
constructed in a manner as to allow use as a parking garage, “thus ensuring both a convenience 
to the public as well as a dependable everyday source of revenue.”16 As this bond proposal was 
to move forward prior to the selection of a site for the building, Commissioner Klorer noted that 
if land acquisition costs were not excessive, it may also be possible to construct a “combination 
Auditorium and Municipal Office building.”17 
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The Association of Commerce, the predecessor to the New Orleans Chamber of 
Commerce, was an avid supporter of the new auditorium.  Through the mid-1920s, the 
Association’s Civic Bureau established an “Auditorium Committee” to garner support for the 
auditorium proposal, the bond issue to fund the idea, and ultimately selection of the site for the 
new structure. The Association of Commerce is generally credited with bolstering local pride 
while commodifying New Orleans as a tourist destination; the auditorium proposal fit into both 
of these categories.  It was at this time that the Association of Commerce was initiating 
promotional campaigns to develop the tourism sector of the local economy and actively began 
working to bring conventions and trade shows to the City.  The Association’s promotion of New 
Orleans as a tourism center was reinforced by hoteliers and other businesses altering their focus 
from being local commercial hubs to providing “sumptuous accommodations to visitors, thereby 
providing an added justification for people to travel not out of need but for desire and status 
attainment.”18  The plan to construct an auditorium capable of hosting large conventions was 
seen as a benefit to the New Orleans business community, with one Association of Commerce 
official stating to the Chair of the Municipal Auditorium Commission in February of 1928 that 
“if the City could have an auditorium by October 1, 1928, that a convention which would bring 
3,000 people over a week’s stay here might have been secured.”19 
The debate over the location of the auditorium began even before a final decision was 
reached on the question of whether an auditorium would be built.  Mr. J. Henry Blache, in a 
letter addressed to Mayor O’Keefe dated February 4, 1927, announced that he would be starting 
a city-wide campaign to have Congo Square selected as the site for the new auditorium.  Mr. 
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Blache proposed this location for a number of reasons, among them being that the site was of 
sufficient size and was owned by the City.  More than an argument of economy, Mr. Blache also 
proposed the site due to its relative location to the Vieux Carré and the Central Business District, 
the location being along one of the main thoroughfares between the City and St. Bernard Parish, 
and the location of the Square being “a link out of a chain of present and contemplated civic 
improvements extending from the river front through Orleans Street and Orleans Boulevard to 
the Lakeshore front.”20  The proposed civic improvements to which Mr. Blache was referring 
were the proposed new municipal center which the City’s first adopted plan recommended be 
constructed along Orleans Street in the Vieux Carré and extending to the blocks surrounding 
Congo Square, in the area generally bounded by Dauphine Street, Dumaine Street, North Liberty 
Street and Toulouse Street.
21
  The Bartholomew Plan recommended construction of this new seat 
of government to locate along Orleans Street in recognition of the historic center of City 
government being located at the Cabildo on Jackson Square.
22
  
Further, as with many other civic undertakings, the impact on property values was a 
driving force in Mr. Blache’s dedication to the use of Congo Square as the home to the 
Municipal Auditorium.  The selection of this location, it was proffered, would lead to an increase 
in property assessments of fifty percent, which would lead to millions of dollars in tax revenues 
for the City’s treasury and would also serve to equalize land values downtown of the Central 
Business District with the value of uptown property.
23
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The Planning 
 On July 11, 1927, Mayor O’Keefe formed the Municipal Auditorium Commission for the 
purpose of crafting the most suitable proposal for the new auditorium, including its location.
24
  
Less than one year after the formation of this Commission, the group presented their 
recommendation as to the most suitable location for the new auditorium. The New Orleans Item 
reported, on April 11, 1928, that the Commission would be recommending Congo Square as the 
site for the new auditorium.  While the announcement had not formally been made, the Item, 
citing knowledgeable sources,  published a story indicating that not only would the Congo 
Square site be home to the City’s new auditorium, but it went on to state that “under tentative 
plans, Beauregard Square will become the nucleus of a future civic center.”25  
 This civic center, proposed by Harland Bartholomew and adopted by the City Planning 
and Zoning Commission, would consolidate government and city services into a single location 
and create a monumental setting for the conduct of governmental business. Bartholomew 
advocated the creation of this civic center for a number of reasons: the convenience to citizens, 
adherence to the national trend of creating municipal centers, and as “fine municipal advertising 
in that it gives to the city’s thousands of visitors and sight-seers an imposing view.”26  In addition 
to these intangible benefits, Bartholomew spoke to the ability of the civic center proposal to 
increase property values in the designated area:  
The property in this neighborhood is not valuable nor in a good state of repair. 
The neighborhood has shown little tendency to improve in recent years.  It is 
believed that the creation of a public building group facing Beauregard Square 
and the squares bounded by Rampart, Dauphine, St. Peter and St. ann streets [sic] 
would result in an appreciation of property values an in substantial improvements 
in the immediate vicinity.
27
 
                                                 
24
 Raffray, at 293, Note 37. 
25
 New Orleans Item, April 11, 1928, pp. 1, 7. 
26
 Bartholomew, The Plan for Civic Art, at 28. 
27
 Bartholomew, The Plan for Civic Art, at 31 
 42 
 
As evidence of this claim, Bartholomew cited previous Planning and Zoning Commission studies 
which predicted the continued expansion of the Central Business District.  This expansion of the 
commercial core of the city could then be steered in the direction of North Rampart Street to 
“stimulate and encourage a high character of building development in a district where it might 
otherwise not be expected.”28 
Though the Municipal Auditorium Commission took less than one year to select a site, 
the length of time was seen as unacceptable to the Association of Commerce.  The Chairman of 
the Commission was invited to speak at a meeting of the Auditorium Committee of the 
Association of Commerce in February of 1928, at which time the Committee members 
questioned him as to why the process of selecting a site was taking so long.  Mr. H. Generes 
Dufor, Chairman of the Municipal Auditorium Commission, explained that the Commission 
voted in September of 1927 to hold off on any announcements until Congress acted on the flood 
relief bills pending due to the floods of 1927.  The Commission did not want the announcement 
that New Orleans would be spending $2,000,000 on a new auditorium to derail any possible 
flood protection that Congress was contemplating.  Mr. Dufor went on to tell the Auditorium 
Committee that while no announcements had been made, the Committee had contacted an 
architectural consultant to guide them on what type of building they could build with the funds 
available and further explained that no site had been selected but assured the Committee that the 
Association of Commerce would be consulted prior to a final decision.
29
 
The position of the Municipal Auditorium Commission was unacceptable to the 
Association of Commerce, with Committee members calling the “prompt erection of the 
auditorium a matter of vital importance” and another stating that he believed that “the business 
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interests of New Orleans do not take the viewpoint expressed by the Commission.”30  Further, 
the Committee stated that any arguments raised by opponents of flood protection for the City 
could be countered with other evidence and that even with these concerns, the Commission 
should be moving forward with plans for the project without publicity so they could then present 
their proposal once Congress acted on flood relief.  Mr. Dufor agreed and stated that the 
Commission was working surreptitiously, but that the position of the Commission was virtually 
unanimous.  In response, and perhaps in effort to push the Commission to act, the Association of 
Commerce requested that they be allowed to propose a site to the full Commission-Council of 
the City separately from the Municipal Auditorium Commission and then let the Commission-
Council decide on the best location.  Mr. Dufor rejected this proposal, but again assured the 
Committee that the Association of Commerce would be consulted prior to selection of a final 
location.
31
  
The Commission analyzed five sites in depth, with cursory evaluations given to 
additional locations.  In addition to the site at Congo Square, the Commission also studied: 1) the 
location of the Criminal Courts Building at Tulane Avenue and South Saratoga Street (the 
present location of the Main Branch of the New Orleans Public Library), 2) the site of the old 
turning basin on North Rampart Street, 3) the site of the City Hall Annex on Lafayette Square, 4) 
a site on Coliseum Square, and 5) in the yet-to-be-acquired City Park extension.  In reporting the 
alternative sites, the Item stated that the protests regarding the removal of Congo Square were 
heard and evaluated but did not change the Commission’s recommendation.32 
 The Municipal Auditorium Commission not only evaluated the proposed sites within 
New Orleans but also, at personal expense, visited other cities with recently constructed auditoria 
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to evaluate how these communities decided upon locations and how the selection of those 
locations benefited the auditoria and their surrounding communities.  Based on these evaluations, 
the Commission did formally recommend the Congo Square location to the full Commission 
Council, with the recommendation that the replacement playground should be completed prior to 
beginning construction of the new auditorium.
33
  Mayor O’Keefe formally presented the 
recommendation of the Municipal Auditorium Commission to the public and the Commission 
Council on April 12, 1928 and introduced an ordinance to designate Congo Square as the 
location of the new auditorium.
34
 
 A public hearing on the selection of Congo Square as the site of the Municipal 
Auditorium was called by Mayor O’Keefe for April 24, 1928.  The plan, as presented to the 
Commission Council and the public was opposed by “the Playground Commission, the Fifth 
Ward Civic League, and a number of individuals.”35  According to both municipal records and 
newspaper accounts, opposition to the proposal was based on the location of the auditorium, not 
on the merits of the auditorium itself; reporting in the New Orleans Item, the New Orleans States, 
and the Times-Picayune suggest the City’s construction of a new auditorium was entirely 
agreeable with the only points of contention coming in relation to the location of the structure.
36
 
At the April 24, 1928 public hearing on the location of the Municipal Auditorium, the 
Times-Picayune reported that during the course of the two-hour hearing, only one proponent of 
the Commission-recommended site at Congo Square was present, Mr. Blache; it would later be 
revealed, during the property acquisition phase of the project, that Mr. Blache had engaged in 
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real estate speculation during the site selection process, purchasing a lounge at the corner of St. 
Peter Street and St. Claude Street for an inflated price in hopes of profiting from the selection of 
Congo Square as the site of the auditorium.
37
 
All other speakers expressed opposition to the proposal, most commonly because the 
proposed location of the auditorium would require the removal of a playground.  At this hearing, 
Mayor O’Keefe assured the opponents that the City would expeditiously work to replace the 
playground and stated that the cost for acquiring a new playground would amount to 
approximately $200,000. Though the representative of Rampart Street businesses offered to 
work with the City to raise the money and assist in any way to create a new playground, the 
opponents were not satisfied; their response: if the money can be found to buy land for a new 
playground, why can money not be found to purchase a site for the auditorium? 
In response to public concern regarding the loss of the Congo Square playground, Mayor 
O’Keefe asked the Playground Commission to evaluate sites near Congo Square for the 
establishment of a new playground.  Specifically, the Mayor recommended the site of the old 
turning basin as a new playground, but allowed flexibility to the Playground Commission to 
evaluate other locations in the proximity of Congo Square as well.  The Playground Commission 
presented their report at the April 24 public hearing and concluded that the site of the old turning 
basin would be unacceptable as a new playground.  Congo Square was, at this time, a playground 
for white children and the replacement playground would also be dedicated for use of white 
children.  The Playground Commission divided the area around Congo Square into four 
divisions, with the results of their population analysis as follows, as presented in their report to 
Mayor O’Keefe: 
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Table 2.1 -   Population Analysis for Replacement Playground Location
38
 
 White 
Children  
5-13 years 
White 
Children  
14-18 years 
Total 
Whites 
Colored 
Children 
5-13 years 
Colored 
Children  
14-18 years 
Total 
Colored 
Section A 12 27 39 405 84 489 
Section B 165 126* 291 150 87 237 
Section C 531 336 867 609 285 894 
Section D 1332 795 2127 294 117 411 
* There appears to be a typographical error in reporting this number, 126 is the mathematical difference between the 
total white population and the 5-13 age bracket, as reported. 
 
The Sections noted in Table 2.1 (above) are defined as follows:
39
 
 Section A: Canal St., St. Peter St., N. Rampart St., and N. Claiborne Ave. 
 Section B: Canal St., St. Peter St., N. Rampart St., and the Mississippi River. 
 Section C: St. Peter St., Esplanade Ave., N. Rampart St., and N. Claiborne Ave. 
 Section D: St. Peter St., Esplanade Ave., N. Rampart St., and the Mississippi River. 
Based on the demographics of the four areas, the Playground Commission recommended 
creation of the new playground in Section D, if the City decided to move forward with the plan 
to construct the new auditorium in Congo Square.  The Playground Commission also proposed 
two locations which could be purchased and cleared to create the new playground.  Site A was 
the square bounded by Dauphine, Bourbon, St. Philip and Ursulines Streets; Site B was the 
square bounded by Bourbon, Royal, St. Philip and Dumaine Streets.  At the time of the 
Playground Commission report, the assessed property valuation of Sites A and B was $96,700 
and $117,600, respectively, which was presented to give an approximation of the acquisition cost 
to the City.
40
 
Notably, another dissenting voice in the public hearing was that of Mr. Charles Favrot, 
the Chair of the City’s Planning and Zoning Commission.  Again, there was not opposition to the 
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auditorium itself, but rather to the site selected to house it.  Mr. Favrot encouraged the 
Commission-Council to place the project on hold until a comprehensive study on the placement 
of government buildings could be conducted.
41
  Specifically, Mr. Favrot noted that the City was 
proposing three new buildings at this same time, not just a new auditorium.  In addition to the 
auditorium, the City was working on selecting a site for a new union rail terminal and a new 
Criminal Court building and Mr. Favrot believed that it would be in the City’s interest to have 
these new improvements created around a civic center, with additional space to construct more 
governmental buildings as the needs arose.
42
 
Mr. Favrot’s position was likely guided, in part, by the Preliminary Report on The 
General Problem of Selecting an Auditorium Site submitted to the City Planning and Zoning 
Commission by Bartholomew and Associates.  In the Preliminary Report, the City’s planning 
consultant notes that “[i]n the minds of some, parks are merely open spaces which the 
municipality fortunately has saved for building sites;”43 however, “[t]o cover a park area with 
such a structure as an auditorium would be a gross violation of one of the basic principles of city 
planning”44 and as such the City should not concern itself with discussion of the legality of 
conversion of park space into an auditorium site.
45
 
The Playground Commission’s report and the City’s assurances to replace the playground 
were not the end of the debate on where this new auditorium should be built.  Following the 
April 24, 1928 public hearing, the Carrollton Business Men’s Association and the Jefferson 
Davis Parkway Civic Improvement Association submitted proposals to the Municipal 
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Auditorium Commission touting Mid-City as the best location for the new auditorium.  The 
association proposed two sites in Mid-City, the first being at the intersection of Tulane Avenue 
and South Carrollton Avenue and the second being at the intersection of Tulane Avenue and 
South Jefferson Davis Parkway.  The Associations’ proposals for both locations stressed the 
availability of parking and the presence of wide streets to encourage traffic flow.  The groups 
also noted that the property at Tulane Avenue and South Carrollton Avenue was owned by the 
City and had failed to sell though the City had tried to sell it twice.
46
  
 At the same time that the City of New Orleans was discussing the placement of their new 
auditorium, a legal challenge had been posed to an auditorium proposed by the City of 
Shreveport.  In a situation virtually identical to the debate raging in New Orleans, The 
Shreveport City Council selected an existing public park as the location for a new public 
auditorium. The Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Anderson v. Thomas 
in April of 1928, and determined that land acquired and traditionally used as a public park could 
not be repurposed as an auditorium site.  While the Court concurred with the City of Shreveport 
as to their outright ownership of the parcel, this ruling hinged not only on ownership but 
traditional use of the space.
 47
  The Court concluded that  
the city acquired this property in its governmental capacity for the declared public 
use as a park; that it has been devoted to such use for more than 50 years; that 
large sums of the public’s money has been expended upon its improvement as a 
park; that under such circumstances it holds said property in trust for the use of 
the public; that as long as said property is so used and needed the municipality is 
without right to divert it to some other inconsistent public use.
48
 
 
So, while the Court fully recognized the proposed auditorium itself as a valid public purpose, it 
rejected the City’s selection of a parcel that was purchased and used as a public park as a suitable 
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location.  Particularly, the Court believed that if the erection of the auditorium were not to 
completely change the character of the public park, it could be a suitable use; however, in the 
instant case, the proposed auditorium would occupy the majority of the space, with the remaining 
space being made unsuitable for “seekers after the peace and quiet of a park.”49 
Following the Anderson decision, Mayor O’Keefe instructed the City Attorney to research 
the acquisition of Congo Square to determine if there were any legal obstacles to the use of the 
site for construction of an auditorium. The City stated that they believed the use of the site was 
entirely legal, the research was being conducted out of an abundance of caution as legal action 
had been threatened to preserve the playground
50
 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.51 
In what appears to be a draft of the City Attorney’s analysis of the City’s ownership of 
Congo Square, the title is traced back to the French and Spanish Crowns in an effort to 
distinguish New Orleans’s auditorium proposal from the Shreveport proposal which had been 
invalidated by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In effect, the City would have acquired title to the 
site of Congo Square through two separate avenues, neither of which would have led to 
dedication of the site as a park. A portion of the site is traced back to a French land grant to 
Chevelier de Morand in 1756 with subsequent sales leading to the purchase of the site by the 
City of New Orleans in 1810 from Claude Treme. The other portion of the site was once 
occupied by the Spanish Fort Burgundy. Title to the Spanish portion of the site traveled from the 
Spanish Crown to the French Crown and finally to the United States Government in the form of 
the Louisiana Purchase.  In 1807, Congress authorized the transfer of formerly Royal lands to the 
City of New Orleans, at which point the City gained title to the remainder of what became Congo 
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Square.
52
  The City Attorney also concluded through a review of past ordinances relating to the 
Square that there had never been a formal dedication of the space as a public park or playground.  
While there had been ordinances passed to name the space and a 1916 ordinance to place the 
management of the Square under the jurisdiction of the Board of Playground Commissioners “to 
be used for playground purposes,” it was determined that none of these ordinances affected a 
permanent dedication of the space as a public playground.
53
 
As the City ultimately selected a site adjacent to Congo Square rather than the Square itself 
as the location for the Municipal Auditorium, there was not a legal challenge filed to preserve the 
park.  Therefore, it is unknown if the City would have prevailed based on distinguishing the case 
on the basis of the intent of acquisition or if the Court would have held that the Anderson ruling 
applied due to the historic and continuous use of the space as a public park even though there 
was never a formal declaration or intent to use it as such. 
On May 23, 1928, the Times-Picayune ran an article stating that that Municipal Auditorium 
Commission remained committed to their recommendation of constructing the new auditorium 
on Congo Square and encouraged the Mayor to act on the recommendation so that if legally 
challenged, the case could make it through the legal system and construction could begin.  
Mayor O’Keefe, yet to receive a recommendation from the City Attorney, simply held the 
position that no final decisions had been made. 
54
 
On June 1, 1928, the Association of Commerce’s Auditorium Committee held a joint 
meeting with the City’s Municipal Auditorium Commission, at which time the Committee and 
the Commission both expressed the sentiment that Congo Square would not be the ideal location 
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but that with the funds available, the building would have to be located on City-owned property.  
The Auditorium Commission believed that if additional funds were made available the City 
could purchase a more suitable location for the new auditorium.
55
   
Also on June 1, 1928, at the meeting of the Commission-Council, Mayor O’Keefe 
introduced an ordinance to authorize the acquisition, by purchase or expropriation, of the two 
municipal squares to the rear of Congo Square.  These Squares, designated as Squares 135 and 
136, were generally bounded by St. Peter Street, St. Claude Street, St. Ann Street and N. Liberty 
Street and were bisected by Orleans Street, which was to be closed as part of the auditorium 
proposal.   
Figure 2.2 – Mayor O’Keefe’s Proposed Auditorium Site56 
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Ordinance 10,607 CCS was adopted on July 31, 1928 and the City immediately began 
acquisition of the individual parcels comprising the site. As reported by the Times-Picayune, by 
the time the ordinance was introduced by the Mayor, options to purchase had been signed on 
most of the parcels but some hold-outs remained and while the announcement and introduction 
of the ordinance was a surprise to the general public, the Commission-Council members had 
been working on the proposal for weeks.  The compromise location allowed Congo Square to 
remain in use as a playground while accepting the general recommendation of the Municipal 
Auditorium Commission as to the location of the new structure.
 57
 Following the introduction of 
this ordinance, the Association of Commerce contacted the Auditorium Commission to ask why 
this was not mentioned at the meeting. According to Mr. Charles Dunbar of the Executive 
Committee of the Municipal Auditorium Commission, the Commission “knew absolutely 
nothing of the proposed ordinance and was rather astonished that the City authorities should take 
such action without consulting the Auditorium Commission.”58 
 In planning for the auditorium itself, the Auditorium Commission contracted the 
architectural services of Favrot and Livaudais for the design of the Municipal Auditorium.  The 
Commission did not place this contract out to public bid as planned, but rather called a vote 
among its members to award the contract to this local firm to expedite the work but also 
“because of the great amount of time they have devoted in recent years to civic work without 
compensation.”59  Specifically, Mr. Favrot served as chairman of the City’s Planning and Zoning 
Commission.   
 Once contracted, the architects immediately began developing preliminary plans to 
present to the Auditorium Commission detailing the space within the new Municipal 
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Auditorium.  The building would be built to seat 10,000 persons and would be dividable into two 
separate halls to accommodate different types of uses.  One section would seat 3,000 and could 
be used as a “theater, ballroom, opera house, or concert auditorium” while the other section 
could seat 6,000 and would be “suitable for use for opera, mass meetings, band concerts, public 
school exercises and other activities.”60  Approximately 19,000 square feet of the total 25,000 
square foot interior of the structure would be within the main exhibition hall, in order to 
accommodate large events and conventions that the City was hoping to lure with the 
development of this structure.   
Figure 2.3 – Architect’s drawing by Favrot and Livaudais of the proposed municipal auditorium, 
as published by the Times-Picayune.
61
 
 
The Land Assembly 
The City initially obtained purchase options on many properties within the proposed 
footprint in the spring of 1928 prior to forwarding the site to the Commission-Council for 
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selection.
62
  However, following the formal designation of the site, the Auditorium Commission 
determined that the City’s purchase options reflected inflated property values which were 
unacceptable.  Rather than exercise the City’s purchase options, the Auditorium Commission 
chose to allow the options to expire at which time they proceeded to attempt to renegotiate lower 
prices with property owners, and failing that they were willing to resort to expropriation.
63
   
In total, the City had obtained options on 22 of the 24 parcels comprising the site prior to 
making the final site selection; the total value of these parcels was optioned at approximately 
$275,000.  The Auditorium Commission, the entity that would be responsible for the task of land 
assembly, believed that this amount was substantially inflated.  In comparing the purchase 
options to the existing assessed valuation of the properties found on the City’s tax rolls, it was 
found that the “assessed valuation … is only from one-third to one-fourth the amount named in 
the options” and in several cases where properties were acquired by their present owners within 
the last year or two, “the prices named in the options were three or four times the amount paid 
for the parcels by the present owners.”64  According to Leigh Carroll, chairman of the 
Auditorium Commission, the reason for this frugality in land acquisition was that “every dollar 
paid for private property leaves that much less money for the [auditorium] itself.”65   
It was later shown that the Auditorium Commission was wise to attempt to renegotiate 
purchase options within the Municipal Auditorium site.  As of October 1, 1928, the Commission 
reported that new purchase options had been secured on 16 of the 24 properties within the site 
and that there were negotiations underway for four more.  Of the 16 properties were new options 
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were obtained; the City realized a savings of $52,000 by renegotiating the purchase prices. The 
initial options on these 16 parcels totaled $127,000 and the new price totaled $75,000.
66
 
According to the records of the City’s Department of Property Management all but two 
properties were acquired through negotiated purchase.  The full record of property acquisitions, 
including Square and Lot numbers, addresses and dates of acquisition, is included as Appendix 
2.1.  The remaining two properties, identified as Square 135, Lot 5 and Square 136, Lot 9, were 
expropriated by the City of New Orleans to assemble the required land for construction of the 
auditorium. As the Louisiana Supreme Court had already determined auditoria to be “public 
uses” for purposes of exercising eminent domain, these expropriations were shepherded through 
the legal system quite quickly.
67
  
While the City’s records indicate the only two properties were acquired through 
expropriation proceedings, the Times-Picayune’s reporting indicates that expropriation 
proceedings were initiated against the owners of four parcels within the Municipal Auditorium 
site.  The first expropriation suit was filed with the Civil District Court on September 11, 1928; 
suit was filed against William Gomez, the owner of “a vacant lot on St. Peter Street between St. 
Claude avenue and Liberty street and of several old houses on Orleans street.”68 Mr. Gomez had 
been approached a number of times by the City to negotiate a purchase of the properties but he 
refused to engage the City’s advances so the City proceeded to take the necessary steps to 
acquire the property through eminent domain.
69
  Further news reports appear to indicate that this 
action was settled prior to trial, though this cannot be confirmed.
70
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The second expropriation action filed by the City was against John Albion Saxton, who 
owned one lot within the auditorium site.  The newspaper reported the property address as 1222 
St. Peter Street, but this would have been incorrect as the even-side of St. Peter Street was not 
within the project footprint.
71
  In this case, the City alleged, Mr. Saxon not only refused the 
City’s offers to purchase the property but invested in improvements in order to raise the value of 
the structure.  The city architect inspected the property and determined it to be in such a 
dilapidated state that the property must be immediately repaired or demolished.  Following this 
inspection, the property owner had the property repaired to meet the City’s standards, but the 
City’s attorneys maintained that these repairs were made in bad faith and that the City should not 
be required to pay for the improvements or the increased property value.
72
   In this case, prior to 
filing expropriation actions, the City made a final offer of $4,200 on this property but the owner 
maintained that the true value was $10,000; the jury determined the fair value of this property to 
be $5,500.  While this was the second suit filed, this matter was the last to be disposed of at the 
trial court level.
73
 
The third expropriation suit filed by the City was for the property owned by J. Henry 
Blache, who, as was noted previously, was the primary proponent of the Congo Square location 
for the auditorium.  Mr. Blache purchased the property located at 703 St. Claude Avenue on June 
6, 1927 during the City’s evaluation of Congo Square as a potential site for the Municipal 
Auditorium.  The property was purchased for the inflated price of $18,500, which the City 
maintained was more than $7,000 above the assessed valuation and even further above the actual 
fair market value of the property.  Mr. Blache refused to enter into a private sale with the City 
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because they would not offer a price that would allow a profit over the speculative price paid for 
the property.  The City’s attorney, in the expropriation action filed with Civil District Court, 
stated that the “property is needed for the auditorium and the owner must yield the same to the 
city at its actual market value” and that Mr. Blache “cannot shift the burden or cost of his unwise 
speculation in the property onto the shoulders of the taxpayers.”74  
Prior to filing the expropriation suit, the City’s final offer was $16,500; Mr. Blache 
maintained that the fair value of the property was approximately $30,000.  The Court not only 
allowed testimony in the matter, but brought the jurors to inspect the property as part of the trial.  
Following testimony and a site inspection, and “after deliberating on the case for a few minutes 
the jury recommended that the city expropriate the property for the amount that the owner had 
paid for it,” $18,500.75 
The fourth, and final, expropriation action filed by the City to fully acquire the Municipal 
Auditorium site was filed against Domineque Salvatore, owner of the property addressed as 709-
13 St. Claude Street and 1214 Orleans Street.  In this case, the City was petitioning the Court to 
empanel a jury to determine the value of the structure as the parties had been unable to agree on 
a fair price.
76
 The City made a final offer of $9,500 and the Salvatores believed their property to 
be worth $25,000.  The jury established a value of $14,500 for the property
77
 which the 
Salvatores then appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court; on February 11, 1929, the Court 
upheld the valuation set by the trial court.
78
 
The site selected for construction of the Municipal Auditorium required the acquisition of 
twenty-four individual parcels.  Of these, the City only had to exercise its power of eminent 
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domain in four instances.  The City worked to avoid having to acquire private property, whether 
through expropriation or purchase, but bowed to public pressure to preserve the open space of 
Congo Square as a park. 
Subsequent to the City’s assembly of land for construction of the auditorium, the 
Commission-Council passed ordinance 11,115 CCS, revoking the rights-of-way along Orleans 
Street and St. Claude Street where these streets crossed the site for the auditorium, essentially 
creating a final, developable piece of land upon which the City’s new auditorium could be 
constructed.  Construction began in 1929 and the completed Municipal Auditorium was 
dedicated on May 30, 1930.
79
 
The Legacy 
 The Municipal Auditorium, completed in 1930, became a fixture of New Orleans cultural 
and recreational life through the remainder of the Twentieth Century.   
Figure 2.4 – Postcard depicting the newly constructed Municipal Auditorium80 
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Over the course of the decades the structure, as anticipated by Commissioner Klorer in his bond 
proposal to the Commission-Council accommodated a multitude of events and uses.  Generations 
of New Orleanians came to know the Auditorium as the venue of circuses and cultural events, 
graduations, and Mardi Gras balls and in the 1990s as a casino and hockey arena.  
 Harland Bartholomew’s civic center plan, with the Municipal Auditorium as a 
centerpiece was abandoned shortly after its adoption, presumably with the onset of the Great 
Depression.  When the City resurrected the plan for a new City Hall and Civic Center, the grand 
plan was retained but the location shifted to the corner of Poydras Street and Loyola Avenue 
(discussed in Chapter 4).  In the 1960s, the City undertook the creation of a Cultural Center, 
which became the site of present-day Armstrong Park (discussed in Chapter 6) with the 
Municipal Auditorium as a central fixture in this plan.  The Theatre of the Performing Arts was 
added to the site and is the only element of the initial Cultural Center plan which came to 
fruition.  
Figure 2.5 – City Auditorium taken from Rampart St. side – September 9, 1957.81 
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Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records. 
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 While the need, or at least the perceived need, for a new auditorium was readily accepted 
in New Orleans in the 1920s, the location of the new building was cause for substantial debate.  
Neighborhoods sought the economic boom that was sure to accompany the new auditorium and 
the business community was generally open on the location of the auditorium as long as it was 
built.  What should be noted, and what was absent in the municipal and newspaper records of 
this project, is the neighborhood in which the City chose to construct their new multi-million 
dollar auditorium.  If one refers back to the demographic data presented by the Playground 
Commission on the suitability of different areas for a new white-children’s playground, there is a 
figure that is somewhat masked.  Section “C,” defined as  the area generally bounded by St. Peter 
St., Esplanade Ave., N. Rampart St., and N. Claiborne Ave. was the area with the highest 
number of African-American children, and therefore likely the Section with the highest African-
American population.
82
  This Section is where land was taken to clear a development site for the 
Municipal Auditorium in order to preserve the adjacent white-children’s playground.  It would 
be a stretch to place racial motivations on the desire to construct a new auditorium or in the 
building of the local economy, but the same is not true of the claim that the leadership of New 
Orleans – commercial and governmental – simply did not consider or care about the impact on 
this neighborhood.  
 Ultimately, the location of the Auditorium was chosen based on pressure from North 
Rampart Street merchants and others in the business community hoping to profit from the 
presence of the new auditorium and the combination of local and convention traffic it would 
generate.  There are no records to indicate that there was any undue influence levied on the site 
selection process by those with a vested interest in the site, numerous individuals proposed sites 
and all, according to the official records of the City, were evaluated.  However, the most vocal 
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proponent of the Congo Square location, Mr. J. Henry Blache, was later revealed to have a 
personal stake in the selection of Congo Square as the site of the Municipal Auditorium.  When 
Mayor O’Keefe relented to public pressure and shifted the site to the adjacent occupied 
municipal squares, Mr. Blache came very close to losing in his speculative land deal but was able 
to convince a jury to award him compensation that would allow him to break even.   
 The case of Mr. Blache is the only instance where such speculation can be documented, 
but it is entirely possible that other properties within close proximity of Congo Square were 
purchased during site deliberations in hopes of cashing in on the presence of this new, 
municipally-funded tourist attraction.    
 The construction of the Municipal Auditorium was generally a success in terms of its 
stated goals.  As was outlined by Commissioner Klorer regarding the bond proposal, the 
structure could, and did, house carnival balls and community functions, create a home for opera 
and live theatre and accommodate conventions and trade shows; the structure also accomplished 
the goals of the Association of Commerce.  The Association aimed to make New Orleans a 
venue for conventions and tourism and the Municipal Auditorium created that element of the 
local economy. 
At the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, the Municipal Auditorium was utilized 
less for large events due to many other, larger venues being constructed in the intervening 
decades, though many Mardi Gras balls and high school graduations continued to call the 
structure home.  In 2005, the flooding associated with Hurricane Katrina filled the basement of 
the building and the structure suffered significant wind damage.  The City is yet to repair the 
structure or set a course for its future. 
 
 62 
Figure 2.6 – Current Condition of the Municipal Auditorium83 
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Chapter 3 
 
Public Housing in New Orleans: 
The Transition from Homes to Housing 
 
“The fundamental purpose of all government, whether state or municipal, 
is to protect the morals and the health of the people and to provide for their safety.   
All governmental activities, complicated as they are, have that simple end in view.” 
 - Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1938
1
 
 
 Public housing in the United States, as it developed in the twentieth century, originated 
with the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937, which for the first time placed responsibility for 
public housing within the federal bureaucracy. Prior to this Act, the Public Works 
Administration (PWA), a New Deal agency, began to issue loans to limited-dividend 
corporations for the construction of low-income housing under the auspices of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act.  The goal of these loans was to infuse money into the stagnant economy 
and provide jobs to the unemployed masses.  As a result of this experiment, a federal district 
court issued a ruling in 1935 which stated that the federal government’s power of eminent 
domain did not include takings to provide public housing or clear slums.
 2
  While the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that “taking one citizen’s property for the purpose of improving it 
and selling or leasing it to another, or for the purpose of reducing unemployment” was not within 
the scope of the federal government’s constitutional powers, they acknowledged that this same 
action would not necessarily be prohibited to the individual states or their political subdivisions 
under their separate constitutions.
3
  In 1936 a state court in New York held that local 
governments were empowered to seize property for slum clearance and public housing. This 
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ruling led the United States government to encourage local management of such projects and 
ultimately paved the way to the model of public housing that was authorized under the Wagner-
Steagall Housing Act of 1937.
 4
 
 While the federal government did not get into the business of public housing until 1937, 
consideration of such a program in New Orleans began in the late 1920s following a survey and 
subsequent report by Woofter, commissioned by the Institute of Social Justice and Religious 
Research, entitled Negro Problems in Cities.  The report summarized the living conditions of 
African-Americans in cities throughout the country, one of which was New Orleans.
5
 The 
Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) would later refer to this report in stating that 
“crowded and unsanitary conditions and the type of non-weather proof houses in New Orleans 
negro slums were large contributing factors in adult and infant mortality in this race of people.”6  
No physical progress was made in the development of public housing in New Orleans as a result 
of this report, but it did serve to raise awareness of the issue and bring a problem to the fore 
which would otherwise have been easily overlooked by those able to make a difference. 
 This chapter will focus on New Orleans’s adoption of public housing and how the 
policies that built HANO were formed, their impacts on the community and the acquisition of the 
real estate needed to carry out the vision of the housing reformers that dominated policy debates 
in the 1920s and 1930s which subsequently shaped the physical and cultural landscape of the 
City for decades more. While the use of HANO’s expropriation powers was minimal in the 
development of public housing, it was a matter of choice on the agency’s part, not legal 
necessity. The research presented here shows that HANO was fully cognizant of their eminent 
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domain authority, but were also aware that resorting to use of that authority without exhausting 
all possible alternative remedies would be highly unpopular, possibly leading to pushback 
against the housing reforms that were seen as necessary for the protection of the health and 
safety and New Orleanians.  
The Vision 
 Although the reported findings of the Institute of Social and Religious Research did not 
ultimately lead to improved housing conditions, steps were taken following the report that laid 
the foundation for the creation of HANO and the development of public housing.  In 1929, 
Moise Goldstein, a New Orleans architect, submitted preliminary plans and cost estimates to the 
Julius Rosenwald Fund for the development of new, improved housing for the African-American 
community.
7
 
 The plans developed by Mr. Goldstein called for the redevelopment of what was 
determined to be the worst African-American neighborhood in the city.  This model development 
was proposed for the site which would later be occupied by the Magnolia Project (later C. J. 
Peete, currently Harmony Oaks).  This proposal was submitted to the federal government, but 
due to the lack of a clear housing policy at the time, no action was taken on the application; 
housing conditions for the lowest-income sector of New Orleans’s population continued to 
decline.
8
 
 Through a field survey of two blighted areas in New Orleans conducted by the Civil 
Works Administration in 1933, the following conditions were revealed: of the 507 structures 
surveyed, only 7% were found to be in ‘good’ condition. The remainder broke down as follows: 
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45% ‘fair,’ 33% ‘poor,’ and 15% ‘dilapidated.’  Half of all units surveyed had only outdoor 
toilets and no other sanitary facilities. The survey also analyzed mortality statistics for these 
areas compared to New Orleans as a whole.  The study indicated that in 1932, the death rate for 
New Orleans as a whole was 16.11 per thousand of population while in these neighborhoods the 
rate was 25 per thousand.  The tuberculosis mortality rate was two times higher than the rate of 
the city as a whole and the syphilis and cancer rates were 40% higher.
9
 
 Around this same time, public health officials in the United States began to recognize that 
housing conditions are as much a concern to physical health as to social health. In a presentation 
to the American Public Health Association, Dr. Charles-Edward Winslow, a Public Health 
professor at the Yale School of Medicine, called on the public health community to “not be 
satisfied to condemn insanitary tenements” but to make take responsibility “to see that insanitary 
tenements are replaced by decent dwellings.”10 This call to action was reinforced by numerous 
studies which correlated high disease and mortality rates with poor housing conditions.  While it 
was understood that those residing in these conditions had little, if any, ability to improve their 
housing, this concern for general public health necessitated governmental action to provide safe, 
sanitary housing for even the poorest of Americans.
11
 
 The next step in the improvement of housing conditions in New Orleans was undertaken 
by the New Orleans Council of Social Agencies in 1933. This organization sponsored 
applications to the Emergency Relief Administration for the development of two housing 
projects in New Orleans, separate developments for African-Americans and for whites.  The 
Council of Social Agencies again contacted Mr. Moise Goldstein regarding the design of the 
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proposed African-American housing project, as there was general acceptance of his previous 
proposal.
12
  The firm of Owen and Underwood, local architects, was appointed to create a 
proposal for the project for whites, which would be constructed in the Irish Channel area (later 
constructed as the St. Thomas Project, currently the site River Gardens, a mixed-income housing 
development).
13
  By April of 1935, the applications for housing had been accepted by the federal 
government and the contracts were being prepared when the programs were suspended 
indefinitely.
14
 
This setback did not deter these committed members of the community from their pursuit 
of adequate and sanitary housing for the underprivileged of New Orleans.  During the 1936 
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the state passed a housing act which authorized 
any city in Louisiana with a population of greater than 20,000 to establish a municipal housing 
authority
15
 in order to take part in slum clearance activities and construction of replacement 
housing, under the sponsorship of the federal government.
16
  This legislation, Act 275 (House 
Bill 480) of the 1936 Regular Session, was projected to allow New Orleans to receive 
approximately $3,000,000 in federal funds for slum clearance and public housing.
17
  
Under the provisions of Act 275, a petition signed by twenty-five citizens was presented 
to the New Orleans Commission Council on September 18, 1936 requesting the authorization of 
a housing authority for the City of New Orleans.  At that time, the Commission Council adopted 
a resolution to formally create HANO.  Although HANO would operate as a separate entity from 
municipal government, the language of Act 275 called for local leadership to establish and 
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appoint the leadership of housing authorities.  In March of 1937, the members of the HANO 
Board were appointed by the Mayor and the Authority began operation.  The first meeting of the 
HANO Board was held on March 18, 1937 and resolutions were adopted to immediately 
undertake slum clearance and housing development as authorized by Act 275.
18
 
While the HANO Board and its Chair, Col. L. Kemper Williams, immediately began the 
task of working with the federal government to secure funding, no such funds were actually 
available.
19
  All funding for these activities was tied into the Housing Act, which was pending 
before Congress for the fifth time in as many sessions.
20
  While the State of Louisiana and the 
City of New Orleans undertook the necessary steps to qualify for federal funding as was 
proposed, no more progress could be made in furtherance of the program until action was taken 
in Washington, D.C. 
21
 
On September 1, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Wagner-Steagall 
Housing Act of 1937 into law
22
 and within days HANO submitted their applications to the 
newly-created United States Housing Authority (USHA), which had yet to be formally organized 
or staffed.
23
 The diligence and expeditious action of HANO paid off for the City of New 
Orleans; on March 18, 1938 USHA awarded a loan of $8,411,000 to HANO for the construction 
of low-income housing.  This award to HANO was the first in the nation awarded under the 
Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937.  Following this initial award, the USHA subsequently 
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awarded HANO approximately $30,000,000 more by the end of 1938 for slum clearance and 
housing projects within the city of New Orleans.
24
 
Although the federal funding commitment to New Orleans and HANO was substantial, 
there was an ever-present local understanding that public housing would only be utilized until the 
private housing sector could fill the demand for housing.  Additionally, there was a belief that 
public housing would satisfy a temporary need for low-income housing created by the financial 
realities of the Great Depression.
25
  While neither of these would ultimately prove to be the case, 
these were popular positions which allowed New Orleans to accept federally-backed slum-
clearance and public housing dollars at a time when a large percentage of New Orleanians were 
living in substandard conditions, and municipal leadership believed that the road to the future 
could be paved over the past.  
The creation of HANO marked the beginning of the municipal government taking part in 
providing housing, but it was not the first step that was taken in trying to improve the conditions 
of housing.  The City of New Orleans adopted its first building code in 1929, with the goal of 
improving housing conditions and ensuring the safety of structures.  Prior to this, the City only 
concerned itself with larger public concerns of fire hazards and structural stability.  Even with 
the adoption of a building code, there was no provision built into that ordinance to require 
compliance from existing structures and specifically excluded any structure built prior to 1919.  
Enforcement of the code was tasked to the City Architect’s office which did not have the staff to 
successfully implement the regulations.  Adding to the City’s inability to effectively require 
improvements to existing properties, the New Orleans Fire Department was not authorized to 
enforce local fire ordinances, but rather this authority was retained by the State Fire Marshal, 
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which led to lax enforcement and was subject to political interference by state officials.  
Additionally, health and sanitation guidelines were generally enforced broadly, such as relating 
to preventing outbreaks of disease, rather than as specifically applying to housing conditions. 
Not only did this allow substandard housing to remain occupied, but it did not provide any 
motivation to improve the conditions.
26
 
The Planning 
 As previously noted, planning for the implementation of public housing in New Orleans 
began almost a decade before there was a mechanism in place to fund such an endeavor.  
Through the late 1920s and through the 1930s, plans were crafted and refined in anticipation of 
federal dollars being made available to improve the housing conditions in low-income sections 
of the city.   
 The first housing survey of New Orleans was presented by Woofter in 1928 through the 
report commissioned by the Institute for Social and Religious Research (ISRR) as a part of a 
national study.  For this survey, the Institute’s researchers partnered with local housing advocates 
to survey the conditions of African-American neighborhoods and to gain information about the 
occupants thereof.  Figure 3.1 (below) illustrates the areas of New Orleans classified as African-
American neighborhoods for survey purposes. 
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Figure 3.1 – Distribution of African-Americans within New Orleans as of 1925.27 
 
The results of this survey revealed that living conditions for poor African-Americans in 
New Orleans in this era fell far short of the standards set forth by public health professionals as 
requirements for healthy communities.  Excess density of population and overcrowding within 
dwellings were two key elements targeted by early housing advocates as emblematic of the 
problems facing African-American communities.  Table 3.1 (below) indicates the population 
density of New Orleans in 1925.   
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Table 3.1 – Density of Population in New Orleans, 1925 (with densities of African-American 
neighborhoods broken down by Ward) 
28
  
Ward White African-American 
 Population Net Residence 
Area (Acres) 
Density 
per Acre 
Population Net 
Residence 
Area (Acres) 
Density per 
Acre 
 304,700 22,038 14 109,380 3,671 30 
1, 2, 10, 
11, 12 
   38,700 845 46 
Lower     
1 & 10 
   6,800 180 38 
7    11,500 298 39 
4, 5, 6    18,500 576 32 
Upper    
14 & 16 
   3,230 115 28 
Lower 16    1,750 72 24 
3    9,800 427 23 
Lower    
12 & 13 
   5,400 255 21 
Algiers    4,700 355 13 
17    3,800 317 12 
Industrial 
Canal 
   3,300 327 10 
 
As seen here, and reported by ISRR, the density of the average, primarily African-American 
neighborhood in New Orleans was more than twice that of white neighborhoods.
29
  The findings 
presented for New Orleans appeared to have been within the density standard of approximately 
thirty-five persons per acre set forth by the U.S. Housing Corporation at the time.  Though the 
numbers were within these limitations they were presented as being out of character for the 
community as a whole and therefore substandard.
30
   
 The standard by which ‘overcrowding’ was measured was an occupancy of two or more 
persons per room within a dwelling.  In their 1925 survey of New Orleans, ISRR found that 
16.5% of all African-American dwelling units exceeded this standard. In some instances, this 
                                                 
28
 Woofter, (1928), compilation of Tables VII and VIII at 79 and 80. 
29
 To clarify the data presented by Woofter, the Institute of Social and Religious Research defined an area with a 
population of over 90% African-American as a “Negro Area.”  Woofter, (1928), at 37. 
30
 Woofter, (1928). 
 73 
overcrowding was found to be attributable to the presence of lodgers who were taken in as 
tenants to off-set some of the costs of living; in New Orleans it was found that 6% of African-
American families had lodgers present at the time of the ISRR survey.
31
 
 By the early part of the 1930s, little was officially known of the physical housing 
conditions in New Orleans, except “that the amount of bad housing there is considerable.”32 In 
the 1933 survey of blighted areas conducted by the Civil Works Administration, almost half of 
all dwelling units were classified as being in poor or dilapidated condition.  Further, the property 
survey indicated a “prevalence of small dark rooms, inadequately lighted and ventilated 
[structures], and of tenement and alley buildings ‘without sanitary facilities which lead to right 
living’” as factors which led to higher incidences of illness and death within these communities 
than in the city as a whole.  Additional factors used to determine the conditions of housing, and 
the resultant percentages of the study are indicated below: 
Table 3.2 Condition of Living Units
33
 
Nature of Fault 
Percent 
of Total 
 Nature of Fault 
Percent 
of Total 
Leaking roof 13.85  Unsafe stairs 10.47 
Leaking plumbing 4.39  Broken windows 22.64 
Unsafe walls 16.22  Poor drainage in yard 22.97 
Unsafe floors 18.92    
 
This general understanding of the prevalence of ‘bad housing’ in New Orleans was reinforced by 
HANO’s own later findings. Data presented in 1938 by HANO indicated that there were a total 
of 55,170 substandard dwelling units prior to any slum clearance activities, the total number of 
dwelling units in the city at that time was 135,780; this means that in 1937, approximately 41% 
of all dwelling units were considered substandard.  To put this statistic in terms of individuals, 
these 55,170 dwelling units were occupied by approximately 72,000 families (or approximately 
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225,000 individuals).
34
  In the 1930 Census, the population of New Orleans was tabulated as 
458,762.
35
  These numbers indicate that approximately half of the city’s population resided in 
housing that was considered to be substandard. 
In the first annual report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans, HANO released 
summary of the findings which led to their selection of sites to be cleared and redeveloped with 
public housing. The proposed sites were generally located as follows:
36
 
 Project LA-1-1 (St. Thomas): Generally bounded by St. Thomas 
Street, Josephine Street, Laurel Street and Felicity Street. (For white 
occupancy.) 
 
 Project LA-1-2 (Magnolia): Generally bounded by Magnolia Street, 
Washington Avenue, La Salle Street, and Louisiana Avenue. (For 
African-American occupancy.) 
 
 Project LA-1-3 (Iberville): Generally bounded by North Robertson 
Street, St. Louis Street, North Saratoga Street, and Iberville Street. 
(For white occupancy.) 
 
 Project LA-1-4 (not constructed): Generally bounded by North 
Claiborne Avenue, St. Philip Street, St. Claude Street, and Orleans 
Street. (For white occupancy.) 
 
 Project LA-1-5 (Lafitte): Generally bounded by North Rocheblave 
Street, Orleans Street, North Claiborne Avenue, and Lafitte Street. 
(For African-American occupancy.) 
 
 Project LA-1-6 (not constructed): Generally bounded by North 
Rocheblave Street, Dumaine Street, North Roman Street, and 
Orleans Street. (For African-American occupancy.) 
 
 Project LA-1-7 (Calliope): Generally bounded by South Claiborne 
Avenue, Calliope Street, South Broad Street, and Erato Street. (For 
African-American occupancy.) 
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 Project LA-1-8 (not constructed at proposed location): Generally 
bounded by North Galvez Street, Press Street, Louisa Street, and 
Florida Walk.
37
 (For white occupancy.) 
 
 Project LA-1-9 (not constructed): Generally bounded by South 
Saratoga Street, Poydras Street, and Tulane Avenue.
38
 (For white 
occupancy.) 
 
Projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 were those first proposed by HANO and ultimately the first 
redevelopment projects in the nation authorized under the Housing Act of 1937.  These proposals 
were crafted prior to the creation of HANO or the passage of enabling legislation and had been 
designed since 1934 through funding by the New Orleans Council of Social Agencies, as 
previously discussed. The remaining sites were selected by HANO through subsequent real 
estate and housing surveys of New Orleans. 
In 1938, a survey was conducted which focused on the areas later refined into Projects 
LA-1-3 and LA-1-5; this survey was sponsored by the Works Progress Administration and 
partially funded by HANO and the City’s Department of Public Welfare. Sites for LA-1-7 and 
LA-1-8 were determined due to their primarily vacant character rather than the presence of 
blight.  This was done to try to create the federally-mandated balance of housing units 
demolished to housing units constructed.   
To document the conditions at the proposed sites, HANO released a summary of their 
housing condition surveys, indicating the interior conditions found within each project area. This 
data is reproduced in Table 3.3 (below).  This data does not reflect the physical condition of the 
structures, but referring back to Table 3.2, partial information is available for Project Areas LA-
1-1 and LA-1-2. 
 
                                                 
37
 Project LA-1-8 became the St. Bernard Project and these initial boundaries were later changed to the area 
generally bounded by St. Bernard Avenue, Sere Street, Hamburg Street and Senate Street. 
38
 This site was eventually cleared and redeveloped as the Civic Center, see Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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Table 3.3 – Structural Condition Tabulation of Tenant Relocation Department Survey39 
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LA-1-1 513 451 183 116 129 41 37 78 92 1 42 207 
LA-1-2 869 854 471 168 309 70 127 311 226 31 116 454 
LA-1-3 723 714 485 168 364 101 196 341 329 5 229 476 
LA-1-5 567 532 172 171 141 40 27 81 138 2 27 220 
LA-1-7 25 25 8 2 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 10 
LA-1-8 67 64 35 33 32 9 0 1 40 1 1 62 
 2764 2640 1354 658 978 263 387 814 925 40 415 1429 
 
While this data provides only a snapshot of dwellings located within the project 
boundaries, HANO officials believed that these findings were applicable to the conditions which 
would be found throughout the city in structures deemed ‘substandard.’ These findings were 
summarized in the statement that “there is on every hand desolation, despair, squalor, poverty, 
frustration – the whole sordid and dangerous group of sinister elements that form the component 
parts of a slum.”40 Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, below, are composite photographs presented by 
HANO in their Annual Reports to illustrate the conditions of structures within the boundaries of 
the proposed project sites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Reproduced from Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 
31, 1938, at 27.  NOTE: The findings presented for Project LA-1-8 reflect conditions in the originally proposed 
location, not the revised project boundaries noted in footnote 36, above. 
40
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 31, 1938, at 26. 
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Figure 3.2 – Composite photograph of existing conditions within the LA-1-2 site.41 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – Composite photograph of existing conditions within the LA-1-3 site. 42 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939.  Accessed from the 
New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division. 
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Figure 3.4 – Composite photograph of existing conditions within the LA-1-5 site. 43 
 
 
HANO outlined their site selection guidelines both in terms of the benefit that would 
ultimately occur through the construction of housing and the benefits to be realized through the 
removal of substandard and slum housing. Specifically, since HANO understood its mission to 
be two-fold: HANO officials intentionally selected sites that would allow for the removal of a 
large number of slum properties while simultaneously providing the services and amenities that 
were viewed as beneficial to future tenants.  
In selecting project locations, HANO also considered the accessibility of transportation, 
proximity to schools, recreational and community resources, and availability of medical services.  
According to HANO, attention was also paid to the City’s plan for future development.  
Particularly, they looked at where investments were proposed for playgrounds and street 
improvements so that they could adequately plan their housing developments to “harmonize with 
                                                 
43
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939. 
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these other developments.”44  While cost of property acquisition was not officially reported by 
HANO as a factor in the site selection process, it is logical to conclude that since their focus was 
on removing the worst slum conditions in the City these areas would have likely been the some 
of the lowest priced tracts of land that met the criteria of being integrated into the larger 
community insofar as schools, transportation, and other resources. 
In retrospect, another element likely factored into the site selection process was the 
possibility of public opposition.  Certainly the sites proposed by HANO for redevelopment 
would have met their stated criteria, but there was likely an eye to public relations in the site 
selection. Only Projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 were located in densely populated neighborhoods.  
The subsequent projects moved to less densely developed areas; Thayer (1979) notes that 
“Iberville (LA-1-3) and Lafitte (LA-1-5) replaced the dead “Storyville” area which had before 
their construction been a wasteland of sorts” and that “Calliope (LA-1-7) was on vacant land 
near an industrial area;”45 while St. Bernard (LA-1-8) was a considerable distance from the 
center of the city and was disconnected from the adjoining neighborhoods by rail lines. 
Additionally, the St. Bernard site was owned by an investment company that was holding vacant, 
fringe property for future development; Thayer (1979) states that the construction of the St. 
Bernard development on this tract was to bail out investors that had been unable to otherwise sell 
off the site.  Whether accurate or not, the selection of this location for development of a housing 
project brought at least the appearance of impropriety into the HANO site selection process.
46
   
In addition to the unclear site selection policies employed by HANO, it also appears that 
their operational policies evolved over time.  Projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 were constructed on 
land cleared specifically for that purpose.  This caused the city’s housing crisis to be magnified 
                                                 
44
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 31, 1938, at 22. 
45
 Thayer (1979), at 62.  Parenthetical Project Number references added for clarity. 
46
 Thayer (1979). 
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since those least able to find decent housing were made homeless while new housing was 
constructed.   This problem seems to have also factored into HANO’s site selection process.  As 
discussed above, as these redevelopment projects progressed, HANO moved to less populated 
areas for the construction of public housing. This would have likely had as much to do with the 
availability of underdeveloped or undeveloped land as it had to do with minimizing displacement 
of those who needed assistance the most.  This policy led to the construction of new housing on 
available tracts and subsequent demolitions of slum housing in other areas to meet the Housing 
Act’s requirement of an equal number of dwellings demolished as created.47 
Within the developments, the proposed changes could not have been more dramatic; 
replacing the dense, substandard housing detailed above would be large, modern apartment 
buildings.  While the sizes of the structures and individual units would vary, the elements of the 
living units would be uniform.  Each unit would be equipped with the conveniences of modern 
life: gas ranges and heaters, electric refrigerators, bath tubs, and laundry sinks.  The sites would 
be designed with structures covering approximately 25% of the total site area to allow an 
“abundance of fresh air and sunshine.”48  While each site was individually designed, the general 
concept for all of the proposed project sites was similar. Figures 3.5 and 3.6, below, illustrate 
HANO’s vision for public housing for two of the redevelopment sites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 31, 1938, at 28. 
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Figure 3.5 – Proposed layout, in perspective, for Project LA-1-2.49 
 
 
Figure 3.6 – Proposed layout, in perspective, for Project LA-1-7.50 
 
 
 Though, as the Times-Picayune indicated, there was general agreement as to the necessity 
of these projects, both in terms of the jobs to be created by construction and the housing itself, 
actually beginning the projects proved to be a difficult task.  According to a Times-Picayune 
editorial on September 6, 1938, HANO was facing issues with acquiring the land necessary to 
begin clearance and subsequent construction.  Despite the fact that HANO was the first local 
                                                 
49
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 31, 1938. 
50
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939. 
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housing authority in the nation to receive a commitment of federal funds, there were 78 projects 
in other communities which were either complete or under construction before HANO had even 
completed site acquisition to begin the proposed redevelopment.
51
 
 The impact of these undertakings, according to HANO, was substantial.  According to the 
HANO 1939 Annual Report, expenditures for the several projects through the end of 1939 
totaled $2,654,119.95 in land acquisition, $674,970.52 in wages, and $1,106,064.20 in materials.  
These dollars would then flow back into the local, regional, and national economies in the form 
of new jobs and increased salaries in associated industries.  HANO also believed that the benefits 
accrued by these projects were not only economic, but that “the benefits to future tenants of these 
homes cannot be measured in dollars and cents as human misery and discomfort cannot be so 
measured.”52  However, in an attempt to quantify human misery, HANO noted that the decreases 
in juvenile delinquency and infant mortality in addition to generally improved health in these 
areas would “result in savings to the city far in excess of the amounts that would have been 
received in taxes on the property occupied by the projects when privately owned.”53 
The Land Assembly 
 In their 1938 Annual Report, HANO noted that “[b]y the end of January, 1938 the firm of 
Ernest A. Carrere’s Sons reported that 45% of the necessary property in the white area (Project 
LA-1-1) and 47% of the necessary property in the Negro area (Project LA-1-2) had been covered 
by options.” Early in the planning process, HANO began contemplating the best course of action 
for the acquisition of the property required for their proposed slum clearance and redevelopment 
projects. This led to the appointment of a real estate firm (Ernest A. Carrere’s Sons) to begin 
gathering signed purchase options on properties within the two targeted areas in late 1937.   
                                                 
51
 Times-Picayune, September 6, 1938, at 14, accessed via www.newsbank.com. 
52
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939, at 43. 
53
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939, at 44. 
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 According to HANO, the policy pursued in the acquisition of property was one of “equity 
and fairness.”54 To that end, HANO hired a team of real estate professionals to individually 
appraise every property within the sites selected for redevelopment.  These appraisals were then 
forwarded to USHA for review and independent analysis.  Once the property values were 
established under this mechanism, HANO’s real estate team would then work with the individual 
property owners to obtain purchase options on the properties.
55
  
 The specific demographics of the property owners and residents within these areas is 
unknown; however, based on the data presented by Woofter (1928), both areas to be occupied by 
these new housing developments were predominantly occupied by African-Americans.  Figures 
3.6 and 3.7, below, present Woofter’s population distribution and density maps with the 
locations of the St. Thomas and Magnolia housing developments indicated.  
Figure 3.7 – Distribution of African-Americans within New Orleans as of 1925, with general 
locations of St. Thomas (red) and Magnolia (green) Housing Developments indicated.
56
 
 
                                                 
54
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939, at 12. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Woofter, (1928), Map XIV-A, New Orleans, Louisiana, at 62. Red and green indications added by author. 
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Figure 3.8 – Population Density of African-Americans within New Orleans as of 1925, with 
general locations of St. Thomas (red) and Magnolia (green) Housing Developments indicated.
57
 
 
 
It should be noted that based on these population density maps the locations selected for 
establishment of the first two housing projects served to reinforce racial separations within New 
Orleans.  The location of the Magnolia development in the Central City neighborhood (indicated 
in green, above) placed the African-American housing development within a concentrated 
African-American neighborhood while the St. Thomas site would have the effect of removing a 
growing African-American population from an otherwise predominantly white area of the 
community (indicated in red, above).  The official records of HANO do not reflect that racial 
homogeneity outside of their immediate developments was intended or anticipated, but it is 
reasonable to assert that it would have been more popular to propose housing for whites in an 
otherwise white neighborhood than to propose publicly-funded integration of a community.   
                                                 
57
 Woofter, (1928), Map XIV-B, New Orleans, Louisiana, at 63. Red and green indications added by author. 
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This appraisal process worked well at the onset of the project, according to HANO, but 
by the autumn of 1938 some property owners began demanding higher prices for their properties 
than HANO would be able to pay. The belief at the time was that due to properties being taken 
for use as housing projects, the government should be willing to pay a premium for the required 
land. HANO immediately went on the offensive against this position and stated that if the 
properties could not be acquired at a price that HANO deemed reasonable, they would have to 
look to other sites for redevelopment. While HANO would have been within their statutory 
authority to seek title to the required properties through expropriation, they appeared to be 
unwilling to take that route so early on in the redevelopment process.  Instead, they coordinated a 
public relations attack with the Times-Picayune; according to HANO, “[t]he newspapers assisted 
the Authority in moulding (sic) public opinion upon the issue, pointing out the grave civic risk 
being incurred by some scattered instances of unreasonable selfishness on the part of a few 
owners.”58 
 One must assume that the prices HANO and USHA arrived at would have been fair based 
on the local appraisals and subsequent independent review, but it appears that the demands made 
by property owners was, at least in some instances, about more than greed.  The Times-Picayune 
ran an article entitled “Owners Protest Prices Proposed in Housing Area:  Business Proprietors 
Say Appraisal Left Out Good Will Item,” which outlined the objections of business owners 
within the housing project sites.  According to this article, these individuals believed that not 
only were the prices offered for the actual real estate unacceptable, but that their businesses 
would suffer from having to leave a neighborhood where they were known, and reestablish in a 
new neighborhood.  As one business owner stated: “[w]e are perfectly willing to sell our 
                                                 
58
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939, at 13. 
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properties and look for new business locations, if necessary even going into new territories in the 
city, if the housing authority pays us what we think our present locations are worth.”59 
 While HANO initially planned to acquire all property through negotiated purchases, they 
were aware that doing so might not have ultimately proved successful.  To prepare for an 
eventual exercise of eminent domain, HANO requested that the State Attorney General initiate 
legal proceedings that would allow the courts to determine if the exercise of eminent domain for 
the purpose of slum clearance and redevelopment as public housing would be constitutionally 
permissible. The case progressed through the courts during 1938, and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court ultimately ruled that both slum clearance and public housing were public purposes for 
which eminent domain may be exercised.
60
 
 The final resolution of the Attorney General’s suit was rendered on September 28, 1938, 
and by this point HANO had come to believe that most, if not all, properties within project sites 
LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 whose purchase could be negotiated had been.  The October 23, 1938 
edition of the Times-Picayune announced that HANO would begin filing expropriation suits 
within days in order to complete land acquisition on those sites so that redevelopment could 
begin.  By announcing the pending legal action via letter to property owners and subsequently in 
the press, HANO’s legal department was of the “opinion that some of the remaining holdouts, 
particularly those cases where the margin of difference between their price and the offer of the 
authority is slight, will come to agreement before the institution of court action.”61  
 Apparently the legal department’s belief was correct. HANO announced in their 1938 
Annual Report that through initiation of condemnation proceedings, property owners who had 
                                                 
59
 Times-Picayune, September 24, 1938, at 19, accessed via www.newsbank.com. 
60
 State ex. rel. Porterie, Atty Gen. v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, et al. 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938). 
61
 Times-Picayune, October 23, 1938, at 8, accessed via www.newsbank.com. 
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been holding out for higher prices were ‘induced’ to sign purchase options without legal 
proceedings.
62
 
 While later academic research indicates that approximately half of the required property 
for Project LA-1-1 and all of the property for Project LA-1-2 were acquired through eminent 
domain, it is unclear where these findings originate.
63
  Unfortunately for this investigation, the 
property transfer records for these sites have not been retained by the Real Estate and Records 
Division of the Department of Property Management for the City of New Orleans.  HANO’s 
early Annual Reports indicate that the agency had to resort to expropriation “[i]n a few cases – 
but none of an extreme character – [when] the Authority and the property owners failed to agree 
upon valuation.”64 
 This pattern of primarily negotiated purchases with occasional expropriations appears to 
be supported by the reporting of the Times-Picayune.  On October 23, 1938 the Times-Picayune 
published an article entitled “Expropriation of Sites in Low-Rent Project Area to Begin.”  In this 
article, the newspaper reported that HANO was preparing to file its first round of expropriation 
suits for property acquisition within the Project LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 areas;
65
 five days later, on 
October 28, 1938, the newspaper published a second story, announcing that HANO had filed a 
second round of expropriation suits for an additional three properties within the Project LA-1-2 
site.
66
  
 While the reporting of the Times-Picayune cannot be expected to chronicle every 
expropriation proceeding initiated in the furtherance of these projects, its reporting does provide 
that the following properties were taken via judicial ruling rather than by negotiated purchase: 
                                                 
62
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 31, 1938. 
63
 Thayer (1979), at 53-54. 
64
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 31, 1938, at 14. 
65
 Times-Picayune, October 23, 1938, at 8, accessed via www.newsbank.com 
66
 Times-Picayune, October 28, 1938, at 16, accessed via www.newsbank.com 
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 Project LA-1-167 
o 801 St. Andrew Street 
 
 Project LA-1-268 
o 3317 South Robertson Street 
o 3323 South Robertson Street 
o 2606 Belmont Place 
 
Through an analysis of print journalism of the era and HANO’s self-reporting, it is clear that 
expropriation was not a desired route in property acquisition for the furtherance of public 
housing in New Orleans, and was viewed as a necessary step in completing land assembly for 
slum clearance so that the larger project of housing poor families could move forward.  For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the review of newspaper reports was limited to expropriations for 
Projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 due to two considerations: the first being that these were the first 
two sites developed and acquired by HANO for slum clearance and public housing; the second 
being that these were the most densely populated areas of the sites to be redeveloped. 
 By January 19, 1939, the Times-Picayune announced that HANO would begin title 
transfers for properties within the Project LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 areas.  At this time HANO had 
obtained purchase options on all negotiated purchases and final judgments had been rendered in 
the few cases where expropriation suits had to be prosecuted. The total cost for property 
acquisitions within the two sites was reported to be $1,750,000 paid to approximately 400 
individual property owners for 1,300 dwellings.
69
 Table 3.4 (below) reflects HANO’s property 
acquisition costs through the end of 1939 for projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 as well as the other 
three active projects which were under development at the time. 
 
                                                 
67
 Times-Picayune, December 15, 1938, at 23, accessed via www.newsbank.com 
68
 Times-Picayune, November 22, 1938, at 28, accessed via www.newsbank.com 
69
 Times-Picayune, January 19, 1939, at 3, accessed via www.newsbank.com 
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Table 3.4: Total Site Area and Land Acquisition Costs for Projects as of December 31, 1939.
70
 
 
Total 
parcels 
in area 
Total 
squares 
in area 
Total square 
footage of area 
Total cost 
for area 
Average 
cost per 
square foot 
Average cost 
per square 
foot in 2012 
dollars
71
 
LA-1-1 237 13 1,226,979 $1,046,239 $0.853 $14.05 
LA-1-2 152 11 774,728 $878,574 $1.134 $18.69 
LA-1-3 192 11 760,484 $906,460* $1.247* $19.65 
LA-1-5 260 16 939,987 $760,783* $0.882* $13.34 
LA-1-7 27 14 1,220,472 $170,000 $0.139 $2.30 
 * Site acquisition was not complete for these Projects as of December 31, 1939.  Data presented is the amount of  
  total signed purchase options and resultant average cost per square foot as of this date. 
 
The Legacy 
 Though this chapter only discusses the planning and implementation of the first several 
housing projects constructed by HANO, it is important to note that New Orleans’s experiment in 
public housing did not end with the close of the Great Depression or Second World War.  
Through the late 1940s into the 1960s HANO, with the backing of federal dollars provided under 
the Housing Act of 1949, continued to grow.  This growth was in the number of projects, the 
number of buildings within individual projects, and percentage of the New Orleans population 
residing in public housing.   
 The Housing Act of 1949 altered the financing scheme for public housing throughout the 
country and the aim was to “remedy the observed defects of earlier housing laws and to provide 
new opportunities to address the housing issue.”72 What this meant to New Orleans specifically 
was that approximately $18,000,000 would be flowing to the city through HANO for slum 
clearance and redevelopment.  The initial plan announced by HANO for use of this funding was 
                                                 
70
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939, at 11-12. 
71
 Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculations via the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (www.bls.gov).  
72
 Thayer (1979), at 73. 
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to acquire and clear slum properties which would then be sold to the private sector for 
redevelopment, with initial focus on the “fringes of the civic center site.”73 This plan would later 
be abandoned after the Louisiana Legislature modified urban renewal enabling statutes in 1954. 
Following this modification, HANO would be prohibited from expropriating private property 
and transferring or leasing it to a third party for redevelopment (see further discussion of 
Louisiana’s limitations on urban renewal in Chapter 6). 
 In addition to this funding, the Housing Act of 1949 allocated additional dollars for use in 
the expansion of traditional public housing.  As under the Housing Act of 1937, HANO was the 
first local housing authority in the nation to be awarded funds under this section of the Housing 
Act of 1949.  Upon receipt of these funds, HANO announced that 5,000 units would be added to 
their inventory across the five existing housing developments, and that “[i]n each instance …, 
new construction will commence opposite an existing project or on an open space within it, so in 
effect, five projects will be increased in size.”74 Thayer (1979) notes that this announcement 
appears to have been met with no public debate as to how this would impact either conditions 
within the existing housing projects or the surrounding areas; the housing projects were initially 
designed to provide ample open space, as the density of development was seen as one of the 
urban ills that would be remedied through slum clearance. However, due to changes in 
conditions, it had become necessary to increase the density of developments without expanding 
public housing into new locations.
75
  
 As time progressed, HANO developed additional public housing projects; Fisher, Florida, 
Desire, and Guste were built in the late 1950s into the early 1960s to address the ever-increasing 
demand for publicly assisted housing in New Orleans.  The demand was so great that, upon 
                                                 
73
 Ibid, at 74. 
74
 Ibid, at 74, quoting Olin Linn (March 27, 1950), Chairman of the Housing Authority of New Orleans. 
75
 Ibid. 
 91 
completion in 1956, the 1,860-unit Desire development was inundated with approximately 4,000 
applications for housing.  What is important to note is that the Desire development was built in a 
difficult to access industrial area with little to offer in the way of community amenities.
76
  
 By the 1970s, New Orleans had the most public housing units per capita of all American 
cities, and HANO, as an agency, was financially struggling.
77
 In 1979 the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began to evaluate the performance of housing 
authorities nationwide based on specified performance indicators and contractual obligations 
under the Housing Acts under which financing was provided for public housing construction.  
Beginning with the first survey in 1979, HANO was designated as “troubled” by HUD.  By 
1994, HANO was ranked “as the worst performing large housing authority” in the nation.78  
Finally, in February of 1996, the Secretary of HUD declared that HANO was in breach of its 
contract with the federal government.  As a result of this breach, the HANO Board was dissolved 
and HUD appointed a federal administrator to oversee the operations of HANO.
79
  The HANO 
Board has not been reestablished and the agency remains under federal oversight as of the 
writing of this dissertation. 
 The legacy of HANO on the physical landscape of New Orleans remains present to this 
day.  Nearly all sites acquired for the establishment of public housing remain in use for that 
purpose; however the original physical improvements have been replaced at nearly every site.  
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Figure 3.9 – “Legacy Buildings” at River Garden (St. Thomas).80 
 
 
All of the original sites, with the exception of Project LA-1-3 (the Iberville Development), have 
been redeveloped in recent years to alleviate what had become superblocks of poverty. In the 
place of the original housing projects, HANO has sold the property to private developers for 
construction of mixed-use, mixed-income communities.  The only location of the first six sites 
where HANO’s original, lauded improvements remain is at the Iberville Development, though 
this site will soon be cleared to make way for redevelopment, which will comprise fewer 
dwelling units and would employ a mixed-income occupancy policy which would result in a 
substantial loss of dwelling units for poor residents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80
 Photograph by author. 
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Figure 3.10 – Mixed-Occupancy, Mixed-Income Structure at River Garden81 
 
 
These projects, by and large, restored the traditional urban street-grid of the city while attempting 
to recreate the historic architectural fabric of New Orleans.  HANO has now functionally 
evolved into a clearinghouse for public housing assistance rather than a large-scale provider of 
housing, though several of the projects developed in the 1950s and 1960s remain under direct 
control by HANO.  
  
  
                                                 
81
 Photograph by author. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The New Orleans Civic Center: 
Making a Modern City 
 
“Ladies and gentlemen: We are dedicating more than a structure.  I believe that in 
meeting here we are rededicating ourselves to the upholding of an honored task – the 
building of a greater community for ourselves and for our children.” 
 - Mayor de Lesseps S. Morrison, 1957
1
 
 
The Civic Center project symbolizes New Orleans’s introduction to what would become 
known as Urban Renewal, and began before the concept was brought into fashion with the 
Housing Act of 1949. The City’s Planning Director, Brooke Duncan, had been pitching the idea 
of a Civic Center to the Maestri administration, but the Mayor had not warmed to the idea. 
Following the election of deLesseps S. Morrison, his Administration seized the Civic Center 
proposal as an opportunity to both modernize city government and construct a legacy, and 
immediate action was taken to begin assembling the necessary real estate.
2
  Bauman notes that 
during World War II, American civic leaders were enamored with the image of a “deslummed, 
beautiful… city,”3 with this vision culminating in the Housing Act of 1949.  Blight was 
commonly viewed as a cancer on urban environments with the only treatment found in the form 
of planning and urban revitalization.  
This diagnosis did not escape Mayor Morrison. Upon assuming office in 1946, Morrison 
urged increased city planning and announced that the clearance of slums would begin in order to 
address the City’s housing shortage.  Morrison’s newly named director of housing, Robert 
                                                 
1
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Morrow, stated that by his estimation, the City was facing a housing shortage amounting to 
15,000 units.  In response, the Mayor presented a plan to create 18,000 units of low-rent housing.  
This specific endeavor did not come to fruition, and Morrison began exploring other physical 
changes that would show progress towards the creation of a modern New Orleans.
4
   
The Vision 
 The Civic Center, a centralized home for City government, was adopted as the physical 
embodiment of the changes proposed by Mayor Morrison in his defeat of the political machine 
of Mayor Maestri.  Morrison proposed to revise the City’s charter, modernize and streamline 
municipal government, and reorganize personnel within the bureaucracy; the construction of a 
new government complex was the perfect visual image to reflect those reforms and an ideal 
opportunity to trumpet his goal of planning a modern city.
5
 
Planning, as a professional municipal undertaking, began in New Orleans with the 
creation of the New Orleans City Planning and Zoning Commission in 1923.  Among the first 
substantial actions of this Commission was retaining the services of Harland Bartholomew and 
Associates, of St. Louis, Missouri; the Bartholomew Report was the first document created by 
this new commission and served as the foundation of planning in New Orleans.  As part of this 
report, Bartholomew recommended the creation of a municipal center, complete with new 
buildings to modernize city services.
6
  Bartholomew proposed this center to focus on Orleans 
Street in the Vieux Carré, as homage to the original seat of colonial and municipal government at 
the Cabildo. The report and its recommendations were adopted by the Planning and Zoning 
Commission but were not acted upon.  This inaction was partly due to increasing property values 
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in the Vieux Carré, it was also partially attributable to the interest in preserving the historic core 
of the city that gained substantial popularity in the 1920s.  Almost two decades later, the plan 
was dusted off and brought back to the fore by Brooke Duncan, then the Director of the Real 
Estate Utility Department, with one critical change – the location of the ‘Civic Center’ – which 
was now proposed to occupy a neighborhood adjacent to the Central Business District which had 
been deemed blighted.
7
 
Figure 4.1 – Times-Picayune Illustration of the Civic Center and other public improvements 
(Civic Center site outlined in red).
8
 
 
The Civic Center promised several things at the outset: 1) to “eliminate … a squalid 
slum;” 2) boost property values in the booming Central Business District; and 3) centralize 
municipal government.
9
  In addition to these proposed goals of the project, the City would gain 
the ability to guide the growth of the Central Business District in the direction of its choosing.  
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As an added benefit to the City’s endeavor, this location – between what was the existing Central 
Business District and Charity Hospital (and a proposed Veteran’s Administration Hospital) – was 
among the “lowest priced property available to the central business section.”10 The appraised 
value of the property made possible the acquisition of a site large enough to not only construct a 
new building for the New Orleans municipal government, but would allow for the development 
of a true Civic Center complex.  
 The proposal, as laid out in 1945 by Brooke Duncan, called for the acquisition of eight 
municipal squares in the area generally bounded by Gravier, South Saratoga (now Loyola 
Avenue), Poydras and LaSalle Streets.  This would allow six entire municipal squares for 
construction of governmental buildings, with two squares being dedicated to open space to serve 
both the Civic Center and the state’s Charity Hospital.  In addition to the assembly of property 
for the construction of the Civic Center, the plan also called for a portion of this land to be 
dedicated as a right-of-way to allow the widening of South Saratoga Street (now Loyola 
Avenue).  This would be required under the plan to provide improved automobile access to the 
new center of local government while also creating a grand boulevard to connect the City’s 
Municipal Auditorium and the newly-constructed Union Passenger Terminal.   
 To further the City’s goal of slum clearance, the 1945 preliminary plan also contemplated 
private investment in the areas surrounding the Civic Center.  Specifically, Mr. Duncan 
envisioned parking garages, parking lots, and hotels to serve not only the new Civic Center but to 
serve all of this new northern extension of the Central Business District.  By removing “one of 
the worst slum conditions that now exists in New Orleans,”11 the City would be opening the 
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doors to development that had been retarded by the presence of “tenement buildings of no 
economic value.”12 
 There is little detailed information available on the condition of this neighborhood in the 
official records, but to counter this description of the community to be cleared from the New 
Orleans landscape, one can look to the depiction of this community provided by one of its 
renowned native sons, Louis Armstrong.  In his autobiography, Satchmo: My Life in New 
Orleans, Armstrong describes the neighborhood as poor but functioning, and provides depth to 
an area otherwise portrayed as simply a slum to be eradicated.  There were honkey-tonks (which 
would later become the first jazz clubs), shops, a school, and churches; all elements which make 
for what would now be described as a walkable community.  Armstrong recounts his youth as 
being a part of this neighborhood.  He attended the Fisk School, gained an interest in music from 
the churches and neighborhood bands, sold papers on the streets, and lived near the intersection 
of Liberty and Perdido Streets (approximately where the main entrance of City Hall is now 
located). It is also in this neighborhood that a young Louis Armstrong was given the opportunity 
to play in quasi-professional bands and was, from time-to-time, employed as a coronet player in 
the honkey-tonks or brothels found in this part of the City. 
13
 
 By the time the Civic Center was being proposed to occupy this area, the neighborhood 
had been in decline for some time.  Fields (2004) tracks the changes in this neighborhood 
through the perspective of urban morphology, and while the specific morphological study did not 
entirely overlap with the Civic Center site (only one square of the Civic Center is found in 
Fields’s study), the change is worth noting as representative of the area’s condition at the time 
the Civic Center was proposed.    
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In the period between 1908 and 1937, Fields found substantial reductions in the number 
of structures occupying municipal squares in the neighborhood of what would become the Civic 
Center. Of these noted changes, calculated on a municipal square by municipal square basis, the 
lowest was a reduction in total buildings of less than one percent, while the remaining eight 
squares studied showed losses ranging between 66% and 100%.
14
  This reduction in structures 
was partly due to more lucrative use of property as parking lots as automobiles came to dominate 
urban transportation.  The more profitable use of this space combined with the deteriorating 
conditions of the existing structures resulted in the vast swaths of parking which have since 
become the primary land use in the area directly abutting the Civic Center. 
 These losses account for only the number of buildings located within the study area and 
do not accurately portray the quality of neighborhood life.  This is perhaps better explained 
through the numerous neighborhood commercial services present in the area.  Fields found, 
through a survey of the 1938 Polk Directory of Businesses, that many groceries, clothiers, 
specialty shops, and offices existed in this area even after the large-scale loss of structures noted 
between 1908 and 1937.  While the area may not have been affluent, it was a functional, living 
New Orleans neighborhood.
15
 
 Though this was a functioning neighborhood, the City took the position that the area was 
in need of investment and substantial change that only governmental intervention could 
accomplish.  According to Mr. Duncan’s “Proposed Plan for a Central Municipal Center,” the 
area for his proposed Civic Center had already been proposed as a potential site for a federal 
housing project due to its blighted condition.  Rather than allowing the redevelopment potential 
of this location to be squandered in the form of government-assisted housing, the City took the 
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position that due to the site’s ideal location “for the convenience of the public -- for pedestrians, 
automobile, and public transportation” it would be ideal for the Civic Center.16  The City 
concluded that if this area was to be the subject of large-scale redevelopment, the end result 
should be a project that would add to the growing Central Business District rather than a use 
which would obstruct the commercial growth of the area.  This conclusion was probably on 
target, as the superblock-style development of the federally-funded housing projects would likely 
have created a boundary to commercial growth and prevented the Central Business District from 
expanding north of Loyola Avenue.  As for the housing needs of the city, Mr. Duncan’s proposal 
goes on to state that “[i]t is also a well known fact that there are numerous other similar slum 
areas, as bad or worse, that would be more suitable for residential use by the Housing Authority, 
and which could be acquired as cheaply, or at lower cost.”17 
The Planning 
 In the early to mid twentieth century, planning shared two themes: planning for 
preservation of the existing urban fabric and planning to create homogeneity by modernizing 
urban cores.  New Orleans experienced both during this period; the creation of the Vieux Carré 
Commission in 1925 symbolized the preservation element and the modernization element was 
represented by the City Planning and Zoning Commission, created in 1923.  As part of the City 
Planning and Zoning Commission’s goals of modernizing the city, plans were created for the 
removal of existing urban fabric and the reshaping of the Central Business District.
18
 
 The idea of a modernized metropolis was not uniquely New Orleanian, but fell into a 
larger, national goal of moving the country from the Great Depression and World War II into a 
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modern age, to be defined by automobiles, concrete, glass, and steel.  Plans to rescue declining 
downtowns and combat the draw of suburbia were commonplace across American cities, and 
many relied on the use of eminent domain to acquire and repurpose property to suit their often 
newly-adopted plans. This national movement led to the Housing Act of 1949, through which the 
federal government would provide up to three-quarters of funding for projects which would 
remove slums and clear land for redevelopment.
19
  To place the Civic Center into a national 
context, it is worth noting that while the project began in 1947, the City of New Orleans filed an 
application with the federal government in 1950.  The application was approved and funding was 
provided to the City to offset the architectural design costs of the new Civic Center complex.
20
 
 Under the Housing Act of 1949, many cities across the United States undertook similar 
redevelopment schemes as that proposed as New Orleans’s Civic Center. The Housing Act 
contained two separate elements: one element dealing directly with the provision of public 
housing and one dealing with slum clearance and urban redevelopment. The public housing 
element of the Housing Act authorized a total of 810,000 public housing units nationally through 
1955 but, as Mohl (1993) notes, by 1960 only 320,000 units were actually constructed. The true 
impact of the Housing Act of 1949 came from the second element of the Act which provided 
funding for the removal of blighted and sub-standard housing units.  This portion of the law was 
seized upon and used in cities throughout the United States: “Big-city central business districts 
were rebuilt and modernized under the aegis of urban renewal legislation; look-alike glass and 
steel office towers transformed the urban skyline everywhere.”21 
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 Following the election of Mayor Morrison and his adoption of Brooke Duncan’s plan for 
the construction of a modern Civic Center complex, initial steps were taken to acquire the 
requisite property to implement the vision.  A bond election was called in the spring of 1947 to 
sell $23.5 millions dollars of municipal bonds.  This bond issue was to provide $12 million for 
an ongoing rail-grade separation project for rail lines serving the newly constructed Union 
Passenger Terminal, $10.5 million for street improvements throughout the city, and $1 million 
for Civic Center site acquisition.
22
 
 Prior to this bond issuance, an assessment was performed to approximate the cost of 
acquiring the land needed to construct the Civic Center.  The Civic Center was to occupy 
approximately eight municipal squares; Table 4.1 (below) indicates the existing development of 
the municipal squares as of October 8, 1946; and the total estimated cost for site acquisition 
came to $456,360.   
Table 4.1 – Development and Value of Civic Center site23,24   
Square 303 Partial Square, owned by City of New Orleans 
Square 304 
33 lots, 2 common alleys 
Land: $60,400, Improvements: $16,720 
Square 305 
36 lots, 2 common alleys 
Land: $50,400, Improvements: $19,600 
Square 332 
37 Lots, 3 Common Alleys 
Land: $43,100, Improvements: $9,680 
Square 333 
33 Lots, 2 Common Alleys 
Land: $49,100, Improvements: $8,900 
Square 334 
28 Lots, 2 Common Alleys 
Land: $88,600, Improvements: $31,100 
Square 340 
39 Lots 
Land: $41,000, Improvements: $10,100 
Square 341 
26 Lots 
Land: $33,800, Improvements: $3,860 
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 The Bureau of Governmental Research (“BGR”) released their “Special Report on 
Proposed $23,500,000 Bond Issue” just before the bond election which was held on April 15, 
1947.  In this report, BGR noted that they were generally in favor of the bond issue and 
recommended approval, but expressed some concerns with the initial proposal, the possible site 
selection, and the cost of the overall development.  In the bond ordinance, the City did not state 
the specific location for the new Civic Center complex, though it had been stated that the 
municipal government was looking at land at Poydras and South Saratoga.  As there was no firm 
proposal for the development of the site or specific details on how the proposed consolidation of 
government would proceed, BGR was left to make a number of assumptions in their analysis.
25
 
 In their recommendation for approval of ‘Proposition 3’ of the 1947 bond election BGR 
makes two key assumptions in their analysis of the proposal: (1) the eventual widening of South 
Saratoga Street (Loyola Avenue) due to the presence of the Union Passenger Terminal, and (2) 
the slum conditions present within the neighborhood found at the intersection of South Saratoga 
and Poydras Streets.
26
  Again, it is worth noting that the language of the bond proposal did not 
lock the government into this location, nor did it specify this particular location for 
redevelopment under this urban renewal scheme.  Once the bond was passed, the City would be 
free to acquire land wherever it so desired for the purpose of developing a Civic Center.    
 A third assumption that BGR was forced to make due to a lack of specificity in the Civic 
Center proposal was in which elements of government would be consolidated into the new 
complex.  In their discussion of the Civic Center element of the 1947 bond proposal, BGR 
discusses the numerous buildings currently occupied by city government with an eye towards 
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moving all of these functions to the new Civic Center complex. Specifically, government was 
spread across City Hall (now Gallier Hall), the City Hall Annex, the Soule Building, the Howard 
Annex, the Old Criminal Courts Building, and the Board of Health Building; in addition, there 
was also the “New Courthouse Building” in the Vieux Carré (now the Louisiana Supreme 
Court).
27
 
 Among the arguments in opposition to the proposed Civic Center complex were the cost 
to eventually construct the proposed complex (estimated at $15-$20 million) and that the existing 
governmental offices were not inadequate but merely poorly maintained.  BGR suggested that as 
an alternative to land acquisition and the subsequent construction of a new municipal complex, 
the City could dedicate the proposed funding to renovation and retention of the existing 
government buildings rather than abandoning the current buildings in favor of a consolidated 
location and a brand new complex.  Certainly this argument must have had proponents in the 
general populace, but city leaders were dedicated to their new complex and the ‘renovate and 
retain’ argument did not appear to gain any traction with decision-makers.28 
 The bond election held on April 15, 1947 was a success for Mayor Morrison and the 
modernization of the City. All three bond proposals were approved and the city immediately 
began to purchase the properties in the area which was to become the Civic Center.  As 
properties were acquired by the City, the improvements were razed and replaced with surface 
parking lots.  These lots were then leased to private operators in order to accommodate the need 
for parking in the bustling, increasingly automobile-oriented Central Business District.  Planning 
for the eventual development of the site began soon after the successful bond election, but the 
physical development of the site was placed on hold while the City completed other projects.  
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   The progress of the Civic Center project in the intervening years was slow and not 
clearly traceable, with the exception of the Mayor’s annual published reports, which trumpeted 
the annual progress made by the Morrison Administration in achieving the goal of a modern 
New Orleans.  The Mayor’s 1949 “Report to the People” detailed progress on the Civic Center 
stated that “half of seven squares of slum land near the business district above Tulane Avenue 
were acquired [in 1948], the rest to be acquired in 1949.  This million dollar undertaking will 
temporarily serve as the site of 2½ squares of offstreet (sic) parking at low rates.”29 An 
illustration included in the 1949 Annual Report (reproduced below) indicates that one thousand 
parking spaces were to be provided on the noted 2½ squares of land. 
Figure 4.2 – Parking Lot Illustration from Mayor Morrison’s 1949 Annual Report30 
 
 
 By 1954, the land acquisition was complete, as was the transition of the area from 
neighborhood to parking lots. The 1953-54 Annual Report of the Mayor boasts of the success of 
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the Civic Center project as opening the business district to unimpeded growth and encouraging 
private investment where it had previously been absent.  The report stated “six years ago the 
Civic Center area was a cancerous slum blocking the natural growth of the central business 
district.  Then the city purchased the area, cleaned out the dilapidated buildings and cut through a 
new 152-foot wide boulevard.  The interest of private business was stimulated in the area.  New 
multi-storied buildings were constructed and existing buildings expanded.”31 It is worth noting 
that these achievements were produced without the City breaking ground on the structures that 
were to occupy the Civic Center.   
 In 1951, the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), in cooperation with the City of 
New Orleans prepared “A Preliminary Report Upon Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment: 
Project U.R. 1-A.”  This report was compiled in response to the Housing Act of 1949, which 
provided local governments with federal dollars for slum clearance.  The total site studied for 
this report was approximately forty-six municipal squares in area, generally bounded by South 
Saratoga, Poydras, South Broad Streets and Tulane Avenue, and included the site designated to 
become the new Civic Center.  Much of the Civic Center site had been acquired by this time, but 
the report spoke generally to the conditions of the area in terms relative to the condition of the 
remainder of the U.R. 1-A site.  Only one of the squares previously listed as part of the Civic 
Center complex, Square 334, was detailed in this report with the remaining squares being 
indicated as “Entire Area Site of Civic Center.”32 
 The selected boundaries of Project U.R.1-A were arbitrary, as admitted by HANO in their 
report, the stated reason for this being that “the total extent of urban redevelopment needs for the 
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City as a whole [having] not been determined.”33  While admittedly arbitrary, the justification for 
the boundaries of the project is clearly defined in the Report, and conditions stated are inclusive 
of the Civic Center site.  HANO found that the area was “characterized by obsolescence and 
blight” and “lack[ed] adequate community facilities for the existing population” and that 
wholesale redevelopment would be the only way to improve the area and address the needs of a 
growing, modernizing city.
34
   
 The “obsolescence and blight” of the project area was determined by a number of factors 
outlined in Exhibit 7 of the report, breaking the individual municipal squares down into white 
versus ‘negro’ population, and the number and percentage of dwelling units lacking hot water, 
with outdoor or shared water closets, with shared or no baths, and general dilapidation.  As has 
been stated, the project area for U.R.1-A was far larger than the site of the proposed Civic Center 
and only Square 334 of the Civic Center site was evaluated for this report.  Therefore, by the 
general statements made by the U.R.1-A Report and the overall presentations of the Civic Center 
site by its proponents, one is left to approximate the conditions of the eight municipal squares 
prior to the City’s acquisition and clearance of the site.  The following table illustrates the noted 
conditions of Square 334 within the Civic Center site relative to the entire U.R.1-A project area.  
Table 4.2 – Conditions of Civic Center site in comparison to U.R.1-A project area.35 
 
White 
Dwelling 
Units 
Negro 
Dwelling 
Units 
No Hot 
Water 
Outside 
W.C. 
Share W.C. Share Bath No Bath 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Square 
334 
0 0 21 100 21 100 20 95 20 95 6 29 14 66 
U.R.1-A 
Site 
456 33 908 62 733 51 397 27 411 28 155 11 415 29 
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While the statistics provided by the U.R.1-A study indicate a disproportionate impact on 
the African-American community within both the Civic Center site and the U.R.1-A study area, 
the impact cannot be fully understood without placing this data against the backdrop of City-
wide numbers.  According to the United States Census Bureau, the population of New Orleans 
was 29.3% “non-white” in 1950.36  These numbers clearly illustrate that the African-American 
community of New Orleans was disproportionately impacted by both the U.R.1-A and Civic 
Center projects at rates of two to three times the statistical expectation.  
Whether this racial disparity was an intentional or unintentional consequence of the 
projects is undocumented; it seems that the result may have been a combination of the two.  
While the projects likely did not intentionally target African-American communities in New 
Orleans, the reality of the situation is that through Jim Crow and associated oppression, this 
community was relegated to the least desirable neighborhoods, both by custom and, in some 
cases, legal mandate.  
Hirsch profiles the Morrison Administration’s approach to race relations as fairly 
disingenuous.  While Morrison sought to appeal to African-American and did make efforts to 
improve the share of municipal services open to African-American neighborhoods, no real effort 
was made to address the societal inequalities which permeated New Orleans.  Specifically, 
Morrison constructed new facilities within the New Orleans Recreation Department for the 
African-American community and opened up hiring within the New Orleans Police Department 
and public libraries to African-Americans; these accomplishments were set within the framework 
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of “preserve[ing the] traditions and habits of [the] city.”37  For all of his posturing to the 
contrary, perhaps Morrison’s own words best convey his Administration’s approach to the issue 
of race in New Orleans: “racial segregation is embodied in the basic law of the State of 
Louisiana, and we are obligated to abide by it.”38 
In addition to the racial characteristics of the Civic Center site and the U.R.1-A project 
area, HANO also measured the conditions of the area based on ‘Dilapidation,’ with the standards 
for this determination clearly outlined in Appendix A of the Report.  The extent of dilapidation 
was to be determined based on an evaluation of four elements: 1) weather tightness of the 
structure; 2) makeshift construction; 3) extent of disrepair; and 4) hazards to the safety of 
occupants.  Specifically, the quantifiable conditions of individual properties were assessed as 
follows:
39
 
1) Exterior Dilapidation: 
a. Walls; cracks missing materials, loose materials, sagging or leaning. 
b. Chimneys; missing material or leaning. 
c. Windows; missing materials or operation defects. 
d. Porches; weak or broken supports, railings, or steps. 
e. Roof; missing materials or obvious leakage. 
 
2) Interior Dilapidation: 
a. Basements; cracks, leakage, or bad floor. 
b. Floors; sagging, missing materials, or excessive wear. 
c. Partitions; same as walls. 
d. Ceilings; same as walls. 
e. Stairways; same as porches 
 
3) Dilapidation of Utilities: 
a. Electric Service; wiring deficiencies. 
b. Plumbing; lacking or inoperative water supply, inoperative flush toilet, 
lacking, obsolete, or unsafe bathing facilities. 
c. Heating; detrimental to health, conducive to fire. 
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The following table presents another comparison of Square 334 within the Civic Center footprint 
to the larger U.R.1-A project site as a whole: 
Table 4.3 – Dilapidation of Civic Center site in comparison to U.R.1-A project area.40 
 
Dilapidation 
Exterior Interior Utility 
No. % No. % No. % 
Square 
334 
18 86 18 86 18 86 
U.R.1-A 
Site 
796 55 784 54 773 53 
 
Based on these standards, the City was able to utilize funding through the Housing Act of 1949 
to seek federal dollars for the proposed Civic Center complex.  Specifically, funding was 
obtained to aid in the site and architectural design of the proposed Civic Center complex 
following the submission of the U.R.1-A report in 1951. 
Figure 4.3 – Visual Representation of Property Conditions within the Civic Center site.41 
 
The Land Assembly 
 Immediately following approval of the $23,500,000 bond issue in 1947, the City of New 
Orleans began the process of land assembly for development of the Civic Center. Over the 
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course of the subsequent eight years, the City acquired 197 individual lots comprising the Civic 
Center site. Through a review of the real estate transfer records maintained by the City’s 
Department of Property Management, it is clear that negotiated purchase was the acquisition 
method of choice for the Civic Center. Of the 197 individual parcels acquired for this project, 
only 12 were taken through expropriation rather than through negotiated purchase.    
Table 4.4 – Summary of Property Acquisition for the Civic Center site.42 
Municipal 
Square 
Number of 
Lots 
Number of  
Expropriations 
304 32 2 
305 34 3 
332 37 5 
333 35 0 
340 33 0 
341 26 2 
 
 At the outset of the project the determination was made to acquire as much needed 
property through purchase rather than expropriation.  On September 28, 1946 the City 
announced the location of the proposed Civic Center.  Within days, the Morison Administration 
announced what actions would be taken to being acquiring the property and bringing the project 
to fruition, the Times-Picayune reported that Mayor Morrison’s position was to “attempt to 
negotiate for purchase of the properties … but in the event of failure to negotiate a purchase at a 
fair appraisal price [the City] will institute condemnation proceedings.”43  
 Once the site selection was official, the process of inventorying the required land and 
obtaining appraisals to budget property acquisition costs began.  The Morrison Administration 
estimated that the land within the Civic Center could be obtained for a reasonable price and 
Brooke Duncan noted that the entire Civic Center site had a total property assessment of only 
$525,000, which was seen as beneficial to the City for the purpose of site acquisition. On a 
                                                 
42
 Date summarized from full property acquisition inventory found in Appendix 4.2. Data compiled from the City of 
New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records. 
43
 Times-Picayune, October 1, 1946, accessed via www.newsbank.com, at 21. 
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property map dated October 8, 1946, the City outlined the ownership of the required properties 
which included notations for land already publicly owned and properties which were targeted to 
be acquired through exchange.
44
 An interesting discrepancy is found in this document when 
compared with the property transfer records: the map, dated 1946, indicates that Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 
A, U, V, W, X, Y, and Z of Square 333 were, at that time, owned by the City of New Orleans;
45
 
however, property transfer records indicate that the City of New Orleans acquired these parcels 
through purchase on August 20, 1948.
46
  The individual from whom these parcels were acquired 
was Gervais Favrot, Chairman of the City Planning and Zoning Commission.  It is impossible to 
determine how or why this discrepancy occurred but it is interesting to note.   
This conflict in the record does give the appearance of impropriety on the part of the site 
selected for the Civic Center project; however, it is somewhat unlikely that as the owner of less 
than one-third of a single municipal square Mr. Favrot would have actively steered the project to 
this site.  While there is no specific information available to explain this glaring error in the 
record, it does lead one to question whether anyone else involved in the decision-making process 
owned property within or adjacent to the Civic Center footprint. It should be noted that no other 
conflicts between the initial ownership map and property transfer records were identified in the 
full review of these documents.  
 While the appraisals for properties within the Civic Center site were undertaken 
immediately upon selection of the site in 1946, the Commission Council did not authorize the 
Morrison Administration to begin property acquisitions until May 21, 1948. This action by the 
                                                 
44
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Commission Council authorized the negotiated purchase of half of the requisite property for the 
overall project and all sales were subject to ratification by the Council prior to purchase.
47
    
 There was little coverage of the few expropriation proceedings by the press, the sole 
exception appears to have been over the properties owned by Mr. Herman Doescher, Jr. Mr. 
Doescher owned lots 5 and 6, of Square 304 with improvements bearing the municipal addresses 
436-38 and 442 Loyola Street.  The contention in this case, which appears to have been what 
attracted the attention of the press, was that the expropriation was being fought not only on the 
basis of the project but rather on the merits of the state law under which the expropriation took 
place. In 1948, the Louisiana Legislature passed an act which removed the requirement of a jury-
trial in expropriation cases. Mr. Doescher filed suit arguing a jury must be empanelled to 
determine a fair value for his properties.  The challenge levied against the Civic Center proposal 
was that the project was likely years away from construction so forcibly expropriating the 
property at this point was premature.  Mayor Morrison was called to testify on behalf of his Civic 
Center project and stated that the plans were sufficiently far along that his administration 
expected to let the contracts for construction within 18-months. On December 30, 1949, the court 
ruled in the City’s favor regarding both arguments and awarded Mr. Doescher $16,120 for his 
two properties on Loyola Street.
48, 49, 50
 
 Property acquisition, both via negotiated purchase and expropriation, continued through 
April of 1955 with 7 of the 12 total expropriations within the Civic Center site taking place 
between February and April of that year. The total expropriations within the Civic Center site 
amounted to only 6% of the total lots acquired.  The reason for this low number of expropriations 
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is likely attributable to the political determination to negotiate purchases combined with the 
length of the overall acquisition process.  
From the time the Commission Council authorized the Morrison Administration to begin 
assembling the land to the point where all land formally entered the City’s possession eight years 
elapsed. During this time there was little motivation on the part of municipal leaders to forcibly 
acquire property; there were no construction deadlines or contractual obligations that required all 
property to be obtained by a specific date.  While this was likely beneficial to the City in terms of 
reducing the number of required expropriations it also acted against the City in at least the one 
legal challenge to expropriation that was followed by the press.  
The Legacy  
 The Civic Center was developed in accordance with the early plans, with a new City Hall 
to consolidate municipal government, the main branch of the New Orleans Public Library, a new 
state office building, the Louisiana Supreme Court and a new complex for Orleans Parish Civil 
District Court.  City Hall was dedicated on May 6, 1957 and the other buildings comprising the 
complex were completed in the following years.  In addition to the structures occupying the 
Civic Center, Loyola Avenue was created by widening South Saratoga Street to a width of 144 
feet. This stretch of roadway from the Municipal Auditorium to the newly-constructed Union 
Passenger Terminal was dubbed the “miracle mile” to reflect its prominent place in the renewal 
of New Orleans.
51
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Figure 4.4 – City Hall – August 23, 1958 52 
 
 
Figure 4.5 – Postcard depicting the newly constructed Civic Center 53 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52
 City Hall – August 23, 1958, photo from the records of the Department of Property Management, Division of Real 
Estate and Records. 
53
 Postcard image published by Bernard F. Holmes. 
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In 2005, following Hurricane Katrina, the state office building and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court building were abandoned and subsequently demolished.  The site remains 
improved with City Hall, Orleans Parish Civil District Court, the main branch of the New 
Orleans Public Library, and Duncan Plaza.   
 The Civic Center project, as proposed and eventually realized, provided the citizens of 
New Orleans with a modern government complex that reflected both the new governmental 
structure of the City and the push to modernity that the 1950s came to represent; but at what 
cost?  The neighborhood had been in decline for many years preceding the decision to take and 
clear the land for redevelopment.  While the area once was occupied by a thriving neighborhood 
of shops, community resources, and residents, many had gone by the late 1940s. Perhaps this 
decline was as much due to the poor physical conditions which were found in the community, 
but perhaps these conditions were partly a self-fulfilling prophecy in that the land had been 
designated as a potential redevelopment site for public housing prior to the Civic Center 
proposal. This designation, which was made in the mid-1930s, may have led to further 
disinvestment within this neighborhood which was already in decline causing the area to spiral 
into outright blight; the truth in this instance will never be known.   
The stated goals of the Civic Center project were generally accomplished; those goals 
being: elimination of slum conditions, boosting area property values, and centralizing 
government.  While the goals themselves are debatable as appropriate exercises of municipal 
government, it must be recognized that the City achieved what it set out to do, at least in the 
short term. Over the intervening five decades since the Civic Center was constructed, the area 
has seen both the desired rise, and the unexpected decline in adjacent private investment. 
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While the residential slums were removed from the landscape, a commercial slum has 
taken hold.  The surface parking lots once seen as necessary to the survival of downtown have 
proven a barrier to development and the 1950s-era office structures have largely been abandoned 
in favor of high-rise development along the Poydras Street corridor. A cursory examination of 
the conditions surrounding City Hall, in the neighborhood described by Louis Armstrong in his 
autobiography, will find that the birthplaces of jazz have largely been demolished to make room 
for surface parking lots.  The “interests of private business” which were trumpeted by Mayor 
Morrison in 1954 as being symbolized by multi-storied buildings have been put asunder and 
those buildings left to decay in the shadow of City Hall.   
Figure 4.6 – Upper Poydras Street, 2012 54 
 
 
The long-term success of the project comes not necessarily from the stated goals, but 
from the subsequent projects, both public and private, which expanded the Central Business 
District in accordance with what was viewed as the area’s logical growth pattern.  By removing 
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the blighted neighborhood from the lake-side boundary of the Central Business District, the City 
opened development for numerous office buildings and hotels along Poydras Street and that 
portion of Loyola Avenue between City Hall and the Union Passenger Terminal, as well as the 
development of the Louisiana Superdome in what was a rail yard a stone’s throw from the Civic 
Center site.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Bridges and Highways: 
Accommodating the Automobile at the Expense of the City 
 
“Now let me say at the very outset that transportation, and  
certainly road transportation is a lifeline of any community” 
          - Mayor de Lesseps S. Morrison, 19581 
 
 Building the automotive infrastructure was neither a quick nor easy task in a city as 
historic as New Orleans. Certainly it was one thing to pave the existing surface streets to 
accommodate the automobile, but it was another thing entirely to create the infrastructure of 
regional expressways that the burgeoning automobile age demanded in the mid-twentieth 
century. The City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana recognized the infrastructural needs 
of the New Orleans area and crafted plans for the building of bridges and highways connecting 
Orleans and Jefferson Parishes before the federal government created the Interstate Highway 
System, which would permanently scar many historic cities throughout the United States.   
 Of the governmental undertakings studied as part of this research, the construction of 
bridges and highways were the projects that had the most far-reaching and lasting impacts on the 
physical and social conditions of New Orleans.  The very nature of these projects caused shifts in 
the daily life of citizens in nearly all parts of the City, whether that change was a result of altered 
traffic patterns or commutes, the physical division of once united neighborhoods, or, on a larger 
scale, the clearing of large swaths of a community to provide space for construction of these 
projects.  The focus of this chapter will be on the visions for and planning of these large-scale 
public improvements and the property acquisitions that were required to make these plans come 
to fruition.  Although the historical records show that the State and City governments tried to 
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avoid expropriation proceedings, they did not shy away from the exercise of eminent domain to 
acquire the needed property to move forward with what was perceived as best for the public at-
large. 
The Vision 
 Shortly following the end of World War II, New Orleans – and many other American 
cities – began looking at ways to invest in the infrastructural needs that had been laid fallow 
during the conflict.  Among the projects New Orleans sought to implement for the improvement 
of the community and the enhancement of its growth was the Pontchartrain Expressway, a 
freeway connecting the Central Business District with Airline Highway and the proposed 
Veterans Memorial Boulevard being constructed in Metairie, in adjacent Jefferson Parish.    The 
goal of this highway was to increase accessibility to the Central Business District from both the 
residential portions of New Orleans and the developing bedroom communities in Jefferson 
Parish.  
To reduce project costs, the Pontchartrain Expressway was proposed to be built within 
the New Basin Canal right-of-way. Construction of the New Basin Canal was authorized by the 
Louisiana Legislature in 1831 and opened for service in 1835; the Canal provided a connection 
from the Central Business District to Lake Pontchartrain.
2
  The Canal was dug by hand at a cost 
of $1,225,000
3
 and approximately 8,000 lives, the death toll in this project being caused 
primarily by cholera and yellow fever epidemics.
4
  With the passing of a century and rail, truck, 
and barged freight rendering the Canal obsolete, the City of New Orleans, in conjunction with 
the State’s Highway Department, began exploring other possible uses for this space. The 
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conclusion these entities arrived at was that the Canal should be filled and the space reused to 
create a singular rail line into the heart of the City with the remaining space being devoted to the 
construction of a super-highway to serve the automotive needs of New Orleans.   
Originally this new super-highway, which would replace the New Basin Canal, was 
proposed to connect “Julia Street at the River to Lake Pontchartrain (a distance of some five 
miles) where it would connect with the proposed causeway to Mandeville.”5  The proposed 
starting point at Julia Street was in anticipation of the contemplated Mississippi River crossing to 
be located in that general vicinity, and the route of the New Basin Canal was seen as the only 
place to construct such a highway in New Orleans.
6
  The closure of the Canal was approved by 
Constitutional Amendment on November 5, 1946.  The Times-Picayune, which editorialized for 
the passage of the amendment as being “of vital importance to the future of New Orleans,”7 
reported that the Amendment passed by large margins both within New Orleans and state wide.  
With all New Orleans precincts reporting, the final vote tally on Amendment 31, authorizing the 
closure and filling of the New Basin Canal, was 47,587 in favor and 7,343 opposed; state wide, 
only 422 precincts out of a total 1,871 had reported by press time two days following the election 
with a recorded vote of 52,101 in favor and 9,116 opposed, but the amendment was projected to 
pass.
8
  
With the future of the Pontchartrain Expressway virtually secure, the municipal 
leadership turned their attention to creating a vehicular river crossing within the city of New 
Orleans. Until this time, the only bridge spanning the lower Mississippi River was the Huey P. 
Long Bridge in Jefferson Parish, ten miles upriver from the Central Business District of New 
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Orleans.
9
 In 1948, a Constitutional Amendment was placed before Louisiana Voters “authorizing 
a bridge across the Mississippi River at New Orleans.”10 The exact location of the bridge had not 
been determined at this time, but what was known was that the East Bank side of the bridge 
would have to connect to the proposed Pontchartrain Expressway. This proposed configuration 
was in accordance with the City’s Major Streets Plan and had been approved by the United 
States Bureau of Public Roads, as federal funds were being sought for partial funding of the 
project. Though the specific details of the bridge had not been clearly defined, Amendment 21 
was approved by Louisiana voters in 1948. The vote in New Orleans totaled 49,021 in favor of 
the authorizing amendment and 9,669 opposed.
11
   
While voters approved the concept of the Mississippi River Bridge in 1948, the plans and 
financing scheme were not settled until the 1952 Legislative Session and subsequent election. 
Amendment 10 authorized the bonding capacity of the Mississippi River Bridge Authority to 
finance the bridge project and to back those bonds with not only toll revenue from bridge user-
fees but to dedicate the State’s Highway Fund No. 2 (a vehicle license tax) to the maintenance of 
the proposed bridge and guaranteeing of the bonds.
12
 Additionally, Amendment 19 was placed 
before the voters at the same election to reallocate “a portion of the Dock Board’s 9/20ths of one 
cent gasoline tax” to finance the construction of bridge approaches13 and to authorize up to $30 
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million in highway bonds to be sold by the Department of Transportation to finance their share 
of construction costs for the Mississippi River Bridge.
14
  
Not surprisingly, Mayor Morrison endorsed the proposed constitutional amendments 
designed to fund the Mississippi River Bridge, and its approaches and associated improvements. 
These amendments were endorsed by Mayor Morrison as not only crucial to the bridge project, 
but as “vital to the growth of the New Orleans metropolitan area and to our neighboring parishes, 
which need these key projects.”15  The Mayor went on to clarify that these amendments were not 
solely for the benefit of New Orleans but were intended to improve infrastructure both in the 
surrounding region and across the State. Amendment 10 would, in addition to furthering the 
construction of the Mississippi River Bridge, authorize funding for the Lake Pontchartrain 
Causeway and the Little Woods–Lakeshore Highway, connecting Downman Road, in New 
Orleans East to the Highway 11 Bridge between Orleans and St. Tammany Parishes.
16
 This 
amendment would also provide funding for various other road and drainage projects in Orleans, 
Jefferson, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, Tangipahoa, and St. Tammany Parishes.  
A second proposed Constitutional Amendment, Amendment 19, would have even farther 
reaching impact according to the Mayor; this amendment would reallocate funds that were solely 
dedicated to the New Orleans Dock Board and redistribute them across the state.  This 
amendment was touted as not only aiding in the financing of the Mississippi River Bridge but 
also to allow construction of an Industrial Canal crossing in New Orleans, the West Bank 
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Expressway in Jefferson Parish, a Red River Bridge in Shreveport and various highway projects 
in Baton Rouge and Lake Charles.
17
 
In 1956, Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act, providing for 40,000 miles of 
roads across the country over a period of 16 years. The 40,000 mile authorization was then 
divided among the states based on requests from state highway departments.  The Louisiana 
Highway Department’s initial request was for the allocation of 1,150 highway miles, but the final 
allocation by the federal government granted just less than 600 total highway miles.
18
 Under the 
Act, the Highway Department made clear, highways could be located anywhere the state dictated 
without the involvement of local officials and without regard to local conditions or plans, this 
included the ability to determine highway routes regardless of the impact on property owners and 
the losses that could potentially be suffered as a result of expropriation. However, in the 
benevolence of the State Highway Department, the Department decided to work with local 
officials on the placement of these federal highways.
19
  The proposal for the federal highway 
system presented to the community in 1958 is exactly that which was subsequently constructed 
and is present in New Orleans today (see Figures 5.8, 5.11, 5.12).  The highways were designed 
to complement the Pontchartrain Expressway and Mississippi River Bridge and also, generally, 
followed the adopted Major Streets Plan of the City. The one major deviation from the City’s 
plan was that a portion of highway, which would come to be designated as Interstate-610, would 
not be located along Florida Avenue.  Instead it cut through residential portions of the Lakeview 
and Gentilly neighborhoods because the angle at which Florida Avenue intersected the proposed 
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route of what is now Interstate-10 was too sharp to create a safe connection and too congested 
with rail rights-of-way.
20
 
As required by the Bureau of Public Roads, a hearing was held on the proposed route of 
the highways. This hearing was held in the New Orleans City Council Chambers on February 11, 
1958 and included the entire proposed federal-aid highway system for Jefferson and Orleans 
Parishes. There was support and opposition present for the routes through both parishes, with the 
primary opposition having to do with the land assembly for the project rather than the principles 
of the highway project itself. At the outset of the hearing, Mayor Morrison tried to assuage the 
opposition to the land assembly element of the proposal by reminding the public that both the 
Pontchartrain Expressway and Mississippi River Bridge projects required “acquisition of 
property, removal of peoples’ homes and other incidental consequences.”21  Morrison stated that 
people should recognize that the engineering of these projects should be left to the engineers and 
that the route that “the best place to put the highways is where the engineering determines it 
should be put.”22  The implication of this statement being that the City would stand in agreement 
with the State’s engineering studies for locating the highways without particular regard for those 
whose property stood in its path.  Morrison’s position was clear in that the acquisition and, if 
necessary, expropriation of property was but an “incidental consequence” to progress that, while 
not pleasant, must be tolerated and expected. 
Certainly Mayor Morrison’s position was supported by the fact that the State Highway 
Department aligned their recommendations so closely with the City’s adopted Major Streets 
Plan. This was a plan that was initially created in 1926 by Harland Bartholomew and Associates 
under contract to the New Orleans Planning and Zoning Commission. The initial plan focused 
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primarily on the Central Business District, but through subsequent revisions and updates in the 
1950s, a focused vision for the creation of a major street network serving all of New Orleans was 
adopted. 
The vision outlined by the City through this plan specifically included the then-under-
construction Pontchartrain Expressway, Mississippi River Bridge and Little Woods–Lakeshore 
Highway, as well as major thoroughfares to be located along Claiborne Avenue, Elysian Fields 
Avenue, and Florida Avenue; these routes being selected due to the existing widths of right-of-
way, which would allow the City to create multi-lane radial streets without the added expense of 
right-of-way acquisition.
23
 
The Planning 
 The bridge and highway projects in New Orleans from the 1950s into the 1970s trace 
their origins to Harland Bartholomew’s Preliminary Report on a System of Major Streets 
adopted by the City in 1927.  This first major streets plan for the city, while not as ambitious as 
its successors, called for the designation and creation of major arterial roads to effectively and 
efficiently move people to and from the Central Business District.
24
   
 At this point in the development of transportation planning in New Orleans, 
Bartholomew and the City Planning and Zoning Commission were primarily concerned with 
creating a system of streets in the city that would allow for the free flow of traffic.  In the 
Preliminary Report, Bartholomew lamented the piecemeal and haphazard development of the 
city, and resultant varying street widths, jogs, and dead ends.  These odd configurations in the 
street grid were caused by the historic development pattern of the city, reflecting New Orleans’s 
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growth across antiquated plantation and municipal boundaries. Bartholomew states in the 
Preliminary Report that: 
[t]he increasing use of motor vehicles has brought about a 
revolutionary change in street traffic and a resultant demand for 
highways adapted to modern vehicular use. The theory that all 
streets are of equal value and importance in the city passed with 
the leisurely horse-drawn carriage and the lumbering wagon.  
Wherever this point of view is retained there is almost certain to be 
a waste of public funds and enormous economic losses due to 
poorly designed pavements and unsatisfactory street 
improvements.
25
 
 
 The Preliminary Report outlined fifteen improvements to either create or modify major 
streets in the city of New Orleans. The full list of proposed improvements can be found in 
Appendix 5.1; however, there are two proposals which merit brief discussion, as they later 
became the basis for highway proposals: Proposal 4 called for the immediate widening of North 
Peters and Decatur Streets below Canal Street, and Proposal 9 called for the widening of 
Calliope Street from South Rampart Street to South Peters Street. Proposal 4, the widening of 
North Peters and Decatur, was suggested to accommodate port traffic that was projected to travel 
from the wharves in the vicinity of Canal Street to the Industrial Canal.  This proposal, while 
perhaps not specifically responsible, can be seen as the first suggestion of a riverfront 
expressway.
26
 
 Proposal 9 called for the widening of Calliope Street to serve the up-river traffic entering 
and exiting the Central Business District.  Howard Avenue was the main traffic artery in this area 
of the city, but due to existing development could not be widened to accommodate the ever-
increasing traffic volume projected in this report.
27
  The proposal under the Preliminary Report 
was for the widening of Calliope at ground level even though the street was considered “remote 
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from the business center.” The reasoning behind this proposal was to create a boulevard that 
could become the up-river “counterpart of Canal Street,” and the report encouraged the City to 
undertake this street widening “as soon as possible in order to anticipate the inevitable expansion 
of the business district.”28  While this street widening never actually occurred, this was the 
general path taken by the Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressway in the 1950s. 
 The initial Bartholomew major streets plan was revised in 1947 in accordance with state 
law and again updated in 1951, as “many changes [had] occurred in the character and 
development of the New Orleans urban area since the preparation of the early plan.”29  These 
revised plans now took into account the need for express highways, not just widened surface 
streets for the movement of traffic. 
The first major projects undertaken during the mid-century era to make New Orleans 
more accessible to the automobile were the Mississippi River Bridge and the Pontchartrain 
Expressway.  These projects were designed to allow the growth and expansion of the New 
Orleans metropolitan area through increasing the potential for development on the West Bank of 
the Mississippi River in both Orleans and Jefferson Parishes as well as the further development 
of the East Bank of Jefferson Parish.  
The Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressway were conceived as separate 
projects with essentially the same purpose. The Pontchartrain Expressway had been discussed as 
part of the Grade Separation Project that consolidated all incoming rail lines into one central 
Union Passenger Terminal and virtually eliminated at-grade rail crossings within New Orleans. 
Upon the inception of this project, the City viewed the New Basin Canal as the most logical 
place for these consolidated rail lines due to the availability of land and the obsolescence of the 
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canal. At this same time, Robert Moses, famed highwayman of New York City’s Triborough 
Bridge Authority, was working on a highway plan for New Orleans that would help modernize 
the area with limited-access highways. The Moses plan for New Orleans called for the 
construction of a concrete and steel expressway to be built from roughly S. Rampart Street at 
Calliope Street to Airline Highway along the route of the New Basin Canal. 
Figure 5.1 – Photograph of the Filled New Basin Canal Illustrating the Available Right-of-Way 
to be used for the Pontchartrain Expressway.
30
  
  
 
The orientation of this highway was also intended to connect to any future Mississippi River 
crossings that may be constructed; at this time plans for a bridge were preliminary at best but 
there was certainty that a bridge would eventually be constructed though there was no 
established timeline for doing so.
31
  Aside from the proposed connection to a future bridge, the 
New Orleans City Planning and Zoning Commission considered the location of the Pontchartrain 
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Expressway to be a “very logical location because of available right-of-way relationship to 
existing development and to the urban development which the project will so conveniently 
serve,”32 and encouraged the connection of the expressway with Poydras Street to provide a 
direct connection into the Central Business District.
33
 
Figure 5.2 – Downtown Portion of the Pontchartrain Expressway (yellow) With Connection to 
the Mississippi River Bridge (red).
34
 
 
 
As plans for the Pontchartrain Expressway were finalized, the City and State began 
working on plans for a Mississippi River crossing at New Orleans.  This bridge would connect to 
the Pontchartrain Expressway in New Orleans and be tied to a proposed West Bank Expressway 
in Jefferson Parish, creating the area’s first regional road network. This system was designed to 
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accommodate both existing traffic conditions and the projected growth of the City and the West 
Bank of Jefferson Parish through 1975.
35
  
While there was general agreement with the concept of a vehicular crossing of the 
Mississippi River at New Orleans, there were numerous details that had to be negotiated.  The 
ultimate location of the Mississippi River Bridge shifted slightly during these negotiations, 
though the overall orientation of the structure and its connection to the Pontchartrain Expressway 
were constants in the construction plans. These shifts were relatively slight, with the structure 
moving by mere blocks on either side of the river.  The Algiers side of the structure would 
remove residential areas regardless of the ultimate position of the structure, but by shifting the 
orientation of the bridge in the Lower Garden District, highway planners were able to avoid the 
large commercial structures of the Warehouse District and align the bridge and approaches along 
Calliope Street and through less-densely developed industrial areas and the mostly residential 
areas on the lake-side of Magazine Street.  
In order for the state to construct a river crossing, the location and structure of the bridge 
had to be approved by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).  The initial 
application presented to USACE in 1946 called for construction of a bridge to be located at Julia 
Street; this application was approved and a permit issued for construction.  At the same time, the 
State Highway Department hired Robert Moses to review traffic studies of New Orleans and 
make recommendations for construction of arterial highways to serve the metropolitan area. 
Among the recommendations made was the relocation of the proposed Mississippi River Bridge 
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to an area where the right-of-way acquisition would be less expensive and where the route would 
be less likely to interfere with the proposed Union Passenger Terminal project.
36
   
The relocation of the structure was proposed at Thalia and Bringier Streets. This location 
would have required the placement of both piers of the bridge within the navigable portion of the 
river and the New Orleans Dock Board objected to these as obstructions to river traffic.  The 
Dock Board, officially the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, was created in 
1896 by the Louisiana Legislature for the express purpose of “improv[ing] the wharves and other 
facilities of the Port and greatly develop[ing] and expand[ing] commerce by removing many of 
the obstacles now placed in the way of advancement.”37 While their initial task was to bring all 
wharves under the same operating procedures, by the 1950s, the Dock Board had expanded their 
role to recruiting business for the port and ensuring that the port could safely and adequately 
handle the ever-increasing size of shipping vessels calling on New Orleans.
38
  
Not only would this proposed location require placement of support piers in the navigable 
portion of the Mississippi River, this proposal for the span also presented a vertical clearance of 
135 feet with a 1,400 foot center span, far lower than the 175 foot elevation that the Dock Board 
felt was required.  Based on the operational objections of the Dock Board, the initial permit 
application by the State was rejected and the bridge designers had to go back to the drawing 
board to revise the proposal to ensure that the bridge would not impede the business of the port.
39
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Figure 5.3 – New Orleans Item Illustration of the proposed Mississippi River Bridge.40 
 
 
After months of negotiations with the Dock Board, the Mississippi River Bridge 
Authority finalized a revised bridge proposal to be presented to USACE. The revised proposal 
called for placement of the bridge at Lamarque Street on the West Bank and just below Calliope 
Street on the East Bank.  The revised location of the bridge proposed one pier to be located 
within the river (towards the West Bank side of the stream) and the second pier to be located 
adjacent to the wharves on the East Bank side. The Bridge Authority also raised the height of the 
center span to an average elevation of 155 feet above the river from the 135 feet that was initially 
proposed.
41
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Figure 5.4 – Times-Picayune Illustration of proposed Mississippi River Bridge42 
 
While the Dock Board maintained their objection to placing any support structures within 
the stream of the Mississippi River, they were willing to negotiate with the Bridge Authority on 
the vertical clearance of the structure.  In a meeting of the Dock Board that was held just prior to 
the Bridge Authority’s meeting to finalize the permit application, the Dock Board unanimously 
voted to support the permit application with respect to the vertical clearance but to oppose the 
placement of the support pier 230 feet from the western bank of the river. In giving its approval 
relative to the vertical clearance of the proposed bridge, the Dock Board made clear that they 
were not completely pleased with the negotiated plans but likely felt political pressure to move 
the project forward:  
The board of commissioners has heretofore suggested that the center 
height of the bridge at mean high water should not be less than 175 feet. 
However, after further study and in a spirit of conciliation and as 
evidence of its sincere interest in having a bridge built across the river at 
New Orleans, the committee recommends that the board agree to issue 
its permit for a bridge of 155 feet center clearance at stage 20 feet on the 
Carrollton gauge.
43
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The record does not speak to the change which apparently occurred following this 
approval. As constructed, the pier within the river was placed towards the eastern bank of the 
river rather than the western bank as was agreed upon by the Mississippi River Bridge Authority 
and the Dock Board. Figure 5.5 (below) indicates the final design of the Mississippi River 
Bridge which reflects the bridge as it was constructed. 
Figure 5.5 – Final Design Rendering of the Mississippi River Bridge.44 
 
 
The placement and vertical elevation of the span were not the only points of contention in 
the planning of the Mississippi River Bridge.  The state Highway Department and the 
Mississippi River Bridge Authority proposed a four-lane bridge to span the river, which was 
projected to accommodate traffic for approximately 40 years following construction.  This traffic 
estimate and the proposal of the four-lane bridge were based on the projections of Robert Moses 
in the 1940s. In 1951, as the City, State and Mississippi River Bridge Authority were developing 
the actual plans for a bridge, the firm of Harland Bartholomew and Associates sent a 
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memorandum to the City Planning and Zoning Commission questioning the long-term functional 
capacity of the four-lane bridge.
45
 
The Bartholomew memorandum suggested a six-lane bridge would more successfully 
create the capacity needed to serve the growing population of the New Orleans area.  An 
unknown in the planning of this structure was the population growth estimate for the West Bank 
of Jefferson Parish, which would likely grow exponentially in the years following the opening of 
a vehicular river crossing.  The State, based on the Moses report anticipated an average of 12,500 
vehicles per day to be served by this bridge in the 1990s, the Bartholomew memorandum 
suggested that this number was unrealistically low, citing that the traffic counts of river crossings 
in 1945 totaled 8,950 river crossings per day on the four river ferries serving the Central 
Business District.  The reasoning employed by Bartholomew and Associates to question the 
estimates of Robert Moses was quite logical: 
The development of land on the west bank has taken place under 
conditions which discourage travel to and from the central business 
district. … The west bank has presumably attracted a population 
which attaches comparatively little importance to quick and easy 
access to the central business district and other east bank centers of 
employment.  A bridge or tunnel which provides quick and easy 
access to the central business district will open up large areas on 
the west bank to accommodate a type of population that depends 
on such access.  This would be a factor tending to make the rate of 
increase in trans-river traffic greater than the rate of population 
growth on the west bank.
46
  
 
The City took the observations of Bartholomew and Associates seriously and hired the 
firm of Masters and Henderlite to compile new traffic projections for the Mississippi River 
Bridge.  The Masters and Henderlite report determined that the Bartholomew observations were 
generally well-founded but determined that the increased traffic coming from the West Bank 
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communities would be shared between the Huey P. Long Bridge, the proposed Mississippi River 
Bridge and a third proposed Mississippi River crossing at Luling (in St. Charles Parish, further 
upstream than the Huey P. Long Bridge).  Even with these crossings taken into consideration, the 
consultants determined that a six-lane bridge would be required in New Orleans prior to 1975.
47
  
The Mississippi River Bridge Authority decided to disregard these concerns and move forward 
with plans for a four-lane structure.  The final width of the bridge was set at 52 feet, comprising 
four traffic lanes and a four foot wide median.
48
 
The permit for construction of the Mississippi River Bridge was issued by USACE on 
March 10, 1954 and the Mississippi River Bridge Authority began the process of raising money 
though the sale of revenue bonds.
49
  The bridge opened to traffic on April 15, 1958 to much 
fanfare, with the Times-Picayune pronouncing the event as the dream of a century fulfilled, with 
“the travel habits of as yet untold thousands of New Orleanians [set to] undergo a change.”50   
Figure 5.6, 5.7 – Mississippi River Bridge Authority illustrations of West Bank and East Bank 
approaches to the Mississippi River Bridge.
51
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Following finalization of plans and during the construction of the Pontchartrain 
Expressway and the Mississippi River Bridge, Congress passed the “Federal Aid Highway Act of 
1956,” which, as has been previously noted, authorized 40,000 miles of limited-access highways 
throughout the country, with just less than 600 total miles being initially allocated to the State of 
Louisiana.  The Act dictated that these highway miles were at the discretion of state highway 
departments and Louisiana’s Highway Department began planning for these highways even 
before the law won final approval in Congress.
52
   
Prior to the passage of the Act in 1956, Louisiana’s highway engineers began studying 
the existing infrastructure within the state in anticipation of the eventual passage of the Act. This 
initial planning allowed the state Highway Department to immediately act to begin construction 
on the federally-backed miles of Interstate Highway.  The initial projects undertaken by the 
Highway Department were more rural in character than urban primarily due to the difficulty in 
placing urban rights-of-way in a manner that would not alter existing development too 
dramatically. As the Highway Department moved forward with plans for the urban portions of 
the Interstate Highway System in Louisiana, the state began to coordinate with city officials in 
order to keep the highways as consistent with local plans as possible.
53
 
A requirement of the Act, and of the federal Bureau of Public Roads, was a public 
hearing during which the public would be allowed to present their support or opposition to the 
State’s proposals with all comments being forwarded to the Bureau of Public Roads in 
Washington, D.C. for evaluation prior to a final decision.
54
  The plans for the federally-funded 
highway projects were presented to the community on February 11, 1958 and the hearing 
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combined all highway miles in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes. The highways as proposed, and 
ultimately approved and constructed, are indicated in Figure 5.8, below. 
Figure 5.8 – Times-Picayune reproduction of City Planning Commission’s Map of the 
‘Approved Route of City’s Interstate Hwy. Link.’55 
 
The state Highway Department outlined their proposal for Orleans Parish as follows: upon 
entering Orleans Parish from Jefferson Parish, the highway:  
intersects Pontchartrain Boulevard midway between Kenilworth 
Street and Florida Boulevard; then the highway turns south, utilizing 
the right of way between West End Boulevard and Pontchartrain 
Boulevard.  It connects with the Carrollton Interchange at Airline 
Highway.
56
 
 
The highway then continues 
 
through the Airline-Tulane-Carrollton Interchange, then continues 
south and east along the Pontchartrain Expressway to a junction at 
Claiborne Avenue.  At Claiborne Avenue, the route, as 
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recommended, swings northeast to approximately St. Bernard 
Avenue.  From that point it continues in a northeast direction 
crossing the Interharbor Navigation Canal to a point approximately 
midway between      U. S. 90 and the Lake front.  From this point it 
swings almost due east, crossing Paris Road, crossing U. S. 90, U. S. 
11, near the lake front and then across the lake on new twin 
structures.  It also includes a section through the Kenilworth area, 
starting generally at Pontchartrain Boulevard, Florida Avenue and 
extending easterly to a connection with, what we refer to as the outer 
loop, to a junction with the inner loop near Franklin Avenue.
57
 
  
 The Interstate Highway proposal outlined by the state Highway Department was, as 
previously noted, generally consistent with the Major Streets Plan of the City of New Orleans.  
The primary deviation from the plan was that the City called for the development of Florida 
Boulevard through Lakeview and Gentilly as a major through connection, the state’s highway 
engineers found the use of this right-of-way to be “almost an impossible situation.”58 The route 
was complicated by the presence of two rail lines and an awkward angle at which the bypass 
highway would have to be connected to the primary highway. This connection would have 
resulted in a four level interchange and would have impeded the anticipated industrial 
development along the corridor.  The state also recognized that New Orleans needed a major 
street to serve cross-town traffic and believed that this corridor would best serve that purpose.  
Due to these factors, the decision was made to propose the highway, which would eventually be 
designated Interstate-610, through residential neighborhoods.
59
  
 Of all the highway miles proposed within the City of New Orleans as part of the 
Interstate Highway System, the Lakeview-Gentilly proposal for Interstate-610 proposal is the 
only portion that generated any substantial opposition at the required public hearing. The mayor, 
while trying to placate the residents of these neighborhoods who would lose their homes to 
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progress, outlined that the state Highway Department, at the request of the City, evaluated no 
less than nine separate proposals for alternate routes that would not bring a highway through 
neighborhoods. At the end of the engineering and traffic studies the state determined that the 
initial proposed route was the most feasible from traffic movement, cost, and engineering 
perspective.
60
 
 While not overly enthused about that prospect of large-scale land acquisitions, the City 
nevertheless conceded to the Highway Department’s position and Mayor Morrison became a 
champion for the project within City government. At the public hearing held on February 11, 
1958, numerous individuals and organizations spoke in support of the Highway Department’s 
proposal, including Mayor Morrison, the City’s Chief Administrative Officer, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Central Labor Council (local AFL-CIO organization), and the general manager 
of City Park, Mr. Ellis LaBorde.  Mr. LaBorde’s comments in the context of the hearing were 
interesting, in that while neither speaking as a proponent or opponent of the highways generally, 
he wanted to put on record that in finalizing the proposal to run the proposed Interstate-610 
through City Park, provisions should be made “for the preservation as much as possible of our 
golf courses, and some other major attractions that are in the park such as your fountain, and also 
for providing for safety of the people patronizing the park by having adequate pedestrian 
underpasses and vehicular underpasses.”61  
 Louis Bisso, the Director of the City Planning Commission, also spoke in overall support 
of the project. Mr. Bisso stated that the City Planning Commission had specifically approved of 
the proposed highway route as the best for the City and the most keeping with general “planning 
principles.” Essentially, the City Planning Commission had analyzed the alternative routes for 
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the Lakeview-Gentilly highway and determined that in terms of economy and efficiency, this 
route was preferable to some of the proposed routes that would have managed to avoid taking 
people’s homes. In looking at the Florida Avenue route, the City Planning Commission 
determined that the path would result in the loss of 147 houses where the proposed Lakeview-
Gentilly route would result in the loss of 163 houses.  While having less impact on individual 
structures, the Commission determined that the complexity involved in creating the junction of 
the highways at Florida Avenue would cost far more than the benefit realized in saving sixteen 
houses.
62
  
 New Orleans’s District “C” Councilman, James Fitzmorris, Jr., was perhaps the most 
vocal opponent present at the public hearing.  Councilman Fitzmorris specifically rose in 
opposition to the Lakeview-Gentilly route proposed as a cross-town connection.  In outlining the 
history of the project, Councilman Fitzmorris stated that “[o]n July 5, 1957, the city council 
expressed its firm opposition to [the Lakeview-Gentilly] segment of the proposed highway route. 
… This was done in the form of a definite resolution adopted by the council and passed by a vote 
of six to one.”63   
Through the Motion of July 5, 1957, the City Council vowed to “put forth its best effort, 
and do everything necessary and proper to”64 eliminate the proposed Lakeview-Gentilly bypass 
route through New Orleans.  The motion firmly stated the position of the Council and directed 
Mayor Morrison and all other administrative officials to take action on three specific issues: 1) 
remove the Lakeview-Gentilly bypass route from the Interstate Highway System proposal, 2) 
make the improvement of the Florida Avenue a priority, as called for in the adopted Major 
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Streets Plan, and 3) include the newly-completed Mississippi River Bridge and approaches in the 
Interstate Highway System so that federal dollars could be used to pay for construction of the 
bridge and tolls could be eliminated.
65
  
Following this action by the City Council, Councilman Fitzmorris continued, the state 
took the position that if New Orleans did not want the highways that the state was proposing then 
the City would simply be bypassed; to quote Councilman Fitzmorris: 
Again and again, thinly disguised threats were made that the city of 
New Orleans would be bypassed in effect an ultimatum was actually 
delivered which called for unqualified acceptance by the city 
officials of the entire plan embodied in the recommendation made by 
the Department’s consulting engineers. The Department called for 
unconditional surrender by its firm declaration that no part of the 
Interstate Highway System would be constructed in New Orleans 
unless the city council objections as expressed in its July 5, 1957 
resolution were withdrawn.  This resulted in councilmanic action on 
November 7, 1957, whereby the July 5, 1957 resolution was recalled 
and rescinded and it is significant did not approve the Department’s 
plan.  It was simply a convenient motion which satisfied the 
Department’s conditions, precedent for this public hearing.66 
 
Interestingly, while the New Orleans City Council’s motion of November 7, 1957 did 
rescind the motion of July 5, 1957, the Council maintained their overall opposition to the cross-
town route proposed to cross through Lakeview and Gentilly.  The motion, as adopted, recalled 
and rescinded the previous motion and invited the state’s Highway Department to hold their 
required hearings in New Orleans; additionally, the motion stated: 
At the same time, we again suggest that the proposed cross-town 
route continue to be studied by officials of the department with a 
view of causing a minimum of property damage, and that assurances 
be provided to property owners whose property may have to be 
acquired for necessary right-of-way within the next 5-year period 
that a fair and reasonable price will be paid for such properties.
67
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In acknowledging that New Orleans needed to be connected to the highway system, 
Councilman Fitzmorris wanted to be on record as opposing the route that had been determined 
by the state and which would interrupt life in several neighborhoods when there were alternate 
feasible routes which could be chosen.  The Councilman essentially conceded that nothing would 
be done about the route selection, and further noted that his constituents realized the same; 
however, Councilman Fitzmorris pressed the Department of Highways as to when the property 
acquisitions would begin and how long people would be given to find new homes.  The initial 
timeframe given at this stage of the planning process simply stated that the Lakeview-Gentilly 
segment of the highway system would come to fruition in the next ten to fifteen years.   
In addition to Councilman James Fitzmorris, Jr., numerous citizens of Lakeview rose in 
opposition to the proposed Lakeview-Gentilly route. The residents of this area implored the state 
to seriously evaluate the alternate routes even if that meant adding a few minutes of travel to 
someone’s cross-town travel. The residents that would feel the immediate impact of the highway 
were convinced that the state was ignoring the lives to be interrupted out of mere convenience.
68
 
The absence of discussion about the primary highway to be built along Claiborne Avenue 
is notable in the transcript of this hearing.  There were two mentions in the entirety of the 
meeting, with the exception of where the state verbally outlined the proposed route.  While this 
section of highway was not particularly objectionable at the time, likely due to the proposed use 
of existing right-of-way rather than requiring property acquisition, the Claiborne Avenue 
segment of Interstate-10 had the strongest and most detrimental long-term impact to its 
surrounding community. 
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The first mention was a concern of Tulane University, which was proposing to develop 
property at Claiborne Avenue and Canal Street. The particular concern was if their development 
would be taken and demolished due to the placement of entrance and exit ramps from the 
highway.  Representatives of the state highway department obfuscated in ‘clarifying’ that the 
topic of the hearing was only on the general routes and that the exact locations of entrances and 
exits would be determined at a later time.
69
 
The second mention was in the context of a proposal made by Fred Donaldson to 
eliminate the Lakeview-Gentilly route altogether and create a combined local and bypass route 
within the Claiborne Avenue right-of-way.  This proposal called for the construction of a layered 
highway, with local traffic utilizing surface streets, local highway traffic on the first level of 
grade-separated highway and then a second highway level to accommodate cross-town traffic 
separate from the entering and exiting local highway use (see Figure 5.9).
70
  The record does not 
indicate if this proposal was seriously considered by the Highway Department, but regardless it 
was not selected and the Highway Department proceeded with, and the federal Bureau of Public 
Roads approved of, the initial highway proposal for New Orleans, with the Lakeview-Gentilly 
bypass route included. 
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Figure 5.9 – Illustration of ‘The Fred Donaldson Plan to Eliminate the Lakeview Bypass”71 
 
  
 By the mid-1960s, the Mississippi River Bridge was approaching its daily traffic capacity 
and the Mississippi River Bridge Authority, in conjunction with the City Planning Commission 
began to evaluate proposals on increasing the daily traffic capacity of vehicular river crossings.  
The City Planning Commission staff broke the possibilities for satisfying traffic demands into 
four possible solutions:
72
  
1) Increase the capacity of the existing bridge or build a new one at the same 
location. 
 
2) Construct an additional bridge over the Mississippi River between the present 
bridge and the Huey P. Long Bridge. 
 
3) Impose tolls on the use of the existing Mississippi River Bridge to discourage 
use by private automobile.
73
 
 
4) A combination of items two and three. 
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The recommendation proposed by the staff and ultimately adopted by the City Planning 
Commission and forwarded to the Mississippi River Bridge Authority was the last, with several 
additional items to be considered in order to address congestion and vehicle movement:
74
 
1) Steps should be taken to increase the capacity of the Huey P. Long Bridge. 
 
2) Construction of a new Mississippi River crossing should be started 
immediately at a location between the Mississippi River Bridge and the Huey 
P. Long Bridge. 
 
3) Transit terminals with available parking should be constructed on the 
Westbank to encourage the use of transit to access the Central Business 
District. 
 
4) A large parking structure should be built at the Algiers ferry terminal and 
high-speed pedestrian ferries instituted. 
 
5) Begin planning for the construction of the Paris Road Bridge with the goal of 
completion by 1980 or earlier if the Dixie Freeway is constructed.
75,
 
76
 
 
The recommendation of the City Planning Commission was forwarded to the Mississippi River 
Bridge Authority for consideration and initial planning began to further the construction of a 
second Mississippi River crossing within the City of New Orleans.   In November of 1966, the 
Mississippi River Bridge Authority obtained approval through a constitutional amendment to 
refinance the existing Mississippi River Bridge to fund construction of two additional bridges.
77
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The preliminary planning of this new bridge called for it to be located approximately at 
Napoleon Avenue in New Orleans connecting to the vicinity of Barataria Boulevard in Jefferson 
Parish. The bridge proposal itself did not seem to incite much opposition; however, the 
opposition from both the community and elected officials surrounded the placement of the bridge 
approaches.  Mayor Victor Schiro’s administration generally supported the bridge proposal but 
only if the approaches would tie into the proposed Riverfront Expressway without creating a 
highway through existing neighborhoods.  This position was echoed by a study commissioned by 
Governor John McKeithen, which stated that the bridge’s approaches “must be an extension of 
the Riverfront Expressway” and that no elevated approaches should be permitted along Napoleon 
Avenue or any other street nor should any approaches be allowed to bisect residential 
neighborhoods.  The report concluded that the proposed bridge at Napoleon Avenue could only 
be considered if the Riverfront Expressway was realized.
78
 
In 1969, the U. S. Secretary of Transportation acted to eliminate all consideration of the 
Riverfront Expressway by federal officials, the end of this project then made the 
recommendations of the Mayor and Governor impossible.  The Mississippi River Bridge 
Authority proceeded with plans to construct a bridge at the Napoleon Avenue location but now 
with revised approaches running down Napoleon Avenue and connecting with South Claiborne 
Avenue via a tunnel.  This was later revised to remove the tunnel from Napoleon Avenue and 
place it in the vicinity of General Taylor Street, six blocks downstream from Napoleon Avenue.  
This approach was also to be placed underground via a tunnel but would require large-scale 
property acquisitions and the demolition of 820 housing units, displacing approximately 3,300 
people.
79
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Opposition within the community quickly coalesced, and with that community pushback 
came opposition from elected officials.  The New Orleans City Council passed a resolution 
rejecting the General Taylor Street proposal due to the displacement of homes and individuals as 
well as the need to bisect a community in order to construct the approaches to the bridge.  The 
Mississippi River Bridge Authority responded to the Council’s opposition in a letter on April 23, 
1970.   
In this letter, the Authority generally states that the General Taylor Street location of the 
bridge is the most practical and that the City would suffer dire economic consequences if they do 
not concede to the Authority’s plan to improve traffic flow into the City of New Orleans from 
neighboring Jefferson Parish.  The Authority presented a case to the New Orleans Council that 
tax revenues would suffer due to blight caused by disinvestment in the City and that Jefferson 
Parish’s West Bank would develop into a satellite Central Business District which would lead to 
less metropolitan concern for the historic commercial core of the community.
80
  
 The community and political opposition to the proposed Napoleon Avenue/General 
Taylor Street crossing did not diminish, and the Mississippi River Bridge Authority relented in 
August, 1970 in the form of a Resolution which, to briefly summarize, stated that the Authority 
has determined that the General Taylor Street crossing is best and if either the City of New 
Orleans or Jefferson Parish want the bridge located elsewhere they need to pay for the studies 
and engineering. The Authority expressed willingness to build their bridge wherever the local 
governments selected but that they would not expend their resources on determining any location 
other than the one they had already selected.
81
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 This decision resulted in the cancellation of the second Mississippi River crossing 
between the Mississippi River Bridge and the Huey P. Long Bridge, but the traffic capacity 
problems on the two bridges remained. To settle the question of location, in 1971 Governor 
McKeithen appointed a committee to study possible bridge location and to present the state with 
a location so planning could proceed.  Several options were evaluated by the Molony committee 
(named for the Chair of the committee, Michael Molony, President of the New Orleans Chamber 
of Commerce), including locations entirely in Jefferson Parish, a location between Algiers and 
Press Street in New Orleans, and a location to parallel the existing Greater New Orleans Bridge.  
After years of study, the committee voted to recommend the parallel location to the state and this 
location was subsequently endorsed by Governor Edwards on August 30, 1974.
82
 
Ultimately the City of New Orleans, Jefferson Parish and the Mississippi River Bridge 
Authority agreed that the best location for a supplemental crossing would be adjacent to the 
existing Mississippi River Bridge.  Much of the required right-of-way was already in the 
possession of the State and through reconfiguring the existing approaches very little new land 
would be required, particularly in downtown New Orleans where property values were highest.  
The second Greater New Orleans Bridge, dubbed “GNO II,” opened to traffic on October 1, 
1988. 
The Land Assembly 
 It is impossible to argue that a bridge or highway is not a “public use” as understood by 
the American legal system, but regardless of the State’s ability to expropriate land to complete 
these projects, it is clear from the property records that substantial efforts were made to acquire 
property through negotiated sales rather than through judicial expropriation.   
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 For the purpose of analyzing land acquisition for the Mississippi River Bridges and the 
Pontchartrain Expressway, property records were surveyed for the span of the bridge and 
expressway between the foot of the Mississippi River Bridge at the West Bank toll plaza to the 
point where the Pontchartrain Expressway began traveling through the New Basin Canal right-
of-way.  Once the highway entered the existing government-owned right-of-way, land 
acquisition was minimal and would have only been required to accommodate entrances and exits 
from the highway. 
For the construction of the Mississippi River Bridge and the Pontchartrain Expressway a 
survey of property transfers, summarized in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, indicates a total of 184 
parcels acquired to assemble the right-of-way of both projects (full property transfer information 
for this project can be found in Appendix 5.2).  Out of the 184 parcels acquired for the projects, 
only 45 of those were acquired by the state through acts of judicial expropriation, which is 
approximately 24% of the property acquisition for these projects.   
Table 5.1 –Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Mississippi River Bridge 
Right-of-Way (West Bank/Algiers)
83
 
Square 
Number of Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
280 9 4 
281 12 4 
282 15 4 
285-A 3 2 
285-B 3 1 
A  
(284A) 
2 0 
7A 1 0 
7B 3 0 
8A 4 0 
59 13 5 
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Table 5.2 –Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Mississippi River Bridge 
Right-of-Way (Lower Garden District / Central Business District)
84
 
Square 
Number of Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
46 4 1 
71 6 2 
72 6 1 
138 3 0 
139 4 1 
156 6 2 
157 15 2 
158 9 1 
159 6 2 
Table 5.3 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Pontchartrain Expressway 
Right-of-Way.
85
 
Square 
Number of Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
214 6 4 
238 16 1 
254 9 2 
277 4 2 
290 & 
312 
16 2 
325 9 2 
 
The next project undertaken by the Louisiana Department of Highways in New Orleans 
was the Interstate Highway System. As previously discussed, the State’s proposed highway route 
followed the City’s approved Major Streets Plan fairly accurately, with the deviation of the 
Lakeview-Gentilly Bypass not following Florida Avenue.  In the acquisition of these rights-of-
way, the Highway Department used their power of expropriation sparingly, which is surprising 
particularly due to the opposition that had been voiced at the public hearing regarding the route 
in 1958.  Through analysis of the property acquisitions, it appears that the minimal number of 
takings for this project is attributable to two factors: time and power. 
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Time is proposed as the first factor in helping to minimize the necessity of expropriation 
in these projects.  In reviewing the timeline of these projects, it is clear that the State was in no 
particular rush to acquire parcels.  The required public hearing was held in early 1958 and the 
property acquisitions began in 1959 and were completed in 1972, with the bulk of properties 
being acquired in the early to mid 1960s.  It appears that through this extended period many 
people were able to negotiate sales with the Highway Department that would allow the State to 
acquire the needed property while not having to forcibly evict people from their homes.   
The second factor, power, is proposed because in the case of the Interstate Highways 
through New Orleans, most of the property taken was that of individuals whereas the case of the 
Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressway much of the property was owned by 
commercial interests.  This would have meant that in many cases individual property owners 
would have likely yielded to the needs of the State without much objection where commercial 
property owners would have been in a better financial position to try to fight the expropriations 
with the goal of either realizing a higher price for the property or retaining their property. 
 In evaluating the property transfers for the Interstate Highways through New Orleans, a 
decision was made to limit the scope of this research to property acquisitions for Interstate-10 to 
the section between Tulane and Franklin Avenues and then the entire route of Interstate-610 
from Franklin Avenue to West End Boulevard.  These boundaries were determined due to the 
sparse population found beyond Franklin Avenue and the route of the highways past that point.  
Much of Interstate-10 through New Orleans East, as it is now known, was acquired by the City 
as part of the Little Woods–Lakeshore Highway with much of the remaining right-of-way 
paralleling existing rail lines. 
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The full property transfer table for this project can be found in Appendix 5.3, but the 
findings are summarized in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. (below).  As indicated previously, the number of 
expropriations found in the land acquisition for the Interstate rights-of-way were statistically far 
lower than the 24% expropriation rate found for the initial construction of the Mississippi River 
Bridge and the Pontchartrain Expressway although the total property acquisition, by number of 
parcels, was much higher. 
Table 5.4 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Interstate-10 Right-of-Way 
(Tulane Avenue to Franklin Avenue).
86
 
Square Number of Parcels Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
403 9 3 
434 16 2 
207 3 1 
208 17 5 
209 3 1 
225 7 1 
164 4 0 
182 5 0 
193 6 3 
197 6 2 
198 10 4 
199 11 8 
753 6 2 
754 16 2 
755 10 0 
757 9 3 
758 7 0 
767 11 3 
768 26 3 
769 3 0 
888 20 2 
909 6 1 
910 20 0 
1026 6 0 
1027 15 3 
1028 7 0 
1056 6 1 
1057 17 2 
1058 12 0 
1073 19 1 
1209 14 2 
1172 10 3 
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Square Number of Parcels Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
1210 5 0 
1211 15 0 
1380 11 2 
1381 14 2 
1493 4 0 
1494 10 1 
1708 3 0 
1917 12 2 
1918 7 1 
1978 9 0 
 
Table 5.5 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Interstate-610 Right-of-Way 
(Franklin Avenue to West End Boulevard).
87
 
Square 
Number of 
Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of 
Parcels 
Expropriated 
 
Square 
Number of 
Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of 
Parcels 
Expropriated 
2095 / 
2096 
1 0 
 
2133 9 0 
2097 14 0  2132 22 1 
2098 17 3  2131 5 1 
2099 14 0  2295 7 0 
2100 14 0  2296 1 1 
2101 18 0  2297 1 0 
2102 18 0  2298 1 0 
3 21 1  2313 1 0 
4 6 2  2314 1 0 
6 22 0  2315 1 0 
7 15 0  2316 7 1 
12 19 1  402-B 1 1 
13 8 0  400 10 0 
2104 17 0  399 11 1 
2105 21 0  398 10 0 
2106 18 1  397 13 0 
2107 17 1  396 13 1 
2109 16 0  395 12 1 
2110 18 2  5 or 394 11 0 
2111 20 0  4 or 393 14 1 
2137 / 
2289 
9 0 
 
3 5 0 
1966 10 0  2 or 392 16 0 
2112 16 2  1 9 2 
2113 6 1  391 8 0 
2114 1 0  390 19 0 
2115 9 0  427 2 0 
2116 1 0  428 21 0 
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In the assembly of right-of-way for Intersate-10, the state acquired a total of 427 parcels.  
Of these 427 individual parcels, a total of 66 properties were taken through expropriation, 
making a 15% expropriation rate for this section of the highway system.  Surprisingly, the 
expropriations for the Interstate-610 section of the highway system resulted in even fewer 
expropriations in both real numbers and as a percentage of total properties acquired.  For the 
Interstate-610 route through Lakeview and Gentilly, a total of 597 parcels were acquired by the 
state with only 25 of these resulting from judicial expropriation, bringing the expropriation 
percentage for this section of highway to a mere 4%.  
Notably, the Claiborne Avenue section of Interstate-10, which was to be constructed 
entirely within City-owned right-of-way actually resulted in the largest percentage of 
expropriations of any individual segment of the interstate highway route through New Orleans.  
While this land was actually taken for entrance and exit ramps rather than the actual highway, 
the State acquired 155 individual parcels on squares abutting Claiborne Avenue (from Tulane 
Avenue to St. Bernard Circle) and exercised eminent domain in the acquisition of 42 of these 
properties.  This resulted in an expropriation rate of 27% for the acquisition of rights-of-way 
through New Orleans’s historic Tremé neighborhood.  If the property acquisitions in this area are 
removed from the above total presented for acquisition of the Interstate-10 right-of-way, this 
brings the actual expropriation rate for assembly of the remaining 272 parcels down to 9%, with 
a total of 24 expropriations outside of Tremé.  
In construction of the GNOII Bridge, the Mississippi River crossing paralleling the 
original Mississippi River Bridge from Algiers to the Central Business District and Lower 
Garden District, the State Highway Department required additional properties to accommodate 
the now-widening bridge right-of-way.  While the site analysis used to select the location 
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determined that very little new property would be required by saving space through 
reconfiguration of the existing access ramps, the total property acquisition for the construction of 
the second span and the attendant changes to the Pontchartrain Expressway resulted in the State’s 
acquisition of 143 parcels (184 parcels were acquired for the construction of the original span).  
Detailed property acquisition information can be found in Appendix 5.2, but is briefly 
summarized in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 below: 
Table 5.6 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Greater New Orleans Bridge 
II Construction (West Bank/Algiers)
88
 
Square 
Number of Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
275 20 3 
276 8 1 
274 21 4 
270 10 1 
271-A 1 0 
282 2 1 
285-A 2 0 
285-B 1 0 
270-A 7 0 
C 15 0 
7B 1 1 
8B 1 0 
59 10 2 
 
Table 5.7 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Greater New Orleans Bridge 
II Construction (Lower Garden District / Central Business District)
89
 
Square 
Number of Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
46 1 1 
70A 1 1 
71 7 2 
72 7 2 
119 4 2 
138 2 1 
139 2 2 
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Square 
Number of Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
156 3 2 
157 2 0 
158 5 1 
 
Table 5.8 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Pontchartrain Expressway 
Right-of-Way.
90
 
Square 
Number of Parcels 
Acquired 
Number of Parcels 
Expropriated 
183 5 1 
214 1 0 
238 2 0 
254 2 2 
 
Out of the 143 parcels acquired for this project, the state expropriated 30, which results in 
a 21% expropriation rate for this project.  This percentage is similar to the 24% expropriation 
rate that was found for the original Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressway 
project.  This finding serves to underscore the reality that power, or perception thereof, played a 
role in deciding whether to fight the State or acquiesce to their purchase request.  Many of the 
parcels acquired for this project, particularly in the Lower Garden District and the Central 
Business District, were commercially owned, whereas those in Algiers were predominantly 
residential.  If property acquisition for each side of the river is separated and analyzed 
independently, this theory becomes even clearer: on the Westbank the effective expropriation 
rate for the GNOII project was 13% whereas in the Lower Garden District and Central Business 
District the expropriation rate was 41%.  
The Legacy 
 The long-term implications of the highway projects in the New Orleans area are similar 
to those found throughout the country.  Rather than making the historic commercial core of the 
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community more accessible, the bridges and highways intensified the abandonment of these 
urban areas in favor of the tranquility of suburbia.  As an example of this, one can look at the 
traffic volume counts provided by the City Planning Commission of New Orleans in their 
analysis of the proposal to increase the capacity of the Mississippi River Bridge.  To look at the 
totals for just two years paints a picture of the exponential growth of the once-rural West Bank 
into a bustling suburb.  The Mississippi River Bridge was planned with a capacity of 50,000 
vehicles per day; this capacity was projected to adequately serve demand into the 1990s.
91
  
According to the City Planning Commission’s Staff Report, in January of 1964 the Mississippi 
River Bridge had an average daily traffic count of 30,831.  By January of 1965 the daily traffic 
count increased to 48,932.
92
 
Figure 5.10 – The Crescent City Connection, as viewed from Algiers (2012).93 
 
 
 The bridges and highways have become ingrained into the travel patterns of New 
Orleanians and have ever-increasing traffic volumes.  Much of the highway route has become an 
accepted part of everyday life in both commuting and as elements of the urban landscape.   
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 Photograph by author. 
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Figure 5.11 – Present Aerial View of New Orleans Interstate Highways (in yellow), Jefferson 
Parish Line to Franklin Avenue.
94
 
 
 
Figure 5.12 – Present Aerial View of New Orleans Interstate Highways (in yellow), Franklin 
Avenue to St. Tammany Parish Line.
95
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 Google Maps Aerial Imagery, retrieved from maps.google.com on September 10, 2012. 
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 Google Maps Aerial Imagery, retrieved from maps.google.com on September 10, 2012. 
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The only part of the system that is controversial today is a portion that was almost ignored when 
it was proposed and constructed: the Claiborne Avenue section of Interstate-10.  
Figure 5.13 – Map of Interstate-10 from the Pontchartrain Expressway to Elysian Fields 
Avenue.
96
 
 
 
When this section of highway was constructed, a neighborhood was bifurcated and a 
thriving African-American commercial corridor was destroyed.  North Claiborne Avenue 
through Tremé was a wide boulevard lined with local businesses and majestic oak trees under 
which the community could gather (Figure 5.14).  This was replaced with concrete and the 
perpetual shadow cast by an elevated highway (Figure 5.15).  It is worth noting that Tremé was 
not the only community split by the Interstate Highway System; Interstate-610 ran directly 
through the Lakeview and Gentilly neighborhoods, clearing hundreds of structures as it crossed 
the city.  It is impossible to state conclusively why these communities did not suffer the same  
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Figure 5.14 – North Claiborne Avenue at Dumaine Street (looking east), undated (1950s).97 
 
Figure 5.15 – North Claiborne Avenue at Dumaine Street (looking east), 2012.98 
 
 
negative impacts found in the Tremé area, but it is this researcher’s belief that the reason is likely 
to do with two separate factors: the first being that these were relatively new areas of residential 
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development, therefore the place attachment was not as strong as would have been found in the 
historic Tremé community; and the second being that Interstate-610 did not remove a historic 
community gathering space, as was lost on North Claiborne Avenue.   
The selection of North Claiborne Avenue for the placement of the elevated Interstate 
Highway was based on the designation of North Claiborne Avenue as a ‘major street’ within the 
Major Streets Plan and the availability of right-of-way, the records do not indicate that there 
were any ill intentions regarding placement of this highway through this thriving African-
American community.  White elites in New Orleans have been charged with indifference to the 
construction of this section of highway at best and racism at worst. The official archive records 
reveal evidence of neither. 
Since the time of highway construction, subsequent research has stated that 
preservationists, in fighting against the proposed Riverfront Expressway, offered North 
Claiborne Avenue as an alternative, encouraging double-layered highway development through 
this area to satisfy the traffic capacity which required the addition of the Riverfront Expressway.  
Mohl (2002) cites the Vieux Carré Courier as a vocal supporter of this alternative, editorializing 
in 1965 that the right-of-way on North Claiborne Avenue could “be developed to the limit, with 
at least two upper levels.”99 It is important to note that although little attention was paid to the 
decision at the time, the use of North Claiborne Avenue as Interstate Highway right-of-way was 
designated following the public hearing in February of 1958 and was not the result of eliminating 
the Riverfront Expressway. 
Additionally, based on copies of national publications found within the City Planning 
Commission’s archived material, the prevailing thinking of the era was that highway adjacency 
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would actually boost property values and commercial desirability rather than depress it.  
According to the American Right of Way Association “all properties coming within the 
influence of a freeway [would] enjoy tremendous benefits.”100 These benefits would be realized 
not only in increased commercial traffic for adjacent businesses but also in the form of higher 
property values for properties adjacent to these highways.
101
  These publications cited specific 
figures from studies in multiple states attesting to the benefits of urban expressways, this was 
likely an accurate assessment of the impact of these highways in areas where there was room for 
development as a result of expressway construction.  These reports only addressed truly urban 
expressways in terms of the slum clearance possibilities of such projects.   The Automotive 
Safety Foundation profiled the success of highways in New Orleans, referencing the 
Pontchartrain Expressway and grade separation projects that were occupying the New Basin 
Canal right-of-way, stating that “a blighted area partially surrounded the business district” and 
that “high-grade planning and financing resulted in slum clearance, … right of way for a 
proposed freeway, appropriate site for a new city hall and civic center as well as a new medical 
center.”102 
Regardless of how the Pontchartrain Expressway and related improvements may have 
been portrayed nationally, planning officials in New Orleans saw the highways, and particularly 
the interstate system, as a mechanism to provide for transportation needs of the community 
rather than as an instrument of change.  In a 1960 questionnaire from Engineering News-Record, 
Louis Bisso, Director of the City Planning Commission, was asked: “Is your city taking the 
                                                 
100
 Balfour, F. C. (1956).  Special Benefits, Right of Way Magazine, American Right of Way Association, Vol. 4, 
No. 1.  Extracts of article accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City 
Planning Commission, File 230. 
101
 Automotive Safety Foundation (Undated).  What Freeways Mean to Your City.  Accessed from the New Orleans 
Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 230. 
102
 Ibid, at 5. 
 165 
fullest advantage of the opportunities offered by urban expressway construction for slum 
clearance, urban renewal, rezoning, relief of traffic congestion and other community objectives?”  
Mr. Bisso’s response stated that the focus of urban highways in New Orleans was transportation 
and that the other elements were of “incidental importance.” Speaking for the City of New 
Orleans, he further stated that:  
Of primary importance is the assurance that [a]n Express Way 
System functions as a unifying force for the community and not a 
disruptive element.  Our primary concern is providing an adequate 
circulation program with a minimal amount of disruption of 
community integrity. … In addition, approximately 78% of the 
Interstate System in the City of New Orleans will require little if 
any expropriation of property and structure demolition.
103
 
 
It is impossible to state what unspoken motivations may have been at play, but what is 
clear is that while destruction of this community may not have been the anticipated outcome it is 
the lasting end result of this project. In 1950, North Claiborne Avenue, from Canal Street to St. 
Bernard Avenue, was home to 123 businesses and by 1996 businesses within the same section of 
North Claiborne Avenue numbered only 44. A full inventory of businesses from 1950 and 1996 
can be found in Appendix 5.4.  This number is certainly only one which illustrates the decline of 
this once-thriving neighborhood commercial area.   
Recognizing the impact of this project and the steady decline of the community which 
began in the 1960s following construction of this highway and today the community and the 
municipal leadership have agreed to explore the possibility of removing the elevated highway 
and restoring what was once a grand boulevard, though any final decision-making lies with the 
State’s Department of Transportation.104 
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Chapter 6 
 
The New Orleans Cultural Center: 
‘Culture’ as Defined by Bureaucracy 
 
 The New Orleans Cultural Center, known today as Louis Armstrong Park, was New 
Orleans’s second attempt at urban renewal, following the Civic Center. While the land 
acquisition for this project began in the late 1950s, the space would not be developed or become 
usable until the early 1970s.  Through the years, this project has come to symbolize the 
institutional disregard for New Orleans’s indigenous culture in favor of ‘culture’ as defined by 
national and international trends, as well as a disregard for the city’s African-American culture 
by the white establishment. Additionally, this is an example of top-down planning that has been 
imposed on a community with little regard for the impact on those most affected.   
 The Cultural Center concept was based on the Bartholomew Civic Center plan from the 
1920s (discussed previously in Chapters 2 and 4) and grew from the construction of the 
Municipal Auditorium.  This project was part of Mayor deLesseps S. Morrison’s strategy to 
modernize New Orleans to strengthen the local economy as well as to bolster the civic amenities 
available to New Orleanians. The Cultural Center, initially proposed to house a theatre, an opera 
house, a sports arena, and museums, was never made a priority by municipal government outside 
of acquiring the requisite land for Municipal Auditorium parking. Figure 6.5 (page 183) indicates 
the location ultimately selected for the development of the Cultural Center.   
Other projects during the 1950s were considered higher priorities in the City and region, 
resulting in a lack of inertia for the Cultural Center project. The International Center, consisting 
of the Rivergate Convention Center and the New Orleans International Trade Mart, was 
proposed at the same time as the Cultural Center and was deemed to be a greater need by the 
business community and the City Planning Commission.  Subsequently, the Louisiana 
 167 
Superdome was proposed and constructed, negating the need for the sports arena which had been 
proposed for the Cultural Center. 
The Vision 
  By the late 1940s, the vision for a Civic Center, outlined by Harland Bartholomew and 
Associates in 1925 in the vicinity of North Rampart Street and Orleans Street, had been shelved 
in favor of the Civic Center being constructed at Loyola Avenue and Poydras Street (see Chapter 
4). In 1951, the City’s planning consultants, Harland Bartholomew and Associates, presented 
their ‘Public Buildings’ report to the City Planning Commission which proposed an assembly 
center to be developed near the Municipal Auditorium.  This assembly center would generally 
comprise the existing auditorium, a new sports arena and a building to house exhibits.
1
 This 
initial vision was further refined through the 1950s, and in 1961 a report entitled Public 
Buildings Report II was published by the New Orleans City Planning Commission outlining a 
more detailed description of those uses which would be located at the Cultural Center.  
While the exact plans for what was to be located within the Cultural Center were not 
defined until the 1960s, land acquisition for the project began in 1955 when the City Council 
appropriated one million dollars of the annual Capital Outlay for the purpose.
2
  This land 
acquisition began prior to the development of a plan for the site, and over the objection of the 
City Planning Commission; however, City leadership believed that the land acquisition was 
necessary for two reasons: to replace parking for the Municipal Auditorium (which was being 
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lost to street improvements),
3
 and because the land value would rise once the proposed street 
improvements were completed.
4
 
Figure 6.1 – Basin Street – Orleans Avenue Connection in Relation to the Cultural Center.5 
 
 
These street improvements were necessary to improve access to both the proposed 
Cultural Center complex and to the Central Business District.  This new connection, modern-day 
Basin Street, would connect the new interstate highway to the Vieux Carré and the CBD as well 
as compliment and tie into the ongoing street widening project on Loyola Avenue as part of the 
Civic Center project (see Chapter 4).  In order to make this connection part of the grand 
boulevard connecting the Union Passenger Terminal, Civic Center and Cultural Center to the 
Interstate Highway, three existing municipal squares of parking for the Municipal Auditorium 
                                                 
3
 Memorandum from Glenn P. Clasen, Chief Administrative Officer to Mayor Victor Schiro, August 22, 1961. 
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would be at least partially converted to roadway.
6
  In addition to the immediate physical needs of 
the City relative to parking and street improvements, the federal government was providing 
funding for land acquisition for eligible projects.  By utilizing the available federal dollars, the 
City would be able to acquire the land needed for these immediate goals and for the long term 
goals of the Cultural Center in a manner less costly to the municipal coffers.
7
 
 According to the Public Buildings Report II, “[t]he “Cultural Center” [was] to provide a 
nucleus for recreation, entertainment and culture in New Orleans, and ultimately a high density 
dwellings area in the core of the city.”8 As proposed, the Cultural Center would include an opera 
house, concert hall, “legitimate” theater, museum, community facilities building, high rise 
apartments, and restaurants, shops, stores, schools, churches and green areas.
9
  The location of 
this center was proposed to be in the area generally bounded by North Rampart Street, Esplanade 
Avenue, N. Claiborne Avenue and St. Louis Street.
10
   
 The Cultural Center was envisioned as a civic meeting place and an environment for 
education, recreation and the exchange of ideas; the Center would be developed as a 24-hour 
space to attract both tourists and locals with an eye to the cultural and historical landscape of the 
City. Interestingly, city leaders felt it their duty to provide this forum not only for New Orleans, 
but also for the metropolitan area. In a document prepared by the City Planning Commission in 
1973 outlining the Cultural Center project, it was noted that “[c]ultural facilities are virtually 
                                                 
6
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absent in the parishes surrounding New Orleans; therefore, New Orleans has the responsibility of 
providing cultural attractions for the entire metropolitan region.”11  
 With this recognized responsibility, the City envisioned a Center that would serve the 
needs of a growing metropolitan region. The population of the region at the time of the project’s 
conception was approximately one million with a projected total population of 1.5 million by the 
time the full Cultural Center would be completed based on a 25-year development schedule.
12
  
Since this would be a Center to serve the needs of a region, rather than the community in which 
the complex would be located, the diverse needs and wants of a large population were 
considered. 
 The goal of the Cultural Center, as it developed from concept to functioning plan, was for 
it to “become the center of cultural activities in the New Orleans Metropolitan region”13 and to 
cater to “the educational and recreational needs of families for miles around.”14  In addition to 
the creation of a regional attraction, the proposal called for the development to minimize impacts 
on adjacent neighborhoods by including parking garages accessible from the adjacent major 
streets and fully utilizing its location with respect to existing public transportation lines. 
 In the City Planning Commission’s Public Buildings Report II, the benefits of the 
proposed Cultural Center were broken into bullet points outlining the goals of the project with 
respect to the development of the City as a whole. The goals of the project are summarized 
below:
15
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 Remove ‘blight’ on the site of the Cultural Center and influence the improvement 
of the surrounding neighborhood. 
 
 Implement the City’s Master Plan through careful site selection. 
 
 Create a complex of buildings which both civic design and open space. 
 
 Group public functions while allowing some private development 
 
 Provide tangible evidence of the City’s accomplishments. 
 
In addition to these goals, the character of the proposed development would allow the expression 
of history, tradition and culture of the City through site design and architecture.
16
  Additionally, 
the Cultural Center could be designed in a way that would bring day and night activity to the area 
and designed to “relate to human scale by the inclusion of uses that will attract the general 
public.”17 
 In their Public Buildings Report II, the City Planning Commission outlined five physical 
factors that were considered in selecting a site for the Cultural Center: the creation of a growth 
boundary on the northeastern side of the Central Business District, the redevelopment of an area 
whose potential was not being realized, creating a visual relationship with both the Union 
Passenger Terminal and St. Louis Cathedral, creation of parking areas, and suitability of the 
location for assembly activities. 
 In line with the first of these criteria, the Cultural Center was proposed in the vicinity of 
the Municipal Auditorium to serve as a barrier between the Central Business District (CBD) and 
nearby residential neighborhoods.  The City Planning Commission noted that there were uses 
being established on the periphery of the CBD which are more suited to the historic commercial 
center.  They believed that the establishment of a large public space at the edge of the CBD 
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 Public Buildings Report II. 
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would serve as a deterrent to business interests expanding beyond that area and would therefore 
encourage development in the core area of the City. The Public Buildings Report II notes that 
this was part of the strategy employed in selecting the site of the Civic Center and that by doing 
so the City had successfully encouraged new development in both the area of the Civic Center 
and between the historic commercial core and the new Civic Center complex.
18
  
 The selection of the Municipal Auditorium area as the new Cultural Center shared a 
second common element with the Civic Center as well: the complete rehabilitation of a 
neighborhood which “was not fulfilling its potential as Central Business District property.”19  
The City Planning Commission envisioned that this renewal would not only involve removal of 
blighted property which would increase the values of adjacent properties, but would also spur the 
private redevelopment of commercial structures along North Rampart Street. The anticipated 
positive impacts of the proposed Cultural Center were not limited to North Rampart Street or the 
Tremé neighborhood.  They extended to the “accelerate[d] rehabilitation of the Vieux Carré” and 
“protection against the infringement of incompatible uses.”20 
 The aesthetic reasoning for selecting the location was to create a grand civic boulevard 
(Loyola Avenue/Basin Street/Orleans Avenue), extending from the Union Passenger Terminal to 
the Cultural Center, with the new Civic Center as the mid-point.  This location afforded the City 
the opportunity to highlight the new Basin Street/Orleans Avenue connection to the proposed 
Interstate Highway (see Chapter 5) as well as the newly-expanded Loyola Avenue which 
connected the Union Passenger Terminal and the Civic Center to Canal Street.  Additionally, this 
location also provided convenient access from around the metropolitan region to the Cultural 
Center, via the proposed Interstate Highway.  The location also served a second aesthetic 
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purpose in connecting the sight-line from the St. Louis Cathedral to a public building complex 
via a “visual axis along Orleans Street through the Vieux Carré.”21 
Figure 6.2 – Cultural Center site in relation to the proposed Interstate Highway.22 
 
 
 Parking concerns drove the acquisition of land in this area without consideration of the 
larger Cultural Center project.  The need for land in this area only served to provide another 
reason for the selection of the Municipal Auditorium area to house the proposed Cultural Center.  
As previously noted, the City was constructing the Basin Street/Orleans Avenue connection to 
the Interstate Highway which caused the loss of existing Municipal Auditorium parking for the 
new roadway.  While the Interstate Highway was not yet constructed, the route had been 
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approved in 1958 and construction of the highway was seen as imminent.  The City recognized 
the need to provide adequate parking for the Auditorium and the growing Central Business 
District, and the City Planning Commission concluded that this area could serve both; the needs 
of the CBD would be met during the day and the needs of the Auditorium would be met at night 
and on weekends.
23
 
 The final element of site selection, according to the Public Buildings Report II, was the 
“suitability of the area for major public assembly facilities.”24  The City Planning Commission 
determined that this site was within walking distance of Canal Street and the historic commercial 
core of the City and was connected to major streets and the Interstate Highway.  This location 
was therefore deemed ideal in that it would “relate to urban facilities to become an interesting 
cosmopolitan area.”25 
 Proposed in tandem with the City’s new Cultural Center was an International Center, 
which would be comprised of a convention center (the Rivergate Convention Center, now the 
site of Harrah’s Casino), a hotel, and an office building, the International Trade Mart, which 
would provide office space for the Dock Board, International Trade Mart, and foreign 
consulates.
26
 This proposal was seen as critical to maintaining New Orleans’s position both as a 
tourist and convention destination and as a major international trading center due to the Port of 
New Orleans.  This International Center was introduced not as a competing proposal with the 
Cultural Center, but as a complementary one in which the International Center would serve the 
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commercial and tourism interests while the Cultural Center would be designed to serve the 
citizens of the region.
27
   
The initial discussions of the projects included consideration of combining the 
International and Cultural Centers.  In 1961, the City’s Chief Administrative Officer, Glenn 
Clasen, sent a memorandum to Mayor Victor Schiro effectively ending consideration of 
combining the facilities. In evaluating the proposals, several issues were raised which made 
consolidating the proposals either impractical or impossible.  Specifically, the Chief 
Administrative Officer determined that: 1) the uses proposed within the two proposals were 
incompatible; 2) there was no duplication of services created by moving forward with both 
proposals separately; 3) consolidating the proposals into a single location would generate parking 
and traffic issues; 4) the Municipal Auditorium site had existing needs that would have to be met 
regardless of the eventual fate of the Cultural Center; and 5) the Federal assistance available for 
the Cultural Center site would not be available for the proposed site of the International Center 
due to its location in the commercial core of the City.  In addition to these findings, Mr. Clasen 
also noted that moving forward with the Cultural Center in its proposed location would also 
allow the Municipal Government to eliminate substandard housing.
28
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Figure 6.3 – Times-Picayune Illustration of the Relative Locations of the Proposed Cultural 
Center and International Center.
29
 
 
 
The Planning 
 As stated previously, the planning for what would become the New Orleans Cultural 
Center (initially the Assembly Center and later Louis Armstrong Park) began with the 
Bartholomew Plan for New Orleans in the 1920s. This initial proposal called for the construction 
of a grand civic center in the area now occupied by the Cultural Center but the plan was shelved 
in the 1930s as the nation struggled through the Great Depression, and the municipal priorities of 
New Orleans changed through the years.  The New Orleans Civic Center (Chapter 4) was 
developed in the early 1950s at a different location that was more in line with encouraging 
growth in the Central Business District. Through the years, however, the original plan for 
Bartholomew’s civic center was not forgotten and the Municipal Auditorium (Chapter 2) served 
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as an ever-present reminder of the grand plans for the redevelopment of the Tremé neighborhood 
at the backdoor of the Vieux Carré. 
 Beginning in 1955, the Morrison administration began including land acquisition for the 
Cultural Center in its Capital Budget proposals to the City Planning Commission and the City 
Council.
30
  The Capital Budget process is required to outline capital expenses on a five year 
schedule pursuant to the City’s Charter; however this outline can be changed yearly as priorities 
change.  The table below reflects the dollar amounts for land acquisition budgeted by the City 
Planning Commission and the City Council only in the year immediately following adoption of 
the Capital Budget in order to reflect the actual amounts available rather than the projected 
amounts that were included in previous budget years. 
Table 6.1 – Budgeted Capital Expenditures for Land Acquisition for the Cultural Center31 
Capital Budget 
Year 
City Planning 
Recommendation 
City Council 
Action 
Total Budgeted 
Expenditures 
1955 0 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 
1956 $1,000,000 $500,000 $1,500,000 
1957 0 0 $1,500,000 
1958 0 $200,000 $1,700,000 
1959 0 $250,000 $1,950,000 
1960 0 $100,000 $2,050,000 
1961 0 $250,000 $2,300,000 
1962 $500,000 $500,000 $2,800,000 
1963 $1,000,000 $500,000 $3,300,000 
1964 $500,000 $200,000 $3,500,000 
1965 0 $500,000 $4,000,000 
1966 $500,000 0 $4,000,000 
 
The acquisition of property in the decade from 1955 through 1965 represented a leap of faith 
with respect to the Cultural Center project, but also served to accommodate the immediate 
perceived need of providing adequate parking for the Municipal Auditorium which was going to 
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be lost to the construction of the Basin Street/Orleans Avenue connection to the new Interstate 
Highway.
32
  
 Interestingly, this land acquisition began even before there was a formal selection of a 
site for the Cultural Center.  Again, this is partially attributable to the parking needs associated 
with the Municipal Auditorium, but also to the strong-mayor style administration of deLesseps S. 
Morrison. In the City Planning Commission’s Report relative to the proposal of consolidating the 
International and Cultural Centers, the Commission’s staff outlined the history of the Cultural 
Center proposal and the City Planning Commission’s attitude regarding same. It noted that the 
Commission was opposed to beginning acquisition of land in 1955 based on the “absence of a 
plan for the center.”33  Following the City Council’s approval of the Capital Budget including 
land acquisition, the City Planning Commission acted to limit land acquisition to the four squares 
adjacent to the Municipal Auditorium, which were the likely areas upon which the Cultural 
Center would be developed.
34
 
 Over the course of the next several years, the City Planning Commission took small steps 
toward crafting a plan for the Cultural Center.  These steps culminated in the adoption of the 
Cultural Center as part of the City’s Master Plan on April 11, 1961.  Prior to the adoption of the 
proposal, the City Planning Commission held a public hearing on the Cultural Center on October 
25, 1960 and the Commission’s Report noted that “[t]here was no opposition voiced at the 
hearing.”35  The coverage of the public hearing by the Times-Picayune corroborates this claim by 
the City Planning Commission.  The only points of contention relative to the Cultural Center 
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proposal related to the timing and priority of the proposal with respect to the simultaneous 
International Center proposal.
36
  According to the transcript of this hearing, the only individuals 
requesting to speak on the proposal were Louis Brown, Director of the Central Area Committee 
(Chamber of Commerce of the New Orleans Area); Harry England, Greater New Orleans Tourist 
Comission; E. B. Benjamin, Cultural Attractions Fund of Greater New Orleans; and Ray 
Scheuring, Manager of the Municipal Auditorium.  There were no speakers either in support or 
opposition from the general public.
37
 Interestingly, Mayor Morrison appeared at this public 
hearing and spoke in support of the proposals, noting to the Commission that he, the City 
Council and the electorate of New Orleans had “overruled you” by including land acquisition in 
the Capital Budget over the opposition of the City Planning Commission and by voters’ approval 
of the three separate successful Bond Issues to fund the acquisition.
38
 
An additional point of contention was the site plan presented in Figure 6.4, below. The 
concern was not for the neighborhood or residents that would be displaced, but rather in that the 
proposal would convert Congo Square (formerly Beauregard Square)
39
 to a parking lot, which 
the Louisiana Landmarks Society decried as a ‘tragedy’ and a ‘calamity.’40  In his letter to the 
Mayor, Harnett T. Kane, President of the Louisiana Landmarks Society, stated that the Society 
had yet to take a position on the overall proposal, but that the City should take immediate action 
to ensure that Congo Square is preserved in the overall plan for the site. 
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Figure 6.4 – First Cultural Center site plan (1963)41 
 
 Following the City Planning Commission’s acceptance of the Cultural Center plan and 
the City Council’s subsequent ratification of it, the Administration began the process of trying to 
gain funding for the project.  At this time the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency’s 
(HHFA) Urban Renewal Administration was authorized to reimburse local governments for 
“75% of the difference between the cost of acquiring and clearing the needed site, plus the cost 
of installing public improvements and the reappraisal value of the cleared site.”42 In the 
particular case of the New Orleans Cultural Center, this reimbursement was anticipated to 
amount to $7,250,000 for the project as a whole, including the land acquisitions and 
                                                 
41
 Cultural Center site plan by Mathes Bergman Favrot & Associates, Inc. Accessed from the New Orleans 
Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 331.   
42
 Memorandum from Chief Administrative Officer Glen Clasen to Mayor Victor Schiro, at 2. 
 181 
improvements to construct the Orleans/Basin Street highway connection.
43
 This assistance from 
the federal government was available for the Cultural Center only if it were to be developed 
adjacent to the Municipal Auditorium because the city would “automatically be eliminating 
existing sub-standard housing conditions in acquiring the needed site.”44   
 As part of the City’s application to the HHFA, the City Council adopted a resolution on 
July 6, 1961 outlining the existing conditions of the Cultural Center site as well as stating the 
City’s ability and willingness to comply with the standards of the HHFA program. First, the City 
Council resolved “that the proposed Cultural Center Area … is a slum, blighted, deteriorated, or 
deteriorating area appropriate for such project.”45  While no comprehensive analysis of the area 
was located within the City’s records for this project, the following was the summary provided 
by the City Planning Commission in their Public Buildings Report II: 
The … area houses approximately 5,000 persons and consists of substandard 
dwellings, 63% of which have no bath and 47.8% of which have no running 
water.  Median income is less than $2,000/year and more than 75 cases of juvenile 
delinquency were reported in the area during one year.  The commercial area 
behind the Auditorium is used for shops, restaurants, service stations, and 
warehouses; the general condition of improvements is substandard.
46
 
 
What was not mentioned in this analysis was the racial breakdown of the chosen site.  
Approximately 410 families were displaced from the Cultural Center area, of which 80% were 
low-income African-Americans; the average income in the neighborhood was less than half of 
the average income for Orleans Parish as a whole.
47
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An analysis of the Sanborn Maps of the Cultural Center area illustrates the general 
development pattern of the neighborhood. It does not provide an accurate portrayal of the 
conditions, but does describe the overall existing development of the neighborhood. 
Table 6.2 – Development pattern of Cultural Center site (1940).48 
 Residential Units Commercial Units 
Square 113 46* 10 
Square 114 25 6 
Square 137 49* 7 
Square 138 46 5 
Square 147 48* 5 
Square 148 47 9 
Square 167 16 6 
Square 168 45* 6 
Square 169 67 2 
      * Indicates the presence of an apartment building with an unrecorded unit count. 
Also within the Council’s resolution of July 6, 1961, the City stated its understanding of 
the federal government’s requirements as to the process to be undertaken with respect to the 
residents of the Cultural Center site. Section three of the Council’s resolution stated, in part, the 
following: 
That [the City] is cognizant of the conditions that are imposed in the undertaking 
and carrying out of such projects with Federal financial assistance under Title I, 
including those relating to the relocation of site occupants and the provision of 
local grants-in-aid and the requirements that as a condition of the execution of a 
contract for a capital grant for such project the locality must present to the 
Housing and Home Finance Administrator a workable program… for utilizing 
appropriate public and private resources to eliminate and prevent the development 
or spread of slums and urban blight.
49
 
 
Further, the resolution stated that it was the sense of the Council that: 
(a) A feasible method for the relocation of families could be prepared. 
(b) Local grants-in-aid could and would be provided in an amount not less than ¼ of the 
project cost. 
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(c) In addition to the grants-in-aid there would be adequate funds available to pay costs 
associated with the project that are excluded from the federal grant. 
 
The final portion of this resolution “authorized and directed” the Mayor to file an 
application for assistance with the Administrator of the HHFA. By June of 1962 the application 
had been filed with the HHFA and the review of the request was all but approved. On June 21, 
1962, the Acting Urban Renewal Commissioner for the HHFA sent a letter to the City in which 
the agency questioned the legal ability of the City to engage in urban renewal projects due to the 
State Legislature’s repeal of urban renewal authorization legislation. In response to this 
precarious legal situation, the City Attorney replied to the Urban Renewal Commissioner on July 
26, 1962, outlining the legal standing of the City of New Orleans to engage in urban renewal 
with respect to state law. 
In 1954, the Louisiana Legislature had repealed a portion of state law relative to urban 
renewal projects; however, the State did not, in the City’s opinion, act to nullify all attempts at 
federally-funded urban renewal. Act 709 of the 1954 Regular Session removed portions of the 
state’s existing urban redevelopment enabling statutes which would allow the expropriating 
redevelopment authority to transfer the newly-acquired property to a third-party by resale, lease, 
or any other means. The City believed this to only eliminate participation in federally-funded 
urban redevelopment where a part of the plan was to sell or lease the property to private parties 
in furtherance of the redevelopment project.   
Specifically, the changes made in 1954 were relative to Section 40:481 of the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes, which were originally adopted in furtherance of the state’s ability to participate 
in federally funded public housing under the Housing Act of 1949 (see Chapter 3).
50
  The New 
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Orleans City Attorney’s Office, in an undated internal memorandum, clarified that the ability of 
the state or its political subdivisions to expropriate property needed for public improvements was 
found under Section 19:1-2 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.  Further, the City Attorney’s 
Office stated that public parks are an acceptable ‘public use’ for which to expropriate property, 
as previously determined by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1931 and reinforced in the initial 
five expropriations on Square 137 within the Cultural Center site.
51
 
Based on these factors, the City Attorney opined that the restrictions enacted by the 
Legislature in 1954 would not hamper redevelopment in cases where land was to be expropriated 
for actual public uses. The City underscored this position by citing to subsequent state legislation 
in which the Legislature revised regulations for expropriation of property (1956) and for the 
acceptance of outside financial assistance (1960).
52
 The HHFA found this to be an acceptable 
analysis of the law and the legal questions raised by the agency were resolved and the application 
was allowed to move forward.
53
 
The Land Assembly 
Site acquisition continued following approval of the application for federal assistance.  
Property records indicate that Square 137, directly behind the Municipal Auditorium, was the 
first acquired by the City, with purchases and expropriations taking place between 1958 and 
1960.  This was the only square where land was acquired prior to 1966, before the availability of 
federal dollars. The table below indicates the timeline of acquisitions by square.  A full inventory 
of property acquisitions for the Cultural Center is available in Appendix 6.1. 
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Table 6.3 – Summary of Property Acquisition for Cultural Center site54 
Municipal 
Square 
Number of 
Lots 
Number of  
Expropriations 
Acquisition 
Date Year(s) 
113 28 4 1970-71 
114 20 1 1968-69 
137 24 5 1958-60 
138 22 0 1970-71 
147 25 1 1970-71 
148 22 1 1966 
167 15 2 1966 
168 24 6 1966-67 
169 27 0 1970-71 
 
In all, the City acquired 207 individual parcels for the Cultural Center site and only 
resorted to expropriation in order to take possession of 20 of these.  The City was able to utilize 
federal assistance in the acquisition of 183 of the 207 total parcels and of the total 20 
expropriations, 15 were prosecuted with the assistance of federal funds.  What is interesting 
about these numbers is that by the time the last four squares were acquired in 1970-71, there was 
relatively little resistance to the City’s efforts to purchase the requisite property (102 parcels 
acquired, 5 expropriations). While it is impossible to say why there was less resistance in the 
latter part of the acquisitions, it could be because, as Assistant City Attorney Posey Bowers 
noted in a memorandum of explanation, the courts had consistently ruled that political 
subdivisions of the State can expropriate property needed for government projects. More 
specifically, in the initial Cultural Center expropriation cases from the 1950s, “in every instance 
where there was no subsequent agreement of the parties, the City’s prayer for a judgment in “fee 
simple” was granted.”55 Therefore, by the 1970s it may have been a foregone conclusion in the 
minds of the residents and property owners that regardless of the fight, resistance would prove 
futile. 
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The planning for the Cultural Center continued through the 1960s. The City amended the 
site plan several times throughout this period as it became apparent that it would not be able to 
fund the grand projects envisioned for the site.  Though there was realization that the 
improvements may be a long way off, the City proceeded with property acquisition in phases 
which were divided by the availability of federal dollars.   
Figure 6.5 – Current aerial photograph with Municipal Square Numbers overlaid for reference.56 
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The first phase of acquisition (not including the initial acquisition of Square 137 in the 1950s) 
was broken down as follows:  Phase I – Squares 147, 167, 168; Phase II – Square 114; Phase III 
– Squares 113, 138, 147, 169.  There was nothing noted in the records indicating why the site 
was phased in this manner, but it appears to have been purely a matter of acquiring the site 
moving east from the location of the Municipal Auditorium. Figure 6.5, above, indicates the 
locations and bounding streets for the Cultural Center site acquisition. 
The extended planning and acquisition process served not only to cause residents to 
relocate without assistance, but also enraged absentee property owners.  In a letter delivered to 
occupants of properties in Squares 113, 138, 147 and 169 in June of 1968, the City advised 
tenants that their dwellings would be acquired by the City and that they would be forced to 
relocate at a later time.  The letter explained that no one was being required to relocate yet and 
that further information would be made available once properties were bought by the City.  This 
letter also explained that a relocation office would be available in the vicinity of the Cultural 
Center to address the questions and concerns of neighborhood residents.
57
 
As a result of this notice sent to residents of the Cultural Center site, Mr. Frederick 
Forstall, a property owner within the proposed Cultural Center site, sent a letter to Mayor Schiro 
stating that the notice was premature and that the result would be that tenants would be driven 
out by the impending relocation.
58
  The Mayor replied in agreement with Mr. Forstall’s position 
but noted that the letter was sent out by the Relocation Office in compliance with federal 
regulations relating eligibility to receive federal funding.
59
  Indeed, Mr. Forstall’s prediction 
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came to pass; in many cases residential units were abandoned more than a year before the City’s 
appraisals and purchase negotiations occurred.  Landlords found it difficult to rent the properties 
because of the pending acquisitions.  During this period, property owners were left with 
responsibility for maintaining and making mortgage payments on the properties with no rental 
income to cover the costs.
60
 It is likely that this situation also factored into the relatively few 
expropriations which occurred in Phase III of land acquisition, as discussed previously.  The 
reason that this extended acquisition period likely resulted in fewer expropriations is that by the 
time the City tendered offers  to property owners those with rental properties had been having 
difficulty renting their properties for years and they would have been relieved to unload the 
burden of these unprofitable properties.  The same relief was likely felt by owner-occupiers 
within the area, in that they had been living for years knowing that the City would acquire their 
property but with no timetable. 
The Legacy 
By 1971, the City had acquired all land within the Cultural Center complex.  Much of the 
space had been lying dormant for a number of years after the city acquired it.  With the death of 
musician and native New Orleanian Louis Armstrong, Mayor Moon Landrieu assembled a 
committee of prominent citizens to evaluate public suggestions regarding an appropriate tribute 
to Armstrong.  In the 1972 report of Mayor Landrieu’s Citizen’s Committee for a Memorial to 
Louis Armstrong, the Committee describes the Cultural Center site as a “disaster area, serving as 
a depressant to the Tremé neighborhood, the Vieux Carré, and the Central Business District.”61 It 
was as a result of this report that the plan for the Cultural Center shifted from a collection of 
                                                 
60
 Christovich, M.L. & Roulhac, T. (1980). New Orleans Architecture, Vol VI: Faubourg Tremé and the Bayou 
Road. Pelican Publishing, Gretna, LA. 
61
 Mayor Moon Landrieu’s Public Relations Office, Press Release of June 30, 1972. Accessed from the New Orleans 
Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 471, at 4. 
 189 
structures to public green space.    While the Committee recommended that the Cultural Center 
be rededicated as a tribute to Armstrong, they called for a public planning process to determine 
the most appropriate elements and design for the space.
62
 
 The result of this planning process was to revise the approved site plan for the Cultural 
Center, which was a formal complex along the lines of New York’s Lincoln Center, and 
reconstitute the space as a less formal, flexible park that could be used as open space 
immediately and later adapted for the construction of the cultural buildings that had long been 
anticipated.
63
  This revised site plan, which was developed by consultants Lawrence Halprin and 
Associates, included proposals for four acres of lakes to be dredged within the 27 acre site and 
for the installation of covered walkways and indigenous landscaping throughout the space. In 
addition to these basic improvements the consultants proposed both participatory and performing 
facilities.  The participatory facilities would include restaurants, an ice rink, a carousel, a Ferris 
wheel, and other attractions based loosely on Copenhagen’s Tivoli Gardens; the performing 
facilities would include, in addition to the Municipal Auditorium and Theatre of the Performing 
Arts, a 400-seat “legitimate” theatre and a 600-seat outdoor amphitheatre.64  The City Council-
adopted plans for the space eliminated the Tivoli Gardens element of the plan and would allow 
the community to determine the best uses for the park over time.
65
 
  By the end of 1973, the 25-year planning process for the New Orleans Cultural Center 
was nearly at its end.  The City Planning Commission and the City Council adopted the revised 
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site plan for Louis Armstrong Park and construction commenced on the covered walkways, 
lakes, landscaping, and a fence. 
 The legacy of the Cultural Center, now Armstrong Park, is generally one of top-down 
planning where the ideas of bureaucrats were imposed on a generally powerless community.  
While the official records of the planning and execution of the Cultural Center project do not 
reflect opposition from the community that would house this development, later records reveal 
significant resentment on the part of the surrounding neighborhood to the City’s indifference 
towards this culturally significant community.   
 In 1972, as plans were coming together for recreating the Cultural Center as a tribute to 
Louis Armstrong, the community found a voice in the Tremé Community Improvement 
Association (TCIA).  The position of this organization and the residents was outlined in an 
article in the Times-Picayune on March 5, 1972.  According to Jim Hayes, the Director of the 
TCIA “The City, in efforts to build a cultural center has seen fit to destroy and uproot our 
community,” 66 the irony of this situation, the article pointed out, was that the City’s Cultural 
Center was destroying the culture of the Tremé community.  
 Not only was the neighborhood slighted in the planning and implementation of the 
Cultural Center plan, the TCIA estimates that approximately 80% of site residents relocated 
without the assistance they were entitled to under the urban renewal guidelines. The City’s 
position on this situation was that the residents vacated the site based on knowing that the project 
was coming and not as a direct result of the City’s acquisition of the site.67   
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 The legacy of the Cultural Center does not end with the displacement of the community; 
those remaining in the neighborhood surrounding the park continue to struggle with certain 
elements of the end result of this project.  In an effort to appease the neighborhood after the 
debacle surrounding the relocation of residents and acquisition of the last four squares, the City 
agreed to construct a community center for the Tremé community within the Cultural Center site.  
This community center is one of the few benefits that the community has realized from the 
presence of the park.  
 One of the most discussed elements of the present development of the Cultural Center is 
the presence of the concrete and iron perimeter fence.  During the latter part of the Armstrong 
Park planning stage, the need for a fence was discussed in the City Planning Commission’s Staff 
Report of 1973:  
The entire park is proposed for enclosure by a fence allowing five controlled entry 
points.  This fence would provide security from vandals and permit the park to be 
closed off, vis a vis Jackson Square, to facilitate maintenance.  Nothing is 
inappropriate about this fence concept as it is currently applied throughout the 
City.
68
 
 
Perhaps the problematic legacy of the fence is more perception than reality, but whatever the 
situation, the Tremé community has come to view the fence as a barrier, separating the 
community and the Cultural Center.  Many efforts to have the fence removed have been made in 
the interceding years, but to no avail.  The space remains fenced, serving as a barrier between the 
traditional residents of Tremé and the Vieux Carré.
69
   
The debate over the fence continued as the park was rebuilt following damage suffered as 
a result of Hurricane Katrina. While the Theatre of the Performing Arts was quickly renovated 
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and returned to use, Armstrong Park remained off-limits to the general public until mid-2011.  
Through bureaucratic delays and contractor incompetence, the simple return of public open 
space in Tremé has been delayed for years. On August 17, 2011, the Times-Picayune published 
an article entitled “Locked-up Armstrong Park lamented as 'neglected jewel' of Treme, French 
Quarter area.” In this article, Ben Harwood of People United states that the organization has 
spoken to numerous community organizations and hundreds of individual neighbors about the 
future of Armstrong Park, and the fence in particular.  The perception remains that the fence acts 
as a barrier to neighborhood use of the space and advocates for the park have asked the City to 
delay the official reopening of the park to address concerns of the community. Mayor Mitchell 
Landrieu’s spokesperson, responding to a press inquiry for the article, stated that the 
Administration is committed to reopening the park on schedule but is willing to hear community 
concerns.
70
 
Figure 6.6 – The Armstrong Park Fence at Congo Square71 
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 The New Orleans Cultural Center was an idea that has not been and likely never will be 
realized.  What started out as a civic improvement project with urban renewal has become a 
monument to a City’s indifference to the intrinsic value of a people and a culture that is at the 
root of what makes New Orleans unique.  Just as the Civic Center project destroyed the physical 
foundations of jazz music, the Cultural Center removed almost 200 years of a unique part of 
New Orleans’s African-American culture to build an opera house. This space was taken from the 
community to create an island of bourgeois culture within the city of New Orleans while 
neglecting the authentic culture of the community. 
Figure 6.7 – Theatre of the Performing Arts from the N. Rampart Street entrance of the park.72 
 
 
 Perhaps most importantly, the project failed insofar as the Cultural Center was initially 
contemplated. As has been discussed previously, the City’s Public Buildings Report II outlined 
the five proposed functions of the Cultural Center:
73
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1) Create a barrier to prevent the spread of the Central Business District. 
2) Rehabilitate an area which is not fulfilling its potential and Central Business District 
property. 
 
3) Complete the public building mall extending from the Union Passenger Terminal to 
the Municipal Auditorium and create a visual axis from St. Louis Cathedral down 
Orleans St. 
 
4) Accommodate the growing need for parking in the Central Business District and 
create a day and night use environment. 
 
5) Create an environment of uses relating to the existing urban infrastructure.  
With the exception of completing the Theatre of the Performing Arts, the City was unable to 
meet any of the goals that were specifically outlined for the project.  However, with respect to 
the first goal, a barrier was created – though it was between the neighborhood and community 
services rather than stemming the growth of an expanding Central Business District.  
 The community has never taken ownership of the green space that resulted from the 
City’s eventual realization that the Cultural Center would never materialize. The installation of 
the fence has inhibited use of the space for anything other than organized events, but has not 
allowed the day-to-day use that is seen in many of the neighborhood and regional parks in New 
Orleans.  This lack of availability, paired with the fact that the community had this development 
imposed on them, makes it understandable that there is not greater acceptance of what is 
otherwise valuable passive parkland in the middle of a densely populated urban area. 
 It is interesting to note is that underutilized green space was also created in conjunction 
with the Civic Center project.  There has not been community pushback on the project as there 
has been with the Cultural Center, but that may be a result of historic residential uses being 
wiped out by the mid-century growth and eventual decline of the Central Business District. 
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 Moving forward, the City should work with the community to develop uses for the park 
that will benefit the neighborhood and the City as a whole.  The space was conceived as a place 
for New Orleanians to celebrate culture, and later the goal shifted to making the space accessible 
to tourists wishing to experience authentic New Orleans. It is impossible to bottle that which 
makes New Orleans unique into convenient tourist packaging, and it is not this author’s 
suggestion that anyone should try.  This should be a space dedicated to the residents of New 
Orleans and to the Tremé community specifically; the City should work with the adjacent 
community organizations to encourage use of the site for cultural events and actually make the 
New Orleans Cultural Center a center for New Orleans culture. 
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Chapter 7 
 
The Bio-Medical District: 
Removing a Community to Provide for their Well-Being 
 
 The history of public hospitals in New Orleans dates to the founding of the city and has 
remained a function of the government since Bienville, a founder of the city, brought hospital 
equipment to New Orleans from Biloxi in 1723. The first building to house such a public 
hospital was constructed in 1736.  Charity Hospital as an institution traces its roots to the 
hospital constructed by Don Andres Almonester y Roxas
1
 on North Rampart Street, between 
Toulouse and St. Peter Streets in 1782. The Hospital of St. Charles, as this facility was named, 
remained in use until it burned down in 1809.  In 1814, the State of Louisiana built a replacement 
hospital on Canal Street, between Baronne and Dryades Streets, where Charity Hospital operated 
until 1832.  In 1832, a new structure was provided for the State’s public hospital on Tulane 
Avenue, in the location where it would remain until 2005.
2
 
 The hospital constructed in 1832 was subsequently expanded as the needs of the medical 
profession changed, and was entirely reconstructed beginning in 1937 through the financing of 
the Works Progress Administration.  The outdated hospital structures were removed and the 
redevelopment, the sixth structure to house the legacy of Charity Hospital, resulted in a modern, 
20-story hospital tower with attendant support structures.
3
  By 2003, Charity Hospital had 
become outdated and failed to meet the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), the agency tasked with certifying healthcare facilities across 
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the United States.  Following a reaccreditation survey in December of 2002, the administrators of 
the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO), the entity responsible for the 
operation of Charity and University Hospitals in New Orleans, were informed of numerous 
deficiencies in the operation of Charity Hospital that threatened future reaccreditation if not 
sufficiently addressed by the next scheduled survey, which would have occurred in December of 
2005.  JCAHO encouraged the leaders of MCLNO to “strongly consider seeking from the state a 
more modern facility to improve patient safety, environmental safety, patient privacy and 
infection control,” as a replacement for the aging Charity Hospital structure.4  
 Following this notification, the administrators of MCLNO, in conjunction with Louisiana 
State University (LSU) which operated the medical school affiliated with Charity Hospital, 
sought and obtained $1.8 million for the creation of a master plan to guide the development of a 
new Charity Hospital complex.  This appropriation was made during the 2003 Legislative 
Session with the goal of having the project “well underway toward completion in 2008.”5 This 
master plan was completed and presented to MCLNO administrators in May of 2005, just 
months before the devastation of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent levee breaches that 
flooded vast swaths of the city of New Orleans.  
 In addition to a replacement for Charity Hospital being constructed by the State of 
Louisiana, the federal government has chosen to invest in a replacement hospital for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.  The new United States Department of Veterans Affairs Medical 
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Center (VAMC) is being constructed adjacent to the new public hospital, as indicated in Figure 
7.1 (below). 
Figure 7.1 – Medical Center Site Relationships, as indicated by the VA.6 
 
 
The existing VAMC in New Orleans was originally constructed in 1949 and was 
expanded in phases through the subsequent decades.  The location occupied by the current 
facility is generally bounded by Perdido Street, Freret Street, Gravier Street and South Claiborne 
Avenue.  In 2004 the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) identified projected long-term gaps 
in both inpatient and outpatient service delivery in the existing New Orleans VA facility.  
Following damage from Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans, the VA 
evaluated their options relating to the delivery of medical services in New Orleans and along the 
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entire Gulf Coast and reached the conclusion that investment in a new medical center would be 
preferable to reinvesting in a facility that would not adequately serve their needs into the future.
7
 
The ‘Bio-Medical District’ is the collective name for the concentrated medical industry in 
New Orleans, comprising not only the sites of the new MCLNO and VAMC hospitals, but also 
affiliated institutions such as the LSU Health Sciences Center (medical school), the Tulane 
University hospital and medical school, the Louisiana Cancer Consortium, and the Bio-
Innovation Center on Canal Street. However, though this refers to the collective whole of the 
medical industry in New Orleans, it is the common term used to refer to the specific 
redevelopment plans relating to the joint MCLNO-VAMC redevelopment in lower Mid-City. 
This lower portion of Mid-City, officially designated as the Tulane-Gravier neighborhood 
by the City Planning Commission (CPC), which was targeted for redevelopment is generally 
bounded by South Claiborne Avenue, Tulane Avenue, South Broad Street and Canal Street.  The 
Mid-City neighborhood, as defined by the CPC, is directly northwest of Tulane-Gravier across 
South Broad Street.  
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Figure 7.2 – Mid City National Register Historic District, with MCLNO and VA sites indicated.8 
 
 
While these neighborhoods are separately designated for City Planning purposes, they are 
commonly referred to as Mid-City in reference to the Mid-City National Register Historic 
District, which covers substantial portions of both neighborhoods, as indicated in Figure 7.2 
(above). 
  This chapter will discuss the planning and creation of New Orleans’s ‘Bio-Medical 
District’ in terms of the concept, the physical development, and the assembly of the real estate 
needed to execute the overall vision.  The footprint of this project is reminiscent of urban 
renewal projects such as the Civic Center (Chapter 4) and the Cultural Center (Chapter 6), as 
were the arguments presented by proponents of the location as to the underutilization of land 
under its present ownership. Unlike these previous projects, the selection of a site was to be 
publicly debated and analyzed through regulatory schemes designed to prevent disparate impacts 
on communities; despite this, the research reveals that while processes were legally followed the 
intention of the requirements were not.   
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 As with the previous projects discussed in this dissertation, governmental actors appear to 
have only resorted to eminent domain in instances where negotiated purchases failed mainly due 
to the understanding that exercising this authority is highly unpopular. Unlike the previous 
projects, the prospect of exercising eminent domain was a major topic of discussion throughout 
the planning phases of the project, resulting in early cooperative agreements among various 
levels of government as to how exercise of this authority was to be handled.  
The Vision 
 As stated above, the planning for replacing both Charity Hospital and VAMC began 
years prior to Hurricane Katrina. Both facilities were projected to become obsolete due to either 
physical structures, standards of patient care, or projected patient loads.  Similarly, both MCLNO 
and VAMC took long-term perspectives in determining how to deal with the deficiencies of their 
respective institutions; both wanted new facilities, both wanted room for future expansion, and 
both wanted modern medical centers that would serve to attract physicians, medical students, and 
patients well into the future. 
 MCLNO began planning for replacement of the aging Charity Hospital facility in 2003 
when MCLNO administrators hired ADAMS Management Services Corporation to evaluate 
their existing facilities and develop a strategic long-term plan for future growth of the medical 
center. This initial report led to the Site and Facility Master Plan for Consolidation of Charity 
and University Hospitals at Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans. This document, which 
outlined the location for a new hospital and a projected timeline for this development was funded 
by a legislative appropriation of $1.3 million in 2003.  
 The resulting master plan for MCLNO was developed in response to ADAMS and 
MCLNO’s own findings that “the Charity Hospital structure was no longer suited for healthcare 
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services delivery”9 and that a “preliminary analysis of University Hospital facilities suggest that 
its best long-term usage would be primarily for non-clinical activities.”10  With this in mind, the 
ADAMS planning team encouraged MCLNO to construct a replacement medical center “north 
of Tulane Avenue, with an address facing Canal Street.”11  The ‘north option,’ as this location 
was referred to, was encouraged for several reasons: image, transportation access, and to tie into 
the “urban redevelopment efforts of the community.”12 
Figure 7.3 – “North Option”13 
 
 ADAMS also evaluated a second site in this initial master plan; the ‘south option’ would 
have kept MCLNO on the south side of Tulane Avenue and called for constructing a new patient 
tower adjacent to University Hospital on land within and immediately adjacent to the existing 
campus of the medical center.  This location would also require the complete renovation of 
University Hospital for ambulatory care functions to supplement the inpatient services provided 
within the proposed adjacent patient tower.  This location was discouraged due to the lack of 
space for future expansion.  
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Figure 7.4 – “South Option”14 
 
 In terms of projected cost, ADAMS estimated that the north option would result in a 
higher initial cost, approximately $775 million, with the south option having an estimated cost of 
$753 million.  Though the initial cost would be higher, MCLNO would see returns in image, 
future growth potential, and long-term operating costs.  The consultants from ADAMS believed 
that south option would “provide an image challenge”15 to the renewed facility because of the 
land-locked nature of the location and the reuse of the existing, historic University Hospital 
structure.
16
 
 The last consideration voiced in the ADAMS report was that of project timelines. The 
north option, for which the consultants noted a reasonable expectation of complexities insofar as 
land acquisition, was projected to actually be faster than utilizing the south option, where a 
portion of the facility would be new construction and another part renovation. Though the north 
option was projected to be faster overall, the report does note that “the design and construction 
schedules for pursuing either site option are almost identical.”17 
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 At this same point the VA was also evaluating the conditions of its facilities across the 
country. In 2004, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs released his Capital Asset Realignment for 
Enhanced Services Plan (CARES Plan) which provided a comprehensive analysis of the VA 
medical system as a whole and identified issues that needed to be addressed from facilities to 
systemic changes. Through this study, the VA Secretary determined that there would be long-
term gaps in both inpatient and outpatient care at the VAMC in New Orleans.
18
   
In addition to the concerns of the CARES evaluation regarding the ability of the facility 
to adequately care for veterans into the future, the VA also determined that there were physical 
deficiencies in the existing facility and site that were not compliant with the Department’s 
Physical Security Design Manual for Mission Critical Facilities.  The requirements of this 
manual provided minimum distances away from a facility that a vehicle may park or travel, 
emergency utility provisions, and ability to adequately supply food, water and fuel to the facility 
should it be isolated for a prolonged length of time.
19
 Combined, these deficiencies in physical 
plant and service delivery led the VA to evaluate the possibility of fully replacing the existing 
VAMC with a modern facility that would address all of the noted problems.  
While the plan for the replacement VAMC was seen as a long-term capital improvement, 
the plan to replace MCLNO was projected to come to fruition by 2013. This 2013 target date was 
based on ADAMS projection that the State of Louisiana would act to fund the master plan for the 
facility during the 2006 Regular Legislative Session.
20
  What could not be projected at this time 
was the devastation which would befall New Orleans in August of 2005 as a result of Hurricane 
Katrina. 
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Due to the weeks of flooding that followed Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, both Charity 
Hospital and the VAMC sustained significant damage to their electrical and plumbing systems. 
Once this damage was sustained, a major concern beyond the pre-existing deficiencies became 
the ability to adequately remediate the damages to the facilities.  The VA outlined the damages 
incurred within the VAMC in a report to Congress in early 2006, noting that there was no 
electric service to the building for weeks and that there had been extensive water and moisture 
damage to the building and the medical equipment contained therein.  Further, the water and 
moisture infiltration caused mildew and mold to spread, “creating unacceptable conditions for a 
medical facility.”21  The VA’s report noted that similar conditions were reported in other nearby 
medical facilities as well.  
In September of 2006 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report to 
Congress entitled Hurricane Katrina: Status of Hospital Inpatient and Emergency Departments 
in the Greater New Orleans Area explained that the State of Louisiana, through MCLNO, was 
working to reopen University Hospital to bring some medical services back online in the New 
Orleans area. There were, however, no plans to reopen Charity Hospital due to a combination of 
flood damage and the existing deficiencies that were viewed as impediments to modern medical 
care.
22
  
The self-reported need for new facilities led MCLNO and the VA to create the 
Collaborative Opportunities Study Group (COSG) to begin exploring options for the 
development of a joint medical facility.
23
 The project, as envisioned by this group, would allow 
each entity to create individual patient towers while connecting the two with shared services that 
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would accommodate both medical centers. Interestingly, while there was no firm plan developed 
nor had a site officially been selected, the VA reported to Congress in February of 2006 that they 
were evaluating the possibility of a joint medical facility with MCLNO to be located in the 
general area bounded by South Claiborne Avenue, Canal Street, South Broad Street, and Tulane 
Avenue.
24
 
MCLNO and VA joined to form a vision of modern medical care for post-Katrina New 
Orleans early in 2006.  This vision, as stated by the VA, would allow for the replacement of both 
VACM and Charity Hospital with a “hurricane hardened, single campus / shared support services 
model… with a state of the art medical center”25 that would “be more cost-effective than LSU 
and VA operating stand-alone facilities.”26  It was with this vision in mind that the VA, 
MCLNO, and State of Louisiana proceeded with post-Katrina facility planning and site selection. 
The Planning 
 While the need and general concept for these replacement medical facilities was 
established in the years prior to Hurricane Katrina, the disaster was seized upon as an 
opportunity to bring this vision to life. In February of 2006, in his Report to Congress on Plans 
for Re-establishing a VA Medical Center in New Orleans, VA Secretary R. James Nicholson 
outlined the options being considered by the Veterans Administration for providing medical care 
to veterans in southeastern Louisiana. Four separate options were being evaluated and even at 
this early stage a ‘preferred option’ had emerged. The options under consideration were: 
1) Restoration and hardening of the existing facility. 
2) Renovation and remodeling of the existing facility. 
3) Construction of a new ‘shared’ facility in the general area of the existing hospital. 
4) Construction of a new ‘stand-alone’ facility in a location to be determined. 
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Among the options under consideration by the VA, the preferred option was clear: a new facility 
should be constructed in conjunction with the proposed replacement MCLNO complex. While 
final site selection was still years away, the VA included in their report a map (Figure 7.3), 
below, indicating the ‘general area’ in which the new VAMC would be constructed should their 
‘preferred option’ be exercised.27  
Figure 7.5 – “Building Site for Option 3”28 
 
 
 Required as part of this ‘preferred option’ was that a sufficient site would have to be 
provided by the State of Louisiana for the project to move forward; at this stage, specific site 
requirements had not been developed but “sufficient land to ensure adequate hurricane hardening 
of the campus”29 was a priority. The VA noted that there were three assumptions critical to the 
selection of this option, one being obtaining the required land, and another being the mustering 
of Congressional support for the project, in terms of funding.  
The third assumption was that the State of Louisiana would be able to create a funding 
package to actually construct the MCLNO sections of the overall complex.  Without this 
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element, the benefits to be realized through the construction of a shared facility would be lost; 
particularly, at this stage in planning for the new complex, it was assumed that certain physical 
improvements and medical-related services would be shared between the facilities, lowering the 
initial cost of development and the long term operating costs.  Among these ‘shared’ elements 
would be  
common areas [that] would provide space for shared non-clinical 
support services such as parking, food services, laundry, energy 
and utility management, and helipad – these  would be located in 
sections of the facility convenient to the bed towers.  Separate, 
though contiguous, diagnostic, major therapeutic and 
interventional areas such as laboratory, radiology, catherization 
(sic) labs, and operating suites would be built for both the VA and 
[MCLNO].
30
 
 
With the assumption made regarding the State of Louisiana’s ability to finance the 
replacement MCLNO, the VA signed an agreement with MCLNO officials in February of 2006 
to “explore the feasibility of jointly building a teaching hospital and Level I trauma center in 
downtown New Orleans.”31   
According to the General Accountability Office (GAO), when they visited with MCLNO 
officials early in 2006, there were a number of planning efforts underway but no consensus on 
plans to move forward with reestablishing a public hospital in New Orleans.  The most difficult 
element of moving forward at this time appears to have been the availability of basic 
information.  There were many unknowns: population to be served, full extent of damages in 
existing facilities, post-disaster funding to be made available by the Federal Emergency 
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Management Agency (FEMA), and what, if any, capital improvement dollars may be made 
available by the State.
32
 
In order to begin addressing these issues, MCLNO again contracted with ADAMS, the 
same firm that had previously been contracted to develop a master plan for the replacement of 
Charity and University Hospitals, to evaluate the damages to the existing facilities and develop a 
cost estimate for their complete restoration.  The goal was to convince FEMA that MCLNO was 
entitled to replacement facilities rather than funding for restoration of the existing hospital.
33
   
In order to understand the distinction between restoration and replacement funding 
though FEMA, it is important to ascertain the guidelines of the Stafford Act, which established 
the assistance protocol for FEMA post-disaster assistance. The Stafford Act, or more formally 
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.), 
is the law which enables FEMA to administer disaster assistance and defines how that assistance 
is to be administered.  Under the Stafford Act, public and non-profit entities are aided in the 
reestablishment of the services or facilities to pre-disaster levels.  Immediately following a 
presidentially-declared disaster, FEMA mobilizes to assess public facilities to determine the level 
of funding required to restore governmental or non-profit functions in an affected area.  As part 
of this assessment, FEMA is not only calculating the dollar value of repairing damages facilities, 
but is assessing the replacement cost of the facility itself. This replacement cost is key to 
establishing the level at which FEMA will fund the reestablishment of the impacted facility.
34
 
As outlined in the Stafford Act, FEMA will aid in the repair of a disaster-damaged 
facility if the cost of that repair does not exceed 50% of the replacement cost of the facility as a 
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whole.  If the projected repair cost does exceed that 50% threshold, FEMA will aid in the 
complete replacement of the facility.  The assessment of damages is initially conducted by 
FEMA but the owner of the facility retains the right to dispute FEMA’s findings through an 
independent assessment of damaged facility.  
It is important to note two additional factors which play into the FEMA-funding 
mechanism. The first is code-required upgrades and the second is that FEMA’s assistance 
reimburses actual costs. While FEMA is statutorily limited in providing assistance to return a 
facility to its pre-disaster condition and level of service, the Stafford Act requires that FEMA 
cover the cost of required code upgrades, the cost of which in an older structure could be 
substantial; however, regardless of the price tag associated with these upgrades, this is not 
included in the repair versus replacement calculation. Secondly, FEMA’s Public Assistance 
program provides reimbursement for the full value of work required to return a facility to pre-
disaster condition. This means that regardless of the initial assessment of damages, if further 
damage is discovered during repair which increases the cost of the work FEMA will still pay the 
actual cost associated with the repairs; this increase in cost also does not impact the 50% repair 
versus replace calculation because both FEMA and the eligible applicant have already agreed to 
repair the facility.
35, 36
  
With this understanding of the Stafford Act and the costs eligible for FEMA assistance, 
MCLNO, in conjunction with the ADAMS consultation team fully assessed the damages to 
Charity and University Hospitals and determined that there were substantial disaster-related 
damages present in both facilities to warrant the complete replacement of these structures under 
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FEMA’s disaster assistance guidelines.  FEMA’s initial damage assessments of these facilities 
indicated far less in damages than the MCLNO/ADAMS team indicated.  The estimated costs are 
reported in Table 7.1 (below).
37
  
Table 7.1 – LSU (MCLNO) versus FEMA Cost Estimates for MCLNO Hospitals38 
 LSU’s Estimates FEMA’s Estimates 
Charity Hospital   
Repair Estimate (in millions) $257.7 $27 
Replacement Estimate (in millions) $395.4 $147.7 - $267.3 
Repair Cost as a percentage of 
Replacement Estimate 
65% 10% - 18% 
University Hospital   
Repair Estimate (in millions) $117.4 $13.4 
Replacement Estimate (in millions) $171.7 $57.4 - $103.9 
Repair Cost as a percentage of 
Replacement Estimate 
68% 13% - 23% 
 
 The GAO notes that the disparity in these figures is partially attributable to ADAMS 
determination that the “mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems were beyond repair” and 
that “there were significant environmental safety problems” in the facilities.39 While FEMA did 
note that these issues were present, they assessed the damages as repairable and estimated a far 
lower cost than the ADAMS team was proposing for similar work.
40
  
 While financing for the replacement VAMC was appropriated by Congress in June of 
2006,
41
 funding for MCLNO would not be finalized until 2010 following a lengthy appeals 
process where the State of Louisiana, LSU, and MCLNO appealed FEMA’s assistance offers to 
the United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. This Board determined that the 
MCLNO/ADAMS estimate of damages was more accurate than the FEMA assessment and that 
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in light of this determination MCLNO was entitled to the full replacement cost of Charity and 
University Hospitals, which was determined to be $474.7 million.
42
 
 Even with financing not-yet-determined, MCLNO moved forward with planning for a 
new hospital complex in conjunction with the proposed VAMC. In selecting a location for the 
new MCLNO facility, the hospital administrators and state officials referred back to the ADAMS 
report of 2005 which advocated locating a new facility in the area roughly bounded by Canal 
Street, South Galvez Street, Tulane Avenue, and South Claiborne Avenue.  This area was 
initially studied by ADAMS and MCLNO because of the presence of a large amount of vacant 
and underutilized property, but the initial plan to occupy four municipal squares, as indicated in 
Figure 7.3, had since grown to encompass all squares within the general boundaries of the site.  
These fifteen squares, comprising approximately 37 acres, were essentially selected by the time 
that MCLNO entered into their feasibility study with the VA in 2006. In addition to the 37 acres 
to be occupied by MCLNO, an additional, contiguous 29 acres was recommended for the VAMC 
in the area bounded by Canal Street, South Rocheblave Street, Tulane Avenue, and South Galvez 
Street.
43
 
 Although MCLNO and VA officials appear to have decided on their location prior to 
doing so, the VA released a public Request for Proposals soliciting a site of 25 to 75 acres in 
size, within a geographic area bounded by the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain, the east bank of 
the Mississippi River, the Jefferson/St. Charles Parish line and Franklin Avenue (in New 
Orleans).
44
 In light of this request, the RPC coordinated a response from State, City, and regional 
officials to formally propose the Mid-City location directly adjacent to the MCLNO site to the 
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VA.
45
 In addition being contiguous to the location selected for the construction of MCLNO, the 
RPC notes that the site proposed to the VA was selected due to “its proximity to downtown 
amenities, public transportation, existing housing and…existing institutions of higher 
learning.”46 
 In response to the VA’s site requirements, the RPC proposal called for the State to 
acquire the property on behalf of the City.  This arrangement was established in a Cooperative 
Endeavor Agreement between the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana which called 
for the State to acquire property with financing to be provided by the City;
47
 the purpose of this 
arrangement was to allow use of the State’s “quick-take” expropriation authority to avoid delays 
in the assembly of the development site being proposed to the VA.
48
  The Cooperative Endeavor 
Agreement called for the state to use “any authority available” to acquire the needed property for 
the “public purpose” of the proposed VAMC and appears to have been written to avoid the 
express mention of expropriation.
49
  The RPC’s formal response to the VA, however, was far 
more direct, and in outlining the Site Acquisition Strategy, indicating that “the State of Louisiana 
(via LSU) will utilize quick-take authority to acquire the 34 acre site…. Acquisition will occur 
immediately and will not hinge on the proposed LSU teaching facility.”50 
 This ‘quick-take’ authority is a legal mechanism available to the State of Louisiana (but 
not the City of New Orleans) where land can be immediately expropriated without a final 
determination as to the true ‘just compensation’ value of the property.  Essentially, the 
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government petitions the court for immediate transfer of title and if the petition is granted the 
government deposits the appraised property value with the court and acquires clear title to the 
property.  The property owner from whom the property was taken retains the right to pursue 
legal action to increase the ‘just compensation’ value of the property following this action but 
allows property acquisition and subsequent redevelopment to occur without prolonged legal 
action.
51
 
Once land assembly was complete, title would be transferred to the VA for development 
of their medical center. This was particularly important in creating an expedited timeline for the 
construction of the VAMC.  Additionally, the RPC outlined supplementary ‘economic 
incentives’ to the VA in the form of infrastructure improvements in the vicinity of the proposed 
VAMC site.  The City of New Orleans pledged $2.4 million in infrastructure upgrades within the 
proposed Medical District, which could be used for off-site improvements such as sidewalks and 
pedestrian lighting.
52
 
Within the RPC’s proposal, the courting of the VAMC and the vision of the new 
MCLNO campus was painted as “THE critical economic development project for the City of 
New Orleans.”53 The economic development potential of these combined facilities was seen as 
the motivating force in the City’s acquiescence in clear-cutting a section of a National Register 
Historic District to provide land for the proposed VAMC.  When combined with the MCLNO 
project, the RPC estimated that the capital investment would total approximately $2 billion and 
provide an annual economic impact of $1.26 billion with an estimated 20,000 construction jobs 
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and 10,000 permanent jobs.
54
 This impact would be experienced not only by New Orleans, but 
by the entire metropolitan area.  The breadth of this impact was, as the RPC indicated, also a 
motivating factor in the proposal of this location. Under Executive Order 12072, signed by 
President Carter in 1978, site selection for federal facilities must give “serious consideration to 
the impact a site selection will have on improving the social, economic and environmental 
conditions of an urban area.”55 
Following submission of the RPC’s proposal to the VA in April of 2007, the VA and 
FEMA, on behalf of the State, moved forward with preliminary studies relative the federally-
mandated Section 106 Review process, since much of the proposed MCLNO/VA site was within 
a National Register Historic District. On July 17, 2008, MCLNO and the VA separately 
submitted letters to the State Historic Preservation Officer outlining the “Areas of Potential 
Effect” for development of the MCLNO and VAMC facilities on the proposed Mid-City sites.  
These assessments, which evaluated every structure within the proposed footprints, outlined 
those structures individually listed on the National Register, those eligible for listing, and those 
ineligible for listing in order to determine the scope of the potential impact on the historic 
resources of the Mid-City National Register Historic District.
56,57
  
These initial inventories led to Findings of No Significant Impact (FONSIs) by the VA 
and FEMA, both issued on November 24, 2008. While both noted that there would be impacts to 
the Mid-City National Register Historic District, including the demolition of contributing 
elements, the belief was that through the Programmatic Environmental Assessment (PEA) any 
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adverse effects could be minimized.
58
  Immediately following release of the FONSIs, MCLNO 
and the VA, on November 25, 2008, held an event at which they announced the final site 
selection for the new medical facilities.  
In a press release touting the announcement of the site selection, the Deputy Secretary of 
the VA stated that the site was selected “because it offers the best solution for our veterans, today 
and into the future” and that “the site, located within a robust medical district with affiliate heath 
care teaching universities, promotes long term operational synergy and efficiency.”59 LSU 
officials, speaking of the medical district and the MCLNO site selection stated that “building 
these hospitals within close proximity to each other assures the future of top quality health care, 
research, and medical education not only for the New Orleans area but for the entire state” and 
added that the facilities “are destined to be models of health care reform for the nation.”60 
In the midst of the fanfare by local officials which accompanied the announcement, there 
was a strong resentment within the community which had been growing for some time.  
Although the press conference of November 25, 2008 marked the announcement of the official 
site selection, it signified the end of a protracted process where state and federal officials all but 
declared that this area was the only site under consideration.  The MCLNO site was essentially 
targeted through the 2005 ADAMS report and the VAMC site was selected in early 2007 due to 
its proximity to MCLNO’s favored location. The first time there was a public forum for 
discussion of either location was November of 2007.  Although State officials presented the 
meeting as one of a series where the public would have the chance to guide decision-making, 
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residents noted that LSU and hospital officials had announced as early as the summer of 2006 
that they would build a new flagship medical complex in lower Mid-City.
61
   
The lack of firm statements or public involvement left the community mired in confusion. 
Mayor C. Ray Nagin was consistently on message calling on New Orleanians to return to the city 
and participate in rebuilding, noting a “right to return” for all citizens62 while the administration 
simultaneously coordinated with the RPC to propose razing nearly 70 acres of a primarily 
residential historic neighborhood. To this end, following the April 2007 proposal of the Mid-City 
location to the VA, the New Orleans City Council adopted a moratorium on building permits 
within the tentative MCLNO and VA sites. Ordinance 22,900 MCS, adopted by the City Council 
on November 20, 2007 enacted the ‘Regional Medical District Redevelopment Moratorium’ 
which served to prohibit the “the issuance of any building permits for construction, renovations, 
repairs, or for demolition of buildings.”63  In preparation for the eventual property acquisition 
and to demonstrate the need for enactment of a permit moratorium, the City extracted data on the 
active permits within the medical center footprint to determine how many structures were 
undergoing renovation.  Figure 7.4 (below) shows the active permits outstanding as of August 
30, 2007, which was four months after this site was proposed for clearance and three months 
before the adoption of the permit moratorium to slow redevelopment in this area.  It can be 
inferred from the Ordinance that this measure was essentially enacted to stop people from 
improving flood-damaged properties which would then lead to increased appraisals when the 
time came for purchase or expropriation; the ordinance, using the tell-tale language of impending 
expropriation, stated that “the purpose of this temporary measure is to enable the development of 
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the VA Hospital and LSU Medical Center, thereby serving the public purpose of providing 
healthcare to the citizens of New Orleans.”64 
Figure 7.6 – Regional Medical Center – Proposed Expansion, Valid Permits as of 8/30/200765 
 
Following the first public meeting and adoption of the permitting moratorium in 
November of 2007, city, state and federal officials held several additional meetings before 
formally making their site selection announcement on November 25, 2008.  These meetings, 
while posed to the public as opportunities to have a voice in the process, were generally regarded 
as appeasement of a process more than actual opportunities for involvement.  From June through 
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August of 2008, several public meetings were held to provide the public with an opportunity to 
voice their positions relative to the MCLNO and VAMC proposed facilities.   
According to the PEA, of the comments received through these public meetings as well 
as via email, letter and website postings, 11% of all comments were relative to a lack of public 
involvement in the site selection process.  Comments falling under this category ranged from 
lack of available information as to criteria being used to select a final location to the belief that a 
site had already been selected to belief that incorrect information was being disseminated to the 
public in the meetings. Officials responded to these criticisms by noting that public involvement 
is a required element of both the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic 
Preservation Act, to that end a project website was developed that allowed all relevant 
information to be publicly posted for review and comment. They added that while “[n]o decision 
has been made as to final site selection” the site must “meet a number of criteria in order to 
achieve the purpose and need of the project.”66  The PEA summarizes the site selection criteria 
for both MCLNO and VAMC facilities as: 
 Proximity to Louisiana State University (LSU) Health Sciences along Tulane 
Avenue and other related health education providers. 
 
 Access from Interstate-10 and local collector streets. 
 Area and geometry of the site. 
 Adequate growth and expansion potential. 
Although there were, officially, alternative sites under consideration at this time, the 
criteria clearly indicated that there would only be one location in contention for final site 
selection.  Of the two alternative sites being reviewed for selection by the VAMC, one was in 
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Jefferson Parish and the other located further north in Mid-City along North Jefferson Davis 
Parkway at the site formerly occupied by the Lindy Boggs Medical Center, which was 
abandoned following Hurricane Katrina.  Neither of these locations appears to have met the 
narrowly crafted criteria for site selection set forth by the State and the VA. From the PEA it 
appears that no other sites were under consideration by the State for development of MCLNO, 
the only alternative presented was the restoration of Charity Hospital.
67
  
Of the remaining comments received during these three months of public input, the PEA 
breaks them down generally as: 17% indicating need for additional/improved health care in New 
Orleans; 14% relating to preservation of historic structures; 17% in support of the proposed Mid-
City location; 13% in opposition to the Mid-City location; 13% in support of the Lindsey Boggs 
location; 1% opposed to the Lindsey Boggs location; 1% in support for the Ochsner (Jefferson 
Parish) location, 1% opposed to the Ochsner (Jefferson Parish) location; 6% relating to 
renovation of Charity Hospital; 3% relating to renovation of the existing VAMC; and 3% 
classified as ‘miscellaneous.’68 
Although 11% of all comments related to lack of true public involvement, these concerns 
were brushed aside in the crafting of the final PEA, leading many to question if the ultimate site 
selection was ever actually being evaluated through this process.
69
  Following the announcement 
of site selection, an announcement that certainly offered no surprises for those involved in the 
public meetings, preservationists and neighbors united in decrying the choice and panned City, 
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State and federal agencies as failing to recognize the impact the decision would have on 
individuals and their historic community.
70
 
Citizen activists and local elected officials similarly questioned if the public meetings 
were envisioned as meaningful opportunities for public involvement or merely held in fulfillment 
of federal regulations.  According to Derrick Morrison, a citizen involved in the public meeting 
process and a co-chair of an organization calling for the renovation of Charity Hospital, the 
public meetings “were a sham,” 71 noting the existing memorandum of understanding between 
the City and the State regarding land acquisition and another memorandum of understanding 
between the City, State and VA which called for the VA to suspend alternative site evaluations 
provided that the City met its obligations with respect to the Mid-City site.  Likewise, 
Councilmember Stacy Head, who represented the selected area, stated that she was unsure if 
officials were “truly going into [the public meeting process] with an open mind” and noted that 
“there was little the Council could have done, short of shutting down the plan altogether.”72   
Conversely, the State and VA officials believed that the public hearing process was valid 
and that the community should not be discouraged by the ‘preference’ of the Mid-City locations 
over other alternatives.  Further, they noted that there were valuable results of the public meeting 
process, among those being that LSU and the VA were able to move forward with their preferred 
sites and that the State came to favor making the Charity Hospital structure available to 
developers for non-hospital uses.
73
 
Within the areas ultimately selected for the development of MCLNO and VAMC, 
surveys revealed that approximately 618 individuals resided within the proposed footprint of the 
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facilities in 265 individual housing units.  Of the 618 individuals, 88% were minority and 46% 
qualified as low income.  Due to these percentages of minority and low income residents, the 
area qualified as a “community of concern” for purposes of PEA environmental justice 
evaluation.  The PEA determined that while there were environmental justice concerns for this 
population, the impact of the proposed projects could be sufficiently mitigated through relocation 
assistance. This would include replacement housing payments which would offset increased cost 
in obtaining comparable housing or placement in ‘housing of last resort’ (public housing) if such 
comparable housing was deemed unavailable or if the individual’s financial means dictated.74  
The physical development of the site was surveyed to determine the number and types of 
structures that would be removed.  The results of this survey were also used to reinforce the 
position that the proposed sites were underutilized and generally in blighted condition, making 
them ripe for redevelopment.  In all, the combined site contained a total of 460 parcels, with a 
total of 184 parcels on the proposed VAMC site and 276 on the MCLNO site. Table 7.1 outlines 
the findings of this survey, which is also visually represented in Figures 7.5 and 7.6. 
Table 7.2 – VAMC / MCLNO Site Land Use Survey Results75 
VAMC  MCLNO 
Use 
Property 
Count 
 Use 
Property 
Count 
Occupied 
Residential 
63  
Occupied 
Residential 
31 
Active 
Commercial 
16  
Active 
Commercial 
27 
Vacant 
Residential 
65  
Vacant 
Residential 
27 
Inactive 
Commercial 
17  
Inactive 
Commercial 
17 
Vacant Lot 23  Vacant Lot 174 
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Figure 7.7– Proposed VAMC Site Land Use Survey, with legend.76 
   
Figure 7.8 – Proposed MCLNO Site Land Use Survey, with legend.77 
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 Based on the physical survey of the proposed hospital sites, a total of 323 parcels were 
considered ‘vacant’ due to either being entirely undeveloped or uninhabited. Using these 
development numbers, the total number of vacant properties amounted to 57% of the VAMC site 
and 79% of the MCLNO site.
78
   
In addition to the use of individual properties, the PEA also provided an analysis of the 
historic character of the overall site as well as the notable structures within the area. The location 
selected for MCLNO and VAMC facilities are within the boundaries of the Mid-City National 
Register Historic District and several structures within the footprint were individually listed or 
eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places.  The area comprising the Mid-
City National Register Historic District was developed between the 1880s and early 1900s, with 
most residential structures falling into the shotgun and Bungalow styles, and accounting for 
55.3% and 31.4% of the ‘contributing’ structures within the District, respectively.  The 
remaining architectural forms include Queen Anne Revival (17.6%), Italianate (15.7%), and 
Creole cottages (15%).
79
   
Within the VAMC footprint, the Pan-American Life Insurance Building, located at 2400 
Canal Street, and the Dixie Brewery, located at 2401 Tulane Avenue, are individually listed in 
the National Register and it was determined that there would be no mitigation possible to offset 
the loss of these structures so they are to be retained, renovated and integrated into the VAMC 
campus.
80
  As of the date of this dissertation, renovation of the Pan-American Life Insurance 
Building is nearing completion and the renovation of the Dixie Brewery has yet to begin. 
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Figure 7.9 – Dixie Brewery81 
 
 
In the MCLNO site, there were no individually listed buildings at the time of survey, but 
it was determined that three properties were eligible for individual inclusion on the National 
Register: the Deutsches Haus, located at 200 South Galvez Street; the McDonogh Number 11 
school, located at 2001 Palmyra Street; and the Orleans House, located at 1800 Canal Street.  
The eligibility of the Deutsches Haus was determined based on cultural rather than architectural 
significance, so mitigation measures including photographic documentation and a public display 
within the MCLNO complex were proposed to allow for the demolition of this structure.  The 
McDonogh Number 11 school was determined to be architecturally significant and is to be 
relocated from the site. The significance of the Orleans House, and its presence as the last 
remnant of the original residential character of this section of Canal Street, was determined to be 
of such importance that the structure and the land it occupies was removed from the MCLNO 
footprint and the State contributed to the rehabilitation of the structure to return it to productive 
commerce.
82
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Figure 7.10– Orleans House83  Figure 7.11 – McDonough Number 1184 
  
 
The remaining area of the proposed MCLNO/VA sites located within the Mid-City 
National Register Historic District was analyzed by the VA and FEMA in consultation with the 
Louisiana State Historic Preservation Officer and issued a determination that of the District’s 
3,710 contributing structures, only 165 were within the boundaries of the proposed 
redevelopment, with 123 within the VAMC site and 42 within the MCLNO site.  This accounted 
for approximately 4.4% of the total contributing building stock within the District.  In order to 
minimize the impact on the Historic District, the City and VA agreed to establish an $800,000 
fund to allow for the relocation and rehabilitation of one-story buildings of “exceptional 
architectural importance” from the VAMC site to new locations within the Mid-City National 
Register Historic District.
85
 
The Land Assembly 
 The State of Louisiana, following official site selection began the process of obtaining 
third-party appraisals on all properties within the MCLNO/VA footprint. As the ultimate 
operator of the MCLNO facility, the required land would be directly acquired by LSU. The 
VAMC properties would be acquired by LSU and the Division of Administration of the 
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Governor’s Office with funding by the City of New Orleans, and turned over to the federal 
government once the site was fully acquired and cleared. As previously discussed, the goal of the 
City essentially contracting with the State for the acquisition of the VAMC site was so that 
expropriations, where necessary, could be accomplished through the State’s ‘quick-take’ 
authority, which is not available to the City of New Orleans.   
 The State (though LSU and MCLNO) and the VA established a timeline on property 
acquisitions which called for acquisition of all required properties to be completed by July of 
2010.   
In the overall property acquisition plan, property acquisition within the VAMC site was 
to be complete by July 13, 2010 in accordance with the priority overlay indicated in Figure 7.12 
(below).
86
  Site acquisition for the VAMC was essentially completed by October 25, 2010, with 
the final parcel, the Dixie Brewery not acquired until February 25, 2011.
87
  As of November 30, 
2009, one year following the official site selection, only two properties within the VAMC site 
had been acquired with three closings in process and 26 offers being considered.
88
 
The MCLNO property acquisition timeline called for complete control of their site by 
May 21, 2010; however, as of November 30, 2009 no properties had been acquired, five closings 
were in process and 45 offers were being considered.
89
  Property acquisition within the MCLNO 
site was completed on June 17, 2011, more than one year after the targeted end-date for that 
stage of the project.
90
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Figure 7.12 – VAMC Site Acquisition Priority Overlay91 
 
 
  Once the State and LSU started assembling the required real estate, they proved to be not 
at all hesitant about exercising their eminent domain authority.  A review of property transfer 
records relative to the MCLNO and VAMC sites, summarized in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 (below),  
shows that the State filed expropriation actions 123 times to acquire property. Due to the way 
these transfers were recorded, it is unclear how many individual ‘parcels’ of the 460 indicated 
above were expropriated; however, to complete land assembly there were a total of 294 
transactions recorded with the Orleans Parish Office of Conveyances. With 123 expropriation 
actions out of 294 total property acquisitions, the rate at which the State and LSU exercised their 
power of eminent domain amounts to 42%.  
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Table 7.3 – Total Acquisitions and Expropriations for MCLNO. 92 
Square Number of Acquisitions 
Number of 
Expropriations 
433 9 8 
434 13 6 
435 1 1 
436 10 5 
437 13 5 
438 6 4 
466 9 1 
467 12 2 
468 12 1 
469 7 2 
470 13 3 
471 2 1 
520 5 2 
521 22 7 
522 4 1 
 
Table 7.4 – Total Acquisitions and Expropriations for VAMC. 93 
Square Number of Acquisitions 
Number of 
Expropriations 
523 6 3 
524 17 8 
525 24 9 
526 2 2 
549 5 4 
550 21 10 
551 25 11 
552 3 2 
553 1 1 
554 25 11 
555 26 6 
556 1 1 
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Through an analysis of the overall property acquisition timeline, it does not appear that 
the State and LSU chose to exercise their power of eminent domain solely as a time-saving 
measure to complete the land assembly process based on the project timeline; instead, they 
appeared to exercise this authority when attempts to reach a negotiated purchase met an impasse. 
If the state were solely looking to complete land assembly in an expeditious manner, they would 
have been within their legal authority to file for ‘quick-take’ on all properties within the 
designated footprint.  As an example, Table 7.4 details the acquisition of Square 437 from within 
the MCLNO site and is excerpted from Appendix 7.2; this Table indicates that property 
acquisition within this single municipal square began on May 18, 2010 and concluded on April 
8, 2011.  Within this time frame there were five individual expropriation actions filed through 
the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans and eight privately negotiated sales. 
Table 7.5 - Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Square 437 for the Medical Center of 
Louisiana at New Orleans.
94
 
Square 
437 
Undesignated 1836 Cleveland Ave $18,700 5/18/2010   
12 1822 Cleveland Ave $33,400 10/7/2010 X  
16, 21 
1837 Palmyra St. 
228-30 S. Roman St. 
 10/19/2010 X  
17, 18, 28, 29, 
30, A 
216-18 S.Roman St. 
219 S. Derbigny St. 
$550,600 10/29/2010 X  
R 211 S. Derbigny St. $4,250 10/29/2010 X  
24 1827 Palmyra St. $138,600 2/14/2011   
11, 13, 14, 15 
1826-34 Cleveland Ave 
210-12 S. Roman St. 
$118,612 2/23/2011   
10, B, 11 1812-20 Cleveland Ave $90,600 2/23/2011   
7, S 1800-04 Cleveland Ave $41,000 2/25/2011   
25 1823 Palmyra St. $65,000 3/21/2011   
A 1808-10 Cleveland Ave $35,700 4/8/2011 X  
24 1827 Palmyra St.  3/9/2011   
23 1829-31 Palmyra St. $180,000 3/29/2011   
 
 Certainly, as with other projects evaluated in this dissertation, it is clear that the State 
sought to avoid expropriation in favor of negotiated sale when possible.  According to the New 
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Facilities for the LSU Academic Medical Center Monthly Report for November of 2009, beyond 
the outstanding offers noted previously, there were a total of 42 offers being prepared and 
another 166 parcels where just compensation determinations had been made but where formal 
offers had not yet been written.  
The Legacy 
 While this project is too recent to draw any meaningful conclusions as to the overall 
benefit that New Orleans will realize from these projects either in terms of improved health 
service delivery or economic impact, what is certain is that these projects will move forward and 
their legacy will shape health care in New Orleans and the surrounding region for many years to 
come.  Notable in the debate which surrounded both the vision and the planning of these 
facilities was general agreement as to the need for improved medical service in the city; not only 
an improvement in the physical environment but an improvement in the delivery of care itself. 
 Certainly there were differences in the overall vision as to what a new medical center 
should look like and where it should be placed. This is expected in any major civic project, and is 
especially true in a situation where people stand to be displaced. What is disappointing and 
troubling is that there was no meaningful public participation in the ultimate decisions which 
were made regarding this project.  It is often thought that planning has come so far since the 
Urban Renewal days of the 1950s and 1960s, but in evaluating the timeline of events 
surrounding the MCLNO/VA project, it is clear that this is no different than the projects that 
have been evaluated in previous chapters. The letter of the law may have been followed, but the 
spirit and intent of public participation requirements were completely ignored as governmental 
leaders informed the community what would be in their best interest rather than allowing them to 
determine that for themselves.  
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 From the perspective of expropriation authority exercised in furtherance of the project, 
the effective expropriation percentage of 42% is substantially higher than the rate at which 
properties were taken for previous projects studied in this dissertation. This is somewhat 
remarkable as this project took place entirely after eminent domain laws in Louisiana were 
changed to protect private property from governmental takings in response to the U. S. Supreme 
Court’s Kelo decision. In reality, at least in the scope of this particular project, these newly-
created constitutional protections did nothing to protect property owners who actually saw the 
state lose patience and expropriate at a higher rate than found even at the height of Urban 
Renewal. 
 Between the development of the Cultural Center (Chapter 6) and the formulation of a 
vision and subsequent planning for the MCLNO/VA hospitals, a number of federal laws have 
been enacted to force governmental entities to take a closer look at what impact their 
redevelopment plans will have on people.  The National Environmental Protection Act and the 
National Historic Preservation Act were briefly discussed in this chapter; both require extensive 
analysis and public comment prior to allowing a project to go forward, the goal of this process 
being to prevent projects from moving forward where there are viable options that will not 
negatively impact a community or the overall environment.   
 The criteria used in site selection made the ‘preferred’ sites the only ones that could be 
realistically considered.  Certainly for the VAMC there were other viable options in terms of 
available land, but the requirements set forth for both hospitals that the location have immediate 
access to Interstate-10 and be located in close proximity to the existing LSU Health Sciences 
Center made any site other than the eventual selection non-compliant with the selection criteria.  
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 It is hard to blame New Orleans officials for their complacency in allowing the 
decimation of an historic neighborhood when the alternative was that they would have to 
concede defeat to losing the economic drivers found in two large, modern hospitals. What is 
disturbing in their complacency is that, from the available evidence, they did not even try to 
devise a solution that would have provided equal benefits to residents in terms of retaining their 
homes while accommodating the development of the medical complex within the same general 
area. 
 Looking back on this project in twenty years with the benefit of hindsight may prove that 
these decisions, while difficult, were truly best for the City, or perhaps not. What is certain is that 
the legacy of the MCLNO/VA hospital complex, as a project and as a development process, will 
likely continue to be met with some level of resentment from those displaced and those ignored 
in the series of ‘public meetings.’ A possible benefit from this experience may be that the public 
will no longer allow powerful government entities to skirt public input requirements to ramrod 
projects into communities; unfortunately, it is likely that there will simply be more of the same.  
Figure 7.13 – MCLNO, under construction.95 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion: 
What is taken, Why, and by Whom?  
 
 Through the previous six chapters, this dissertation has discussed the vision, planning, 
and property acquisitions which shaped major projects in New Orleans from 1929 through 2011. 
These projects run the gamut from localized projects, such as the Municipal Auditorium which 
impacted only two municipal squares of property, to city-wide undertakings, such as the 
Interstate Highway System which either directly or indirectly impacted every neighborhood in 
New Orleans. Regardless of the initial scope of the individual projects, all have shaped the 
physical, cultural, social, and political landscape of the city in some manner.  
 The primary finding of this dissertation research is that the exercise of eminent domain 
has never been used a principal tool in the implementation of redevelopment proposals in the city 
of New Orleans. All projects throughout the established research period required the use of 
governmental expropriation authority to complete land acquisition, but in all cases the 
government’s authority was used conservatively and only when privately negotiated purchases 
failed.  This chapter will summarize the findings of the six cases researched in the previous 
chapters in the context of the research goals and questions presented in Chapter 1. Additionally, 
the specific cases studied in this document will be comparatively analyzed to determine what, if 
any, change occurred to the government’s exercise of eminent domain authority over the course 
of the research period. 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation set forth three primary research questions which will be 
addressed individually, but are restated below: 
1)   To the extent that the City of New Orleans over the last century has pursued 
specific land use policies through the use of its eminent domain power, what 
have those policies been? 
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2) What particular factors have played a role in the City’s determination as to 
which areas were suitable for municipal projects, and specifically, to what 
extent was the impact of such projects on the surrounding community a factor 
in policy-making? 
 
3)  What land use strategies, if any, might have been employed by the City that 
would have been effective in accomplishing the same policy goals without the 
need for exercising the eminent domain power, and do these strategies present 
realistic and viable alternatives today? 
 
Before discussing the findings directly relative to these questions, the specific language of the 
questions must be addressed. The terminology of the questions limits their scope to the actions of 
the City of New Orleans as a corporate entity. These research questions should be read as 
inclusive of governmental actors at all levels, federal, state, and city.  The placement of projects 
was not always purely within the purview of the City as the local governing body; for example, 
in the routing of the Interstate Highway System through New Orleans (Chapter 5), the State 
Highway Department determined the best route and Mayor Morrison conceded to their perceived 
expertise in declaring that “the best place to put the highways is where the engineering 
determines it should be put.”1 To move forward in time by approximately sixty years, the 
placement of the Bio-Medical District (Chapter 7) was determined by actors outside of city 
government, specifically Louisiana State University and the U. S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs, with City leadership blessing the site selection for fear of losing the hospitals as 
economic drivers to neighboring Jefferson Parish. 
1) To the extent that the City of New Orleans over the last century has pursued specific land use 
policies through the use of its eminent domain power, what have those policies been? 
 
 Over the course of this research period, there were several broad land use policies which 
were manifested in specific projects where eminent domain was utilized. Generally, these 
                                                 
1
 Official Transcript of Proceedings of the Department of Highways, State of Louisiana: Federal Interstate Highway 
Hearing for all of Jefferson and Orleans Parishes, February 11, 1958.  Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal 
Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 296, at 23. 
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policies are categorized as improvements in housing and transportation, and slum clearance. The 
institution of public housing within New Orleans (Chapter 3) was accomplished through the 
Housing Authority of New Orleans’s (HANO) mission of providing safe, sanitary housing to the 
citizens of the city. To accomplish this goal, HANO undertook the city’s first slum-clearance 
projects to clear land for the construction of public housing.  
The first sites selected for redevelopment by HANO were determined to be 
neighborhoods with the highest proportion of substandard housing, as determined by housing 
surveys conducted both by HANO and third-party social research organizations.  These findings 
were summarized in HANO’s statement that “there is on every hand desolation, despair, squalor, 
poverty, frustration – the whole sordid and dangerous group of sinister elements that form the 
component parts of a slum.”2 The removal of these substandard, slum conditions was seen as a 
necessity and the provision of housing to relieve people from those same conditions was 
determined to be a priority by all levels of government. Unfortunately, the full scope of eminent 
domain use in the creation of the St. Thomas and Magnolia Housing Developments could not be 
determined due to property transfer records being purged from the City’s Office of Real Estate 
and Records following the redevelopment of these sites in the past decade.  
The transportation element of land use policy which drove the exercise of eminent 
domain in New Orleans was the individual automobile. The Mississippi River Bridge and 
Interstate Highway System in New Orleans resulted in the largest land acquisition of the projects 
studied, and also resulted in the largest number of expropriations of the six cases. Not only did 
these projects have the largest impact on citizens at an individual level, through loss of property, 
but also the largest, and longest lasting, impact on the daily life of metropolitan New Orleans. 
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 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 31, 1938, at 26.  
Accessed from the New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division. 
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The Mississippi River Bridge and Interstate Highway System facilitated ‘White Flight’ that came 
to define the 1950s and 1960s, causing the rapid growth of adjacent Jefferson Parish and the 
decline of New Orleans’s population and tax base.  
Transportation infrastructure, particularly to accommodate automobiles, was seen as 
critical to the survival of New Orleans as a major city in the 1940s and 1950s. These highways 
were rooted in a document produced in 1926 by Harland Bartholomew and Associates, entitled A 
Preliminary Report on a System of Major Streets which outlined the needs of New Orleans in 
terms of adequately handling the growing number of cars on urban streets. In terms of this report, 
‘major streets’ were considered to be wide boulevards that were conducive to traffic flow; 
however, this initial report was updated in 1947 and again in 1951 by the City Planning and 
Zoning Commission.  These revisions recognized the need for regional highways to not only 
improve traffic flow within New Orleans but that a coordinated highway system would be 
required to serve the entire metropolitan area. 
It was this adopted plan which laid the foundation for the route proposed by the state for 
construction of the Interstate Highways in New Orleans.  As noted previously, the City was not 
in a position to dispute the state’s proposed highway routes, but the routes were generally 
consistent with the City’s approved plans for transportation infrastructure. In the case of the 
Mississippi River Bridge and Interstate Highways, the required rights-of-way were acquired by 
the Mississippi River Bridge Authority, as a state-enabled entity, and the state Highway 
Department, respectively. The City’s involvement in actual property acquisition for these 
projects was minimal. 
The third broad land use policy which was furthered by the use of eminent domain was 
slum clearance, popularly termed urban renewal.  There were two projects undertaken in New 
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Orleans during the research period that specifically fell into this category, the New Orleans Civic 
Center (Chapter 4) and the New Orleans Cultural Center (Chapter 6). Both of these projects were 
promoted as being civic improvements that, at least in the case of the Civic Center, had the 
added benefit of ridding New Orleans of “one of the worst slum conditions that now exists in 
New Orleans.”3 Not only did these projects offer to clear areas determined to be ‘slums’ but 
would also offer civic amenities in terms of consolidated municipal government in the Civic  
Center and civic meeting place and an environment for education, recreation and the exchange of 
ideas in the Cultural Center.  
More than the amenities offered in terms of what the residents of New Orleans would 
seek, there was also financial motivation in these projects for the City as an entity. The sites 
selected for these projects were seen as not being developed or used to their potential, and this 
was problematic because if the uses were not being maximized, neither were assessments for 
property taxes. The City was not shy about stating that private development in conjunction with 
these projects was seen as a motivator in the planning and ultimate execution of the proposals.  
2) What particular factors have played a role in the City’s determination as to which areas were 
suitable for municipal projects, and specifically, to what extent was the impact of such projects 
on the surrounding community a factor in policy-making? 
 
 Across the six cases studied in this dissertation, there were a number of factors which 
contributed to the selection of sites for government projects. With the exceptions of the 
Mississippi River Bridge and Interstate Highway System, where the routes were determined 
primarily based on adopted street plans, all projects were specifically located based on pre-
determined selection criteria.  In the cases of public housing, the Civic Center, and the Cultural 
Center, the sites were selected based on presence of ‘slum conditions’ as determined by City 
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 A Proposed Plan for a Central Municipal Center, rev. April 10, 1945.  Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal 
Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 431, at 4 
 239 
officials and, particularly in relation to the latter two, the ability to realize returns on investment 
in terms of increased property values in the areas immediately adjacent to these undertakings.   
In the case of the Municipal Auditorium (Chapter 2) the selected site was chosen based 
purely on its adjacency to Congo Square, where the City initially wanted to place the structure. 
The record reveals that the Congo Square site proposal was partially based on ease of access and 
early proposals for a civic complex centered roughly at Orleans and North Rampart Streets; 
however, a combination of community opposition and an unclear ruling by the state supreme 
court waylaid use of this site for the Auditorium. In reaction to these factors, the City chose two 
municipal squares immediately adjacent to Congo Square as the location for the structure with 
little discussion beyond saving Congo Square as a park for the surrounding community. 
Differing from these earlier projects, the site selection process for the Medical Center of 
Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) and the United States Department of Veterans Affairs 
Medical Center (VAMC) was officially based on defined site selection criteria which was to 
result in the most suitable location for the joint facilities. Unofficially, the selection of the 
MCLNO site was determined by LSU years before the location would be officially announced 
and the VAMC site was chosen purely due to its adjacency to MCLNO.  LSU stated its 
preference for what was termed the “North Option” in a 2003 facilities master planning report. 
This option, with frontage on Canal Street, would present the hospital with a more prominent 
location that would add to its image as an institution and would allow for the complex to tie into 
existing transportation infrastructure, most importantly the Canal Street streetcar line and 
Interstate-10.   
Though it played a role in the decision-making, the vanity of MCLNO’s desire to have 
Canal Street frontage did not seem to be the only factor which played into the ultimate site 
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selection. ADAMS Management Services Corporation, the facility planners for MCLNO, 
analyzed the selected site in terms reminiscent of the urban renewal projects of an earlier era. 
The land on which MCLNO has been placed was comprised largely of vacant land or vacant 
structures, with occupied homes and businesses interspersed. The conclusion reached was to 
redevelop this tract, which if untouched, would prove to be a hindrance to the development of 
medical industry-related uses. By redeveloping this area, across Tulane Avenue from the exiting 
LSU Health Sciences Center, the State would be able to control the type of development within 
close proximity to their investments while also retaining the ability to foster a unified image for 
medical training in New Orleans.  
As previously stated, the site selection for the VAMC was largely based on adjacency to 
the MCLNO site. The official solicitation for site proposals in 2007 called for a site of 25 to 75 
acres in size, within a geographic area bounded by the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain, the east 
bank of the Mississippi River, the Jefferson/St. Charles Parish line and Franklin Avenue (in New 
Orleans). In addition to these geographic limitations, the other criteria included: 1) clear title to 
the property; 2) full disclosure of any hazardous conditions; 3) access to existing or planned 
major streets and public transit; and 4) adequate utility service to support the hospital’s needs.4 
Though these were the official criteria indicated in 2007, the VA stated in 2006 in a report to 
Congress that their primary objective was to create a joint facility with LSU and MCLNO 
adjacent to their proposed new campus in the Mid-City area of New Orleans (see Figure 7.5).   
The impact of these projects, from the Municipal Auditorium through the 
MCLNO/VAMC hospital complex, was routinely evaluated in terms of the potential impact on 
surrounding communities. However, this evaluation of impact almost always turned on the 
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 Veterans Administration Request for Site Proposals. Accessed via the New Orleans City Planning Commission, 
Files of Deputy Director Leslie T. Alley. 
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economic impact rather than the impact to those who actually lived within or adjacent to the 
project footprints. In discussion of site selection for the Municipal Auditorium, the focus was on 
the potential loss of a public park (Congo Square) and how to replace it, rather than on how the 
presence of a large convention and performance hall would impact adjacent property owners, 
though clearly this was considered by some members of the community that intended to 
capitalize on the presence of the auditorium. What makes the lack of consideration for the 
community clear in this case is that when the Congo Square site became politically impractical, 
City leadership quickly offered the privately-held property across St. Claude Street from Congo 
Square with no discussion as to the impacts on the property owners or the community.  
In terms of public housing developments, particularly the first two which were 
constructed in the most densely developed areas of the city, HANO believed that the presence of 
modern, safe, and sanitary housing would improve the overall communities. No longer would 
people be content to live under slum conditions and the market would require upgrades to private 
low-priced rentals in order to make them competitive with public housing. Though HANO stated 
the belief that the public housing developments would improve surrounding communities, it is 
important to note that HANO’s mission is to provide housing, not foster community 
development.   
The Civic Center and Cultural Center, as discussed previously, were seen as mechanisms 
to aid in elevating property values, which would theoretically help adjacent private property 
owners just as much as it would aid the City in terms of increased property taxes.  In addition to 
this factor, both projects were seen as key to guiding the growth of the Central Business District 
in a manner that official City Planning found appropriate. The Civic Center was to guide growth 
north towards Charity Hospital and Tulane Avenue while the Cultural Center was envisioned as 
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creating a barrier to prevent the future expansion of the Central Business District into the historic 
Tremé neighborhood. The Civic Center project did accomplish the goal of guiding growth.  The 
Central Business District expanded to the north along Poydras Street where numerous office 
buildings and the Mercedes-Benz Superdome stand today.  Conversely, the Cultural Center has 
resulted in a barrier between the French Quarter and the Tremé neighborhood rather than 
between the Central Business District and a residential community.  
One other note regarding the Civic Center’s potential impact on its surrounding 
community is that the goal of the project was to guide the growth of the Central Business District 
to the north, which necessitated the complete elimination of the community.  The Civic Center 
project was proposed atop the only pocket of residentially used land in the downtown area. The 
stated goal of the project was to guide commercial growth in that direction and City leadership 
determined that this could only be accomplished by removing residential uses. So one could infer 
from this that the ramifications on the surrounding community were fully considered and the 
decision was made to eliminate the neighborhood in favor of commercial growth. 
The MCLNO/VAMC project presents the most evidence of consideration on the impact 
the projects would have on the surrounding community. This is a result of legally-mandated 
studies that were required prior to the release of federal funds to undertake the projects. It should 
be noted that just because the impacts were considered does not mean that governmental actors 
were necessarily concerned about the potential negative consequences.  Requirements of both the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 
require governmental actors to fully evaluate the impact of government projects prior to their 
approval to prevent harm to communities surrounding new facilities. In evaluating the potential 
impact of the MCLNO/VAMC project, Findings of No Significant Impact were issued based on: 
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1) that the proposed changes to land use designations (zoning) within the site were not 
substantial; 2) no federal, state, or local agency was in opposition to the project; 3) potential for 
environmental impact was minimal; and 4) mitigation measures would be taken to reduce the 
harm to the Mid-City National Register Historic District.
5
 
3)  What land use strategies, if any, might have been employed by the City that would 
have been effective in accomplishing the same policy goals without the need for 
exercising the eminent domain power, and do these strategies present realistic and viable 
alternatives today? 
 
 After reviewing the historical materials relative to these particular projects, the answer to 
this research question is troublingly simple.  There were no alternative strategies available that 
could have been employed to prevent the use of eminent domain in carrying out the policy goals 
that these projects represented. In every case, the governmental entity tasked with property 
acquisition attempted to negotiate purchases to prevent having to resort to use of expropriation. 
In every case, there were parcels that could not be acquired through negotiation. In the majority 
of individually documented cases the reason negotiated purchase failed was because the property 
owner wanted more for the property than was justified by appraisals. The only way to avoid 
expropriations in these situations would have been to offer more money to the property owner, 
but in doing so the government would be acting irresponsibly as a steward of tax dollars.  
 Certainly it is impossible to infer that large public projects cannot proceed without the 
exercise of eminent domain; doing so is simply highly unlikely.  There will always be someone 
holding out for more money than a property is truly worth and in doing so preventing a project or 
facility from being constructed. The tool of eminent domain is a necessary evil in terms of 
planning and governing. Political leaders realize that the threat of expropriation is unpopular, and 
in New Orleans there has been a long history of taking steps to avoid use of the power of 
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 Federal Emergency Management Agency, (2008). Finding of No Significant Impact for Site Selection for the LSU 
AMC Project (FEMA-1603-DR-LA). Accessed via www.valsumedcenters.com, on May 24, 2012. 
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eminent domain. In none of the studied cases was there a requirement to negotiate purchase. The 
government could have expedited projects by filing expropriation suits against all property 
owners within an area and obtaining title through the courts. 
 What is the most interesting finding is that the use of eminent domain was higher in the 
case of the MCLNO/VAMC project than in any other project studied. This project was 
undertaken in a post-Kelo environment where there was substantial political opposition to 
infringing on property rights for what is perceived as the common good. The Kelo-responsive 
laws passed in Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina did not limit expropriation authority where 
the project met a strict standard of ‘public use;’ it is indisputable that both medical center 
projects met that definition. However, it should be noted that all layers of government 
approached these hospitals from an economic development standpoint; this is significant because 
consideration of the economic development potential of a project was not a permissible factor in 
determining if a taking is for a ‘public purpose.’6 
Comparison across Projects 
Across the cases studies as part of this research, there are several similarities and 
contrasts that merit note insofar as assembling the full picture of eminent domain use in New 
Orleans during the research period. To begin this comparison, it is important to evaluate the 
expropriation rates found within the several projects to serve as a baseline for discussion of the 
other factors which may have factored in to these percentages.  
Through all cases studied, it is clear from the official historical record and through 
journalistic coverage of the events that negotiated purchase of property within these project sites 
was always preferable to expropriation. In every instance, the proposed project was a ‘public 
use’ as operationally defined in this dissertation and as recognized by the courts through 
                                                 
6
 Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 851 of the 2006 Regular Session 
 245 
challenges to takings. The overall reluctance of the government to take property can be seen in 
the effective expropriation percentages determined for each project as part of this research.  
Table 8.1, below, illustrates the effective expropriation percentages calculated for each of the 
cases studied. 
Table 8.1 – Effective Expropriation Percentages for Researched Projects7 
Project Expropriation Percentage 
Municipal Auditorium 17% 
Public Housing unavailable 
Civic Center 6% 
Mississippi River Bridge / Pontchartrain 
Expressway (original span) 
24% 
Interstate Highway System 15% 
Mississippi River Bridge (second span) 21% 
Cultural Center 10% 
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans / 
Veterans Affairs Medical Center 
42% 
 
 With the effective expropriation rates for the projects established, one can more readily 
explore the individual projects and the circumstances of those projects which may have factored 
into the use of eminent domain, or lack thereof, with respect to particular projects.  Three 
particular factors which are addressed are: time, participation, and race/ethnicity.   
 The factor of time, which this dissertation will identify as the interval between formal site 
selection and full property acquisition, appears to have played a role in the rate of expropriation 
found within each of the cases studied, with the exception of bridge and highway projects.  As 
indicated in Table 8.2 (below), the longer period between site selection and complete property 
acquisition commonly results in lower expropriation rates for land acquisition.  The apparent 
relationship between time and expropriation could have many elements, but the most likely, as 
previously discussed in the context of the Cultural Center is that through the City’s inability to  
                                                 
7
 Data summarized from previous chapters, full property acquisition information may be found in the appendix to 
each chapter. 
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Table 8.2 – Property Acquisition Timeline Comparison across Cases8 
Project 
Site 
Selection
9
 
Property 
Acquisition 
Timeframe 
Years Between 
Site Selection 
and Complete 
Property 
Acquisition 
Expropriation 
Percentage 
Municipal Auditorium 1928 1929* 1 17% 
Public Housing 1937 1938 - 1939 2 unavailable  
Civic Center 1947 1947 – 1955 8 6% 
Mississippi River 
Bridge/Pontchartrain 
Expressway  
(original span) 
1953 1955 – 1957 4 24% 
Interstate Highway 
System (Interstate-10) 
1958 1963 – 1967 9 
15% 
Interstate Highway 
System (Interstate-610) 
1958 1959 - 1971 13 
Mississippi River Bridge 
(second span) 
1974 1979 – 198810 14 21% 
Cultural Center 1951 1958 - 1971 20 10% 
Medical Center of 
Louisiana at New 
Orleans / Veterans 
Affairs Medical Center 
2008 2010-2011 3 42% 
* Municipal Auditorium property acquisition was not complete until 1934 due to appeals; construction began in 
1929 and was complete in 1930. 
 
move quickly on the site acquisition for a designated project, it caused the population of the area 
to dwindle and property values to decline to the point where property owners would have likely 
welcomed the City’s purchase offer in order to relieve themselves of the burden of a soon-to-be-
valueless piece of property.   
 In contrast to the Civic and Cultural Center projects, where property acquisition lingered 
for many years, the Municipal Auditorium site was acquired in only one year, resulting in a 17% 
expropriation rate, opposed to the 6% and 10% rates found in the City’s Urban Renewal projects. 
                                                 
8
 Data summarized from previous chapters, full property acquisition information may be found in the appendix to 
each chapter. 
9
 “Site Selection” column denotes the year of the official site selection. 
10
 The property at 1061 Magazine Street was acquired in 1992. No explanation was found in the record regarding 
why this property was not acquired earlier.  This acquisition was a negotiated purchase. 
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While the smaller property acquisition window appears to bear a relationship to the number of 
expropriations performed, there is no evidence to demonstrate that there is a direct relationship 
between a shorter period of property acquisition and the percentage of expropriations required to 
complete the land assembly.   
As seen in the MCLNO/VAMC project, the property acquisition timeframe was three 
times that of the Municipal Auditorium project, the expropriation rate was 42%, approximately 
250% higher. In researching the particular cases there is not documentation which speaks to the 
very high expropriation rate in this project. From media reports and local, experiential 
knowledge, the most likely cause for this substantially higher rate of expropriation was the factor 
of time combined with a lack of community buy-in of the project.  This lack of buy-in was 
primarily caused by the lack of true public involvement in the site selection process and a lack of 
engagement on the part of the State in illustrating the alleged need for the project to be located in 
this neighborhood.  
  With respect to the bridge and highway projects, time, as defined for this discussion, did 
not seem to be a relevant or determining factor in the overall expropriation rates for the projects.  
However, timing does appear to have at least played a role in individual expropriations within 
particular areas. By evaluating the property transfer records contained in Appendices 5.2 and 5.3, 
one can clearly see that timing of acquisition remained an element contributing to expropriations. 
In completing property acquisition for these projects, the Louisiana Highway Department phased 
the acquisition over the full property acquisition timeframe, purchasing or expropriating property 
comprising several municipal squares at a time. In taking this raw transfer data, it is clear that the 
State’s position regarding acquisition was that when they were ready to acquire your square they 
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would make an initial attempt to negotiate the purchase and not hesitate to expropriate when 
required. 
 The second factor to be evaluated is that of participation.  Participation and meaningful 
community engagement were not found in any of the cases studied within this dissertation, 
though in one case the community did have an impact in having the location for a project 
changed.  In the case of the Municipal Auditorium, public outrage at the proposed repurposing of 
Congo Square caused the City to locate the structure on two adjacent municipal squares rather 
than causing the loss of historic park space.  This outrage was voiced both in meetings of the 
Auditorium Commission and the City’s Commission-Council when they were considering an 
ordinance to designate Congo Square as the home of the City’s new auditorium.  As a result, 
Mayor O’Keefe proposed acquiring property for use as an auditorium site. This decision was met 
with approval from the business community that was seeking the auditorium and those wishing 
to preserve the Square, but was done with no regard to those who would be displaced as a result.   
 The same lack of consideration is found in the Civic Center and Cultural Center projects, 
where large numbers of low-income persons, mainly minorities, were relocated from areas 
determined to be ‘blighted’ without the benefit of public engagement to determine if the selected 
location was truly best to accomplish the project goals. In the case of public housing, community 
engagement was also not a concern, but HANO did appear to consider the needs of those being 
displaced in furtherance of the projects.  Particularly, HANO would, conceptually, provide 
replacement housing to those low-income individuals displaced from the city’s slums in the 
modern, sanitary housing which would occupy those sites. While this may have been the case, 
there was no provision made to house those displaced while new housing was under 
construction. 
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 In the case of the Interstate Highway System through New Orleans, a requirement of the 
Interstate Highway Act was a public hearing. This hearing was held in 1958 at the New Orleans 
City Council Chambers and during this meeting the State presented its highway plans and 
comments were received. There were individuals rising to speak in opposition at this hearing but 
it seems likely that those concerns were disregarded as the State moved through the approval 
process with federal officials. 
 The final case studied is perhaps the most troubling as far as participation is concerned.  
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were numerous federal regulations in place 
calling for studies, community engagement, and comment periods before a site could be selected 
or a project would be permitted to move forward if federal dollars were to be used.  The State of 
Louisiana, in selecting their MCLNO/VAMC sites technically followed these legally prescribed 
processes; however, they successfully managed to marginalize any opposition to their preferred 
findings. As a result, and via an evaluation of the projects studied in this dissertation, the only 
conclusion that can be reached is that people fighting to preserve a park in 1929, with no formal 
participatory mechanism, were more successful than an organized coalition trying to save a 
community in 2008, where there are legally mandated considerations that must be given.  
 The participation factor cannot be evaluated in terms of its effect on the expropriation 
rate found across the cases studied.  There was no substantive participation or community 
engagement in any of the cases, therefore the effect of meaningful engagement on creating buy-
in for the projects among those being displaced cannot be determined. What is documented, 
however, is City leadership’s position that opposition to one of these projects was seen as being 
an obstructionist to the betterment of the community.  This is illustrated first in HANO’s 
coordination with the press regarding “the grave civic risk being incurred by some scattered 
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instances of unreasonable selfishness on the part of a few owners” within areas identified for 
redevelopment with public housing.
11
 And again in Mayor Morrison’s statement to the 
assembled crowd at the Interstate Highway hearing where he deemed acquisition or property and 
removal of homes as “incidental consequences” to progress in the city.12 
 The final factor to be evaluated is race and ethnicity.  Whether displacement of poor 
African-Americans was a goal of these projects or not, that was the clear end result that can be 
seen across all site-specific projects studied in this dissertation. The exception is in the bridge 
and highway projects where all groups within the New Orleans community – white, African-
American, rich, and poor – were impacted by acquisition of right-of-way, as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  The remaining projects, from the Municipal Auditorium through the 
MCLNO/VAMC Hospitals all imposed a disproportionate impact on African-American 
neighborhoods.  While site-specific demographic data is not available for the Municipal 
Auditorium of Public Housing projects, it is clear, as illustrated in Table 8.3, that all cases 
Table 8.3 – African-Americans as Percentage of Population within Project Footprints13 
Project 
African-Americans as Percentage 
of Total Site Population 
Municipal Auditorium 
Not Available 
(Area selected had highest number of 
African-American children of four areas 
studied) 
Public Housing 
Not Available 
(Sites were densely concentrated 
African-American areas) 
Civic Center 100% 
Cultural Center 80% 
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans 87% (minority) 
Veterans Affairs Medical Center 88% (minority) 
                                                 
11
 Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939, at 13.  Accessed from 
the New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division. 
12
 Official Transcript of Proceedings of the Department of Highways, State of Louisiana: Federal Interstate Highway 
Hearing for all of Jefferson and Orleans Parishes, February 11, 1958, at 23. 
13
 Data summarized from previous chapters; MCLNO/VAMC data from Final Programmatic Environmental 
Assessment for Site Selection: Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) and Louisiana State University Academic 
Medical Center of Louisiana (LSU AMC), November 2008, at 3-65.  Accessed via www.valsemedcenters.com. 
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studied as part of this dissertation were located in predominantly African-American 
communities.  This comparison across cases is fairly simple, and the change over time 
nonexistent. Whether in 1929 or 2008, the presence of African-Americans was a common 
element to all large public projects throughout the research period.  In relation to the use of 
eminent domain within these projects, race and expropriation is difficult to correlate; however, 
this researcher proposes a connection between the two which would exist just below the surface 
of raw population and property transfer data.  
 In the case of the Civic Center, the project with the lowest effective expropriation rate of 
the cases studied, data from HANO indicates that the population of this area was 100% African-
American; however, the names of property owners do not reflect names generally found in the 
African-American community.  For example, the largest individual property owner within the 
area was the Deichmann family, other owners of multiple properties within the site were the 
Locicero family, the Lichtentag family, and Gervais Favrot, Chairman of the City Planning and 
Zoning Commission.
14
  These names, paired with the ownership of multiple pieces of residential 
property within the redevelopment site, begin painting a larger picture indicating that while the 
population may have been 100% African-American, the ownership of the site certainly was not. 
These holdings may have been investment properties or rentals, or may have been purchased due 
to the impending redevelopment in hope of cashing in on the government’s purchase, this cannot 
be known.  What one is left to infer, however, is that regardless of the motivation of ownership 
those being displaced were not the same individuals that were willing to sell their property for 
the development of the Civic Center.  
                                                 
14
 Large Parcel Map with Ownership as of October 8, 1946.  Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, 
New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 412. 
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 While this level of ownership data is not available for the other sites, one would presume 
that due to the social and legal circumstances of the era (Jim Crow, etc.), most low-income 
African-Americans would have been renters of structures owned by whites. These property 
owners would likely have been primarily concerned with compensation for the property and 
rental units rather than the displacement of the poor, minority population inhabiting the 
structures.  This is not to say that landlords were never concerned about their tenants, but this is 
to say that their relationship was, generally, a purely economic one where the owner of the 
property is principally concerned with the return on his investment. 
 Through this cross-case comparison, it can be inferred that there are two distinct elements 
of redevelopment projects which have served to reduce the instances of expropriation during the 
property acquisition phase. The first element, time from site selection to complete property 
acquisition appears to be the single largest factor in the need to exercise eminent domain; 
however, this is the most difficult element to build into a redevelopment project. These large 
timespans were not intentional on the part of the City, and in reality most modern government 
projects would not initiate land acquisition until the project is fully funded and a firm 
construction timeline established. The second element, participation, can be seen as the most 
practical element to reducing instances of expropriation.  By bringing the community together 
early on in a project and allowing the public to have a true voice and ownership of a proposal, 
the government is less likely to experience delays and keep the property acquisition process out 
of the courtroom.  
Race and Redevelopment 
The third common element seen in these cases, prevalence of minorities in project areas 
merits further discussion, and is a matter of concern, not a strategy for reducing the need for 
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expropriation.  Areas with dense minority populations have historically been the areas chosen for 
these large-scale redevelopment projects, particularly during the mid-century Urban Renewal 
era.  This was so wide-spread that historians have deemed Urban Renewal to truly be “negro 
removal.”15 
The disproportionate impact on the African-American community cannot be viewed as a 
matter of chance.  While there is no firm documentation to indicate that these minority 
communities were targeted by redevelopment projects, it is highly unlikely for every major civic 
project to be located in predominantly African-American neighborhoods purely by happenstance. 
Not only would these projects serve to displace, and in come instances eradicate, African-
American communities; these projects, by and large, were to serve the white population of the 
City. In the case of the Cultural Center, the indigenous culture of the Tremé neighborhood was 
destroyed to build an opera house.  At the Civic Center, the neighborhood that served as the 
birthplace of jazz was bulldozed to encourage the expansion of the Central Business District. In 
lower Mid-City, a community was removed to build a modern medical complex that would 
enable the Bio-Medical industry to recruit higher-profile professionals. 
Additionally, as indicated above, the owners of the property within these predominantly 
African-American communities were white, as were adjacent property owners who were likely 
to see their property values improve once ‘slums’ were removed from the community. The goal 
of increased property values is made clear in every project addressed in this document, from the 
Municipal Auditorium through the MCLNO/VAMC hospital projects.  Generally this goal of 
increased valuation is couched in terms of ‘higher assessments’ to bring more revenue to the 
                                                 
15
 Hirsch, A. R. (1993). With or Without Jim Crow: Black Residential Segregation in the United States. Urban 
Policy in Twentieth-Century America, Hirsch, A.R. and Mohl, R.A., eds.  Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 
NJ, at 90 
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municipal coffers or ‘highest and best use’ to indicate that the present owners are not utilizing 
property in a manner that the civic leadership deems appropriate.  
While the site selection for these municipal projects resulted in a disparate impact on the 
African-American community in New Orleans, all official documentation indicates that the 
municipal government was predominantly concerned with the removal of slums from the city.  
Slum clearance was emblematic of the era and certainly there are housing surveys and other 
studies to corroborate the position that these areas were in a very poor state of repair.  
The overlap between slums and low-income African-Americans during the mid-twentieth 
century was substantial. As a general principle, particularly in the American South in this era, 
African-Americans were relegated to declining areas of the community that were being 
abandoned by whites.  This situation was partially attributable to Jim Crow laws, but also 
community standards which served to emphasize segregationist attitudes. As these 
neighborhoods shifted from white to African-American, there was generally an institutionalized 
neglect of these areas which, in turn, produced the poorly maintained ‘slums’ that would later be 
seen as so detrimental to the community.  This situation certainly has to be noted as contributing 
to the disproportionate impact on African-Americans found in every localized case studied as 
part of this research.    
There has been no evidence uncovered, either within the City’s archives or through the 
review of newspaper coverage of these projects, to support the position that the City of New 
Orleans or other entities intentionally targeted African-American communities through these 
redevelopment proposals.  What is clear is that the City targeted areas that could quantifiably be 
identified as ‘slum’ or ‘blighted.’ As previously mentioned, the disproportionate impact on New 
Orleans’s African-American community presents what can best be described as a violent, 
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circular scenario where the most disadvantaged residents of the City occupied the housing in the 
worst condition, which then led to further disadvantage in the form of displacement for 
redevelopment projects and the strongly disparate impact on the African-American community.  
There is also no evidence in the record of the City expressing any particular concern for 
the people being removed from these project sites. This lack of consideration possibly served to 
reinforce the plight of the African-American community at the time because of the limited 
options available for relocation. Additionally the element of property acquisition timelines, as 
discussed previously, also added to the burden of these individuals.  This is clearly illustrated in 
the discussion of the Cultural Center where 80% of eligible residents self-relocated without the 
governmental support to which they were entitled. Primarily renters, these residents chose to 
move as leases expired rather than being placed in the situation of having to quickly find suitable 
housing. It is highly probable that the same situation occurred in projects both prior and 
subsequent to the Cultural Center project.   
Planning and Eminent Domain 
 The relationship between professional planning, site selection for public projects, and the 
exercise of eminent domain in New Orleans during the research period is found to be very close. 
With the rise of modern, professional planning in New Orleans, it became possible for the City to 
bring large proposals to fruition that otherwise may not have been feasible. Certainly, the City of 
New Orleans exercised its authority of expropriation prior to undertaking the Municipal 
Auditorium project and prior to the establishment of the City Planning and Zoning Commission 
in 1923, but moving forward from the first case studied, the projects became larger and more 
complex as time progressed. Funding for these projects became available from multiple levels of 
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government and there had to be a coordinating force behind the ideas to bring them from concept 
to reality. 
 To track the relationship of planning and expropriation, one must refer back to the 
Bartholomew Report which was commissioned by the City Planning and Zoning Commission 
shortly after its creation. Planning, as a professional municipal undertaking, began in New 
Orleans with the creation of the New Orleans City Planning and Zoning Commission in 1923.  
Among the first substantial actions of this Commission was retaining the services of Harland 
Bartholomew and Associates, of St. Louis, Missouri; the Bartholomew Report was the first 
document created by this new commission and served as the foundation of planning in New 
Orleans.   
  Of the cases researched in this dissertation, the origins of four can be traced directly back 
to this Report; Bartholomew recommended the creation of a municipal center, complete with 
new buildings to modernize city services.
16
  Bartholomew proposed this center to focus on 
Orleans Avenue in the Vieux Carré; this report and its recommendations were adopted by the 
Planning and Zoning Commission but were not acted upon.  While the specifics of the proposal 
never came to fruition, the selected locations of the Municipal Auditorium and later the Cultural 
Center were partially attributable to this plan encouraging a government complex centered 
approximately at Orleans and North Rampart Streets.  The Civic Center, eventually located at 
Loyola Avenue and Poydras Street also draws from this initial planning document. While the 
location shifted out of the Vieux Carré, the concept of a new centralized municipal center is 
directly attributable to the Bartholomew Report. 
                                                 
16
 Fields, W. (2004). Urban Landscape Change in New Orleans, LA: The Case of the Lost Neighborhood of Louis 
Armstrong.   Dissertation, University of New Orleans Electronic Theses and Dissertation Collection. 
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A separate element of the initial Bartholomew Report, entitled Preliminary Report on a 
System of Major Streets, provided an analysis of road conditions and the need to improve traffic 
flow through the city. This first major streets plan for the city, while not as ambitious as its 
successors, called for the designation and creation of major arterial roads to effectively and 
efficiently move people to and from the Central Business District.
17
  At this point in the 
development of transportation planning in New Orleans, Bartholomew and the City Planning and 
Zoning Commission were primarily concerned with creating a system of streets in the city that 
would allow for the free flow of traffic.  In the Preliminary Report, Bartholomew lamented the 
piecemeal and haphazard development of the city, and resultant varying street widths, jogs, and 
dead ends.  These odd configurations in the street grid were caused by the historic development 
pattern of the city, reflecting New Orleans’s growth across antiquated plantation and municipal 
boundaries.  Later this Preliminary Report would be revised into the City’s Major Streets Plan 
which became the baseline planning document for the State Highway Department’s Interstate 
Highway route.   
 Public housing in New Orleans combined elements of social policy planning with 
physical planning’s blossoming attraction to slum clearance and urban redevelopment.  Socially, 
local housing advocates partnered with the Institute of Social and Religious Research in 1925 to 
compile the first housing conditions survey of poor African-American neighborhoods in New 
Orleans. These private organizations commissioned proposals for private housing developments 
to aid these families, but the onset of the Great Depression ended the possibility of finding 
private donors to fund these developments. Government recognition of the need for improved 
housing followed these private initiatives, in 1937 the Louisiana Legislature enabled the 
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 Harland Bartholomew & Associates, (1926).  A Preliminary Report on a System of Major Streets, New Orleans, 
Louisiana.  Accessed through the Historic New Orleans Collection, Williams Research Center. 
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formation of local housing authorities later that year Congress passed the Wagner-Steagall 
Housing Act which provided funding for local entities to redevelop slum areas with modern, 
sanitary housing.  
 By the 1940s urban redevelopment became known as Urban Renewal, seeking to remove 
often arbitrarily-defined “slums” from the cityscape, to be replaced by the amenities of ‘modern’ 
life. The Civic Center removed a functional, living, but poor neighborhood from the Central 
Business District to clear a path for commercial development and to provide a centralized home 
for municipal government. The Cultural Center, similarly, cleared a swath of Tremé to provide 
space for the construction of a centralized home for theatre, opera, and museums; this resulted in 
the destruction of culturally significant space to create an island of bourgeois taste which would 
not reflect the neighborhood on which the project was imposed. 
 In the spirit of mid-century Urban Renewal, the MCLNO/VAMC project is being 
constructed atop what was a neighborhood just a few short years ago.  In this instance, there is no 
available information which connects the selection of this site to any larger planning process. 
What the evidence reveals, however, is that the planning was undertaken solely by Louisiana 
State University to serve their institutional interests and potential impacts on the community and 
surrounding neighborhoods were only considered during the federally mandated NEPA and 
NHPA reviews, which were conducted after the sites had been chosen. 
 To clarify, this author is not arguing that the rise of professional planning resulted in an 
increase in projects where eminent domain was utilized; rather, the assertion is that professional 
planning made large-scale projects feasible where previously the government would have 
focused on constructing a single building rather than large projects calling for the redevelopment 
of many acres.  It is undeniable that the ability of the various levels of government to take on 
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such projects has led to increased property acquisitions and, likely, an increase in the exercise of 
eminent domain to complete these acquisitions.  
The Effect of Kelo 
 Following the U. S. Supreme Court’s Kelo decision in 2005, the State of Louisiana, along 
with numerous other states quickly sought to modify takings enabled under their state 
constitutions to prohibit the exercise of eminent domain for economic development purposes. 
This change was successfully accomplished by two separate constitutional amendments placed 
before voters in September, 2006 which restricted the use of eminent domain to a more narrowly 
tailored conception of ‘public use.’ While the language of the amendment remained fairly vague 
(see Appendix 8.1 for full text), it clearly indicated that “[n]either economic development, 
enhancement of tax revenue, or any incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in 
determining whether the taking or damaging of property is for a public use.”18 This constitutional 
change translated into a shift in the scrutiny of eminent domain proceedings from the ‘just 
compensation’ element of the Takings Clause to an analysis of whether a use is ‘public’ enough 
to qualify for use of the government’s expropriation authority. 
 Prior to this Kelo-responsive legislation, challenges to governmental expropriation 
revolved solely around the compensation due to a property owner. As can be seen in all cases 
studied, from the Municipal Auditorium through the MCLNO/VAMC hospitals, the largest point 
of contention in the governmental acquisition of property had to do with the dollar amount that a 
property owner should reasonably expect from the government due to displacement.  In the 
media coverage of the takings studied between 1929 and 2005, not once was there a legal 
challenge to either the purpose or public nature of the taking, the conflict was purely one of 
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 Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 851 of the 2006 Regular Session, Page 2.  See appendix 8.1 for full text of Act 
851. 
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financial compensation for loss. With respect to the MCLNO/VAMC project, there is only one 
challenge to expropriation that was covered by the press where the potential ‘public purpose’ of 
the taking was at issue, and even then the question was not one of whether a medical use 
constitutes a taking, but rather that the proposed use of that particular portion of land was set as 
open space for future expansion and not proposed as immediate, active use as part of the medical 
complex.
19
   
 Notable in the MCLNO/VAMC project is that not a single challenge was made to the 
project under the state constitution’s prohibition on consideration of economic development or 
enhancement of tax revenue.  It is impossible to argue that a public hospital, generally, does not 
comply with the requirement that the result of expropriation be a “public building in which 
publicly funded services are administered, rendered, or provided.”20 However, due to the facts 
surrounding the site selection process, the possibility of a successful challenge could have been 
raised regarding the constitutionality of site selection under the aforementioned prohibition on 
consideration of economic development implications.  
There was no need for the project to be located at the site ultimately selected, and based 
on the initial planning documents contracted by LSU and MCLNO, the reason this area was 
targeted was to redevelop underutilized and generally blighted property which would have 
otherwise presented a barrier to the creation of a cohesive medical district. Further, official 
records of the site proposal process from the Regional Planning Commission consistently tout 
the economic development implications of the joint MCLNO/VAMC venture and the RPC 
explicitly termed the project as “THE critical economic development project for the City of New 
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Orleans”21 and invoked President Carter’s Executive Order 12072 which requires “serious 
consideration” be given to potential improvements to the economic conditions of an area in the 
federal facility site selection process.
22
  
 The economic development considerations of the MCLNO/VAMC project 
notwithstanding, all projects studied as part of this dissertation would qualify as valid ‘public 
purposes’ under the adopted language of Act 851. The Legislature’s attempt to define what 
constitutes a ‘public use’ added, in part, the following language to the Louisiana Constitution: 
(b) Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or more 
of the following objectives and uses: 
(i) Public buildings in which publicly funded services are 
administered, rendered, or provided. 
(ii) Roads, bridges, waterways, access to public waters and 
lands, and other public transportation, access, and 
navigational systems available to the general public. 
(iii)  Drainage, flood control, levees, coastal and navigational 
protection and reclamation for the benefit of the public 
generally. 
(iv)   Parks, convention centers, museums, historical buildings 
and recreational facilities generally open to the public. 
(c)  The removal of a threat to public health or safety caused by the 
existing use or disuse of the property. 
Under this language, every project studied during the research period would defeat comply with 
modern constitutional requirements. This is notable due to the fact that these restrictions were 
supposed to provide additional protection to property owners from governmental actions.   The 
language of the Act is even so broad as to encompass convention centers, which was part of the 
proposed use at issue in the controversial Kelo decision
23
 and which constitute a quasi-publicly 
accessible use at best.  When completed, even under governmental ownership, the general public 
                                                 
21
 Regional Planning Commission (2007). Rebuild, Redevelop, Renew, In Response To: Expression of Interest 
Regarding Land Assembly for the Veterans Affairs Hospital, at 1. Accessed via the Regional Planning Commission. 
22
 Ibid, at 2, quoting Executive Order 12072. 
23
 It is important to note that the convention center was an element of the issue at hand in the Kelo decision, it was 
not the only factor. The case hinged on the government’s ability to expropriate property from one individual and 
turn it over to another under the auspices of economic development where the general public would see no actual 
use of the facility. 
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will not normally see the interior or such a facility and entry would be restricted to ticket-holders 
and conventioneers. 
Research Goals 
As set forth in Chapter 1, the purpose of performing a case study of eminent domain in 
New Orleans is two-fold.  The first goal of this research is to create a chronicle of eminent 
domain utilization in New Orleans from 1929 through 2011.  This time period has been 
established in order to incorporate the development of public housing, urban renewal, and the 
City’s recovery from Hurricane Katrina.   The second and primary purpose of this research is to 
better understand the history of eminent domain in New Orleans.  By better understanding the 
past uses of eminent domain and the policies that drove the exercise of this power, researchers 
and planning practitioners will be better informed in making decisions that will impact the 
rebuilding and future of New Orleans.  While this dissertation does not provide a complete 
inventory of properties expropriated or projects undertaken through the entire research period, it 
does offer a comprehensive perspective on the priorities and goals of governmental actors at all 
levels during the research period and offers insight into the history and practice of takings within 
the context of New Orleans.  
Through better understanding the history and past applications of eminent domain, 
planners, governmental leaders, and the general public can be better informed of the strategies 
which have been and can be implemented both in exercising this authority and avoiding the 
application of this authority.  Eminent domain will always be a necessary tool in the overall 
governmental toolbox because without it a single individual would be able to halt what may be a 
truly needed government project. It is impossible to eliminate the possibility of exercising this 
authority altogether without the risk of bringing all public projects to a standstill. What the 
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government can do is better communicate with the public to illustrate the need of a project and 
ensure that the site selection process is transparent and all interested parties have been brought to 
the table prior to decision-making.  
In the six individual cases studied within this dissertation, not a single one revealed true 
elements of public participation, particularly in the determination of sites. The location of the 
Municipal Auditorium was selected to save an adjacent park based on public pressure; bridges 
and highways were located based on engineering studies that subjectively determined the best 
locations for these improvements; public housing, the Civic Center and the Cultural Center were 
located in neighborhoods that civic leaders believed were not being used to their potential; and 
the MCLNO/VAMC project was sited, in part, to fuel the ego of hospital administrators that 
wanted a Canal Street address rather than a Tulane Avenue address.  
In many of these projects there was no formal mechanism for seeking public input, but 
the most troubling finding of this dissertation, as it relates to the participatory elements of site 
selection, is this: the MCLNO/VAMC hospital project had to follow clearly defined federal 
criteria as to participation in site selection in order to utilize federal dollars for the projects. 
These criteria were met with nominal compliance but the goals of such standards were 
essentially ignored. The hospital administrators created site selection criteria that could only 
result in one possible location and, much like the state highway department with respect to the 
Interstate Highway System in 1958, the proposed site was presented to local officials with the 
message of ‘agree or we will go elsewhere.’  
With respect to the application of eminent domain within the context of these projects, 
the restraint shown by governmental actors over the course of the research period was 
remarkable. In every case the government made a concerted effort to acquire the necessary 
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property through negotiated purchase rather than expropriation.  As previously stated, the use of 
eminent domain will always be necessary in the property acquisition phase of projects, even if 
only as a Sword of Damocles to compel good-faith negotiations based on the appraised value of 
property.  
The evolution of eminent domain as a tool within the context of New Orleans, and 
Louisiana more generally, shows that the government, while ostensibly taking steps to protect 
private property from expropriation, has actually made the exercise of this power easier and 
more convenient for itself. Through the creation of the state’s ‘quick-take’ authority, state 
agencies can seize title to property by simply depositing its appraised value with the court.  If the 
now-former property owner wants to contest the value of the property or the legitimacy of the 
expropriation they are legally able to do so but are unable to stop the government from taking 
control of the property and doing with it as they wish while the wheels of justice slowly turn.  
This researcher believes that the ‘quick-take’ authority of the state is the direct cause for 
the substantially higher rate of expropriations found in the MCLNO/VAMC project than in 
previous undertakings.  Prior to the creation of the ‘quick-take’ authority a government entity 
would file an expropriation action with the courts and have to wait for a final result in the case 
before obtaining title to the necessary property. Certainly from the government’s perspective, 
and to an extent the public’s perspective, there are substantial benefits in not having to wait for 
these legal cases to conclude, which can take years.  With this authority in place there is no 
motivation on the government’s part to exhaust all negotiations with a property owner, aside 
from the unpopularity of actually seeing the word “expropriation” in a headline. 
In all, the findings of this dissertation reveal two truths about eminent domain in New 
Orleans over the course of the research period: 1) the use of the power has always been 
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politically unpopular and restricted to exercise when there were no other options to complete 
property acquisitions; and 2) progress, in terms of the legal process and participatory 
requirements prior to the exercise of eminent domain, has resulted in no more protection to the 
average property owner than was available in 1929 when the site was selected for the Municipal 
Auditorium.  Eighty-two years of public projects and expanding the legal protections of 
communities and property from those projects have resulted in no change whatsoever in the 
ability of the government to arbitrarily select a site for whatever they deem important at a given 
moment.  In Chapter 1, I asserted that “the United States Supreme Court’s split-opinion in the 
case of Kelo [truly brought] to light the breadth of eminent domain powers, and the harsh reality 
that the only thing standing between the homes of the populace and a shiny new convention 
center was the restraint of local governments;” the unfortunate result of the research undertaken 
for this dissertation is that I did not realize how correct I was. 
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Appendix 1.1 – New Orleans, Louisiana Urban Renewal Areas (Undated).1 
 
                                                 
1
 New Orleans Urban Renewal Areas map, undated, prepared by the City Planning Commission.  Accessed 
from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 
419. 
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Appendix 1.2 – Institutional Review Board Letter of Exemption 
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Appendix 2.1 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Municipal Auditorium Site1 
 
Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
135 
1 703 St. Claude St.  8/7/1934 X  
2 
709-13 St. Claude St., 
1214 Orleans St. 
 11/21/1928 X  
A or 12 1218-20 Orleans St. $13,650 11/9/1928   
B 1217 St. Peter St.     
C 1221 St. Peter St     
5 
1225 St. Peter St., 
1222 Orleans St. 
$5,500 2/27/1930 X  
6 1228 Orleans St. $5,000 11/21/1928   
B or 8 
1233 St. Peter St.,  
706 N Liberty St. 
$5,775    
Undesignated 1230-34 Orleans St.  12/5/1928   
Undesignated 1229 St. Peter St.  12/5/1928   
       
Square 
136 
1 or 6 733 St. Claude St. $35,000 11/13/1928   
2 or 7 727-29 St. Claude St.     
3 or 8 723-25 St Claude St. $10,000 2/2/1929   
4 
717-19 St Claude St. 
1203-07 Orleans St. 
$14,500 11/28/1928   
5 or 10 1215-17 Orleans St. $7,350 12/11/1928   
6 1219-21 Orleans St.  8/14/1929   
7 1223-25 Orleans St.  12/5/1928   
8 or 12 1227-29 Orleans St. $6,900 1/22/1928   
9 or 13 1233-35 Orleans St. $9,000 12/19/1928 X  
10 
726-30 N Liberty St.,  
1232-34 St. Ann St. 
 11/28/1928   
11 or 3 1226-28 St. Ann St. $6,300 12/5/1928   
12 or 2 1222-24 St. Ann St. $7,350 11/27/1928   
13 or 4 1218-20 St. Ann St. $6,500 11/14/1928   
14 1214-16 St. Ann St.  11/22/1928   
 
                                                 
1
 Table 2.2 is the result of combining data from two sources: 1) Written offers for the purchase of real 
property accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – Mayor Arthur 
J. O’Keefe, Box 1, and an internal City memorandum outlining the dates of acquisition of individual 
parcels, accessed from the Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City 
of New Orleans – Municipal Auditorium file. 
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Appendix 4.1 - Times-Picayune Illustration of the Civic Center and other public 
improvements.
1
 
 
1. New City Hall 
2. Municipal Center building with plaza 
3. Central Fire Station 
4. Central Fire Alarm 
5. Traffic offices – park and parking 
6. Veterans Administration Hospital Nurses’ Home 
7. L.S.U Medical Center 
8. V.A. Hospital 
9. Union Station Terminal 
10. downtown post office 
11. Charity Hospital Nurses’ Home 
12. Charity Hospital 
13. Tulane Medical Center 
 
                                                 
1
 Times-Picayune, September 29, 1946, accessed via www.newsbank.com, at 2. 
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Appendix 4.2 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Civic Center Site1 
 
Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
304 
A, B, C, D  Exchange 11/19/1948   
6  $18,750 6/3/1949  ■ 
5  $15,000 11/24/1948  † 
4  $36,600 12/6/1948   
1, 2, 3      
A   10/6/1949   
3, 7  $17,275 3/8/1950   
Undesignated   10/6/1949   
16  $15,000 6/3/1949   
4 319-21 S. Saratoga St. $9,500 8/23/1949   
1, 2, 2, 3  $85,000 12/30/1949   
2, 3, 4, 24  $27,500 7/21/1950   
11, 25 410-16 Loyola St.  5/10/1949   
10  $5,050 2/14/1949   
8 426-28 Loyola St.  4/28/1949   
9 422-24 Loyola St.  4/28/1949   
5, 6 436-42 Loyola St. $16,120 7/10/1950 X  
11 444-46 Loyola St. Exchange 11/19/1948   
       
Square 
305 
Undesignated 1227-33 Poydras St. $29,900 1/14/1953   
A  $9,700 5/6/1949   
B, 273, 275, 
C, 271, 269 
1221 Poydras St.  9/14/1954   
265, 267  $36,600 12/6/1948   
A, B  $10,700 8/25/1948   
Y 433-35 S. Saratoga St. $13,600 5/9/1949 X  
X, N, O 
417-19 S. Saratoga St. 
421-23 S. Saratoga St. 
$44,990 12/6/1948  ♠ 
17   8/25/1948  ♣ 
18, 19   12/6/1948   
20 1214-16 Perdido St.  4/28/1949   
4 1218-20 Perdido St.     
2 
500-02 Loyola St. 
1232 Perdido St. 
    
3 504-06 Loyola St. $15,100 10/31/1951  ‡ 
24   4/28/1947   
A, B  $8,000 9/19/1949   
18, 19  Exchange 8/24/1953   
17  $12,480 3/4/1955 X  
16  $15,500 2/21/1955 X  
15 534 Loyola St. $4,800 5/3/1949   
A, B, 31 
538 Loyola St. 
540 Loyola St. 
$10,890 10/12/1949   
                                                 
1
 City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property 
Files for indicated Squares. 
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
332 
1, 2, 3, 6 
1329-31 Perdido St. 
544-48 S. Liberty St. 
$57,500 4/13/1955 X  
3  $13,500 5/6/1949   
4  $13,750 7/6/1949   
5  $14,350 4/18/1950   
6-A, 3 
1315-17 Poydras St. 
539-41 Loyola St. 
$52,100 4/28/1949   
Undesignated 1311-13 Poydras St Exchange 5/31/1954   
1, 2  $13,600 11/22/1949   
A 535-37 Loyola St. $18,750 6/3/1949  ■ 
B 533 Loyola St. $16,100 8/25/1948  ♣ 
8 529 Loyola St. $4,150 6/21/1949   
9, 10 523-25 Loyola St. $15,100 10/31/1951  ‡ 
11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16 
 
Exchange 
(OPSB) 
7/22/1949   
N 1318 Perdido St. $6,000 6/15/1949   
17 1320 Perdido St. $3,750 6/22/1949   
16 1324-26 Perdido St. $4,750 4/27/1949   
14, 15   5/10/1949   
A  $1,250 2/4/1955 X  
O  Exchange 6/26/1951   
11, 12 
520 S. Liberty St. 
524 S. Liberty St. 
Exchange 
+ $6,250 
5/31/1954   
10 516-18 S. Liberty St. Exchange 5/13/1949  ♦ 
9 530 S. Liberty St. $6,915 5/31/1949   
8 or 33,         
7 or 34 
534 S. Liberty St. 
538 S. Liberty St. 
$14,000 9/29/1950   
6   4/13/1955   
       
Square 
333 
1, A, B, 30  $31,550 3/29/1950   
7, 8   8/10/1948   
5, 6, A  $31,090 3/10/1950   
1 445 Loyola St.  8/10/1948   
2  $6,800 6/17/1949   
3, A 433 Loyola St. 15,025 6/7/1949   
C  $15,000 11/24/1948  † 
D, 15  $11,700 8/20/1948   
Z 415-17 Loyola St.  8/20/1948  ^ 
D 1300 Gravier St. $13,000 10/26/1948   
U, V, W,     
X, Y, 1, 2,   
3, 4, A 
1304 Gravier St. 
1306-12 Gravier St. 
1314-20 Gravier St. 
1322-30 Gravier St. 
416 S. Liberty St. 
$57,500 8/20/1948  ^ 
12-B, 13  $16,850 8/20/1948   
Undesignated  $6,150 5/23/1949   
Undesignated   8/20/1948   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
333 
(cont.) 
27  $16,100 8/25/1948  ♣ 
Undesignated  $5,775 2/16/1950   
29   5/10/1949   
       
Square 
340 
23, 24, 25 1427-29 Perdido St. $20,000 6/27/1949   
26  $5,600 8/30/1948   
27  $6,250 8/9/1948   
28  $6,000 8/5/1948   
Undesignated 1405-07 Perdido St. $4,800 8/3/1948   
Undesignated 1409-11 Perdido St. $7,250 8/3/1948   
Undesignated  $3,300 7/27/1948   
Undesignated 447-49 S.Liberty St. $3,350 5/31/1949   
2 445 S. Liberty St. $5,500 8/18/1948   
3 441 S. Liberty St.  8/10/1948   
4  $4,000 7/29/1948   
5 431-33 S. Liberty St.  5/10/1949   
6   5/10/1949   
7   5/10/1949   
8, 9 417-21 S. Liberty St.  5/10/1949   
10  $44,900 12/6/1948  ♠ 
11 1404-06 Gravier St.  8/10/1948   
12  $7,650 9/7/1949   
13, 20  $8,000 7/27/1948   
14 1418 Gravier St. $4,200 7/29/1948   
Undesignated  $9,000 10/22/1948   
16, 17  $13,000 5/26/1950   
18 420 LaSalle St.  5/10/1949   
19  $4,500 8/10/1948   
20, 21, pt. 22  $8,800 7/27/1948   
Undesignated  $3,500 5/24/1949   
       
Square 
341 
1  $18,000 4/4/1953   
2, 23 1425-27 Poydras St. $16,500 10/19/1949   
4, A 
1417-19 Poydras St. 
1400-08 Perdido St. 
$41,250 9/14/1954   
5, 
Undesignated 
 
Exchange 
+ $8,250  
4/15/1954   
1 1401 Poydras St.  11/19/1952   
1, 2, 19, 20  $30,000 4/6/1950   
X  $11,500 9/23/1953   
B, C, D, E  $12,500 5/3/1949   
4 or 19  $5,000 6/1/1949   
3 1418 Perdido St.  5/25/1949   
1, 2  $50,500 12/7/1950 X ● 
Undesignated  $4,900 11/18/1949   
Undesignated  $8,000 5/3/1949   
3, 4, 8 524-34 LaSalle St.  5/13/1949   
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 Appendix 5.1 – Proposed Improvements under the Bartholomew Major Streets Plan (1926)1 
 
1) Immediate widening of Dryades Street from Canal Street to Howard Avenue. 
 
2) Establishment of a building line upon Danneel and Dryades Streets above St. Andrew 
Street. 
 
3) Immediate widening of S. Rampart Street from Tulane Avenue to Calliope Street. 
 
4) Immediate widening of N. Peters and Decatur Streets below Canal Street. 
 
5) Connection of Decatur and Chartres Streets below Almonaster Avenue. 
 
6) Widening and connection of Chartres Street to Poland Avenue. 
 
7) Development of Poydras and Howard Avenues. 
 
8) Connection of Melpomene and Calliope Streets. 
 
9) Widening of Calliope Street from S. Rampart Street to S. Peters Street. 
 
10) Connection of Howard and Washington Avenues near S. Jefferson Davis Parkway. 
 
11) Connection of Palmetto Street and Metairie Road at the Orleans-Jefferson Parish Line. 
 
12) Widening of Metairie Road. 
 
13) Connection of Canal Street with Canal Boulevard. 
 
14) Connection of Fontainebleau Street to S. Claiborne Avenue. 
 
15) Widening of Rousseau and Tchoupitoulas Streets above Felicity Street. 
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Appendix 5.2 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Mississippi River Bridge and 
Pontchartrain Expressway Right-of-Way.
1
 
 
Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Algiers / West Bank  
Square 
280 
21 419 Bringier St.  $3,150 7/28/1955   
12 415-17 Bringier St. $10,500 4/28/1955   
3 or D 423-25 Bringier St. $16,500 9/6/1955 X  
4 427 Bringier St. $6,600 6/20/1955 X  
5, 6 441 Bringier St. $10,850 12/7/1955 X  
16 1721 Nunez St. $3,700 6/10/1955   
3, hf. 2 210 Monroe St. $11,000 8/16/1955   
pt. 1 200-02 Monroe St. $7,000 3/16/1956   
1, hf. 2  $10,000 8/5/1955 X  
       
Square 
275 
1,2 400 Bringier St 
$176,500 3/1/1982   
1 1600 Teche St 
2 1606 Teche St. 
pt. 8 1601-03 Nunez St. 
3 410 Bringier St. $91,000 6/26/1981 X  
4 414 Bringier St $31,300 7/28/1981   
5 416-18 Bringier St. $36,000 10/21/1981 X  
6 420 Bringier St. $66,000 12/3/1981   
7 422-24 Bringier St. 
$110,000 7/6/1981   8 426 Bringier St. 
9, 10 1627-41 Nunez St. 
12  $25,000 7/27/1981   
3 1610 Teche St. $52,300 7/24/1981   
4, 5 1620 Teche St. $45,000 10/6/1981   
6 411 Lawrence St. $66,500 2/11/1983 X  
7 417-19 Lawrence St. $29,500 4/30/1981   
F 421-23 Lawrence St. $32,900 3/10/1981   
9B, 10B 1607 Nunez St. $33,000 7/1/1982   
11 1615 Nunez St. $54,500 7/28/1981   
12 1617 Nunez St. $34,000 12/14/1981   
       
Square 
276 
8-A, 9 1621-23 Teche St. $53,000 4/9/1980   
18  $38,600 2/23/1981   
19  $8,400 1/23/1980   
20 1609-11 Teche St. $20,500 8/9/1979   
21 1605-07 Teche St. $47,700 10/2/1979   
pt. 22 1601-03 Teche St. $14,000 10/12/1979 X  
pt. 22 321-23 Lawrence St. $13,000 9/21/1979   
23, 24 315-17 Lawrence St. $34,200 1/27/1981   
       
Square 
281 
A, B  $15,000 7/1/1955 X  
C, D 1719-23 Hermosa St. $15,000 6/14/1955   
                                                 
1
 City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property 
Files for indicated Squares. 
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
281 
(cont) 
1, 2 1714-16 Nunez St. $10,500 6/7/1955   
3, 4 1700 Nunez St. $13,000 6/20/1955   
5 519 Bringier St. $5,750 4/28/1955 X  
6 521-23 Bringier St $4,620 5/9/1955 X  
7  $1,150 3/4/1955   
8 525 Bringier St. $9,000 3/25/1955   
9 1701 Hermosa St. $28,500 5/11/1982   
10 1705-07 Hermosa St. $6,600 6/16/1955   
11  $1,600 5/31/1955 X  
12 1715 Hermosa St. $1,000 5/17/1955   
       
Square 
274 
1, 2 538-40 Bringier St. $105,600 8/10/1981 X  
3 530 Bringier St. 
$43,000 7/7/1981   
4 528 Bringier St. 
5 526 Bringier St. $24,500 10/10/1980   
6 522-24 Bringier St. $32,200 10/21/1981   
7 516-18 Bringier St. $26,000 6/17/1981   
8 508 Bringier St. $25,500 7/6/1981   
9 506 Bringier St. $32,000 7/23/1981   
10 500-02 Bringier St. $87,500 3/10/1982   
14, pt. 3 1626 Nunez St. $21,800 1/22/1982   
A, B 1600 Nunez St. $63,000 8/31/1982   
C 613 Lawrence St. $21,000 12/14/1981   
D 615 Lawrence St. $4,500 9/19/1981   
N 619 Lawrence St.     
H 625 Lawrence St. $29,500 12/18/1981   
D 629 Lawrence St. $6,400 10/29/1982 X  
3  $7,000 9/20/1982   
2  $6,000 8/11/1981 X  
1  $113,100 3/10/1982   
4B, 5B  $53,000 7/20/1982   
6  $75,000 6/26/1981 X  
       
Square 
270 
1, 2 931 Lawrence St. $46,000 11/30/1981   
3, 4 927 Lawrence St. $33,000 7/10/1981   
5, 6 917 Lawrence St. $52,500 10/19/1981   
7, 8 911 Lawrence St. $34,150 2/2/1982   
9, 10 901 Lawrence St. $42,000 5/28/1981   
11, 12 900 Bringier St. $27,500 6/25/1981 X  
13, 14 908 Bringier St. $46,000 8/27/1981   
15, 16 918 Bringier St. $29,500 9/25/1981   
17, 18 922 Bringier St. $46,000 8/20/1981   
19, 20 928 Bringier St. $33,500 4/23/1981   
       
Square 
271-A 
1  $37,500 1/12/1987   
       
Square 
282 
1 1700 Hermosa St. $26,500 4/2/1982 X  
2 1704-06 Hermosa St. $37,500 3/24/1982   
3, 4 1714 Hermosa St. $17,000 2/16/1955   
5, 6 1720 Hermosa St. $13,300 4/29/1955   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
282 
(cont.) 
7-A 1722-24 Hermosa St.     
pt. 8, 9, 10, 
12, 13, 16 
 $100,000 8/17/1956   
17, 20, 21-A, 
21-B 
 $13,000 2/2/1955   
24, 25 636 Magellan St. $20,000 6/13/1955   
24  $1,500 7/12/1955   
7, 8 1815 Evergreen St. $14,050 10/18/1955 X  
pt. 3, 4, 5, 6 1813 Evergreen St. $22,500 3/8/1956 X  
G 1801 Evergreen St.     
22, 23 701-03 Bringier St. $11,300 9/1/1955   
23, 26  $14,400 6/20/1955 X  
18  $3,300 4/4/1955 X  
14, 15  $15,350 5/23/1955   
11  $7,500 5/23/1955   
       
Square 
285-A 
A, B 1725 Bodenger St. $40,050 8/25/1981   
1, 2 1801 Bodenger St. $53,500 4/20/1981   
3, 4 1807 Bodenger St. $15,500 10/23/1955   
5, 6 1811 Bodenger St. $15,250 2/10/1956 X  
7, 8 1815 Bodenger St. $17,000 1/9/1956 X  
       
Square 
285-B 
C, D 1720 Bodenger St. $35,200 6/18/1981   
pt. 7, 8, 9, 10 1814 Bodenger St. $31,664 9/30/1957   
1, 2, 3, 4  $18,750 2/6/1956 X  
5, 6  $12,000 3/5/1956   
       
Square 
270-A 
21, 22 1718 Bodenger St. $31,666 5/24/1983   
19, 20 1712 Bodenger St. $40,750 6/5/1981   
17, 18 1708 Bodenger St. $34,000 4/24/1981   
15, 16 1706 Bodenger St. $46,000 6/1/1981   
13, 14 1702 Bodenger St. $48,500 3/18/1981   
11, 12 1622 Bodenger St. $64,000 3/10/1988   
9, 10 1618 Bodenger St. $123,000 1/30/1987   
       
Square 
A  
(284A) 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
pt. 6 
1806 Evergreen St. $27,810 12/1/1954   
7, 8 1814 Evergreen St. $9,850 6/10/1955   
       
Square 
C 
1, 2 1600 Hermosa St. $62,500 5/11/1981   
3, 4  $61,500 5/26/1981   
5, 6 1626 Hermosa St. $45,500 2/4/1982   
7, 8 1630-32 Hermosa St. $40,000 1/18/1982   
10 616 Bringier St. $21,700 10/8/1981   
11 618 Bringier St. $31,500 7/19/1982   
14, 15 620 Bringier St. $52,000 7/28/1981   
18 622 Bringier St. $22,500 6/18/1981   
19 624 Bringier St. $33,000 11/17/1981   
22 628 Bringier St. $35,300 8/25/1981   
23, 26 630-32 Bringier St. $30,000 6/17/1981   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
C 
(cont.) 
12, 13 831 Lawrence St. $55,000 7/20/1981   
16, pt. 17 833 Lawrence St. $11,300 1/22/1982   
pt. 17, 20 835 Lawrence St. $16,500 1/22/1982   
21, 24, 25 845-47 Lawrence St. $71,000 3/24/1982   
       
Square 
7A 
C 1717 Le Boeuf St. $10,300 3/16/1955   
       
Square 
7B 
1-B  $13,000 12/4/1981 X  
2  $3,125 5/10/1956   
3-4-5  $5,200 5/26/1955   
pt. 1  $700 8/6/1956   
       
Square 
8A 
8, 9 1629 Whitney Ave. $7,000 4/11/1955   
10, 11 1635 Whitney Ave. $8,900 3/3/1955   
12, 13 1641 Whitney Ave.     
14 1645 Whitney Ave. $4,445 1/24/1957   
       
Square 
8B 
7  $22,000 12/7/1981   
       
Square 
59 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6      
7, 8 1719 Sumner St. $56,500 12/27/1985 X  
9, 10 1721 Sumner St. $45,600 12/11/1981   
11, 12 1725 Sumner St. $42,600 5/4/1982   
13 1727 Sumner St. $28,000 2/8/1982   
14, 15, 16, 17, 
pt. 18 
 $58,750 8/17/1982 X  
pt. 18, pt. 19,    
pt. 20 
 $750 12/5/1955 X  
pt. 20  $42,000 3/2/1982   
rear 21  $630 8/28/1956 X  
22, 23 1740 Sumner St. $4,200 7/23/1956   
24, 25 1744 Sumner St. $4,200 6/20/1955   
pt. 29  $750 3/23/1955   
pt. 27  $100 5/30/1985   
19, 20, pt. 21  $9,000 11/22/1982 X  
pt. 21  $3,150 11/22/1982 X  
26, 27, 28  $2,250 3/4/1955   
30, 31  $1,650 8/24/1955   
32, 33  $1,675 10/17/1955   
34  $7,000 5/26/1955   
35, 36  $1,500 8/9/1955 X  
37, 38  $7,801 8/29/1955   
39, 40, 41, 42  $6,808 9/6/1955 X  
43, 44, 45, 46  $5,972 2/2/1956 X  
Lower Garden District / Central Business District  
Square 
46 
A  $2,100 8/18/1955 X  
1, 2 
1234-36, 1238 
Tchoupitoulas St. 
$18,100 10/18/1955   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
46 
(cont.) 
5  $12,480 8/8/1955   
3, 4, 6, 7, 14, 
15, 16, D 
 $132,000 11/18/1955 
(Part property 
acquisition, 
part perpetual 
servitude for 
air rights) 
 
Undesignated, 
Undesignated, 
8 
 $182,000 11/19/1982 X  
       
Square 
70A 
pt. A-1  $1,165 6/28/1982 X  
       
Square 
71 
1-B  $29,133 12/18/1981   
1-A  $48,300 1/26/1983   
30  $49,500 7/13/1982   
6, 7, 8  $62,400 10/4/1982   
1, A, B, C, D, 
E, F, G, 2, 3, 
4, 5 
 $1,135,320 5/11/1982 X  
A  $145,000 8/12/1982   
pt. B, pt. C  $150 9/6/1955   
A  $7,150 1/26/1956   
3  $7,200 4/28/1955 X  
1, 2  $24,600 3/19/1956   
C, D  $16,000 9/15/1955 X  
pt. D  $16,000 4/19/1960   
2  $21,137 9/30/1982 X  
       
Square 
72 
Undesignated  $135,000 11/17/1955   
 1, 2, 3, 4, 2, 3  $470,482 9/30/1982 X  
 3, 2  $40,000 3/23/1955   
 pt. 1, pt. 2  $55,441 8/30/1983   
 pt. 1, pt. 2, B  $46,614 2/2/1987   
 A, 11, 12  $6,690 8/7/1987   
 20  $46,000 7/13/1982   
 1, 2, C  $744,400 6/28/1982 X  
 B  $16,520 5/26/1982   
 3  $8,200 7/5/1956 X  
 pt. 23  $6,000 11/23/1956   
 4  $2,700 3/24/1955   
 2  $11,650 5/31/1955   
       
Square 
119 
6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 
11, 12, 13 
 $354,420 2/1/1983 X  
14, 15, 18, 19  $112,466 8/11/1982 X  
16, 17  $95,768 12/22/1982   
20  $19,757 6/14/1982   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
138 
A, B, C, D, 2  $275,000 10/9/1955   
C, 2  $28,000 3/12/1955   
1A 1129 Constance St. $15,500 5/11/1955   
pts. 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7 
 $44,861 6/29/1983   
15-1 or A  $1,146,230 11/24/1982 X  
       
Square 
139 
 
2A  $95,029 11/29/1982 X  
A, B  $33,350 3/12/1956   
rear C, rear D, 
8, 9 
 $357,000 6/28/1982 X  
front C, front 
D 
 $16,250 1/5/1956 X  
front A  $8,000 10/27/1955   
pt. 9  $47,000 10/27/1955   
       
Square 
156 
pts. A, B, 8, 9  $218,283 2/1/1983 X  
pt. 8, 9  $23,126 6/29/1956   
7, pt. 8  $8,500 8/29/1956   
4, 5, 6  $31,500 2/27/1956 X  
1, 2, pt. 3  $35,000 12/8/1955 X  
pt. 3, 4, 24, 
Undesignated, 
Undesignated 
 $125,000 5/18/1956   
14, 24  $299,425 7/31/1998   
3  $7,000 8/29/1956   
7, 8, 9, R, S  $176,258 9/11/1997 X  
       
Square 
157 
Undesignated 1133 Magazine St. 
$83,357 7/19/1955   Undesignated 1127-29 Magazine St. 
C, rear 3, pt. 1  
A  $12,000 12/29/1955 X  
5  $600 3/12/1956   
H  $12,000 9/30/1955 X  
S  $17,000 8/4/1955   
M, N  $22,000 8/1/1955   
28, 98, 100, 
Undesignated 
 $231,000 1/15/1982   
B  $19,250 10/25/1955   
1, 2  $30,000 7/6/1956   
6, alley  $36,918 6/14/1955   
2  $14,059 4/20/1955   
7, pt. 6, 5, 4, 
3, alley 
 $598,615 12/22/1955   
A 1127 Gaienne St $34,000 6/9/1955   
X  Land Swap 3/19/1986   
3, pt. 2  $11,140 5/20/1955   
       
Square 
158 
pts. 35, 36 1064 Camp St. 
$150,000 2/20/1956 X  
pts. 35, 36 1131-35 Calliope St. 
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
158 
(cont.) 
37, 38  $39,550 10/28/1955   
39, 40  $68,000 5/23/1956   
41, alley  $45,000 5/31/1955   
42 1042 Camp St.     
43 1036 Camp St. 
$44,500 12/10/1954   
44 1034 Camp St. 
pt. 29, 30, 31 1067 Magazine St. $170,130 1/5/1983   
28 1061 Magazine St. $10,770 4/2/1992   
21, 48 1037 Magazine St. $350,000 1/16/1986 X  
A  $293,946 8/8/1983   
pts. 31, 32, 
33, 34 
 $173,297 6/6/1983   
pt. 34  $2,000 2/9/1956   
Square 
159 
1  $27,500 9/8/1955   
19, 20  $60,000 8/23/1956   
2, 3, 4 538-42 Howard Ave. $99,736 4/1/1957 X 
2
 
14 1030 Camp St. 
$76,625 4/9/1956 X  
15 1024 Camp St. 
pt. 18  $28,000 12/28/1956   
       
Square 
183 
1, 2, pt. 3  $147,561 2/10/1984 X  
pt. 3 or 5 1060 St. Charles Ave. $5,447 7/6/1983   
1, 4 1070 St. Charles Ave. $602,200 8/11/1983   
2 1525 Calliope St. $72,605 1/20/1982   
pts. 1, 2, 3, 1  $117,542 5/31/1983   
       
Square 
214 
6 1123 St. Charles Ave. $40,000 8/17/1956 X  
10, hf. 9, 1, 2, 
3, 5 
1101-07      
St. Charles Ave. 
$266,700 8/1/1956 X  
16, 15, 4 1630-34 Calliope St. $44,000 9/28/1956 X  
Y or H-28 1100-02 Carondelet St. $40,700 4/23/1956 X  
X 1110-12 Carondelet St. $42,000 8/16/1956   
pt. A 1118 Carondelet St. $14,500 6/9/1956   
pt. B  $7,307 12/9/1982   
       
Square 
238 
pt. G  $6,500 8/16/1956   
A  
$51,500 6/25/1956   
B 1105-07 Carondelet St. 
C 1109 Carondelet St. 
C 1113-15 Carondelet St. 
pts. 4, 5 1712-14 Calliope St. $25,000 5/11/1956   
6A 1716 Calliope St 
$22,200 3/8/1957   
6B 1724 Calliope St. 
H-23 1730 Calliope St. $24,000 3/1/1956   
Q 1726-28 Calliope St. $9,000 4/16/1956   
                                                 
2
 Case was appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court.  Court affirmed the Civil District Court ruling of expropriation 
but increased the award to $99,736.10 from $70,000. This was the only expropriation record found in the City’s files 
showing a ruling from any court other than the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.  Louisiana State 
Supreme Court ruling dated April 1, 1957. 
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
238 
(cont.) 
16 1734-38 Calliope St. 
$22,700 3/13/1956   A or 17 1740 Calliope St. 
18 1742-46 Calliope St. 
1 1100-08 Baronne St. $19,000 5/21/1956 X  
A, B  
$30,000 8/9/1956   
1 1120 Baronne St. 
Undesignated  $15,000 11/5/1982   
10  $70,973 3/3/1983   
       
Square 
254 
X 1113-15 Baronne St. $16,200 2/2/1956   
3, 4 1107-09 Baronne St. $39,000 3/8/1956   
1, 2 1101-03 Baronne St. $20,000 3/23/1956   
7 1816 Calliope St. $7,300 3/8/1956   
1 1818-20 Calliope St. $8,500 4/17/1956   
2  $7,775 3/23/1956   
H-12 1828 Calliope St. $12,000 8/14/1956 X  
H-11  $17,500 4/17/1956   
A, B, C, 10, 
pt. 9 
 $67,827 7/6/1956 X  
4  $48,134 1/17/1984 X  
2, 3  $31,860 3/15/1983 X  
       
Square 
277 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
14, 15, 16 
 $140,500 8/21/1956 X  
1, 11 1100-02 S. Rampart St. $50,250 5/14/1956 X  
12 1108-18 S. Rampart St. $17,000 6/25/1956   
13 1112 S. Rampart St. $15,000 4/16/1956   
       
Square 
290  
& 
312 
A  $4,500 8/31/1956 X  
pt. G 1127-29 S. Rampart St. $35,000 1/20/1956   
1, pt. 5 1123-25 S. Rampart St. $28,000 10/28/1955   
pt. 1  $2,000 1/20/1956   
2 1119-21 S. Rampart St. $9,000 1/27/1956   
4 1113-17 S. Rampart St. $12,500 8/17/1955   
8 1109 S. Rampart St. 
$46,403 9/1/1955   
5 1105-07 S. Rampart St. 
6 1101-03 S. Rampart St. $32,500 9/30/1955 X  
1 through 14  $178,607 5/31/1955   
pt. C 1130-36 Simon Bolivar $7,912 3/31/1955   
pt. 8 1122-24 Simon Bolivar  $8,356 5/24/1955   
pt. D 1126-28 Simon Bolivar $11,484 5/24/1955   
pt. B 1134-36 Simon Bolivar $4,634 6/2/1955   
X, Y 2025-31 Clio St. $17,800 2/1/1956   
A  $9,850 4/10/1956   
       
Square 
325 
pt. 1  $1,500 4/22/1957   
N 1117 Simon Bolivar $22,000 5/29/1956   
A 1111 Simon Bolivar 
$26,200 6/27/1956   
Undesignated 2114-16 Calliope St. 
5 1105 Simon Bolivar $17,200 7/31/1956   
6 1101-03 Simon Bolivar $35,775 6/20/1956   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
325 
(cont.) 
B, 14, 15, 
Undesignated 
2122-40 Calliope St. $66,000 9/28/1956 X  
8  $35,500 8/17/1956   
9, 10, 11, 12, 
13 
 $62,000 1/3/1957 X  
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Appendix 5.3 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Interstate-10 and Interstate-610 
Rights-of-Way.
1
 
 
Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Interstate-10 - Tulane Avenue to Franklin Avenue (At I-10/I-610 Junction) 
Square 
403 
B 1601 Tulane Ave. $111,850 4/28/1965   
Undesignated 1605 Tulane Ave. $116,950 10/20/1966   
A 1609 Tulane Ave. $125,300 2/2/1966   
1, 4 200 S. Claiborne Ave. $29,176 3/14/1967 X  
2 202 S. Claiborne Ave. $16,800 5/3/1966   
3 206 S. Claiborne Ave. $17,445 5/15/1967 X  
5, 6, 7 212 S. Claiborne Ave. $97,342 11/7/1966   
8, 9, 10  $162,650 9/26/1966 X  
11, 12, 13, A, 
B, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, B, 21 
230 S. Claiborne Ave 
1621-23 Tulane Ave. $1,024,500 4/25/1966   
       
Square 
434 
E 
1728-30 Cleveland 
Ave 
$12,000 5/16/1966   
Y or 7 1732 Cleveland Ave. $12,250 9/2/1966   
D 216 S. Derbigny St. $17,500 6/4/1966   
C 220-22 S. Derbigny St. $14,300 5/25/1966   
22 226-28 S. Derbigny St. $12,100 8/10/1966 X  
12 230 S. Derbigny St. $9,541 5/18/1966   
13 1731-33 Palmyra St. $24,975 4/7/1967 X  
14, 15  $34,035 8/16/1966   
26 1723 Palmyra St. $20,800 8/22/1966   
27 1719 Palmyra St. $20,250 8/19/1966   
28  $21,050 9/7/1966   
19 241 S. Claiborne Ave. $31,000 6/30/1966   
2, 3  $56,440 8/22/1966   
4, 5 223 S. Claiborne Ave. $59,750 9/2/1966   
F 221 S. Claiborne Ave. $34,900 8/23/1966   
E 215 S. Claiborne Ave. $58,200 1/25/1967   
       
Square 
207 
1, 2, 3, 2 901 N. Claiborne Ave. $188,250 9/24/1965   
4 913 N Claiborne Ave. $77,300 1/14/1966 X  
5 919 N. Claiborne Ave. $13,975 3/17/1966   
       
Square 
208 
13 819 N. Claiborne Ave. $12,600 1/28/1966   
12 823 N. Claiborne Ave. $14,800 1/26/1966   
9 827 N. Claiborne Ave. $24,100 11/10/1965   
T 831 N. Claiborne Ave. $19,650 10/12/1965   
9 835 N. Claiborne Ave. $13,500 10/14/1965   
6 839 N. Claiborne Ave. $23,000 10/11/1965 X  
11 1712 Dumaine St. $14,950 10/4/1965   
4 1718 Dumaine St. $12,300 10/8/1965   
                                                 
1
 City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property 
Files for indicated Squares. 
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
208 
(cont) 
3 1722 Dumaine St. $13,500 9/20/1965 X  
2 1726 Dumaine St.  1/11/1965   
1 1730 Dumaine St. $19,500 6/17/1965   
10A 826 N. Derbigny St. 
$10,800 10/19/1965   
$1,500 1/27/1966 X  
11 822 N. Derbigny St. 
$42,250 1/11/1966 X  
14 820 N. Derbigny St. 
15 814 N. Derbigny St. 
2 1727 St. Ann St. 
1 1731 St. Ann St. $5,500 2/21/1965 X  
       
Square 
209 
3 1727 Orleans Ave. $11,500 6/3/1965   
2 1731 Orleans Ave. $24,200 10/22/1965 X  
1 1730 St. Ann St. $10,150 10/26/1965   
       
Square 
225 
A-2  $16,000 8/11/1965 X  
1 1805 St. Ann St. $13,400 8/17/1965   
2 1811 St. Ann St. $14,600 8/4/1965   
1 1800 Dumaine St. $16,500 8/24/1965   
13 819 N. Derbigny St. $18,175 8/4/1965   
12 815 N. Derbigny St. $13,400 8/9/1965   
L 811 N. Derbigny St. $11,000 10/21/1965   
       
Square 
164 
1, 2 1400 St. Peter St. $62,713 12/7/1966   
3, 4, 5  $44,375 12/20/1966   
4  $10,000 6/3/1965   
1, A  Exchange    
       
Square 
182 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8 1533 Lafitte St. $64,000 2/8/1966   
8 1510 St. Peter St. $10,000 8/31/1965   
6 1508 St. Peter St. $10,500 3/14/1966   
4 1504 St. Peter St. $11,450 5/27/1965   
2 1500 St. Peter St. $17,850 11/4/1965   
       
Square 
193 
R, 1, 2 1600 St. Peter St. $80,750 3/23/1967 X  
S  $7,650 3/23/1967 X  
W  $11,000 5/31/1965   
X  $44,000 5/27/1965   
1, 2 600 N. Claiborne St. $28,139 3/2/1967 X  
17  $12,000 5/27/1965   
       
Square 
197 
2 1622 St. Philip St. $16,200 8/13/1965   
N, 30, 
Undesignated 
 
$62,000 8/13/1965 
 
 
4 924 N. Claiborne Ave. $32,250 10/22/1965 X  
D 916 N. Claiborne Ave. $28,100 9/28/1965   
C 912 N. Claiborne Ave. $26,940 11/15/1965   
21 910 N. Claiborne Ave. $14,863 12/21/1965 X  
       
Square 
198 
1 1618 Ursulines Ave. $11,800 8/3/1965   
29 1622 Ursulines Ave. $20,500 7/29/1965   
L 1038 N. Claiborne Ave $24,000 12/15/1965 X  
M-2 1032 N. Claiborne Ave $25,000 8/2/1965   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
198 
(cont.) 
N-3 1028 N. Claiborne Ave $13,000 9/20/1965 X  
3 1024 N. Claiborne Ave $27,000 12/21/1965 X  
A, B, 15 1020 N. Claiborne Ave $127,100 10/6/1965   
16 1010 N. Claiborne Ave $46,225 10/18/1965   
A-15  $46,000 6/22/1965   
C 1623 St. Philip St. $21,000 12/21/1965 X  
       
Square 
199 
A 1608 Gov. Nicholls St. $46 12/17/1965   
15 1624 Gov. Nicholls St. $8,626 1/20/1966 X  
A-B 1628 Gov. Nicholls St. $95,000 12/6/1965 X  
17 1130 N. Claiborne Ave $30,000 1/11/1966 X  
4 1128 N. Claiborne Ave $118,700 11/29/1965 X  
20 1120 N. Claiborne Ave $22,000 11/15/1965 X  
H 1110 N. Claiborne Ave $14,100 7/21/1965   
I 1114 N. Claiborne Ave $25,500 10/11/1965 X  
A-1 1106 N. Claiborne Ave $37,000 1/14/1966 X  
B-1 1100 N. Claiborne Ave $30,000 10/22/1965 X  
B 1619 Ursulines Ave. $3,282 11/12/1965   
       
Square 
753 
B, 1-B 1700 N. Derbigny St. $15,500 12/28/1964   
14  $10,750 8/17/1964   
15 or V  $23,500 1/20/1965 X  
465A  $12,500 3/5/1965 X  
A  $142,900 1/30/1964   
C 1625 Allen St. $13,500 9/2/1964   
       
Square 
754 
R 1634 Allen St. $12,600 10/7/1964   
S 1630 Allen St. $12,500 6/15/1964   
O 1626 Allen St. $14,500 7/14/1964   
D  $20,500 8/3/964   
Undesignated  $144,500 10/7/1964   
1, 2, 3, 4, 12  1623 N. Claiborne Ave $157,000 11/16/1964 X  
A, B, G  $70,000 12/7/1964   
S 1615 New Orleans St. $12,000 8/31/1964   
R 1619 New Orleans St. $8,750 6/11/1964   
40  $19,500 7/8/1964   
Q 1629 New Orleans St. $9,100 6/22/1964   
P 1631 New Orleans St. $12,600 8/11/1964   
O 1635 New Orleans St. $12,500 6/29/1964   
M  $14,750 6/30/1964   
N 1637 New Orleans St. $16,400 6/24/1964   
T  $10,200 9/30/1964 X  
       
Square 
755 
H 1601 St. Bernard Ave. $75,000 11/12/1964   
D 1621 St. Bernard Ave. $26,000 8/12/1964   
X  $22,350 12/21/1964   
37  $31,000 8/3/1964   
A 1633 St. Bernard Ave. $17,000 8/11/1964   
4 1637 St. Bernard Ave. $12,300 9/8/1964   
2 1643 St. Bernard Ave. $9,250 10/19/1964   
E 1636 New Orleans St. $14,500 6/3/1964   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
755 
(cont.) 
9 1632 New Orleans St. $7,500 7/2/1964   
B 1628 New Orleans St. $7,800 7/24/1964   
       
Square 
757 
 
1 1543 N. Claiborne Ave $36,000 11/29/1965 X  
pt. 1  $7,025 10/29/1965   
Undesignated  $65,000 1/19/1966   
L  $33,250 10/11/1965 X  
N 1565 N. Claiborne Ave $29,800 9/24/1965   
M 1561 N. Claiborne Ave $16,200 10/12/1965   
B  $49,950 11/2/1965   
U 1551 N. Claiborne Ave $38,500 11/15/1965 X  
2  $16,000 9/30/1965   
       
Square 
758 
A-1 1501 N. Claiborne Ave $11,800 1/31/1966   
B 1509 N. Claiborne Ave $27,725 11/18/1965   
pts. B, C 1513 N. Claiborne Ave $19,750 9/13/1965   
C 1517 N. Claiborne Ave $17,750 10/8/1965   
6 1523 N. Claiborne Ave $22,500 9/29/1965   
5 1527 N. Claiborne Ave $24,750 10/8/1965   
6, 10, 10-B  $33,000 9/13/1965   
       
Square 
767 
Y 1716 Allen St. $8,544 1/14/1965   
X 1714 Allen St. $10,500 2/1/1965   
1 1665 N. Derbigny St. $17,000 12/9/1964   
B 1661 N. Derbigny St. $11,000 10/27/1964   
F  $12,750 10/14/1964   
4 1655 N. Derbigny St. $13,000 2/25/1965 X  
5 1649 N. Derbigny St. $7,500 9/23/1964   
C  $7,750 12/9/1964   
11, 12 1645 N. Derbigny St. $16,000 2/12/1965 X  
A 1641 N. Derbigny St. $6,500 12/14/1964   
pt. B  $5,500 2/23/1965 X  
       
Square 
768 
A 1701 Allen St. $11,750 6/25/1964   
11 1705 Allen St. $8,000 5/29/1964   
I 1709 Allen St. $8,750 6/30/1964 X  
9  $9,250 10/13/1964 X  
8  $11,400 8/4/1964   
7  $8,500 5/29/1964   
6  $9,500 8/25/1964   
5 1727 Allen St. $9,350 10/6/1964   
4 1731 Allen St. $11,800 9/17/1964   
18 1733 Allen St. $1,650 2/15/1964   
14B  $11,750 9/28/1964   
13A  $19,000 10/28/1964   
15 1766 N. Roman St. $10,000 6/22/1964   
A 1738 Annette St. $10,500 10/12/1964   
13  $7,500 9/14/1964   
10 1734 Annette St. $8,500 9/17/1964   
9 1730 Annette St. $8,000 9/30/1964 X  
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
768 
(cont.) 
H 1726 Annette St. $8,550 11/30/1964   
6, G 1718 Annette St. $22,000 9/1/1964   
5 1714 Annette St. $7,800 10/20/1964   
3, 4 1710 Annette St. $3,850 9/17/1964   
1, 2  $1,025 8/27/1965   
M  $10,000 11/17/1964   
N 1725 N. Derbigny St. $15,500 8/18/1964   
5 1717 N. Derbigny St. $9,000 6/12/1964   
24 1715 N. Derbigny St. $18,500 7/22/1964   
       
Square 
769 
10 1733 Annette St. $7,800 1/15/1965   
11 1737 Annette St. $8,400 1/15/1965   
8 1741 Annette St. $8,750 12/28/1964   
       
Square 
888 
X 1822 St. Anthony St. $11,250 2/4/1965  
2
 
10-A 1818 St. Anthony St. $11,000 1/22/1965   
X  $13,475 11/12/1964   
8 1830 St. Anthony St. $13,000 12/28/1964   
B 1834 St. Anthony St. $22,500 1/20/1965 X  
16-A 1838 St. Anthony St. $20,000 9/14/1964   
17, 18 1924 N. Prieur St. $19,600 6/24/1964   
19  $15,000 10/15/1964   
20  $20 3/4/1965   
Y, Z  $17,000 2/2/1965   
23 1827 Annette St. $13,500 1/18/1965   
25  $8,750 10/19/1964   
26 1821 Annette St. $10,750 10/6/1964   
27  $10,500 6/19/1964   
28 1815 Annette St. $11,000 8/7/1964   
24 or 29 1813 Annette St. $10,200 8/6/1964   
A, B 1805 Annette St. $22,500 7/24/1964   
A 1813 N. Roman St. $6,000 10/13/1964 X  
2 1817 N. Roman St. $13,000 10/16/1964   
4  $2,450 2/19/1965   
       
Square 
909 
Q 1916 St. Anthony St. $6,500 10/15/1964   
E 1918 St. Anthony St. $10,250 11/12/1964   
24 1921 N. Prieur St. $220 5/7/1965 X  
D 1927 N. Prieur St. $10,000 12/7/1964   
C 1931 N. Prieur St. $15,500 10/26/1964   
R 1935 N. Prieur St. $12,200 7/24/1964   
       
Square 
910 
5 2616 Pauger St. $130 2/4/1965   
6 2620 Pauger St. $1,353 10/28/1964   
7 2622 Pauger St. $16,500 12/18/1964   
8  $14,000 1/15/1965   
9  $6,500 10/13/1964   
10 2638 Pauger St. $24,200 11/6/1964   
B 1968 N. Johnson St. $7,350 6/26/1964   
                                                 
2
 Property purchased from the Republic of France. 
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
910 
(cont.) 
11 1964 N. Johnson St. $12,200 7/22/1964   
12 1958 N. Johnson St. $8,900 7/1/1964   
13, 14  $23,925 1/18/1965   
15  $14,000 12/22/1964   
16 1929 St. Anthony St. $16,500 7/9/1964   
17  $12,450 7/6/1964   
18  $12,400 7/27/1964   
19(A)  $6,250 12/9/1964   
A(19)  $10,250 6/18/1964   
20  $11,600 10/16/1964   
1A  $9,000 6/29/1964   
2B  $9,000 1/4/1965   
C, D 1955 N. Prieur St. $19,550 1/7/1965   
       
Square 
1026 
1, 2 2039 Touro St. $28,000 9/21/1964   
8 2031 Touro St. $20,000 1/18/1965   
5 2025 Touro St. Exchange    
H, X 2064 N. Galvez St. $25,500 12/28/1964   
4 2060 N. Galvez St. $9,750 10/12/1964   
3 2062 N. Galvez St. $7,500 10/26/1964   
       
Square 
1027 
A-2 2013 N. Johnson St. $9,500 10/1/1964   
B, C, 5, 6  $28,600 2/23/1965 X  
pt. C  $1,500 2/19/1965   
pt. 3  $2,567 10/28/1964   
1  $2,100 2/4/1965 X  
8  $11,000 10/21/1964   
3  $10,200 9/25/1964   
3  $10,500 9/22/1964   
4 2028 Touro St. $17,400 2/4/1965   
1, 2 2026 N. Galvez St. $32,900 12/4/1964   
18  $11,175 1/4/1965   
2 2729 Pauger St. $11,000 9/23/1964   
A 2721 Pauger St. $13,000 2/12/1965 X  
23, 24  $32,000 1/14/1965   
B-3  $16,000 9/30/1964   
       
Square 
1028 
Y 1961 N. Johnson St. $9,404 10/23/1964   
14  $17,800 6/29/1964   
13  $14,000 9/16/1964   
H or 12 2710 Pauger St. $16,500 10/6/1964   
G 2714 Pauger St. $15,800 11/23/1964   
F 2718 Pauger St. $16,000 11/13/1964   
E 2722 Pauger St. $9,480 11/19/1964   
       
Square 
1056 
B 2120 Touro St. $50 2/19/1965   
A 2114 Touro St. $10,800 10/27/1964   
41  $15,000 10/29/1964   
42  $15,000 2/25/1965 X  
40  $32,000 12/7/1964   
13 2017 N. Galvez St. $900 2/19/1965   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
1057 
3  $14,450 9/16/1964   
2  $22,000 1/6/1965   
P  $10,500 9/16/1964   
1 2067 N. Galvez St. $27,500 10/21/1964   
4, 5 2116 Frenchmen St. $20,000 11/9/1964   
H 2126 Frenchmen St. $21,000 7/30/1964   
M-2 2136 Frenchmen St. $39,200 9/16/1964   
A 2118 N. Miro St. $30,000 10/12/1964   
X-9 2131 Touro St. $16,500 9/28/1964   
R, Y  $11,165 10/8/1964   
16  $13,500 9/16/1964   
17  $10,800 7/17/1964   
C, D 2119 Touro St. $19,200 9/23/1964   
B 2105 Touro St. $15,500 12/11/1964 X  
A 2101 Touro St. $16,000 10/14/1964   
F 2057 N. Galvez St. $9,800 2/1/1965   
23, 24  $19,000 1/20/1965 X  
       
Square 
1058 
8, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14 
 $88,575 12/22/1964   
9 2115 Frenchmen St. $10,000 8/4/1964   
6 2127 Frenchmen St. $14,400 9/23/1964   
7 2123 Frenchmen St. $13,500 7/27/1964   
1A  $14,000 8/4/1964   
H 2162 N. Miro St. $16,800 9/2/1964   
F, G 2128 Elysian Fields Av $15,000 10/12/1964   
D, E 2124 Elysian Fields Av $23,900 10/14/1964   
C 2120 Elysian Fields Av $15,500 1/8/1965   
B 2116 Elysian Fields Av $13,700 1/14/1965   
A  $13,450 1/19/1965   
14  $550 3/23/1965   
       
Square 
1073 
Z  $14,300 8/6/1964   
X 2213 Frenchmen St. $14,800 9/17/1964   
1  $15,450 8/12/1964   
2 2205 Frenchmen St. $18,000 12/9/1964   
6, ½ 11 2225 Frenchmen St. $22,600 10/12/1964   
B 2227 Frenchmen St. $12,400 9/16/1964   
A  $10,500 10/12/1964   
9  $15,500 12/4/1964   
10  $16,500 9/25/1964   
8 2170 N. Tonti St. $16,600 10/12/1964   
13, 14  $31,000 9/4/1964   
4  $14,400 10/8/1964   
3  $17,500 9/18/1964   
1, 2  $25,750 9/28/1964   
1, 2 2208 Elysian Fields Av $35,000 10/21/1964   
A  $18,000 1/20/1965 X  
B  $18,600 10/5/1964   
2A 2159 N. Miro St. $9,800 10/29/1964   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
1073 
(cont.) 
2B 2163 N. Miro St. $17,600 9/18/1964 
 
 
       
Square 
1209 
7A, 7B 2184 N. Rocheblave St $26,000 2/19/1965 X  
C 2334 Elysian Fields Av $18,500 2/4/1965 X  
3  $13,300 10/30/1964   
Y  $35,000 10/29/1964   
X  $17,250 9/8/1964   
4 2312 Elysian Fields Av $14,000 8/27/1964   
3 2310 Elysian Fields Av $19,750 9/9/1964   
2  $26,000 12/9/1964   
22 2197 N. Tonti St. $9,450 2/2/1965   
6 2189 N. Tonti St. $48,800 12/7/1965   
F  $10,983 1/8/1965   
B  $1,125 3/5/1965   
C  $1,152 3/8/1965   
B  $500 2/19/1965   
B  $1,910 3/4/1965   
       
Square 
1172 
M  $15,500 11/5/1964 X  
N  $15,000 11/5/1964 X  
B  $14,500 9/23/1964   
P  $18,000 10/22/1964   
Q  $17,500 9/15/1964   
R  $18,250 8/25/1964   
T  $16,100 9/4/1964   
U  $17,100 11/13/1964   
15  $15,000 1/22/1965   
A  $150 2/4/1964 X  
       
Square 
1210 
1 2300 Marigny St. $13,750 12/21/1964   
2 2217 N. Tonti St. $13,750 7/22/1964   
3 2213 N. Tonti St. $11,000 7/10/1964   
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16 
2301 Elysian Fields Av $328,724 3/11/1965   
A, B, C, D, E, 
F, G 
2304 Marigny St. $80,000 1/15/1965   
       
Square 
1211 
C 2307 Marigny St. $12,825 1/13/1965   
4 2311 Marigny St. $11,700 8/27/1964   
8 2327 Marigny St. $10,100 7/1/1964   
6 2319 Marigny St. $11,450 8/3/1964   
7 2323 Marigny St. $13,700 7/23/1964   
10 2335 Marigny St. $12,950 12/10/1964   
9 2331 Marigny St. $11,500 7/16/1964   
5 2315 Marigny St. $12,200 9/91964   
11 2339 Marigny St. $12,500 1/15/1965   
12 2414 N. Rocheblave St $11,250 9/22/1964   
13 2418 N. Rocheblave St $11,200 8/11/1964   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
1211 
(cont.) 
14 2422 N. Rocheblave St $9,500 8/5/1964   
A 2336 Mandeville St. $18,800 10/16/1964   
B 2334 Mandeville St. $3,345 9/22/1964   
C 2332 Mandeville St. $239 8/11/1964   
       
Square 
1380 
M-3 2309 N. Dorgenois St. $9,700 10/1/1964   
M-2 2507 Mandeville St. $1,100 2/19/1965   
14 2526 Spain St. $55 2/11/1965   
15 2520 Spain St. $15,500 12/29/1964   
16 2518 Spain St. $8,800 9/18/1964   
17-B 2514 Spain St. $9,500 10/19/1964   
18-A 2512 Spain St. $10,750 2/4/1964 X  
19 2506 Spain St. $9,250 2/12/1965 X  
20 2500 Spain St. $14,300 10/8/1964   
21 2317 N. Dorgenois St. $15,750 10/30/1964   
B 2311 N. Dorgenois St. $6,250 9/29/1964   
       
Square 
1381 
1 2501 Spain St. $10,700 10/12/1964   
2 2505 Spain St. $12,000 10/20/1964   
3, 4  $23,000 10/13/1964   
5  $10,700 11/20/1964   
6 2523 Spain St. $10,000 10/16/1964   
7  $14,500 8/6/1964   
8  $15,000 7/29/1964   
9, 10, 11  $21,500 2/18/1965   
A 2536 St. Roch Ave. $20,000 2/4/1965 X  
B 2534 St. Roch Ave. $19,000 1/15/1965   
C 2530 St. Roch Ave. $15,700 11/13/1964   
17 2526 St. Roch Ave. $9,000 12/31/1964   
18, 19 2520 St. Roch Ave. $12,750 1/15/1965   
24  $375 3/3/1965 X  
       
Square 
1493 
A  $26,375 1/12/1965   
B, 4 2635 St. Roch Ave. $56,951 1/19/1965   
23, 24 2619 St. Roch Ave. $15,050 12/11/1964   
25  $34,775 1/28/1965   
       
Square 
1494 
8 2632 St. Roch Ave. $50 2/26/1965   
9 2628 St. Roch Ave. $11,800 1/4/1965   
10 2624 St. Roch Ave. $15,500 12/31/1964   
11 2620 St. Roch Ave. $7,500 10/9/1964   
23  $6,250 3/26/1965 X  
24, B 2610 St. Roch Ave. $20,000 1/11/1965   
A 2604 St. Roch Ave. $12,500 9/21/1964   
28 2600 St. Roch Ave. $5,000 1/14/1965   
U 2471 Law St. $9,000 2/23/1965   
T 2465 Law St. $12,125 9/10/1964   
       
Square 
1708 
M-8  $10,500 12/14/1964   
M-9  $18,150 8/5/1964   
M-5  $675 8/6/1964   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
1917 
4  $21,000 12/13/1963   
3  $17,145 11/13/1963   
5  $13,900 11/18/1963   
7  $15,000 3/12/1964 X  
9  $15,750 12/3/1963   
1  $13,500 11/14/1963   
2  $13,000 12/3/1963   
6  $15,000 10/24/1963   
8  $13,800 10/4/1963   
11  $17,800 3/20/1964 X  
12  $13,750 12/6/1963   
10  $14,500 10/14/1963   
       
Square 
1918 
N-13  $14,750 9/21/1964   
N-14  $16,000 9/16/1964   
N-15  $14,750 11/6/1964   
N-16  $15,950 8/4/1964   
N-7  $12,300 9/2/1964   
N-12  $2,245 3/31/1964 X  
N-9  $16,500 9/14/1964   
       
Square 
1978 
Q-7  $14,500 11/5/1963   
Q-9  $14,500 11/14/1963   
Q-12  $15,000 10/17/1963   
Q-13  $14,500 10/21/1963   
Q-14  $15,600 10/21/1963   
Q-16  $16,500 11/13/1963   
Q-15  $16,500 10/21/1963   
Q-6  $1,945 10/30/1963   
Q-11  $750 1/9/1964   
       
Interstate-610 - Franklin Avenue to Pontchartrain Expressway (At I-610/I-10 Junction) 
Square 
2095 / 
2096 
Undesignated  $122,000 7/24/1963   
       
Square 
2097 
P-1  $21,500 10/21/1963   
P-2  $14,800 9/16/1963   
P-3  $14,500 1/24/1964   
P-4  $15,000 8/9/1963   
P-5  $15,800 8/26/1963   
P-6  $14,400 8/13/1963   
P-7  $14,200 7/31/1963   
P-8  $14,500 8/16/1963   
P-9  $14,900 8/13/1963   
P-10  $14,300 7/24/1963   
P-11  $12,850 11/18/1963   
P-12  $14,800 6/3/1963   
P-13  $14,700 5/22/1963   
P-14  $12,650 1/13/1964   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
2098 
1  $29,295 10/6/1972 X  
2  $11,500 11/21/1963   
3  $10,800 8/28/1963   
4, 5  $16,200 9/11/1963   
6, 7  $15,650 9/3/1963   
1-16-A-1  $15,680 8/29/1972   
8  $2,500 2/14/1964 X  
9  $18,935 7/21/1972   
10,11  $19,850 8/22/1963   
12, 13  $20,500 1/2/1964   
14  $14,850 10/18/1963   
15  $12,800 9/3/1963   
16  $11,000 7/25/1963   
17, 18  $13,500 10/31/1963   
19, 20  $14,700 7/8/1964   
21  $19,800 9/6/1963 X  
22  $16,000 12/6/1963   
       
Square 
2099 
J-1  $23,500 6/1/1972   
J-2  $14,600 8/12/1963   
J-3  $13,450 9/12/1963   
J-4  $15,200 8/26/1963   
J-5  $14,100 10/9/1963   
J-6  $27,982 9/28/1972   
J-7  $18,900 11/8/1963   
J-8  $16,750 10/24/1963   
J-9 3240 Music St. $19,560 7/11/1972   
J-10  $14,650 11/4/1963   
J-11  $15,400 8/8/1963   
J-12  $13,225 9/5/1963   
J-13  $13,650 10/29/1963   
J-14 3202 Music St. $20,725 8/30/1972   
       
Square 
2100 
1  $16,780 8/14/1967   
2  $15,650 3/21/1966   
3  $14,000 6/14/1966   
4  $17,600 3/17/1966   
5  $19,000 12/28/1965   
6  $19,400 9/6/1967   
7  $20,500 7/24/1967   
8  $22,000 8/9/1967   
9  $18,000 1/19/1966   
10  $15,100 12/3/1965   
11  $13,650 10/25/1965   
12  $15,000 11/15/1965   
13  $37,200 8/23/1967   
14  $18,250 5/11/1967   
       
Square 
2101 
1  $19,550 7/8/1968   
2  $13,600 1/25/1966   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
2101 
(cont.) 
pt. 3  $2,250 8/26/1968   
pt. 3  $12,300 3/18/1966   
4  $15,000 10/31/1966   
pt. 5  $12,650 2/28/1966   
pts. 5,6   $7,800 8/22/1968   
pt. 6  $26,650 2/2/1966   
7  $17,200 12/9/1965   
8  $13,100 12/9/1966   
9  $16,000 11/8/1965   
10  $12,000 11/6/1967   
11  $19,000 6/1/1967   
12  $23,000 6/21/1967   
13  $21,400 7/26/1967   
14  $21,500 5/31/1967   
15  $20,600 9/18/1967   
16  $18,450 11/8/1967   
       
Square 
2102 
1  $24,100 12/14/1965   
2  $21,400 12/14/1965   
3  $22,400 11/17/1965   
4  $21,450 11/15/1965   
5  $17,100 11/22/1965   
6  $19,050 10/26/1965   
7  $18,400 12/11/1965   
8  $22,075 10/14/1965   
9  $19,950 10/28/1965   
10  $20,425 11/2/1965   
11  $24,650 11/2/1965   
12  $19,250 10/18/1965   
13  $19,350 10/12/1965   
14  $18,825 10/25/1965   
15  $22,675 11/3/1965   
16  $18,275 11/16/1965   
17  $17,250 12/22/1965   
18  $21,000 12/28/1965   
       
Square 
3 
3-A 3305 Franklin Ave. $21,000 10/11/1963   
1-B 3301 Franklin Ave. $16,400 8/22/1963   
9 2620 Sage St. $3,500 11/8/1963   
10 2622 Sage St. $975 10/16/1963   
11 2626 Sage St. $18,300 7/8/1963   
12 2628 Sage St. $16,300 8/13/1963   
13, 14 2630 Sage St. $20,000 11/5/1963   
15, 16 2638 Sage St. $15,600 2/4/1963   
X 2644 Sage St. $17,700 10/10/1963 X  
18, 19 2654 Sage St. $17,400 6/14/1963   
20, 21 2666 Sage St. $21,500 3/18/1963   
S 2672 Sage St. $15,700 6/28/1963   
K 2670 Sage St. $15,500 4/5/1963   
22-A 2641 Bay St. $9,300 3/26/1963   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
3 
(cont.) 
23 2639 Bay St. $13,500 4/15/1963   
24 2637 Bay St. $12,750 4/18/1963   
25, 26  $15,850 4/9/1963   
27, 28 2627 Bay St. $12,750 3/15/1963   
29, 30 2623 Bay St. $17,000 3/18/1963   
31 2621 Bay St. $13,400 7/25/1963   
32 2615 Bay St. $13,200 6/25/1963   
       
Square 
4 
1, 2 3328 Franklin Ave. $24,650 1/6/1963   
3, 4 3334 Franklin Ave. $20,800 11/14/1963   
5, 6 3338Franklin Ave. $22,200 11/22/1963 X  
7, 8 3340 Franklin Ave. $32,000 12/19/1963 X  
20   10/7/1963   
       
Square 
6 
18 2644 Elder St. $2,960 9/3/1963   
19 2650 Elder St. $14,400 8/2/1963   
20, pt. 21 2654 Elder St. $14,500 6/10/1963   
pt. 21, 22 2668 Elder St. $14,500 8/12/1963   
A 2672 Elder St. $11,900 12/11/1963   
K 2680 Elder St. $16,000 4/29/1963   
26, 27, 28 2688 Elder St. $19,700 5/7/1963   
29, 29-A 2690 Elder St. $14,800 5/22/1963   
30 2694 Elder St. $5,900 2/27/1963   
30-A 2698 Elder St. $8,800 8/8/1963   
31-C 2699 Sage St. $13,000 7/9/1963   
31-B 2695 Sage St. $13,500 7/11/1963   
32, 33 2691 Sage St. $29,000 5/15/1963   
34 2685 Sage St. $14,200 7/8/1963   
35 2681 Sage St. $10,500 6/26/1963   
36 2677 Sage St. $13,800 5/21/1963   
37 2675 Sage St. $14,350 5/10/1963   
38  $14,200 1/29/1962   
39 2661 Sage St. $15,250 4/10/1963   
40, 41 2651 Sage St. $18,000 4/29/1963   
42, pt. 43 2645 Sage St.     
pt. 43, 44 2641 Sage St. $11,675 12/31/1963   
       
Square 
7 
1 2700 Myrtle St. $24,000 10/8/1963   
2, 3 2704 Myrtle St. $14,450 8/1/1963   
4 2714 Myrtle St. $5,000 1/21/1963   
5, 6 2716 Myrtle St. $18,200 7/8/1963   
9 2734 Myrtle St. $17,800 3/4/1963   
7, 8 2730 Myrtle St. $17,000 2/18/1963   
X  $17,500 2/25/1963   
X-3  $16,750 3/14/1963   
11, 11-A 2746 Myrtle St. $15,000 5/11/1963   
B 2752 Myrtle St. $12,750 1/9/1963   
Y 2725 Elder St. $7,800 4/3/1963   
12-A, pt. 13 2715 Elder St. $13,300 6/25/1963   
pt. 13, 13-A  $13,900 6/27/1963   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
7 
(cont.) 
14, 15  $23,000 7/17/1963   
16-B, 18-A  $30,000 3/1/1963   
       
Square 
12 
J 2736 Acacia St. $3,700 10/21/1963   
11, 12 2742 Acacia St. $24,450 12/19/1963 X  
13 2750 Acacia St. $13,200 5/9/1963   
14 2754 Acacia St. $13,000 12/4/1963   
15, pt. 16 2756 Acacia St. $15,350 2/18/1963   
pt. 16, 17 2758 Acacia St. $13,550 2/14/1963   
18, 19 2760 Acacia St. $19,750 11/7/1962   
T 2764 Acacia St. $16,000 11/2/1962   
21, 22 2757 Myrtle St. $22,200 3/22/1963   
23 2755 Myrtle St. $8,900 5/24/1963   
24 2749 Myrtle St. $16,000 3/11/1963   
25  $12,000 12/4/1962   
26  $12,300 12/14/1962   
27  $12,400 12/6/1962   
28 2735 Myrtle St. $12,300 8/23/1963   
29 2729 Myrtle St. $11,400 8/8/1963   
30, pt. 31 2725 Myrtle St. $18,700 8/5/1963   
pt. 31, 32 2717 Myrtle St. $16,650 6/28/1963   
D 2715 Myrtle St. $2,375 12/19/1963   
       
Square 
13 
18  $250 10/22/1963   
19, 20 2772 Clover St. $12,475 10/3/1963   
21  $2,550 1/3/1964   
pts. 22, 23  $12,750 5/23/1963   
X 2775 Acacia St. $12,500 5/7/1963   
24, 25  $28,000 5/28/1963   
26, 27 2759 Acacia St. $17,800 10/25/1963   
28  $13,400 12/4/1963   
       
Square 
2104 
1  $12,500 4/11/1967   
2  $26,850 11/16/1966   
3A  $23,750 9/27/1966   
4 3216 Elysian Fields Av $30,000 11/23/1966   
5, 6 3200 Elysian Fields Av $41,340 4/3/1968   
7, pt. 4 2165 Benefit St. $25,600 8/16/1966   
8, pt. 4  $22,600 1/30/1967   
9  $18,200 7/13/1966   
10  $16,850 9/7/1966   
11  $18,400 8/4/1966   
12  $16,500 12/20/1966   
13  $16,200 12/1/1966   
14  $15,650 9/28/1966   
15  $16,000 9/9/1966   
16  $16,800 10/3/1966   
17  $14,350 9/26/1966   
18  $25/750 10/31/1966   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
2105 
C  $16,250 9/1/1967   
B  $19,500 5/1/1967   
A  $18,000 10/26/1967   
7  $16,800 7/19/1967   
8  $18,600 6/6/1966   
9  $18,900 9/15/1966   
10  $25,350 6/14/1966   
11  $20,900 4/7/1967   
12  $18,700 1/25/1967   
13  $19,700 6/8/1966   
14, 15  $32,000 10/14/1966   
16  $18,100 12/8/1966   
17  $18,200 10/21/1966   
19  $17,700 9/20/1966   
20  $18,000 8/31/1966   
H  $14,500 8/22/1966   
G  $14,750 10/5/1966   
18  $18,000 11/16/1966   
F  $14,500 9/4/1966   
D  $16,500 8/16/1966   
E  $14,300 9/6/1966   
       
Square 
2106 
1  $7,900 9/26/1969 X  
2  $19,000 10/6/1967   
3  $18,500 7/13/1967   
4, 5  $37,500 8/17/1967   
6  $18,500 7/17/1967   
7  $18,500 7/24/1967   
8  $18,400 9/8/1967   
9  $17,000 9/6/1966   
10-B  $17,750 9/27/1966   
11  $17,000 9/27/1966   
12  $19,400 1/23/1968   
13  $18,450 9/6/1967   
14-A  $29,600 4/2/1968   
15-B  $22,450 4/1/1968   
16  $19,300 11/2/1967   
17, 18  $38,250 10/18/1968   
19  $19,500 12/13/1967   
20  $16,800 2/7/1968   
       
Square 
2107 
A  $18,500 1/20/1967   
B  $19,100 3/20/1968   
C-1  $15,500 9/23/1966   
25  $18,824 3/4/1969   
26  $20,000 7/22/1968 X  
S  $22,000 2/15/1967   
27  $16,700 8/10/1967   
28  $21,350 3/19/1968   
29  $18,000 1/11/1968   
 307 
 
Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
2107 
(cont.) 
34  $19,500 6/5/1967   
35  $4,437 2/28/1967   
36  $19,500 4/11/1967   
L  $17,000 1/29/1968   
K  $18,200 4/21/1969   
K-2, N-2  $28,000 11/27/1967   
L-2  $22,750 4/28/1967   
M-2  $22,400 7/12/1967   
       
Square 
2109 
1, 2  $30,000 12/11/1967   
3  $13,000 1/8/1968   
4, 5  $24,000 9/28/1966   
6, 7  $20,000 10/14/1966   
8  $25,000 4/3/1968   
9, 10  $30,000 2/5/1968   
11  $17,500 8/9/1966   
12, 13  $17,500 6/6/1966   
14, 15  $16,500 2/19/1968   
16  $13,550 7/27/1966   
17, 18  $15,000 7/22/1966   
19  $10,880 10/13/1966   
C  $18,500 10/26/1967   
B  $24,000 11/17/1967   
A  $27,700 1/2/1969   
24, 25, 26  $35,000 6/7/1967   
       
Square 
2110 
Q  $27,600 4/5/1968   
Z  $33,900 1/30/1967   
P  $39,000 5/10/1968   
Undesignated  $8,085 10/31/1969 X  
F, K  $31,550 2/23/1967   
J  $19,600 12/7/1966   
E  $26,750 1/26/1967   
11  $16,200 2/2/1968   
I  $17,850 1/3/1967   
1  $29,500 5/16/1968 X  
N  $17,000 2/13/1967   
M  $17,500 2/28/1967   
L  $17,500 1/25/1967   
J  $16,500 5/12/1967   
K  $17,000 1/17/1968   
13-A  $20,500 3/1/1967   
14, 15  $20,000 7/13/1966   
16, 17, O  $36,700 12/6/1967   
       
Square 
2111 
D 3200 New Orleans St. $18,400 1/14/1967   
E 3206 New Orleans St. $17,500 6/22/1967   
4, pt. 3 3216 New Orleans St. $16,000 10/10/1966   
5 3220 New Orleans St. $19,000 9/6/1966   
6 3224 New Orleans St. $11,250 10/7/1966   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
2111 
(cont.) 
7 3228 New Orleans St. $18,500 2/16/1967   
A 1836 Humanity St. $15,300 10/20/1966   
B 1830 Humanity St. $16,300 7/27/1966   
C 1824 Humanity St. $19,000 10/12/1966   
11 1818 Humanity St. $13,800 8/1/1966   
12 1816 Humanity St. $13,700 10/26/1966   
13 1808 Humanity St. $15,000 7/25/1966   
14 1806 Humanity St. $17,000 7/21/1966   
15 1800 Humanity St. $15,500 8/3/1966   
16 1803 Benefit St. $10,500 5/18/1967   
T 1807 Benefit St. $13,000 7/10/1967   
S 1811 Benefit St. $15,000 6/12/1967   
R 1815 Benefit St. $13,600 6/14/1967   
Q 1819 Benefit St. $13,500 7/7/1967   
21 1823 Benefit St. $14,000 7/6/1967   
       
Square 
2137 / 
2289 
C 3426 Live Oak St. $17,900 1/30/1967   
D-1 3420 Live Oak St. $21,200 3/29/1967   
E 3416 Live Oak St. $19,900 6/5/1967   
F 3414 Live Oak St. $21,000 3/28/1967   
G, H 3408 Live Oak St. $44,750 12/13/1966   
I, pt. K 3401 Live Oak St. $29,820 7/18/1968   
L, pt. K 3409 Live Oak St. $32,450 6/15/1967   
M, N 3419 Live Oak St. $32,000 12/22/1966   
O-1 3423 Live Oak St. $23,500 12/12/1966   
       
Square 
1966 
pt. 2  $12,125 2/16/1968   
2B  $12,500 3/9/1967   
pt. 1  $19,075 1/9/1967   
3, 4  $35,000 8/29/1967   
5, 6  $28,300 4/24/1967   
pts. 7, 8, 9  $15,920 6/10/1968   
pt. B  $11,600 5/26/1967   
24  $11,900 9/12/1967   
25  $14,600 5/26/1967   
26  $15,321 6/1/1967   
       
Square 
2112 
1, 2, 3 1736 Humanity St. $26,000 9/22/1967 X  
4 1746 Humanity St. $14,200 12/27/1967   
5  $6,400 12/1/1967   
6 1756 Humanity St. $14,000 9/1/1967   
7 1760 Humanity St. $14,500 9/15/1967   
8 1762 Humanity St. $17,700 8/28/1967   
9, 10, 11, 12 1778 Humanity St. $30,000 3/25/1968   
13, pt. 14 1781 Benefit St. $13,600 11/3/1967   
X 1779 Benefit St. $23,700 7/29/1967   
16, 17 1775 Benefit St. $13,300 9/26/1969 X  
T 1771 Benefit St. $17,000 7/10/1967   
W 3201 Havana St. $19,700 12/4/1967   
X 3207 Havana St. $19,500 12/8/1967   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
2112 
(cont.) 
Y 3211 Havana St. $19,500 1/25/1967   
Z 3215 Havana St. $22,600 2/28/1967   
V 3223 Havana St. $26,000 9/14/1966   
       
Square 
2113 
1, 2, 3, 4, 8 2210 Gentilly Rd. $120,000 7/17/1967   
5-A, 7-A 2216 Gentilly Rd. $152,650 5/15/1967 X  
9 1731 Benefit St. $31,000 5/6/1968   
11-A  $91,850 6/27/1967   
14-A  $102,230 3/10/1967   
15, 16  $25,110 3/18/1968   
       
Square 
2114 
Full Square  $64,500 2/7/1968   
       
Square 
2115 
A 2137 Gentilly Rd. $23,500 11/7/1968   
10-A, 10-B, 
10-C, 10-D 
3223 Bruxelles St. $61,800 1/4/1968   
9 1654 Humanity St. $12,000 3/31/1967   
6 1660 Humanity St. $10,300 4/27/1967   
5 1664 Humanity St. $13,750 3/23/1967   
B 2135 Gentilly Rd. $22,500 6/14/1967   
4 2133 Gentilly Rd. $25,500 10/21/1966   
7 2129 Gentilly Rd. $33,800 10/11/1966   
8 2123 Gentilly Rd. $51,500 10/28/1966   
       
Square 
2116 
Full Square  $38,500 2/19/1968   
       
Square 
2133 
14 3323 Bruxelles St. $12,227 9/25/1967   
15 3319 Bruxelles St. $10,300 7/10/1969   
16 3313 Bruxelles St. $11,498 1/21/1970   
17, 18, 19 3301 Bruxelles St. $40,500 12/12/1967   
20 1659 Humanity St. $10,350 8/10/1967   
21 1661 Humanity St. $8,940 4/11/1968   
22 1665 Humanity St. $10,900 2/27/1969   
23 1671 Humanity St. $8,650 9/10/1969   
24 1675 Humanity St. $7,350 7/8/1969   
       
Square 
2132 
1 3324 Bruxelles St. $14,550 7/7/1966   
2 3326 Bruxelles St. $11,550 7/8/1966   
3 3332 Bruxelles St. $12,800 9/11/1967   
4 3336 Bruxelles St. $16,900 9/13/1967   
5 3342 Bruxelles St. $3,250 2/11/1969   
6, 7 1616 Pleasure St. $22,000 1/25/1967   
8 1622 Pleasure St. $12,250 5/4/1967   
9 3339 Paris Ave. $13,250 11/30/1967   
10 3335 Paris Ave. $22,250 9/28/1967   
11, 12 3323 Paris Ave. $24,200 12/7/1967   
13 3321 Paris Ave. $11,100 6/27/1967   
14 3317 Paris Ave. $12,600 11/30/1967   
15 3311 Paris Ave. $13,600 4/24/1967   
16, 17 3307 Paris Ave. $16,000 6/18/1968   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
2132 
(cont.) 
18 3301 Paris Ave. $14,500 4/29/1968   
19-B 1623 Humanity St. $11,500 7/29/1968   
20, pt. 19 1625 Humanity St. $13,750 3/2/1967   
21 1627 Humanity St. $12,500 1/23/1967   
22 3300 Bruxelles St. $24,000 6/19/1967   
23, 24 3304 Bruxelles St. $29,950 7/1/1969 X  
25  $5,850 2/10/1967   
26 3322 Bruxelles St. $14,500 3/2/1967   
       
Square 
2131 
Undesignated 1568 Pleasure St. $46,300 7/29/1969   
A, B, 
Undesignated 
1570 Pleasure St. $35,000 8/10/1967   
C, D 3310 Paris Ave. $34,000 6/27/1968   
E 3304 Paris Ave. $17,325 4/24/1970 X  
F 3300 Paris Ave. $5,650 8/10/1967   
       
Square 
2295 
15 3417 Hamburg St. $665 4/8/1970   
16 1541 Pleasure St. $19,482 1/22/1970   
B 1547 Pleasure St. $10,951 5/11/1970   
C 1549 Pleasure St. $11,536 3/11/1970   
D 1551 Pleasure St. $12,802 5/1/1970   
A 1545 Pleasure St. $10,963 3/10/1970   
20, 21, 22  $578 3/24/1971   
       
Square 
2296 
Full Square  $294,730 7/1/1969 X  
       
Square 
2297 
2298 
2313 
2314 
2315 
Full Squares  $405,000 12/1/1969   
       
Square 
2316 
1 1453 Lafreniere St. $29,900 8/22/1969 X  
2 1457 Lafreniere St. $12,900 3/6/1969   
3 1461 Lafreniere St. $11,865 4/7/1970   
4 1465 Lafreniere St. $8,751 1/21/1971   
5 1469 Lafreniere St. $7,727 5/7/1970   
6 1473 Lafreniere St. $100 1/27/1970   
25 3517 Duplessis St. $9,755 1/27/1970   
       
Square 
402-B 
Full Square  $120,000 10/17/1969 X  
       
Square 
400 
1, 2 5757 Marshal Foch St. $27,500 11/6/1967   
D 5739 Marshal Foch St. $23,000 8/9/1966   
C 5747 Marshal Foch St. $21,500 5/15/1967   
B 5751 Marshal Foch St. $21,900 5/16/1967   
E 5733 Marshal Foch St. $18,519 4/10/1968   
2 5728 Argonne St. $20,300 8/6/1968   
4 5714 Argonne St. $19,250 9/12/1967   
1 5734 Argonne St. $22,375 8/23/1968   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
400 
(cont.) 
3 5722 Argonne St. $19,800 7/8/1966   
5 5710 Argonne St. $19,300 9/12/1967   
       
Square 
399 
A 5757 General Diaz St. $38,500 9/22/1966   
B 5747 General Diaz St. $31,000 1/5/1968   
C 5739 General Diaz St. $30,000 5/18/1966   
8, 9 5733 General Diaz St. $29,000 3/16/1967   
10, 11 5731 General Diaz St. $29,000 7/15/1968 X  
B 5728 Marshal Foch St. $19,000 2/19/1968   
30, ½ 29  $20,500 5/31/1967   
31, 32 5740 Marshal Foch St. $20,500 12/5/1967   
33, 34 5748 Marshal Foch St. $29,500 6/17/1966   
35, 36 5754 Marshal Foch St. $24,500 6/20/1966   
37, 38 5760 Marshal Foch St. $22,800 9/29/1967   
       
Square 
398 
1, 2 5761 Memphis St. $26,500 6/11/1966   
3, 4 5755 Memphis St. $26,100 10/30/1967   
5, 6, 7 5753 Memphis St. $41,000 6/7/1967   
8, 9 5737 Memphis St. $27,000 6/22/1966   
10, 11 5731 Memphis St. $27,000 11/29/1966   
28, 29 5730 General Diaz St. $24,400 8/8/1968   
32, 33, 34 5748 General Diaz St. $38,650 6/6/1968   
30, 31 5732 General Diaz St. $26,500 10/7/1966   
35, 36 5754 General Diaz St. $42,000 11/6/1967   
37, 38 5768 General Diaz St. $40,500 8/21/1968   
       
Square 
397 
1, 2 5759 Vicksburg St. $30,150 6/26/1967   
3, 4 5755 Vicksburg St. $31,600 6/6/1966   
5, 6 5751 Vicksburg St. $30,500 7/5/1966   
7, 8 5737 Vicksburg St. $30,000 7/13/1967   
11, 12 5725 Vicksburg St. $26,950 7/1/1968   
13 5721 Vicksburg St. $16,174 4/26/1968   
9, 10 5729 Vicksburg St. $29,000 5/19/1966   
26, 27 5724 Memphis St. $23,608 6/6/1968   
28, 29 5730 Memphis St. $29,000 12/15/1967   
30, 31 5738 Memphis St. $23,000 9/6/1966   
32,33 5744 Memphis St. $23,500 6/15/1966   
34, 35 5750 Memphis St. $23,500 7/25/1966   
36, 37, 38 5770 Memphis St. $37,500 7/26/1967   
       
Square 
396 
1,2 5757 Canal Blvd. $40,000 3/7/1968   
3, 4 5751 Canal Blvd. $42,500 5/20/1968   
5, 6 5749 Canal Blvd. $42,000 5/2/1968   
7, 8 5737 Canal Blvd. $39,000 4/8/1968   
9, 10, 11  $46,000 7/18/1968   
14, 15 5717 Canal Blvd. $5,000 4/30/1971 X  
12, 13 5725 Canal Blvd. $47,000 3/13/1968   
27, 28 5726 Vicksburg St. $32,000 11/16/1967   
29, 30 5734 Vicksburg St. $25,500 4/5/1967   
31, 32 5740 Vicksburg St. $25,500 10/9/1967   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
396 
(cont.) 
33, 34 5750 Vicksburg St. $23,600 12/8/1966   
35, 36 5754 Vicksburg St. $23,300 4/27/1967   
37, 38 5760 Vicksburg St. $28,600 9/6/1967   
       
Square 
395 
1, 2  $31,097 6/29/1960   
3, 4 5741 Louis XIV St. $22,750 5/21/1959   
5, 6 5737 Louis XIV St. $25,250 9/18/1959   
7, 8 5735 Louis XIV St. $32,000 10/18/1960   
9, 10 5731 Louis XIV St. $29,000 8/23/1961   
11, 12  $26,000 2/18/1960   
13, 14  $28,339 11/10/1959   
R, S  $40,000 8/1/1961   
29,30 5734 Canal Blvd. $49,500 8/10/1961   
31, 32 5736 Canal Blvd. $37,450 8/29/1961   
33, 34, 35, 36 5740 Canal Blvd. $50,700 10/13/1961 X  
37, 38 5758 Canal Blvd. $38,200 9/21/1961   
       
Square 
5 or 
394 
6, 7  $11,000 2/18/1960   
8, 9, 10  $39,700 9/13/1961   
11, 12, 13, 14 5725 Woodlawn Pl. $28,200 9/11/1961   
15, 16  $22,000 2/8/1960   
17, 18 5735 Woodlawn Pl. $27,400 5/12/1959   
19, 20, 21, 22  $50,331 1/29/1960   
T 5720 Louis XIV St. $24,400 10/30/1961   
U 5728 Louis XIV St. $26,000 11/2/1959   
V 5742 Louis XIV St. $31,400 9/20/1961   
pt. W  $31,000 6/15/1959   
pt. W 5760 Louis XIV St. $33,250 10/23/1959   
       
Square 
4 or 
393 
A 441 Bakewell St. $26,625 11/9/1959   
K 435 Bakewell St. $26,900 10/8/1959   
J 5736 Woodlawn Pl. $31,900 10/22/1959   
7, 8  $26,500 6/23/1959   
9, 10  $23,375 9/15/1960   
11, 12 420 Kenilworth St. $19,300 6/8/1959   
13, 14  $31,700 8/14/1959   
15, 16 414 Kenilworth St. $20,725 9/30/1959   
17, 18 5753 Rosemary Pl. $16,993 3/4/1960   
19, 20 5751 Rosemary Pl. $18,800 8/28/1959   
21, 22 5747 Rosemary Pl. $18,500 8/22/1961   
23, 24 5743 Rosemary Pl. $23,500 10/13/1961 X  
25, 26 423 Bakewell St. $25,000 9/15/1959   
27, 28 427 Bakewell St. $25,393 8/25/1959   
       
Square 
3 
pt. A 5722 Woodlawn Pl. $11,180 5/31/1966   
B  $25,498 7/31/1961   
15, 16  $27,600 12/7/1959   
17, 18 5729 Rosemary Pl. $17,150 9/29/1959   
19, 20 5727 Rosemary Pl. $17,850 10/1/1959   
       
Square 
2 / 392 
13, 14 5728 Rosemary Pl. $22,200 1/27/1960   
15, 16 5732 Rosemary Pl. $21,600 1/20/1960   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
2 / 392 
(cont.) 
17, 18  $29,700 9/2/1961   
19, 20  $17,000 9/2/1961   
21, 22  $24,000 7/22/1960   
23, pt. 24  $21,350 2/10/1960   
pt. 24, 25,    
pt. 26 
5754 Rosemary Pl. $24,100 7/26/1961   
pt. 26, 27  $23,761 6/30/1959   
28, 29 5771 Ridgeway St. $19,250 11/8/1961   
30, 31  $19,300 11/19/1959   
F  $19,285 9/5/1961   
G 5749 Ridgeway St. $18,275 9/1/1959   
H 5743 Ridgeway St. $18,630 8/13/1959   
37, 38 5737 Ridgeway St. $26,550 5/28/1959   
39, 40  $25,650 5/28/1959   
41 5727 Ridgeway St. $20,350 5/11/1959   
       
Square 
1 
1 303 Florida Ave. $3,996 11/17/1961 X  
B 5720 Ridgeway St. $6,842 10/13/1961 X  
C 5730 Ridgeway St. $25,500 9/20/1961   
D  $21,725 6/27/1960   
E 5740 Ridgeway St. $19,300 8/25/1961   
13, 14 5744 Ridgeway St. $17,023 9/8/1961   
15, 16, 17 5750 Ridgeway St. $16,700 9/1/1959   
18, 19 5754 Ridgeway St. $21,150 8/7/1959   
20, 21, 22  $16,875 7/27/1961   
       
Square 
391 
1, 2, 3, pt. 4  $31,350 1/26/1960   
5-A 5747 Catina St. $32,200    
8-B  $30,630 10/20/1959   
9, pt. 10 5721 Catina St. $22,701 9/15/1959   
pt. 10, 11,    
pt. 12 
5717 Catina St. $21,800 3/30/1961   
pts. 12, 13    
or C 
 $17,460 8/25/1959   
pt. 13, 14  $20,850 8/19/1959   
15, 16  $32,750 10/28/1959   
       
Square 
390 
Undesignated  $36,350 6/29/1959   
B 5757 West End Blvd. $20,180 9/21/1959   
pt. 4, 5 5753 West End Blvd. $41,050 8/19/1959   
6, pt. 7 5741 West End Blvd. $27,600 2/24/1960   
F 5739 West End Blvd. $13,475 4/20/1960   
pt. 8, 9, 10 5733 West End Blvd. $38,650 10/28/1959   
B  $20,250 7/13/1959   
C  $18,872 6/2/1959   
H  $26,450 7/1/1959   
15, 16 5701 West End Blvd. $50,156 10/19/1960   
17, 18  $38,300 1/29/1960   
19 5714 Catina St. $23,388 4/28/1959   
20  $21,128 9/22/1959   
21, 22  $26,400 7/30/1959   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
390 
(cont.) 
X 5726 Catina St. $25,350 2/18/1960   
Y 5740 Catina St. $37,500 8/5/1959   
27, 28 5746 Catina St. $25,250 4/12/1960   
29, 30  $25,500 8/20/1959   
31, 32 5762 Catina St. $26,703 10/15/1959   
       
Square 
427 
1-A  $35,000 11/2/1959   
2-A  $27,800 7/23/1959   
       
Square 
428 
1, 2 126 Florida Ave. $36,900 7/23/1959   
Undesignated 120 Florida Ave. $35,975 12/16/1959   
rear 5, 6, 7, 8  $33,300 11/30/1959   
front 5, 6, 7, 8  $50,850 11/17/1960   
9, 10, 11 5673 West End Blvd. $42,350 1/21/1960   
12, 13 5665 West End Blvd. $28,150 8/29/1960   
14, 15  $13,200 2/1/1961   
16, 17  $28,600 5/30/1960   
X 5645 West End Blvd. $26,000 9/15/1959   
pt. 19, 20,    
pt. 21 
5639 West End Blvd. $27,400 11/4/1959   
pt. 21, 22  $26,673 8/13/1959   
Y  $18,550 7/9/1959   
pt. Z  $38,000 12/3/1959   
pt. 27-A  $28,000 7/17/1959   
B  $327 2/24/1960   
44, 45  $1,250 5/19/1961   
46, 47  $15,200 7/15/1959   
48, 49  $21,998 9/8/1959   
50, 51  $24,050 5/7/1959   
52, 53  $22,614 7/22/1959   
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Appendix 5.4 – Comparison of Active Businesses Along N Claiborne Avenue from Canal Street 
to St. Bernard Avenue, 1950 to 1996. 
 
Address Business Name (1950)
1
 Business Name (1996)
2
 
107 N Claiborne Ave. N. O. Motor Co. Inc.  
133 N Claiborne Ave. Bettcher Bros. Bodies  
141 N Claiborne Ave. Schulingkamp’s Serv. Sta. Chun King Chinese Food 
201 N Claiborne Ave. Schulingkamp’s Used Cars Precise Collision Center 
211 N Claiborne Ave. Gen’l Truck Co.  
215 N Claiborne Ave. 
Canal Auto Pntng & Body 
Wks. 
 
217 N Claiborne Ave. Claiborne Shell Service Sta.  
301 N Claiborne Ave. Mack Motor Co. BBCL Auto & Truck Sales 
325 N Claiborne Ave. N. O. Motor Co. Inc.  
401 N Claiborne Ave. Greco Sam Beer  
405 N Claiborne Ave. 
Schmidt Jno. A. Sheet Met 
Wks 
Energy Management 
Systems, Inc. 
419 N Claiborne Ave. Alaska Ice Cream Co  
419 N Claiborne Ave. 
Bassil’s Refrigeration Sales 
& Service 
G&M Electric Sales Co. 
425 N Claiborne Ave. 
Smith Rudy Body Fender & 
Wrckr Serv 
Rudy Smith Svc. Inc. 
435 N Claiborne Ave. Manno’s Service Station  
503 N Claiborne Ave. Colonial Buick Co.  
514 N Claiborne Ave. Bologna A & Co Liqr  
612 N Claiborne Ave. Betat Gus & Son Bicycles  
708 N Claiborne Ave Valentino J. F. Dr Ofc  
710 N Claiborne Ave. Majestic Ind Life Ins Co  
714 N Claiborne Ave. 
Supreme Industrial Life Ins 
Co Inc 
Cohen’s Formal Shop 
716 N Claiborne Ave. LaBranche Drug Store Geno’s Lounge 
717 N Claiborne Ave. Douglas Restrnt  
720 N Claiborne Ave. Douglas K. L. Dr Dent Maurice’s Barber Shop 
721 N Claiborne Ave. Blanks Herbert C. Dr. Dent.  
722 N Claiborne Ave. 
LaBranche Hernandez G Dr 
Ofc 
 
724 N Claiborne Ave. Two Sisters Beauty Shop  
728 N Claiborne Ave. Original Orleans Club  
732 N Claiborne Ave. Joseph Harry S Dept Store Basin Street Club 
757 N Claiborne Ave. 
 Duke’s 24 Hours Liquor 
Store 
801 N Claiborne Ave.  J&G Furniture Co 
                                                 
1
 Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company (1950). New Orleans, LA Street Address Telephone Directory, 
March 1950. 
2
 Polk Cross-Reference Directory for New Orleans, LA (1997).  
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812 N Claiborne Ave. Grand Super Market  
816 N Claiborne Ave. Excel Finance Co.  
817 N Claiborne Ave. 
Claiborne Wholesale Candy 
Co. 
Women Entrepreneurs for 
Dev. 
817 N Claiborne Ave N. O. Amusement Co.  
824 N Claiborne Ave. O’Brien’s Mattress Wks  
827 N Claiborne Ave. Peters Joseph R. Furn  
830 N Claiborne Ave. Pearl’s Beauty Shoppe  
841 N Claiborne Ave. Guichard Pharmacy  
900 N Claiborne Ave. Continent Wine & Liqr Co.  
901 N Claiborne Ave. People’s Ind Life Ins Co.  
906½ N Claiborne Ave.  Moderne Beauty Salon  
910 N Claiborne Ave. Moore’s Pie Shop  
912 N Claiborne Ave. Smith Norman Studio phtgr  
913 N Claiborne Ave.  Jackie & George’s Lounge 
913 N Claiborne Ave.  Olivier’s Beauty Salon 
914 N Claiborne Ave. Suzanne’s Dress Shop  
915 N Claiborne Ave. Dandy Ice Cream Co.  
924 N Claiborne Ave. Sehrt Wm & Son Confry  
926 N Claiborne Ave. Citizen Flower Shop  
926 N Claiborne Ave. Williams Camilla Mrs. Flrsts  
930 N Claiborne Ave. Gosserand Superior Printers  
930 N Claiborne Ave. Gosserand V. Mrs. Ofc  
934 N Claiborne Ave. West’s Watch Repair Shop  
938 N Claiborne Ave. Green Spot Restaurant  
943 N Claiborne Ave. Reed’s Pharmacy  
943 N Claiborne Ave. Venus Industrial Life Ins Co  
1000 N Claiborne Ave. Green O Liqr Store  
1001 N Claiborne Ave. Katz Manuel Grocery  
1003 N Claiborne Ave. Wong’s Barber Shop  
1004 N Claiborne Ave. Commerce Cash Grocery  
1004 N Claiborne Ave. Curtis M. J. Ofc.  
1005 N Claiborne Ave. Superior Cocktail Lounge  
1015 N Claiborne Ave.  Wong’s Barber Shop 
1016 N Claiborne Ave. Elaine’s Beauty Shop  
1018 N Claiborne Ave. Darril’s Barber Shop  
1018 N Claiborne Ave. Morales N. J. Roofer  
1020 N Claiborne Ave. 
Bernissant E. F. & E. S. 
Hdwr 
 
1020 N Claiborne Ave. Claiborne Hdwe & Paint Co.  
1022 N Claiborne Ave. Joubert Ernest Rl Est  
1025 N Claiborne Ave. 
Bernadas Charles Sr. Auto 
Serv 
Holly’s Auto Repair 
1028 N Claiborne Ave. Fox Hole Bar & Liqr Str  
1028 N Claiborne Ave. Matassa Joseph A. liqr  
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1031 N Claiborne Ave. Clabon Theatre Church of God in Christ 
1032 N Claiborne Ave. Albright’s Sewg Mch Repr  
1038 N Claiborne Ave. Johnnie’s Bar  
1100 N Claiborne Ave. Elite Pharmacy  
1100 N Claiborne Ave. Heliam Inc Drugs  
1101 N Claiborne Ave. Jim’s Bar  
1108 N Claiborne Ave. Acme Life Ins Co.  
1108 N Claiborne Ave. Robin Labasse J. Dr Ofc  
1115 N Claiborne Ave. Stern Sales Co. Auto  
1120 N Claiborne Ave. Ben’s Bicycles  
1125 N Claiborne Ave. Sheffield J. O. Dr Ofc  
1125 N Claiborne Ave. 
St John Berchman’s Ind Life 
Ins Co. 
New Orleans Jazz & Entrtn. 
Safety Industrial Insurance 
1128 N Claiborne Ave. 
Safety Ind Life Ins & Sick 
Ben Assn 
 
1136 N Claiborne Ave. Paul’s Spot Café  
1137 N Claiborne Ave. 
Walter’s Body & Fender 
Wks 
 
1139 N Claiborne Ave.  La Parisienne Liquor & Food 
1200 N Claiborne Ave. N. O. Floor Covering Co.  
1208 N. Claiborne Ave. Eumont Gustave Groc  
1210 N Claiborne Ave. Matassa John J. Ofc.  
1210 N Claiborne Ave. 
Sixth Ward Civic 
Improvement Assn. 
 
1212 N Claiborne Ave. 
Massicot for Councilman 
Hdqtrs 
 
1214 N Claiborne Ave. Antonia’s Beauty Parlor  
1214 N Claiborne Ave. Toca Gladys H Bty Shp  
1216 N Claiborne Ave. Claiborne Poultry Mkt  
1240 N Claiborne Ave. 
 Industrial Demolishers MBE 
SVC of Louisiana, Inc. 
1250 N Claiborne Ave.  Claiborne Auto Repairs 
1251½ N Claiborne Ave  Dominick’s Liqr Store  
1410 N Claiborne Ave. Tom’s Pool Hall  
1412 N Claiborne Ave. Tedesco’s Oyster Bar  
1413 N Claiborne Ave. Swan Cleaners Manchu Food Store 
1414 N Claiborne Ave.  Elite Burial Plans 
1418 N Claiborne Ave.  Gallery of Braids 
1418 N Claiborne Ave.  Latitude 31 Communications 
1418 N Claiborne Ave. 
 Special Touch Home Health 
Care 
1418 N Claiborne Ave.  Golden Comb 
1433 N Claiborne Ave.  Kern Reese (Attorney) 
1433 N Claiborne Ave.  Michelle Diaz, CPA 
1441 N Claiborne Ave. Magner E. S. Dr. Dent Magic World Hair Design 
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1449 N Claiborne Ave. Francois Bobbie Funrl Dir Louisiana Undertaking Co. 
1449 N Claiborne Ave. LA Undertaking Co. Inc.  
1455 N Claiborne Ave. LA Industrial Life Ins Co.  
1468 N Claiborne Ave. 
Southern Sch of Cooking & 
Baking 
 
1471 N Claiborne Ave. 
Crescent Tractor & 
Implement Co. 
 
1476 N Claiborne Ave.  Robert Magee, MD 
1479 N Claiborne Ave.  Cottman Transmission Ctr. 
1500 N Claiborne Ave. 
Lou’s Restrnt & Bar Ernie K-Doe’s Mother-in-
Law Lounge 
1501 N Claiborne Ave. Puelo Joseph Groc  
1506 N Claiborne Ave. Steve’s Poulty Place  
1509 N Claiborne Ave.  Darlene’s Beauty Salon 
1512½ N Claiborne Ave Lillie’s Beauty Salon  
1514 N Claiborne Ave N. O. Informer  
1520 N Claiborne Ave. Little Beck’s Restrnt & Bar  
1523 N Claiborne Ave.  Classis Nails of Hollywood 
1525 N Claiborne Ave.  Ho Ho Chinese Restaurant 
1527 N Claiborne Ave.  Hair Station 
1529 N Claiborne Ave.  United States Government 
1530 N Claiborne Ave. Haydel C. C. Dr Ofc  
1530 N Claiborne Ave. Standard Ind Life Ins Co. Inc  
1536 N Claiborne Ave. Steve’s Restaurant M&C’s Sports Page Lounge 
1540 N Claiborne Ave. Saltalamachia Frank Pltry  
1544 N Claiborne Ave. 
Heckmann’s Shoe Store Equal Care Medical 
Transportation 
1548 N Claiborne Ave. Levata A. A. Restrnt  
1556 N Claiborne Ave. Dixie Dept Store  
1565 N Claiborne Ave. Levachez Drug Store  
1571 N Claiborne Ave. Dad’s Café  
1575 N Claiborne Ave. Buras R. A. Contr  
1575 N Claiborne Ave. Serve Your Self Station  
1600 N Claiborne Ave. Gabriel H. Fruits  
1608 N Claiborne Ave. Galle Furniture Store  
1610 N Claiborne Ave. Echo Wine Cellar  
1611 N Claiborne Ave. Claiborne Circle Garage  
1623 N Claiborne Ave. 
St. Bernard Hdw & Supply 
Co. 
 
1624 N Claiborne Ave.  Afro House Hair Care Clinic 
1624 N Claiborne Ave.  Bejae’s Skin Care Salon 
1627 N Claiborne Ave. Rimbolt Finance Serv Inc.  
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Appendix 6.1 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Cultural Center Site1 
 
 
Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
113 
A 901-03 N. Rampart St. $50,000 8/5/1971 X  
B      
C 915 N. Rampart St. $58,250 3/19/1971   
T 917 N. Rampart St. $65,000 12/14/1970   
4 919-21 N. Rampart St. $60,000 10/9/1970   
15 923-25 N. Rampart St. $49,500 12/30/70   
Undesignated 931 N. Rampart St. 
$100,000 10/20/1970   
Undesignated 935 N. Rampart St. 
C or 7 937 N. Rampart St 
$70,200 12/14/1970 X  
A 941-45 N. Rampart St. 
8 1108-10 St Philip St. $32,000 4/22/1971 X † 
A 1112-14 St Philip St. $15,600 11/30/1970   
L 1120 St Philip St. $13,000 12/9/1970   
A & K 1122 St Philip St. $18,700 1/11/1971   
C 1126-28 St Philip St. $18,200 10/23/1970   
B & H 1130 St Philip St. $14,000 11/13/1970   
A 940-42 St Claude St. $28,000 10/1/1970   
S or Undes. 938 St Claude St. $6,300 1/18/1970   
A or Undes. 934 St Claude St. 
$73,400 9/25/1970 
 
 
16 928-30 St Claude St. 
D or Undes. 926 St Claude St. $16,250 12/14/1970   
Undesignated 922 St Claude St. $29,000 12/29/1970   
Undesignated 1141-43 Dumaine St. $17,000 11/10/1970   
2 1137 Dumaine St. $20,000 11/21/1970   
1 
1131 Dumaine St. Fire House 2/28/1913   
Undesignated 
2 1123-25 Dumaine St. $16,650 11/13/1970   
X 1119-21 Dumaine St. $17,400 11/10/1970   
25 1111-13 Dumaine St. $10,300 10/9/1970   
       
Square 
114 
1  $12,500 4/14/1969   
2 1134-36 Dumaine St. $17,000 8/1/1968   
6 1130-32 Dumaine St. $19,200 6/20/1968   
S 1126-28 Dumaine St. $18,250 6/21/1968   
Undesignated 1120-22 Dumaine St. $18,900 5/30/1968   
9 
839 N. Rampart St. $82,600 5/21/1968   10 
A 
2 841-43 N. Rampart St. $71,000 8/15/1968   
4 or 1 827-29 N. Rampart St. $45,000 1/14/1969   
Undesignated 825 N. Rampart St. $44,000 1/14/1969   
Undesignated 821 N. Rampart St. 
$290,000 10/17/1968 X  
Undesignated 815-17 N. Rampart St. 
                                                 
1
 City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property 
Files for indicated Squares, Second Municipal District, Seventh Assessment District. 
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Square 
114 
(cont) 
3 811-13 N. Rampart St. $61,000 7/30/1968   
Undesignated 801 N. Rampart St. $331,000 9/24/1968   
C   9/24/1968   
B 
 
Land swap 
with School 
Board 
8/2/1968   Undesignated 
Undesignated 
Undesignated 826 St Claude St. $34,000 7/19/1968   
       
Square 
137 
C or 8,9,10 
 
Land swap 
with 
Catholic 
Church 
8/15/1957   
Undesignated 
Undesignated 
14 or Undes. 
13 or Undes. 
B 809-11 St Claude St. $13,000 5/28/1959   
F 817 St Claude St. $27,000 3/11/1960 X  
E & 6  $25,000 1/6/1960 X  
S  $22,175 6/1/1959 X  
X 833 St Claude St. $45,700 12/29/1958   
A 839-41 St Claude St. $24,000 8/4/1959 X  
I & 5 1218-20 Dumaine St. $18,300 8/4/1959 X  
2 1222 Dumaine St. $19,000 5/19/1959   
20 1226-28 Dumaine St. $11,500 10/21/1958   
4  $19,250 4/3/1959   
18 822 S. Liberty St. $7,000 6/26/1958   
17 820 S. Liberty St. $9,000 4/28/1958   
6 818 S. Liberty St. $12,500 7/24/1958   
D 
1225-27 St Ann St. 
Land swap 
(C. Tessier) 
+ $3,700 
9/20/1957   
H 
G & D 1217-21 St Ann St. $18,900 10/1/1958   
       
Square 
138 
Undesignated 907 St Claude St. $101,250 11/10/1970   
Undesignated 919 St Claude St. 
$19,800 12/29/1970   
Undesignated 921 St Claude St. 
2 923-25 St Claude St. 
$175,000 1/28/1971  ‡ 9 931-33 St Claude St. 
Undesignated 1216-18 St Philip St. 
10 929 St Philip St. $39,400 10/22/1970   
8 1200-02 St Philip St. $15,750 9/18/1970   
7 1204-06 St Philip St. $12,000 10/9/1970   
6 1208-10 St Philip St. $14,000 9/18/1970   
5 1212-14 St Philip St. $11,000 10/21/1970   
X 1224-26 St Philip St. $33,200 3/9/1971  ♦ 
3-A 1228 St Philip St. 
$16,275 10/5/1970   
2 1230 St Philip St. 
1 1232-34 St Philip St. $15,325 10/22/1970   
Undesignated 926-28 N. Liberty St. $16,500 9/25/1970   
20 922 N. Liberty St. $12,000 10/5/1970   
19 918-20 N. Liberty St. 
$53,400 11/30/1970   5 914-16 N. Liberty St. 
7 1231-33 Dumaine St. 
pt 10 908 N. Liberty St. $16,000 10/5/1970   
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Sq 138 Undesignated 1225-27 Dumaine St. $36,000 12/29/1970  ♣ 
       
Square 
147 
1-B 1300 St Philip St. $25,000 12/14/1971 X  
Undesignated 1304-06 St Philip St. $15,000 10/27/1970   
4-B 1308-10 St Philip St. $14,000 10/9/1970   
4 1312-14 St Philip St. $19,550 11/23/1970   
5 1318-20 St Philip St. 
$135,000 11/23/1970   C 1325 Dumaine St. 
X 1321 Dumaine St. 
Undesignated 1322-24 St Philip St. $17,000 10/5/1970   
A 1332-34 St Philip St. $175,000 1/28/1971   
B 928 Marais St. $13,000 12/14/1970   
8 924 Marais St. $10,000 2/22/1971   
7-A 920 Marais St. $13,000 11/13/1970   
pt 6 918 Marais St. $8,000 12/15/1970   
A 1331 Dumaine St. $23,000 9/18/1970   
B 1329 Dumaine St. $26,000 12/14/1970   
5 1315 Dumaine St. $37,500 11/23/1970   
10-A 1309-11 Dumaine St. $36,000 12/29/1970   
Undesignated 1305-07 Dumaine St. $37,500 11/15/1970   
Undesignated 1301 Dumaine St. $17,000 10/8/1970   
3-A 911-13 N. Liberty St. 
$26,000 11/23/1970   
4-A 915 N. Liberty St. 
2 919-21 N. Liberty St. $12,375 10/27/1970   
21 923-25 N. Liberty St. $33,200 3/9/1971  ♦ 
2 927-29 N. Liberty St. $11,000 2/17/1971   
1-A  $11,000 10/8/1970   
       
Square 
148 
1 1300-02 Dumaine St. $33,000 3/11/1966   
1 1306-08 Dumaine St. $16,500 3/10/1966   
2 1312-14 Dumaine St. $26,500 3/11/1966   
5-B 1318-20 Dumaine St. $21,125 2/11/1966   
5-A 1322-24 Dumaine St. $14,200 3/10/1966   
6 1332 Dumaine St. $39,175 3/18/1966   
6-B 828-30 Marais St. $12,000 2/11/1966   
7 822 Marais St. $16,500 2/18/1966   
pt 7 818 Marais St. $6,750 3/10/1966   
A 812-14 Marais St. $12,000 5/27/1966   
1 1331-33 St Ann St. 
$31,200 2/25/1966   
2 or B 1327-29 St Ann St. 
1 1321-25 St Ann St. $22,000 4/29/1966   
2 1317-19 St Ann St. $24,750 3/4/1966   
3 801-03 N. Liberty St. $55,000 4/21/1966   
4 805-07 N. Liberty St. $13,150 8/29/1966   
5 809-11 N. Liberty St. $14,125 2/11/1966   
6 815-17 N. Liberty St. $23,045 6/17/1966 X  
19 819-21 N. Liberty St. $19,400 3/17/1966   
20 823 N. Liberty St. $13,000 3/4/1966   
B 827 N. Liberty St. $18,000 3/24/1966   
A 831-33 N. Liberty St. $24,000 3/10/1966   
       
Square 
167 
Undesignated 1401-03 Orleans St. $22,500 3/21/1966   
2 1405-07 Orleans St. $13,250 5/4/1966   
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Square 
167 
2 
1409-11 Orleans St., 
1408-10 St Ann St. 
$73,000 7/26/1966 
 
 
3 1419-21 Orleans St.  7/26/1966   
3 1423-25 Orleans St. $1,500.60 3/11/1966   
2  
$39,500 8/24/1966 
 
 1  
6 1430-32 St Ann St. 
5 1426-28 St Ann St.  $10,000 2/25/1966   
Undesignated 1424 St Ann St. 
$9,175 7/14/1966   
4 1422 St Ann St. 
10 or B 1416-18 St Ann St. $10,200 5/26/1966   
B 1406 St Ann St. 
$19,500 7/29/1966 X  
A 1400-02 St Ann St. 
       
Square 
168 
Undesignated 1405-07 St Ann St. $16,000 10/27/1966 X  
Undesignated 1409-11 St Ann St. $19,400 7/8/1966 X  
Undesignated 1415 St Ann St. $11,600 10/24/1966 X  
9-A 1417-19 St Ann St. $15,500 11/9/1966   
6 1425 St Ann St.  5/24/1966 X  
5 1427-29 St Ann St. $14,500 3/24/1966   
1 
1431-33 St Ann St., 
806-10 N Villere St. 
$16,000 3/10/1966   
2 814-16 N Villere St. $15,000 7/18/1966 X  
2 or 8 818-20 N Villere St. $14,000 3/25/1966   
1-A 822-24 N Villere St. $12,600 3/4/1966   
22 826-28 N Villere St. 
$35,857 2/25/1966   23 830-32 N Villere St. 
Undesignated 834 N Villere St. 
Undesignated 1428 Dumaine St. $16,500 2/25/1966   
Undesignated 1422 Dumaine St. $37,200 3/3/1966   
Undesignated 1414-16 Dumaine St. $14,122 2/25/1966   
E 1410-12 Dumaine St. 
$37,500 7/14/1966   15 1400-02 Dumaine St. 
16 827-29 Marais St. 
Undesignated 1408 Dumaine St. $6,800 3/3/1966   
Undesignated 823-25 Marais St. $13,500 3/3/1966   
5 819-21 Marais St. $13,000 7/14/1966   
Undesignated 815-17 Marais St. $14,500 3/10/1966   
20 811 Marais St. $21,000 1/25/1967 X  
       
Square 
169 
1 
1432 St Philip St.,     
936 N Villere St. 
$24,000 10/8/1970   
B 923-34 N Villere St. $11,000 10/22/1970   
Undesignated 926-28 N Villere St. $11,000 11/16/1970   
1 922-24 N Villere St. $29,000 9/25/1970   
2 918-20 N Villere St. $18,000 3/8/1971   
A 916 N Villere St. $12,000 10/22/1970   
Undesignated 910 N Villere St. 
$21,000 9/18/1970   
pt 4 1431-33 Dumaine St. 
Undesignated 1427-29 Dumaine St. $15,850 10/8/1970   
A 1423-25 Dumaine St. $21,250 9/18/1970   
B 1421 Dumaine St. $40,500 10/8/1970   
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Square 
169 
4 or C 1415 Dumaine St. $12,000 10/8/1970   
Undesignated 1409-11 Dumaine St.  4/22/1971   
Undesignated 1405-07 Dumaine St. $15,000 11/24/1970   
15 
1401-03 Dumaine St., 
913-15 Marais St. 
$12,000 10/23/1970   
X 919 Marais St. $14,000 12/15/1970   
Undesignated 921 Marais St. $17,000 11/23/1970   
2-B 923-25 Marais St. $18,000 10/23/1970   
3D 927-29 Marais St. 
$36,000 12/29/1970   
3C 931-33 Marais St. 
3A 
935 Marais St.,      
1400-02 St Philip St. 
3B 1404-06 St Philip St. 
4-A 1410 St Philip St. $11,750 12/15/1970   
24 1414 St Philip St. $9,000 11/23/1970   
A 1418-20 St Philip St. $16,000 5/14/1971   
Undesignated 1422-24 St Philip St. $11,300 12/14/1970   
D 1426-28 St Philip St. $13,000 11/30/1970   
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Appendix 7.1 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Medical Center of Louisiana at 
New Orleans Site.
1
 
 
Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
433 
C 1709-11 Tulane Ave. $56,000 5/5/2011   
13 1731 Tulane Ave. 
$190,449 3/11/2011 X 
 
14 1725 Tulane Ave.  
15 1727 Tulane Ave.  
16 1729 Tulane Ave.  
A  113,218 4/27/2011 X  
17  
$97,000 3/16/2011 X 
 
18   
3 251 S. Claiborne Ave. 
$98,000 3/23/2011 X 
 
4 253 S. Claiborne Ave.  
11 1728 Palmyra St. $34,500 4/21/2011 X  
A 1705 Tulane Ave. 
$116,500 4/28/2011 X 
 
B 1701 Tulane Ave.  
2, 3, 4, 5, 
7, 8, 9 
1714-1722 Palmyra St. $104,500 4/29/2011 X  
10, 12, 13, 
14, B 
310-14 S. Derbigny St 
1724 Palmyra St. 
1734 Palmyra St. 
$95,000 5/24/2011 X  
       
Square 
434 
14, 15 1729 Palmyra St. $11,300 6/8/2010   
15, 16, C,  
D-1, E, F 
1722-30 Cleveland Ave 
221 S. Claiborne Ave. 
216-22 S. Derbigny St. 
$235,345 10/11/10 X  
C, D 209-11 S. Claiborne Av $80,000 9/28/2010   
26 1723 Palmyra St. $433,449 10/18/2010  ♦ 
12 228-30 S. Derbigny St. $4,700 10/11/2010 X  
A, B, C 
201 S Claiborne Ave. 
1708 Cleveland Ave 
$119,000 2/15/2011 X  
E 213 S. Claiborne Ave. $43,350 2/10/2011   
4, 5 227 S. Claiborne Ave. $42,500 2/15/2011   
G 1716 Cleveland Ave. $135,000 11/9/2010   
14, 15 1729 Palmyra St. $198,827 3/9/2011  † 
19, 21, 28, 7  $18,600 3/31/2011 X  
14 1718 Cleveland Ave $33,500 2/15/2011   
2, 3  $13,700 4/4/2011 X  
       
Square 
435 
 1732 Canal St.  10/18/2010 X  
       
Square 
436 
26, 27, 28 1813-19 Cleveland Ave $175,094 5/13/2010   
2 127 S. Derbigny St. $37,966 10/7/2010 X  
X 1801 Cleveland Ave $18,848 2/15/2011 X  
11, 12, 13, A 
1820-24 Canal St. 
120 S. Roman St. 
$446,456 3/1/2011 X  
                                                 
1
 Orleans Parish Conveyance Records 
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
436 
(cont.) 
13, 14, 15 1830-34 Canal St. $279,657 2/23/2011   
29, A 1805-11 Cleveland Ave $55,000 2/23/2011   
X 131 S. Derbigny St. $23,391 3/17/2011 X  
14, 15, A, B 122-26 S. Roman St. $91,563 9/28/2010   
11, 16 
1838 Canal St. 
127 S. Roman St. 
$25,496 3/21/2011 X  
28, 4, 8-B, E 1806 Canal St. $772,157 2/10/11   
       
Square 
437 
Undesignated 1836 Cleveland Ave $18,700 5/18/2010   
12 1822 Cleveland Ave $33,400 10/7/2010 X  
16, 21 
1837 Palmyra St. 
228-30 S. Roman St. 
 10/19/2010 X  
17, 18, 28, 29, 
30, A 
216-18 S.Roman St. 
219 S. Derbigny St. 
$550,600 10/29/2010 X  
R 211 S. Derbigny St. $4,250 10/29/2010 X  
24 1827 Palmyra St. $138,600 2/14/2011   
11, 13, 14, 15 
1826-34 Cleveland Ave 
210-12 S. Roman St. 
$118,612 2/23/2011   
10, B, 11 1812-20 Cleveland Ave $90,600 2/23/2011   
7, S 1800-04 Cleveland Ave $41,000 2/25/2011   
25 1823 Palmyra St. $65,000 3/21/2011   
A 1808-10 Cleveland Ave $35,700 4/8/2011 X  
24 1827 Palmyra St.  3/9/2011   
23 1829-31 Palmyra St. $180,000 3/29/2011   
       
Square 
438 
23 1809 Tulane Ave. $65,000 2/22/2011   
B 1805-07 Tulane Ave $82,000 3/11/2011 X  
16, 17, 18 1831-35 Tulane Ave $365,000 3/11/2011 X  
E 1829 Tulane Ave $46,000 3/21/2011   
15, A 
1837 Tulane Ave 
318 S. Roman St. 
 4/25/2011 X  
2 
1800-02 Palmyra St. 
313 S. Derbigny St. 
 5/24/2011 X  
       
Square 
466 
6, 7  1910-12 Palmyra St. $13,400 1/25/2010   
C 307. Roman St. $6,400 1/25/2010   
1 301 S. Roman St. $49,202 7/27/2010   
25, 26, 27, A, 
B, C 
1901-09 Tulane Ave. 
315-19 S. Roman St. 
$3,277,150 2/17/2011 X  
8, 9 1914-16 Palmyra St. $42,880 3/21/2011   
B, 21 
1933 Tulane Ave 
318, 330 S. Prieur St. 
$118,734 3/11/2011   
4, 5, 6 311-13 S. Roman St. $272,946 3/28/2011   
2, 3 303-05 S. Roman St. $83,000 5/3/2011   
10, 11, 12, 13, 
17, 18, 24,  
pt. 9, A, A-1, 
A-2, B, C, D 
1919-39 Tulane Ave. 
314-24 S. Prieur St. 
1918-38 Palmyra St. 
 5/19/2011   
       
Square 
467 
C 1931 Palmyra St. $7,500 1/25/2010   
C 228 S. Prieur St. $4,600 1/25/2010   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
467 
(cont.) 
18 218 S. Prieur St. $165,000 4/22/2010   
17 216 S. Prieur St. $240,297 6/2/2010   
B 1926-28 Cleveland Ave $330,000 10/7/2010   
25, A, B, D 
1921-27 Palmyra St. 
1933, 1939 Palmyra St. 
$433,449 10/18/2010  ♦ 
1, 2, 3, A, B, 
24, 28 
1901-13 Palmyra St. 
223, 231 S. Roman St. 
$360,000 10/28/2010 X  
26 1919 Palmyra St. $6,935 10/27/2010 X  
C 1915-17 Palmyra St. $200,000 2/15/2011   
11, A 1918-24 Cleveland Ave $49,000 2/23/2011   
29, 30 217-21 S. Roman St. $84,000 2/28/2011   
19, 20, A, B 
1932-38 Cleveland Ave 
220-22 S. Prieur St. 
$883,214 3/28/2011   
       
Square 
468 
P-1 
1837-39 Cleveland Ave 
130-36 S. Prieur St. 
$131,985 5/13/2010   
14, 15, 6, 7, D 1900 Canal St. $2,000,000 1/27/2011   
A 1905-07 Cleveland Ave $198,260 2/14/2011   
13, 14, 15 1926-34 Canal St. $535,000 2/28/2011 X  
B 128 S. Prieur St. $25,272 2/28/2011   
18 118 S. Prieur St. $40,843 2/25/2011   
23 1927 Cleveland Ave $21,211 2/25/2011   
B, 27 
1909-11 Cleveland Ave 
1917 Cleveland Ave 
$62,000 2/25/2011   
22 1933-35 Cleveland Ave $198,827 3/9/2011  † 
29, 30 122-26 S. Prieur St. $84,613 3/14/2011   
16 1936 Canal St. $461,100 3/9/2011   
A, B 1919-23 Cleveland Ave $65,252 3/15/2011   
       
Square 
469 
19, 20, B, C 
2024-30 Canal St. 
126 S. Johnson St. 
$825,705 3/11/2011 X  
X 116 S. Johnson St. $94,500 3/9/2011   
A 2020 Canal St. $203,975 3/21/2011   
22-B 2035 Cleveland Ave $34,100 3/25/2011 X  
A, B 2032 Canal St. $325,000 4/1/2011   
A 2014 Canal St. $246,000 5/26/2011   
17, 23, 24 2023-31 Cleveland Ave $106,000 5/26/2011   
       
Square 
470 
X 220-22 S. Johnson St. $214,000 10/13/2010 X  
33, X 2014-20 Cleveland Ave $55,000 10/14/2010 X  
13-D, 14-C 2030 Cleveland Ave $401,652 9/28/2010   
B, C, P 
215-21 S. Prieur St. 
2008-10 Cleveland Ave 
$433,449 10/18/2010  ♦ 
7 2024 Cleveland Ave $164,000 11/9/2010   
16-A 2038-40 Cleveland Ave $120,000 2/10/2011   
15-B 2034-36 Cleveland Ave $89,000 2/28/2011 X  
A 2000-02 Cleveland Ave $160,000 3/1/2011   
17 216 S. Johnson St. $61,000 3/14/2011   
A 223-25 S. Prieur St. $331,457 3/28/2011   
Y 224-26 S. Johnson St. $190,000 4/7/2011   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
470 
(cont.) 
1, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 30, A, B, 
C, Undesig. 
236 S. Johnson St. $2,430,000 6/14/2011   
16-C 212 S. Johnson St. $8,000 6/17/2011   
       
Square 
471 
10, 11, 12, 14, 
16, 17, 17-B, 
19, 2, 20, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 9, A, B, 
C, D, E, F 
2008-26 Palmyra St. 
2032-38 Palmyra St. 
312-22 S. Johnson St. 
315-29 S. Prieur St. 
2001-05 Tulane Ave 
2017 Tulane Ave 
$2,400,000 3/25/2011 X  
9 2028-30 Palmyra St. 0 6/7/2011   
       
Square 
520 
30-B 2107-09 Banks St. $84,000 11/12/2010 X  
1 2010 Banks St. $368,272 3/11/2011   
10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 2, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 
27, 28, 29, 4, 
5, 7, 8, 9,  
B, C 
2111-19 Banks St. 
2131 Banks St. 
2100-14 Palmyra St. 
304-28 S. Galvez St. 
315-29 S. Johnson St. 
$4,450,000 3/25/2011 X  
25, 26 2121 Banks St. $345,000 3/11/2011   
3 325 S. Johnson St. $178,000 3/28/2011   
       
Square 
521 
9, 18 2110  Cleveland Ave $10,000 1/25/2010   
A 240 S. Galvez St. $20,293 3/25/2010   
31 236 S. Galvez St. $8,104 3/25/2010   
16, 26 226 S. Galvez St. $165,300 6/4/2010   
A, B 223-27 S. Johnson St. $20,118 6/9/2010   
Undesignated 2118 Cleveland Ave $43,226 7/19/2010   
1, 17, 18, 2 230-32 S. Galvez St. $200,000 10/14/2010   
Y 2104 Cleveland Ave $185,000 10/14/2010   
15 224 S. Galvez St. $106,177 10/12/2010 X  
19 2114 Cleveland Ave $130,000 10/18/2010   
25 2105 Palmyra St. $14,405 10/26/2010 X  
23 2113 Palmyra St. $62,640 10/26/2010 X  
24 2107-09 Palmyra St. $14,185 10/27/2010 X  
13, 20, 21, 5 
2119-21 Palmyra St. 
217-21 S. Johnson St. 
$140,000 10/27/2010 X  
25 2115 Palmyra St. $70,470 10/26/2010 X  
20 2123 Palmyra St. $290,000 11/12/2010 X  
1 
2101-03 Palmyra St. 
237 S. Johnson St. 
$197,000 9/20/2010   
19 2127 Palmyra St. $171,800 2/14/2011   
8 2106-08 Cleveland Ave $140,000 3/2/2011   
W 213 S. Johnson St. $10,000 2/28/2011   
X 2100-02 Cleveland Ave $37,800 2/25/2011   
14, 24, 
Undesignated 
200-20 S. Galvez St. 
2122 Cleveland Ave 
$517,100 5/5/2011   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date Expropriation  
Square 
522 
5, 6, 7, 8, A, 
B, C, 1, 10, 
11, 13, 14, 2, 
3, 4, 8, 9 
2115 Cleveland Ave.  10/18/2010 X  
2, X, Y 
2100 Canal St. 
121-25 S. Johnson St. 
$550,000 3/17/2011   
12, 13 2109 Cleveland Ave. $195,000 4/25/2011   
1, 14 
2105 Cleveland Ave. 
133 S. Johnson St. 
$375,000 4/25/2011   
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Appendix 7.2 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Veterans Administration Medical 
Center Site.
1
 
 
Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
523 
5, 6 2216-18 Canal St. $500,000 4/26/2010   
23 
2201-03 Cleveland Ave 
127-29 S. Galvez St. 
$130,848 5/18/2010   
1, 2, 3, 4 2200-12 Canal St.  7/9/2010 X  
Undesignated, 
5, 6, 7, 9-A, 
10, 11, 12, K, 
L, R, X 
2220-26 Canal St. 
2205-33 Cleveland Ave 
122-26 S Miro St. 
121 S. Galvez St 
 7/22/2010 X  
8 125 S Galvez St. $235,151 8/6/2010   
14, 15, 
Undesignated, 
Undesignated 
2201-03 Cleveland Ave 
127-33 S Galvez St. 
$1,500 9/27/2010 X  
       
Square 
524 
21 229 S. Galvez St. $95,000 4/22/2010   
B 232-34 S Miro St. $227,051 4/22/2010   
20, A, B, S 
233-37 S. Galvez St. 
2211-13 Palmyra St. 
$141,415 5/27/2010   
F, F-1, G 217-19 S. Galvez St. $267,000 6/23/2010   
3 2208-10 Cleveland Ave $160,927 7/1/2010   
1, 10, 11-A, 
12, A 
2225-29 Palmyra St. 
218-40 S. Miro St. 
$151,500 7/16/2010 X  
5, 6, 9   7/22/2010 X  
Undesignated 201-05 S. Galvez St.  7/22/2010 X  
4, 14, 15 228-30 S. Miro St. $295,010 8/5/2010 X  
4 2212 Cleveland Ave.  8/23/2010 X  
E 223 S. Galvez St. $223,532 8/23/2010 X  
7 2224 Cleveland Ave $141,933 8/30/2010 X  
pt. 16, 17 2217-19 Palmyra St. $229,150 8/30/2010   
A, B 200-08 S. Miro St. $38,250 8/25/2010 X  
18-A 239-41 S. Galvez St. $244,552 8/31/2010   
D 227 S. Galvez St. $29,150 9/1/2010   
8 2226-28 Cleveland Ave $37,900 10/18/2010   
       
Square 
525 
11 321 S. Galvez St. $210,000 2/26/2010   
A 310-12 S Miro St. $135,000 4/16/2010   
1, 2 300-02 S Miro St. $40,000 4/5/2010   
5 2216 Palmyra St. $169,600 5/20/2010   
C 2213-15 Banks St. $225,000 5/27/2010   
X 2209-11 Banks St. $210,000 6/15/2010   
22 314-16 S Miro St. $187,728 7/19/2010   
3 2224 Palmyra St.  7/22/2010 X ♦ 
A 309 S. Galvez St. $50,000 7/29/2010 X  
K 325-27 S. Galvez St. $238,140 8/4/2010 X  
                                                 
1
 Orleans Parish Conveyance Records 
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
525 
(cont.) 
14 2217 Banks St. $47,000 8/13/2010   
X, Y 2205-07 Banks St. $200,000 8/4/2010   
10 319 S. Galvez St. $54,568 8/20/2010   
7 305-07 S. Galvez St. $18,150 8/30/2010   
pt. 8, 9 311-13 S. Galvez St. $162,000 8/31/2010   
6 
2212-14 Palmyra St. 
301-03 S. Galvez St. 
$110,000 8/30/2010   
4 2220 Palmyra St. $150,000 8/24/2010 X  
16, 17, 2 2223-27 Banks St.  8/30/2010 X  
Undesignated 
2201-03 Banks St. 
331-37 S. Galvez St. 
 9/7/2010 X  
21 318-20 S. Miro St. $220,762 9/7/2010 X  
15 2221 Banks St. $230,000 9/20/2010   
7 305-07 S. Galvez St. $18,150 9/14/2010 X  
1, 1-L, 19 
2231 Banks St. 
330 S. Miro St. 
 10/19/2010 X  
20 322-24 S. Miro St. $43,000 10/20/2010   
       
Square 
526 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, C 2231 Tulane Ave. $230,000 8/23/2010 X  
A, B 
2201-09 Tulane Ave 
349 S. Galvez St. 
2202 Banks St. 
$230,000 8/23/2010 X  
       
Square 
549 
A 
2337-39 Tulane Ave. 
414 S. Tonti St. 
$45,299 8/11/2010 X  
5, 6-A 2319-21 Tulane Ave.  8/23/2010 X  
7 2323 Tulane Ave. $82,000 8/25/2010   
8, B 
408-12 S. Tonti St. 
2327 Tulane Ave. 
$241,200 8/13/2010 X  
1, 2, 3, 4 2301-09 Tulane Ave. $697,858 8/23/2010 X  
       
Square 
550 
4 2322 Palmyra St. $38,960 5/19/2010   
D 323-25 S. Miro St. $42,600 6/23/2010   
A 315 S. Miro St. $140,628 7/14/2010   
7 2314 Palmyra St. $239,624 7/19/2010   
1, A, X, 10, 
11, 9, 
Undesignated 
2335-37 Banks St. 
318-20 S. Tonti St. 
$138,590 7/20/2010 X ♣ 
5, 6 2320 Palmyra St. $162,645 7/27/2010   
Undesignated 2321-23 Banks St. $379,318 7/28/2010   
11 2330 Palmyra St. $14,230 8/5/2010 X  
2 
2338 Palmyra St. 
310 S. Tonti St. 
 8/23/2010 X  
17 2315-17 Banks St. $443,795 8/25/2010   
B 2307-09 Banks St. $404,854 8/25/2010   
18 2311-13 Banks St. $72,413 8/25/2010   
1A 2300 Palmyra St.  8/26/2010 X  
1 2332-34 Palmyra St. $73,736 8/13/2010 X  
B, C 2325-27 Banks St. $189,510 8/13/2010 X  
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
550 
(cont.) 
X 329 S. Miro St. $143,357 8/26/2010 X  
29 319-21 S. Miro St.  9/1/2010 X  
6 2316 Palmyra St. $350,083 8/31/2010   
A 2301-03 Banks St.  9/10/2010 X  
2A 2310 Palmyra St. $147,515 10/11/2010 X  
1, 11, 2 314 S. Tonti St. $88,824 10/11/2010   
       
Square 
551 
7 2322-24 Cleveland Ave $295,000 2/26/2010   
M 2336-38 Cleveland Ave $65,000 4/21/2010   
33 218-20 S. Tonti St. $65,000 6/16/2010   
H 2328-30 Cleveland Ave $220,000 7/1/2010   
6 2318-20 Cleveland Ave $150,000 7/19/2010   
23, 24 227-29 S. Miro St.  7/22/2010 X ♦ 
42 2310-12 Cleveland Ave $250,000 7/27/2010   
25, 26, 27 219 S. Miro St. $28,080 8/3/2010 X  
24 or 25 223 S. Miro St.  8/5/2010 X  
8 2326 Cleveland Ave. $280,000 8/5/2010   
1, 2 201 S. Miro St. $265,000 8/11/2010 X  
Q 2333-35 Palmyra St.  8/10/2010 X  
17, 18 2319-21 Palmyra St. $230,000 8/20/2010   
43 2314-16 Cleveland Ave $70,192 8/25/2010   
21, 22 2305 Palmyra St. $45,000 8/26/2010 X  
7 2323 Palmyra St. $250,000 8/31/2010   
pt. 22, 23 2301-03 Palmyra St. $82,000 8/31/2010 X  
16 2327 Palmyra St. $6,655 8/27/2010 X  
1, Q, 
Undesignated 
2339 Palmyra St. $140,057 8/27/2010 X  
19 2313 Palmyra St.  9/1/2010 X  
3, 4 228-30 S. Tonti St. $51,000 8/28/2010   
19 2317 Palmyra St.  9/10/2010 X  
5 224 S. Tonti St. $143,068 7/16/2010   
B, B-1 212-14 S. Tonti St. $226,512 9/15/2010   
R 2329 Palmyra St.  10/25/2010  ‡ 
       
Square 
552 
1, 2, 3, 21-A,  
2300 Canal St. 
 
 7/22/2010 X  
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 
16, 17, 18 
2324-30 Canal St. 
2317 Cleveland Ave 
$3,942,000 8/23/2010   
19, 5-A 
2322 Canal St. 
2313-15 Cleveland Ave 
 10/5/2010 X  
       
Square 
553 
Full Square 2400 Canal St.  3/11/2010 X  
       
Square 
554 
C, D 2410-14 Cleveland Ave $72,500 12/7/2009   
B 2415 Palmyra St. $120,000 6/16/2010   
H 2400 Cleveland Ave $198,000 7/1/2010   
13 218 S. Rocehblave St. $33,000 7/1/2010   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
554 
(cont.) 
28 223 S. Tonti St. $40,000 7/9/2010   
23 2411 Palmyra St. $233,000 7/9/2010   
1, 2 213 S. Tonti St. $176,000 7/28/2010   
6 2418-20 Cleveland Ave $165,000 8/5/2010   
25 2405 Palmyra St. $236,000 8/5/2010 X † 
14 222 S. Rocheblave St. $15,000 8/11/2010 X  
1, 2 2402 Cleveland Ave $36,000 8/11/2010 X  
29, 30 217 S. Tonti St. $164,304 8/20/2010   
20 2423-25 Palmyra St.  8/19/2010 X  
7 2422 Cleveland Ave  8/19/2010 X  
15 224-26 S. Rocheblave  8/23/2010 X  
19 2427-29 Palmyra St.  8/13/2010 X  
26, 27 
2401 Palmyra St. 
227 S. Tonti St. 
$173,000 8/26/2010 X  
21, pt. 22 2419-21 Palmyra St. $136,000 8/30/2010   
8 2426 Cleveland Ave.  8/31/2010 X  
9 2430 Cleveland Ave. $164,520 9/8/2010   
11 2436-38 Cleveland Ave  9/7/2010   
5 2416 Cleveland Ave. $136,000 9/15/2010   
10 2434 Cleveland Ave. $140,000 10/11/2010 X  
24 2407-09 Palmyra St. $116,259 10/4/2010   
12 214 S. Rocheblave St.  10/20/2010 X  
       
Square 
555 
28 325 S. Tonti St. $39,500 11/12/2009   
27-B 327 S. Tonti St. $8,300 11/12/2009   
6A 2420 Palmyra St. $124,000 3/5/2010   
30 319 S. Tonti St. $135,000 3/9/2010   
7-A 2422-24 Palmyra St. $248,000 4/16/2010   
4 2412 Palmyra St. $37,000 4/19/2010   
C 2421-23 Banks St. $178,000 4/23/2010   
B 2415-17 Banks St. $42,000 5/20/2010   
8 2426 Palmyra St. $127,000 6/2/2010   
31 317 S. Tonti St. $105,000 6/29/2010   
32 313 S. Tonti St. $274,763 6/30/2010   
27 2401-03 Banks St. $138,590 7/20/2010 X ♣ 
5 2414 Palmyra St. $125,000 7/27/2010   
1 2400 Palmyra St. $110,000 7/29/2010   
16 328 S. Rocheblave St. $13,929 8/5/2010 X  
2 2404 Palmyra St. $156,407 8/5/2010 X  
26 2405-07 Banks St. $236,000 8/5/2010 X † 
pt. 12 314-16 S. Rocheblave $114,000 8/20/2010   
15 324 S. Rocheblave St. $74,000 8/23/2010 X  
9, 11 2434 Palmyra St. $230,000 8/26/2010   
A 2411-13 Banks St. $160,000 8/30/2010   
29 323 S. Tonti St. $36,500 8/31/2010 X  
H, F 2433-35 Banks St. $268,109 10/15/2010   
14 320-22 S. Rocheblave $13,500 10/13/2010   
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Lot Number Address 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Acquisition 
Date 
Expropriation  
Square 
555 
(cont.) 
D 2425-27 Banks St.  10/21/2010   
25, 3, A 
2409 Banks St. 
2408 Palmyra St. 
 10/25/2010  ‡ 
       
Square 
556 
Full Square 2401 Tulane Ave $52,285 2/25/2011 X  
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Vita 
 
Jared E. Munster was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, and has lived in the Greater New Orleans 
area all his life. He graduated in the class of 2000 from Archbishop Shaw High School in 
Marrero, Louisiana, a suburb of New Orleans. 
 
Jared earned his Bachelor of Science in Urban Studies and Planning from the College of Urban 
and Public Affairs at the University of New Orleans in 2004. While an undergraduate at UNO, 
Jared was elected Student Government President, and served in that role for the 2002 – 2003 
academic year. He also served in the University Senate and on the University Athletic Council as 
a Student Representative. Additionally, he served as a student member of the University of New 
Orleans International Alumni Association’s Board of Directors from 2002 – 2004. 
 
Jared attained his Master of Urban and Regional Planning from the University of New Orleans in 
2006.  While a graduate student, Jared held an internship with the Planning Department of the 
City of Sanford, Florida during the summer of 2005. He was also awarded a Mayoral Fellowship 
with the City of New Orleans for the 2006 – 2007 academic year.  After completing his 
fellowship, Jared remained with the City of New Orleans as a full-time employee, and worked 
with the City Planning Commission before taking his current position as Assistant Zoning 
Administrator in the City’s Department of Safety and Permits. 
 
After attaining his Master’s degree, Jared entered directly into the Doctorate in Urban Studies 
program in the School of Urban Planning and Regional Studies at the University at New Orleans, 
and will earn his Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Studies in December of 2012. 
 
He currently lives in the Gentilly Terrace neighborhood with his husband, Brandon Robb, and 
their cats, Gingerbread, Dodecanesel and Dreidel. 
